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1Introduction -^ * ^ f
We currently witness a heightened concern over the natural environment. Although
problems of pollution and resource depletion are not new, the accumulation of long-
lived pollutants and rapid extraction of depletable resources are a major cause for
concern. Whether current growth paths will destroy life-supporting functions of the
natural environment in an important way and will cause the economy to run out of
natural resources in the foreseeable future is unclear. There is much uncertainty about
these issues, and there will continue to be uncertainty about the consequences of en-
vironmental change and the exact nature of environment-economy relationships. We do
know, however, that the possible impact of the build-up of pollutants and depletion of
natural resources can be great or even dramatic.
In the debate over environmental degradation, two totally different views stand
out: that the current environmental problems are caused by 'too much' technology and
that we must adapt to the perceived environmental crisis by radically changing our
behaviour, or that the problem is one of 'not enough' technology, in the sense that we
need more environmentally benign technologies that preserve the natural environment.
Whether technology will save us — to use a popular phrase — is unclear. This will
depend on public and private support for environmentally beneficial technologies and
the extent to which further growth in population and economic output will compromise
per capita emissions reductions and a more efficient use of natural resources.
Understanding the change process in technology, and how technological change
may be redirected towards more environmentally benign directions, is of great impor-
tance in designing efficient policies for environmental protection. As Adam Jaffe and
Robert Stavins write: ,. .,, . .^. . . . .. .'_ . , .. .,., ....
In the long run, the development and wide-spread application of new technologies
can greatly ameliorate what, in the short run, sometimes appears to be overwhelm- ".'.'
ing conflicts between economic well-being and environmental quality.'
- ' • • - • ' : i . » • - ' > ; • ;
Or, as Allen Kneese and Charles Schultze wrote almost twenty years ago: '•*-
• •*?
• * " * • • • ; < • • • ! * •
' Adam B. Jaffe and Robert N. Stavins, 1990, Evaluating the Relative Effectiveness of Economic
Incentives and Direct Regulation for Environmental Protection: Impacts on the Diffusion of Tech-
nology, paper for the WRI/OECD-Symposium "Toward 2000: Environment, Technology and the New
Century", June 13-15,1990, Annapolis, Maryland, p.l .
• j
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• Over the long run, perhaps the most important single criterion on which to judge
;. , environmental policies is the extent to which they spur new technology toward the
efficient conservation of environmental quality.*
How various environmental policy approaches (taxes, tradeable pollution permits,
subsidies, information supply) affect the decisions of economic agents to develop and
use more environmentally benign technologies is the main subject of this study.
1.1 P r o b l e m a n d R e s e a r c h M e t h o d s ' ^ w ? ^m, hv .-jr-,acv
The use of the natural environment as a common property resource with a low or zero
price, especially in its role as a recipient of environmentally hazardous emissions and
waste, enables individual polluters to shift the environmental costs to others, including
future generations. In this context, technical change is induced to favour the use of
common property resources, a result formally worked out by Kerry Smith (1972) and
Roger McCain (1978).^  Government intervention is mostly needed to make sure that
polluters reduce their environmentally hazardous emissions to socially more efficient
levels.
This raises the question of how public policy may be used to redirect technical
change toward more environmentally benign directions. For example, are environmental
regulations a good way to promote technological innovation and diffusion of environ-
mentally prefereable technologies? Or are incentive-based policies, such as pollution
taxes, subsidies and tradeable quota, a better way to foster environmentally benign
technical change? These issues will be examined in this thesis. How will this be done?
This is an important question, because the research method chosen may have an impor-
tant bearing on the results.
Within the economics of technological change there are two relatively well-devel-
oped approaches: the neoclassical approach in which the decision to develop and adopt
a new technology is seen as an economic cost-benefit decision under uncertainty, and the
evolutionary or Neo-Schumpeterian approach, which builds on the work of Joseph
Schumpeter. Each approach has its own virtues and weak points. The advantage of
neoclassical economics is that it is based on simple assumptions about economic behav-
iour. A rise in the price of an input, or a tax on pollution, will cause firms and house-
holds to economize on the use of the input, or to reduce pollutant emissions. In neoclas-
sical models, economic actors are not constrained by cognitive limitations, by their
technological capabilities, by institutional constraints (or even laws of nature) to respond
* Allen V. Kneese and Charles L. Schultze, 1975, PoMutfon, Prices and PuWic Po/icy, Washington,
p.82.
' V. Kerry Smith, 1972, The Implications of Common Property Resources for Technical Change,
European Economic Review, 3(4): 469-479; and Roger A. McCain, 1978, Endogenous Bias in Technical
Progress and Environmental Policy, American Economic Rroirai, 68: 538-546.
/nfroducfton ?$
to changes in the price and demand structure. By making these (heroic) assumptions
about human behaviour it is possible to derive theorems and test economic relationships.
The apparatus is well-developed and may be applied to almost any problem. Economists
have used this method to analyze and compare firm incentives for innovation in pollu-
tion control technology under different control regimes.
*' For some problems, however, the neoclassical model is less appropriate. For
instance, if we want to understand radical change in technology or technological regime
shifts, where an important part of the technological system and the social and
organisational context changes, the neoclassical world of perfect information (or
probabilistic uncertainty) and optimisation is less appropriate. As each technological
regime implies different technical interrelationships, linkages with information networks,
different engineering skills and practices, and all kinds of institutional changes, a differ-
ent type of approach is needed — an approach that looks at the ways in which innova-
tions are technically and economically linked, and that considers the ways in which
institutions (economic, social and political) shape and limit economic decisions and
technological choice. In such a case, the evolutionary or Neo-Schumpeterian model of
technological change — developed by Richard Nelson, Sidney Winter, Chris Freeman,
Luc Soete, Giovanni Dosi, Stan Metcalfe and Jerry Silverberg — is more appropriate.''
Central to economic evolutionary theory is that optimal behaviours and technol-
ogies cannot be determined ex ante on the basis of economic calculus but are selected ex
posf in the selection environment — they are selected ex post by the evolution of social
needs, the actions of other firms and organizations, new discoveries in technology and
science, and government interventions, much more than they are selected by the choices
of economic actors that look into the future. It shares with biological evolution theory
the distinction between variation and selection. In the economic world, variations are
inventions (or technological innovations) that are selected or not selected (taken up) by
the market. It differs from biological evolution theory in that the variations are generated
by the deliberate choices of economic actors rather than by a stochastic process, although
chance often plays a role. Another difference is that the selection environment is influ-
enced and altered by firms' activities and strategies. This means that in the economic
world the feedbacks between variation and selection are less mechanistic than in the
biological world; there are goals and intentions and there is learning, organisation and
* Neo-Schumpeterian and evolutionary approaches to technology are put together in Giovanni
Dosi, Chris Freeman, Richard Nelson, Gerald Silverberg and Luc Soete (eds.), Tec/mica/ Change and
Economic TTieory, London: Pinter Publishers. A more recent book is Paolo Saviotti and Stan Metcalfe
(eds.), 1993, Epo/ufionary Tteones 0/Economic and Techno/ogica/ Change, Reading: Harwood Academic
Publishers. Classical works in the evolutionary tradition are Thorstein B. Veblen, 1898, Why is
Economics Not an Evolutionary Science?, Quarfer/y /ourna/ 0/ Economics, 12: 373-397; Joseph A.
Schumpeter, 1939, Business Cyc/es. /4 TTieorefica/, Historice/, and Sta<is<ica/ /Ina/ysis 0/ the Captto/isf
Process, 2 vols, New York: McGraw-Hill; Kenneth E. Boulding, 1978, Ecodynamks. /I New 77jeory 0/
Soctefa/ Eoo/ution, Beverly Hills, London: Sage Publications; and Richard R. Nelson and Sidney G.
Winter, 1982, An Epo/w/ionan/ TTieory 0/Economic C/wnge, Cambridge (Mass.): Bellknap Press;
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strategies.* In this study, the evolutionary model will be applied to the problem of
technological regime shifts. As in most studies, the term 'evolutionary' will be used in a
rather loose sense; it refers to a process of gradual and cumulative change along certain
paths or trajectories, in which a change in the selection environment may cause the
system to develop into a new direction, i.e., there is path-dependency and there are
bifurcations. That is, in this study, the evolutionary terms of variation and selection will
not be used much; instead, we will talk about the co-evolution of technology and the
socio-economic context from which it emerges and focus on the importance of institu-
tions and technical and economic relationships in the rate and direction of technological
change. This means that our approach is closer to the more 'institutional' approach to
technology of Richard Nelson, Chris Freeman, Giovanni Dosi and Luc Soete, than to the
'evolutionary modelling' approach of Jerry Silverberg and Bart Verspagen.'
This thesis will use neoclassical notions and tools and ideas from evolutionary
theory. To some extent, we will combine the two approaches. For instance, in developing
our own neoclassical models of innovation and diffusion of environmentally beneficial
technologies we have sought to bring in more realistic elements of technology develop-
ment and application in the whole discussion — while keeping the theoretical analysis
manageable. Examples of such refinements are, in the innovation models: the introduc-
tion of regulator uncertainty about the technical feasibility and economic costs of pol-
lution control policies, the distinction between (curative) end-of-pipe technologies and
(preventive) process-integrated technology, and the introduction of time in the analysis.
In our diffusion model, consumer preferences are not held constant but may shift over
time, the purchase costs and variable costs of using the new technology may change (in
part as a result of policy interventions), and post-innovation improvements may enhance
the attractiveness of the innovation. Although the models are still recognizable as neo-
classical models, there are 'enriched' with evolutionary elements. In our discussion of
technological regime shifts, we introduce neoclassical elements of rational choice and
optimization, things that are neglected in the evolutionary model that assumes that firms
apply rules of thumb and are unable to respond adequately to changes in the demand
and cost structure. In diffusion studies, we will both estimate a rational choice model
and epidemic models that are more evolutionary in nature. The use of different research
methods also enables us to analyze the robustness of the results of the technological
impact of policy instruments. .
* A discussion of the evolutionary paradigm and technical change is in Chris de Bresson, 1987,
The Evolutionary Paradigm and the Economics of Technological Change, /ourna/ 0/ Economic Jssues,
21(2): 751-762; and in Chris Freeman, 1991, Innovation, Changes of Techno-Economic Paradigm and
Biological Analogies in Economics, Reoue Economiaue, 42(2): 211-232. i,,;-',-: .< v^- j ,-<-;;
' Examples of evolutionary models of technical change are Gerald Silverberg, Giovanni Dosi and
Luigi Orsenigo, 1988, Innovation, Diversity and Diffusion: A Self-Organisational Model, Economic
/ounw/, 98: 1032-1054; and Bart Verspagen, 1993, Trade and Knowledge Spillovers in an Evolutionary
Model of Growth Rate Differentials, in Adolf Wagner (ed.), Dezentra/e Erttecteidungs/ina'ung
n, Tubingen: Franke verlag.
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As a last general point, we want to stress that this study is not confined to environ-
mental technology in a narrow sense, as either a pollution control device, re-use system
or an environmentally improved product. Although the innovation and diffusion pro-
cesses of such devices and products will be studied in the following chapters, the project
will move beyond these types of environmental technologies by also looking at the
possibilities of achieving shifts in technology systems. Examples of shifts in technology
systems that may bring considerable environmental benefits are: a switch away from
hydrocarbon-based energy supply, conversion and end-use technologies (toward renewa-
bles and vehicles powered by batteries or fuel cells), or the replacement of car commuter
traffic by interactive telecommunication systems. Thus, the thesis will also explore the
broader question of how complex technology systems evolve and change, and how
public policy may be used to induce and sustain a shift towards more environmentally
sustainable technological regimes.
We will now define the subject of this thesis in more detail. The aims of this thesis are
threefold:
'*»• i) to analyze and compare the effects of various pollution control instruments
(emission standards, effluent charges, subsidies, tradeable pollution per-
"*^*' "';" mits) on mnorafion in pollution control technology;
- ii) to analyze the effects of different policy approaches to limiting environ-
' *'• • mentally hazardous emissions on the dijfj'usion of environment-saving pro-
i ' *- cesses and products;
"* iii) to examine the problem of technological regime shifts. ' • '^ '• ; y^ *;
Problem i) will be analyzed in neoclassical innovation models. Problem ii) will be ana-
lyzed in a rational choice diffusion model and two econometric studies. The technologi-
cal impact of environmental policies will furthermore be examined in three case studies.
The problem of technological regime shifts will be studied from an evolutionary or Neo-
Schumpeterian perspective.
1.2 Outline''-'•"'"^••'•.-^"'**•• ^ ^ T * ' ^ •••
This thesis consists of three parts and a concluding chapter. Part I contains theoretical
models of the impact of pollution control instruments on the development and diffusion
of environmentally preferable technologies. Part n presents the results of empirical
investigations of the technological impact of environmental policies. It contains empirical
results from statistical tests of the impact of policy instruments (effluent charges and
investment subsidies) on the technological diffusion of biological waste-water treatment
plants and thermal home insulation in the Netherlands. It also contains a literature
ft . C/wpfer I
review of empirical studies into the effects of past environmental policies on the devel-
opment and adoption of cleaner technologies and the findings of three case studies: CFC
substitutes, low-solvent paints and membrane filtration. Part IH analyzes the problem of
technological regime shifts; it looks at patterns in the evolution of technology and the
factors that account for continuity and discontinuity in technical change, and explores
how public policy may be used to induce a transition away from fossil fuels. We will
now give a short overview of the content of the different chapters.
Chapter 1 outlines the aims of the project and the research methods that are used. It also
provides a taxonomy of technical change (incremental and radical innovations, new
technology systems) and of environmental technology (end-of-pipe versus process-
integrated technology, clean and cleaning technology, etc.).
Chapter 2 gives a critical overview of the existing (neoclassical) theoretical litera-
ture about the relationship between environmental policies and innovation in pollution
control technology. The theoretical models are divided into two groups: first, the graphi-
cal models that analyze firm incentives for doing R&D in pollution control (where
innovation in pollution control is modelled as a downward shift of the marginal cost
curve of pollution abatement); and second, the micro-economic models of R&D in
pollution control.
Chapter 3 advances two models of government-induced innovation in pollution
control. The first model analyzes the R&D behaviour and abatement policy of a polluting
firm under different regulatory regimes (emission standards, taxes, subsidies, tradeable
quota). The innovator is a (myopic) polluter who tries to minimize current costs, which
consist of pollution abatement costs, R&D costs and transfer payments relating to pollu-
tant emissions. The second model is an extension of Nentjes' model of innovation in
pollution control. The model analyzes the effects of policy instruments on innovation in
a political economy model of regulator behaviour, in which the (risk-averse) control
agency maximizes a utility function which is a function of emission reduction, environ-
mental costs and uncertainty.
Chapter 4 contains an interpretative survey of technological diffusion models,
making a distinction between epidemic and rational choice diffusion models. In the
epidemic models, the aggregate diffusion pattern of a technological innovation is the
result of the epidemic spread of information through personal contact, whereas in the
rational choice (or equilibrium) diffusion models, the diffusion process is the result of
economic decision making by prospective adopters. In the rational choice models, the
diffusion process is caused by exogenous changes in the heterogeneous adopter environ-
ment (the obsolescence of capital goods, changes in input prices) and changes in the
technology, rather than the result of epidemic learning and bandwagon effects. The
reason for giving an overview of diffusion models is to find out what model is most
suitable for explaining the diffusion of technological innovations that conserve environ-
mental qualities.
Chapter 5 analyzes the diffusion of environmentally beneficial technological inno-
vations. It discusses two technological diffusion studies of environment-saving technolo-
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gies. The chapter also advances a f/zresfcoZd diffusion model with (epidemic) learning that
is used to analyze the impact of various policy instruments (taxes, subsidies, information
supply) on the aggregate diffusion pattern of a low-emission (or energy-saving) process
or product. The model is a rational choice model with (epidemic) learning.
;, Chapters 6 and 7 present the empirical findings of the threshold diffusion model
developed in chapter 5 and of three epidemic models (the logistic, Gompertz and Bass
models). The models are applied to the technological diffusion of biological waste-water
treatment plants in the Dutch Food and Beverage industry (chapter 6) and the diffusion
of double glazing and cavity wall insulation across owner-occupied and rented houses
built before 1976 in the Netherlands (chapter 7). The models allow us to determine
statistically the technological diffusion effects of effluent charges and investment sub-
sidies, which has not been attempted before. .,«?. v
Chapter 8 presents the findings of three case studies of cleaner technologies: i) CFC
substitutes, ii) low-solvent paints and coatings, and iii) membrane technology for the
metal-plating industry. The chapter examines the impact of government policies on the
development and adoption of environmental technologies in each of the case studies.
Chapter 9 gives a literature overview of the technological impact of past environmental
policies in the United States, the Netherlands and Denmark.
Chapter 10 examines the possibilities of inducing radical change in technology, as
opposed to modification of existing products and processes or adoption of end-of-pipe
technologies. It presents an overview of current understanding of the nature and direc-
tion of technological change, which emphasizes the notion of a system — i.e., that tech-
nologies should be seen as part of an integrated system of production and consumption
rather than as individual products or processes. It discusses various technology concepts
(like technological paradigms and regimes) that are used to account for the ordering and
structuring of technology, and provides an explanation as to why the 'greening of
technology' is likely to be a gradual and rather slow process, despite the strong public
call for it.
Chapter 11 discusses shifts in technological regimes as opposed to changes within
a technological regime — where a technological regime refers to the whole complex of
scientific knowledge, engineering practices, process technologies, infrastructure, product
characteristics, skills and procedures which make up the totality of a technology. Key
factors in inducing technological regime shifts are identified and discussed, using histori-
cal examples to illustrate theoretical arguments. It also examines the relationship
between radical change in technology and firm behaviour.
J • Chapter 12 examines the problem of how public policy may be used to begin and
sustain a transition away from the hydrocarbon regime, the energy system based on
fossil fuels. The final chapter draws conclusions about the technology effects of envi-
ronmental policies and about the best policy instrument(s) to foster innovation and
diffusion. , , ,,,.*.;..•:.,.*; ,.,.-..,-,-J.,-.„„.. ..,,,,:,-;. ,-..,.,, ....... .,-,; .,, . .... , :,., ,
In what respects is this study an original contribution to the existing literature? In our
view, the main contributions are: ^ ^ ,^  ."••'-,
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First, an extensive survey and discussion of existing micro-economic models about
regulation-induced innovation in pollution control. Our discussion of this literature is
critical in nature, not because we believe the models are of little value, but because they
neglect a number of important aspects of technological change and for not considering
the policy-making process in the context of technological uncertainty.
Second, the development of a theoretical model that describes a firm's R&D behav-
iour in pollution abatement under different control regimes and a further development
of Nentjes' model of regulatory behaviour and innovation in pollution control. Nentjes'
original model is extended by widening the range of policy instruments open to the
control agency (pollution taxes, tradeable permits instead of standards) and by including
technology features (sunk costs, end-of-pipe versus process-integrated technologies) in
the discussion.
Third, the development of a theoretical diffusion model for environmentally benefi-
cial technological innovations that enables us to analyze the technological impact of
pollution taxes, R&D subsidies and information dissemination on the aggregate diffusion
pattern of an environmentally desirable innovation. The technological diffusion of
environment-saving innovations is a seriously underresearched area.
Fourth, an empirical application of the new diffusion model and three epidemic
models to two types of environmentally beneficial technologies: biological waste-water
treatment plants in the Dutch Food and Beverage industry and thermal insulation (in the
form of double glazing and cavity wall insulation) of the existing housing stock (built
before 1976) to determine econometrically the impact of public policies and other vari-
ables on the aggregate diffusion pattern. -• * n ^u
Fifth, three case studies of environmentally beneficial technologies: CFC substitutes,
low-solvent paints and coatings and membrane filtration, with a focus on the technologi-
cal impact of government policies.
Sixth, a further refinement of the evolutionary model of technological change,
which views technical change as a cumulative and historically contingent process,
proceeding in quite specific directions, dependent on economic incentives, engineering
ideas and institutional structure. Here we discuss continuity and discontinuity in tech-
nological regimes, and how public policy may be used to achieve a swift and smooth
transition away from the existing energy regime based on fossil fuels as the primary
energy source, into a new regime for energy technologies, involving other energy
sources, conversion technologies and energy-using technologies.
1.3 Technology Definitions ""*
The previous sections outlined the aims, methods and organisation of the book. Impor-
tant concepts like innovation, diffusion, environmental technology were introduced
without an explicit discussion of what they mean in the context of this thesis. We will
now define several technology concepts that are used extensively throughout this study.
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In the study of technology, the following conceptual distinctions are common. First,
the distinction between technical change and technological change, between technique
and technology. A technique is a tangible method of production. Technology is the body
of knowledge about techniques, but it is frequently used to encompass both the knowl-
edge itself and the tangible embodiment of that knowledge/ Another distinction is that
between invention and innovation. Following Schumpeter, they are defined by Chris
Freeman in the following way: an muewtzon is an idea, a sketch or model for a new or
improved device, product, process or system; it is the elaboration of a new technical
principle. Inventions may often (though not always) be patented but they do not neces-
sarily lead to technical innovations (in fact the majority do not). An mnouafion in the
economic sense is accomplished only with the first commercial transaction involving the
new product, process, system, or device.*
At the basis of many if not most modern inventions lie research and development
activities that are undertaken in firms, government laboratories, and universities,
although they also may be the result of research by independent inventors. Commercial
new products and processes are commonly produced in firms, often but not always on
the basis of research and development activities; innovations invariably also involve
other, non-R&D activities such as prototype development, tooling up, design, market
research and so on. But what constitutes an innovation? Again closely following Schum-
peter, Stephen Kline and Nathan Rosenberg divide innovation in five categories: first, a
new or improved product, second, a new process of production, for example a com-
puter-numerically controlled (CNC) machine or the oxygen steelmaking process, third,
the substitution of a cheaper material, newly developed for a given task in an essentially
unaltered product, fourth, the reorganisation of production, internal functions, or dis-
tribution arrangements leading to increased efficiency, better support for a given prod-
uct, or lower costs, and fifth, an improvement in instruments or methods of doing inno-
vation.' !i-jS-'5:t-s• /,."_*•.% .. : '>; ;fjU! ;;..:• a:Y*SiV» '"!:3Jfl*i'iiSiTOr?(to<f t».:.r
In this study, the term innovation is primarily used for a new or improved prod-
uct, process or the use of a new or different material. That is, we concentrate on technol-
ogical rather than organisational or other (such as marketing) innovations. This does not
imply that the last two categories are unimportant or uncommon. The fourth category in
particular constitutes an important class of innovations being responsible for large cost
efficiencies. It is through organisational changes and other kinds of social innovations
that the welfare gains of the first three categories of innovations are often realised.
Invention and innovation constitute the first two stages of technological change.
The third stage of technological change is the difj'uszon stage: the adoption and use of the
' Chris Freeman, 1982, 77K Economics o/7ndus<ria/ /nnotwhon, 2nd Edition, London: Pinter Publish-
ers, p.4
'/bid, p.7. ;
' Stephen J. Kline and Nathan Rosenberg, 1986, An Overview of Innovation, in R. Landau and N.
Rosenberg (eds.), 77ie Posif/oe Sum Strategy, Washington D.C.: National Academic Press, p.279.
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new technology over time. The diffusion phase is very important from the viewpoint of
productivity and social welfare since it is adoption and implementation which gives the
innovation economic significance. Although the distinction between invention, innova-
tion and diffusion is important from a conceptual point of view, it should be noted that
the three stages are all strongly related. The invention determines largely the technical
characteristics of the innovation and the costs of producing it; the diffusion process is
highly contingent on the economic advantages offered by the innovation; and improve-
ments in the innovation often stem from user experience during the diffusion phase. We
return below to the significance of this inter-relatedness.
Up until now, innovations have being characterised in terms of their functions within the
productive system. For our purposes, another dimension of innovation is far more
important: the extent to which an innovation constitutes a radical departure from the
past. It is plain that there is a significant distinction to be made between technological
changes which modify and improve a technology based on an existing technical prin-
ciple, and changes which introduce an entirely new technology to an industry.
A common way of discussing this is in terms of "radical" versus "incremental"
innovations. Many students of technological change have come up with similar concepts
for the various types of innovations. Usher speaks of "epochal" and "secondary" inven-
tions; Mensch speaks of "basic innovations" instead of "radical innovations". Similarly,
Joel Mokyr speaks of microinventions and macroinventions. Microinventions are defined
as "the small incremental steps which improve, adapt, and streamline existing techniques
already in use, reducing costs, improving form and functions, increasing durability and
reducing energy and raw material requirements". Macroinventions are "those inventions
in which a radical new idea, without clear precedent, emerges more or less ab m7ri/o".'°
Mokyr further notes that "whereas in terms of sheer numbers microinventions are
far more frequent and from an economic point they account for most gains in product-
ivity, the importance of macroinventions in technological history is crucial (...) without
novel and radical departures, the continuous process of improving and refining existing
techniques would run into diminishing returns and eventually peter out"."
Freeman and Perez, like others, make a distinction between incremental and radical
innovations, but extend the notion of radicality into the area of social and economic
impacts" /ncremenfa/ innovations are relatively minor changes of processes and prod-
ucts that occur more or less continuously. They may often occur, not so much as the
result of deliberate R&D but stemming from experiences of engineers in the production
'" Joel Mokyr, 1989, Tu-enty-Ffw Centuries of Tec/mo/ogica/ Change: .An Historica/ Surrey, London:
Harwood Academic Publishers, p.7.
"/bid, p.7. •
" The following description of incremental and radical innovations and new technology systems
and techno-economic paradigms is taken from Chris Freeman and Carlota Perez, 1988, Structural
Crises of Adjustment, Business Cycles and Investment Behaviour, in Dosi rt a/., op cif., pp.45-47.
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process or as a result of initiatives and suggestions by users. They are frequently associ-
ated with scaling up of plant and equipment and quality improvements of products and
services. Although their combined effect is extremely important in the growth of prod-
uctivity, no single incremental innovation has dramatic effects.
Rodicfl/ innovations on the other hand are discontinuous events and in the modern
period are usually the result of deliberate R&D in enterprises and research activities in
university and government laboratories. They are unevenly distributed over sectors and
over time. Examples are nylon or 'the pill'. Over a period of decades they may have
dramatic effects, i.e., they do bring about structural change, but in terms of their aggre-
gate economic impact they are relatively small and localised, unless a whole cluster of
radical innovations are linked together.
When innovations are technically and economically linked, Freeman and Perez
speak of new fec/rwo/o^ y systems. Changes in technology systems affect several branches of
the economy and give rise to entirely new sectors. Their use often requires
organisational and managerial innovations. An example is the cluster of synthetic
materials innovations, petro-chemical innovations, machinery innovations in injection
moulding and extrusion, and innumerable application innovations introduced in the
1920s till the 1950s.
sfr When changes in technology systems have such pervasive effects that they affect
either directly or indirectly almost every other branch of the economy, Freeman and
Perez speak of a fec/mo-economzc paradigm (or technological revolutions). A techno-econ-
omic paradigm involves a combination of interrelated product and process, technical,
organisational and managerial innovations, embodying a quantum jump in potential
productivity for all or most of the economy and opening up an unusually wide range of
investment and profit opportunities. Such a paradigm imposes a unique new combina-
tion of decisive technical and economic advantages.
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) is an example of such a para-
digm which came to replace the paradigm of energy and material-intensive mass prod-
uction. The term "paradigm" is used to describe the radical transformation of the prevail-
ing engineering and managerial common sense for best productivity and most profitable
practice, which is applicable in almost any industry (i.e., it is a meta paradigm). Further,
each new techno-economic paradigm involves a particular input or set of inputs (the
"key-factor" of the paradigm) which fulfils the following functions: clearly perceived low
and rapidly falling relative cost, an almost unlimited supply over long periods, and a
dear potential for the use or incorporation of the new key factor or factors in many
products and processes throughout the economic system.
After this taxonomy of 'normal' technological change, we will now define environmental
technology. EnuironmenfaZ fec/ino/ogy may be broadly defined as each technique, process
18 CTwpfer 1
or product which conserves environmental qualities." Environmental qualities may be
conserved directly, through the treatment of pollution, re-use of waste material, and they
may be conserved in an indirect way by technologies and materials that are less environ-
mentally harmful than comparable processes, products and substances. Environmental
technologies may be grouped into four categories:'''
i) Pollution control technologies that prevent the direct release of environ-
mentally hazardous emissions into the air, surface waters or soil —
examples of such technologies are fluegas-desulphurisation and biofilters;
ii) Off-site re-cycling and treatment of waste — for instance the treatment of
effluent in collective waste-water treatment plants, the clean-up of polluted
soils and the upgrading of waste material by firms to make it suitable for
re-use;
iii) Process-integrated changes in production technology, input material
changes and good housekeeping that reduce the amount of pollutants and
waste material that is generated during production and diminish the usage
of environmentally harmful materials;
iv) Environmentally beneficial products like zero-emission motor vehicles, low-
solvent paints that are less damaging to the natural environment.
Pollution control technologies are also known as abatement technologies and as "end-of-
pipe" or "add-on" technologies for the reason that they are typically added to the prod-
uction. They are usually placed against process-integrated changes in production prac-
tices. Analogous to the distinction between "end-of-pipe" and "process-integrated" tech-
nology (which is at the firm level) a distinction can be made between c/ean technology
" Examples of environmental qualities are: pristine air, safe drinking and swimming water,
natural resources that are available for production, the beauty of the landscape, biodiversity, etc.
Environmental conservation is not something that should be pursued per se, i.e., at any cost. Whether
or not environmental qualities should be conserved depends on the economic valuation of these
qualities, which depends on people's preferences and wealth. It also depends on the importance of
environmental functions for our well-being and the possilibities for substitution that are available.
" Tweede Kamer, 1982, Mi/ieu en Tec/mo/ogie in Neder/and (Environment and Technology in the
Netherlands), Tweede Kamer zitting 1981-1982, 17386, nr.2, Den Haag, p.14. See also Jacqueline J.
Cramer and Johan Schot, 1989, Problemen rond innovatie en diffusie van milieutechnologie belicht
vanuit een technologie-dynamica perspectief (Problems of innovation and diffusion of environmental
technology from a technology dynamics perspective), paper for the workshop "Ontwikkeling en
implementatie van milieutechnologie", Utrecht, 12 sept 1989; OECD, 1985, Enpironmenfai Po/icy and
Tec/mica/ C/iange, Paris; Nicholas Ashford, 1993, Understanding Technological Responses of Industrial
Firms to Environmental Problems: Implications for Government Policy, p.277, in Enw'ronmenta/
Strategies ybr /ndwsfry: /Hternafiona/ Perspectives on Research Needs and Po/icy /mp/icafions, edited by Kurt
Fisher and Johan Schot, Washington D.C.: Island Press.
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and c/rawm^ technology. Clean technology consists of process-integrated production
changes that prevent pollution or reduce the use of environmentally harmful materials,
of recycling technology and of cleaner consumer products. Cleaning technology consists
of end-of-pipe technology and clean-up technology like waste-water treatment plants
and municipal waste facilities. Clean technology is preventive whereas cleaning technol-
ogy is curative." A more detailed overview of pollution prevention techniques is in
Figure 1.1.
It must be noted that environmental technologies — even pollution prevention techniques
— are not environmentally benign in the strict sense of the word. The manufacturing and
operation of environmental technologies requires scarce material inputs and (usually
fossil-based) energy; their application leads to waste problems, both at the time of their
operation and at the end of their service life. The determining feature of an environ-
mental technology is that it emits less than comparable products or processes or that
emissions and waste material from manufacturing are treated in such a way that the
resulting waste stream causes less environmental damage. Thus, also environmental
technologies have adverse environmental effects and one may object for good environ-
mental reasons against the adoption of particular environmental technologies (especially
against end-of-pipe technologies that commonly give rise to environmental waste prob-
lems). Of course, the net impact on the natural environment must be positive, otherwise
there is little sense in making polluters adopt such devices.
This is also the main reason why the term "environmental technology" will not be
used much in this study. In the following chapters we will usually speak of enuironmen-
to/Iy desirabZe (or pre/erabZe, enuironmenf-sauing or -/Wend/ier) technologies, or speak of
c/eaner technologies. The latter categories are also broader than "environmental tech-
nology". For instance, a train is considered an environmentally desirable technology
(compared to automobiles or airplanes) whereas it is not regarded as an environmental
technology. Sometimes we use the term CTiwronmenta/Zy susfamaWe fec/ino/ogzes (or sus-
tainable technologies) when the environmental impact is so low that their application
does not pose an environmental hazard.
** The distinction between different types of environmental technology is not always clear: waste
material captured by end-of-pipe technologies may be used as an input, add-on technologies some-
times require changes in the production process or input substitution, etc. In this respect, Hartje and
Lurie argue that the distinction between end-of-pipe and process-integrated technologies should not
be considered a dichotomy but rather as a "continuum of technical change" (Volkmar J. Hartje and
Robert L. Lurie, 1984, Adopting Rules for Pollution Control Innovations: End-of-Pipe versus In-
tegrated Process Technology, International Institute for Environment and Society (HUG), Wissen-
schaftszentrum Berlin, p.6). Similarly, Mensink e< a/ speak of a "sliding scale of prevention" (AJ.
Mensink, C.H.A. Quarles van Ufford, J.M.M. Veeken, 1988, Naar een prevenrief milieubeleid: onder-
zoek naar belemmeringen en mogelijkheden van preventie bij de houtconserverings- en galvanische
industrie, (Towards preventive environmental policies: A study into the barriers of and opportunities
for prevention in the Wood-Preservation and Metal-Plating industries, Nijmeegse Milieukundige
Studies nr.l, KUN, Nijmegen, p.l).
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REDUCTION AT
SOURCE:
Changes to process and
product
PRODUCT CHANGES
- Product substitution
- Product conservation
- Change in product
PRODUCTION PROCESS
CHANGES
- Material purification
- Material substitution
- Use of less environmentally
harmful raw materials
Process changes
Equipment, piping, or layout
changes
Automation
Changes in operational
settings
Procedural measures
Prevention of emissions
Management
Waste stream segregation
Material handling
improvement
Logistics
ON-SITE
RECYCLING
OFF-SITE
RECYCLING
USE AS RAW MATERIAL
- Return to original process
— Raw material substitute
for another process
MATERIAL RECOVERY
- Processed for resource
recovery
- Processed as by-product
USEFUL APPLICATION
lid;
Figure 1.1. Techniques for the prevention of waste and emissions. Source: Dieleman
and de Hoo (1993, p.250).
Table 1.1 gives an overview of the environmental technologies that are investigated in
this study. It demonstrates that the study covers all kinds of environmentally beneficial
technologies across different adopter populations.
Technology
'• end-of-pipe
"• Process-integrated
*• Prorf«cf changes
•• product reformulation
"• product substitution
Firms/
organisations Adopter population
Consumers
Waste-water treatment
systems (Chapters 6 and 8)
CFC-recycling (chapter 8)
Membrane technology (Chapter 8)
systems
Overview of technology studies in this study
CFC-free aerosols and refriger-
ators (Chapter 8) ^
Low-solvent paints (Chapter 8)
dermal home insulation
-ewable-intensive energy system (Chapter 12)
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A Critical Survey of Innovation Models
in Pollution Control
There is a considerable literature that analyzes economic properties of pollution control
instruments. Such studies can be placed in one of three broad groupings: 1) static effi-
ciency analyses of pollution control instruments, 2) political/regulatory feasibility assess-
ments of policy instruments; and 3) the impact of pollution control instruments on
technological change.' Most studies are concerned with the static efficiency of pollution
control instruments and — to a lesser extent — the political feasibility of various regula-
tory regimes. How different environmental policy instruments influence innovation in
pollution control is a relatively neglected area of research.* This neglect is surprising,
because most economists would probably agree with Adam Jaffe and Robert Stavins that
the effect of public policies on the process of technological change may, in the long
run, be among the most significant determinants of success and failure in environ-
mental protection.'
It is thus important to know the differential technological innovation effects of policy
instruments for environmental protection. To analyze the relationship between environ-
mental policies and innovation in pollution control, several models have been developed,
starting with Richard Zerbe's article in 1970.* This chapter sets out to give a (critical)
overview of the different theoretical models of government-induced innovation in
pollution control.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 1 describes the most important models
about the impact of environmental policy instruments on technological innovation in
pollution control. A distinction is made between the models that analyze firm incentives
for innovating in pollution control and the R&D models. Section 2 compares the differ-
' Scott R. Milliman and Raymond Prince, 1989, Firm Incentives to Promote Technological Change
in Pollution Control, /ourna/ of Enpironmenfa/ Economr'cs and Management, 17, p.249.
' Paul B. Downing and Lawrence J. White, 1986, Innovation in Pollution Control, /ourna/ o/
EnpironmCTifa/ Economics and Management, 13, p.18.
* Jaffe and Stavins, op ci/., p.l.
* Richard O. Zerbe, 1970, Theoretical Efficiency in Pollution Control, Western Economic /ourna/, 8:
364-376.
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ent innovation models. It examines the assumptions that underlie the models and
explores the implications of a relaxation (or rejection) of these assumptions. As the title
of this chapter indicates, our assessment of this literature is critical. The theoretical
models are viewed critically, not because we believe that the models are of little value,
but because they neglect a number of important aspects of technical change and environ-
mental policy such as innovator gains from diffusion, and problems of uncertainty and
lack of information, which are central elements in the regulator-innovator relationship.
The final section summarizes the main findings.
2.1 Models of Innovation in Pollution Control
Policy instruments aimed at limiting environmentally hazardous emissions can be
divided into three categories: First, instruments of direct regulation like emission reduc-
tion standards, technology standards, product standards or bans. Second, incentive-based
instruments (pollution fees or taxes, subsidies, tradeable pollution permits) that rely on
price incentives. And third, communicative instruments such as information supply and
moral suasion. Environmental protection may also be achieved through government
investment (in the form of municipal waste treatment plants and reforestation) and the
choice of administrative mechanisms (administrative unit, enforcement).'
The theoretical literature on the relationship between policy instruments and
innovation in pollution control falls into two categories: first, graphical models that
analyze firm incentives for innovation in pollution control, and second, R&D models of
innovation in pollution control. Examples of the first category are Zerbe (1970), Wenders
(1975), McHugh (1985), Downing and White (1986) and Prince and Milliman (1989).'
Examples of the second category are Magat (1978; 1979) and Mendelsohn (1984)7 The
distinction between these two types of models is not a sharp analytical distinction. Both
models assume optimisation within a partial context. R&D behaviour could be intro-
duced in the graphical models through a cost function for R&D. . . . . . . ,
* An overview of environmental policy approaches is in William J. Baumol and Wallace E. Oates,
1979, Economics, Enpirownenfa/ Po/icy ami the Q""''ty qfLi/e, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, pp.218-
219.
' Zerbe, op cif; John T. Wenders, 1975, Methods of Pollution Control and the Rate of Change in
Pollution Abatement Technology, Wafer Resources Research, 11(3): 393-396; Richard McHugh, 1985, The
Potential for Private Cost-Increasing Technological Innovation Under A Tax-based Economic Incen-
tive Pollution Control Policy, Land Economics, 61(1): 58-64; Downing and White, op cif; and Milliman
and Prince, op cit.
' Wesley A. Magat, 1978, Pollution Control and Technological Advance: A Dynamic Model of the
Firm, Journa/ 0/ Enpironmenta/ Economics and Management, 5: 1-25; Wesley A. Magat, 1979, The Effects
of Environmental Regulation on Innovation, Law and Contemporary ProWems, 43(1): 4-25; Robert
Mendelsohn, 1984, Endogenous Technical Change and Environmental Regulation, /ourna/ 0/Environ-
ments/ Economics and Management, 11: 202-207. , .-pjiosro
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2.1.1 TTie ^rap/itca//irm mce«ftz;e mode/s *« « siiLo,n no:: smart; ins
The grapical firm incentive models set out to assess firm incentives for innovation in
pollution control under different regulatory regimes. Firm incentives for innovation in
pollution control are measured as the cost savings in firm abatement costs. These cost
savings are in three forms: 1) direct costs of abatement (equipment expenses, operating
costs); 2) associated transfer losses (payments made by the firm such as emission taxes);
and 3) associated transfer gains (payments made to the firm, such as emission subsidies
or patent royalties)'. Except for the model of Milliman and Prince (1989), firm incentives
for innovating in pollution control are analyzed only for a polluting firm. The innovation
is firm-specific and only to be used by the innovating firm to reduce its pollutant
emissions. In the analyses, firm incentives for promoting technological change across
regulatory regimes are compared and ranked. The central idea behind such analyses is
that the cost savings under the different regulatory regimes are indicative for the prob-
ability that innovation in pollution control will occur. ?rWiN^<;=/•>!.:;»
Two types of approaches are used within the "firm incentive" literature; those that
assume speci/ic cost functions for pollution control (before and after innovation), as in
Wenders (1975), Mendelsohn (1984) and McHugh (1985), and those that use £CTieraI cost
functions, as in Zerbe (1970), Downing and White (1986) and Milliman and Prince
(1989).' Innovation in pollution control is modelled as a downward shift in the marginal
cost curve of emission reduction — not just for some inframarginal units of control.'"
Polluters are profit maximizers, which means that the polluting firm will pursue innova-
tions at the margin up to the point at which the marginal gains are equal to the marginal
costs of innovation. In the models, the regulator is assumed to possess perfect knowl-
edge about the marginal conditions (the marginal cost curves and the damage function),
which allows it to realize the socially optimal amount of emission reduction (before and
after the innovation is available).
The basic model is presented in Figure 2.1. MC (or M Q R ) is the firm marginal cost
curve of emission reduction and MD is the marginal damage curve of emission reduc-
tion (which mirrors the social gains from emissions reductions). The marginal cost curve
of controlling emissions is usually assumed to be upward sloping at an increasing rate (
c^MC / d<f > 0 where <? is emission reduction). M C is the new marginal cost curve for
abatement. The socially optimal outcome is where the marginal costs of emission reduc-
' Milliman and Prince, op eft, p. 251.
' The term "general" for the second type of models is somewhat misleading. The general cost
functions for pollution abatement have certain mathematical properties (such as positive first and
second derivatives with respect to abatement output). The general models, do not, however, assume
an explicit mathematical expression (such as a quadratic function) for the (marginal) cost function of
pollution abatement. Since firm incentives for innovation are determined through graphical analysis,
they may be also referred to as "graphical models".
'° The latter is analyzed in McHugh, op rif, the results of which will be discussed later in this
chapter.
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tion are equal to the marginal social value of emission reduction, which is at the inter-
section point of MC and MD before innovation (and of MC and MD after the innova-
tion).
*>.«.« a- r i •
50 100
emission reduction (ER)
Figure 2.1. Marginal costs and benefits curves from emission reduc-
tions. Source: Downing and White (1986)
2.2.2.1 Tne genera/ /irm incentive mode/s '
The general firm incentive models of innovation in pollution control do not assume a
specific mathematical expression for the marginal cost curve of pollution abatement
(before and after innovation). They do, however, assume a few properties of the mar-
ginal cost functions of pollution abatement: that it is continuous and upward sloping (
3MC / 3<7 > 0 where <j is emission reduction). We will discuss the two most comprehen-
sive models in the general firm incentive literature, that of Downing and White (1986)
and that of Milliman and Prince (1989), which both extend the model of Zerbe (1970).
Downing and White's model «•>?•;<• 1 i J
The model of Downing and White (1986) analyzes the effects of four pollution control
methods (effluent fees, emission control subsidies, marketable permits, and direct regula-
tion) in three contexts. First, the situation where the marginal conditions are not changed
(i.e., the reduction in the polluter's emissions can be valued at the existing social value
of emissions reductions). Second, the situation where the innovation changes marginal
conditions, but the control authority fails to adjust. And third, the case where innovation
changes marginal conditions and the control authority adjusts properly (which is
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referred to as "rate/iefiwg"). In all cases, it is assumed that the innovating polluter correct-
ly predicts the reactions of the government authority and bases his innovation decisions
o n t h a t p r e d i c t i o n . • r t > i " - \ i * <<**>'•;••;; - v . -; • '-, . H ' v - A \ i s •. > . - • • • ; - , *?»?&
Two important properties of the regulatory regimes are investigated: first, the
incentives for innovation in pollution control, and second, the "dynamic efficiency" of
these incentives. Dynamic efficiency refers to the efficiency of the allocation of resources
fl/*er the innovation.
The first situation — in which the innovation does not change marginal conditions
— applies when the polluter in question is just one among a large number of emitters of
the pollutant, so that any reduction in this polluter's emissions can be valued at the
existing social value of emissions reductions, P,, which is also the optimal effluent fee.
This situation is illustrated in Figure 2.2.
A
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Figure 2.2. Marginal costs and benefits from
emission reductions. No change in marginal condi-
tions. Source: Downing and White (1986, p.2O).
Under the effluent fee system, a profit-maximizing polluter, contemplating emissions
control after the innovation, would pursue control to the point where the marginal cost
of control per unit equals the effluent fee per unit — i.e., a control level of OD. At that
point, the gains to the polluter from the innovation are the sum of the cost reduction at
the previous control level (O/1B), plus the reduction in effluent fee payment (.AEDC), less
the extra control costs incurred (BEDC). Thus, the net gains to him are QAE. Thus, the
innovator gains are equal to the social benefits from innovation. The polluter will pursue
innovation to the point of ARD = AOAE, where RD is the R&D costs.
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It can be shown quite easily that an emission reduction subsidy equal to P, and a
marketable emission permit sold at P, give results identical to those of the effluent fee:
the gains to the profit-maximizing polluter are OAE." Firm incentives for innovation
under direct regulation are different however. Under a regime of direct regulation, the
profit-maximizing polluter, contemplating pollution control after the innovation, would
have no incentive to increase the level of control, as long as the regulatory level of
allowed emissions does not change. Thus, emissions would remain at the level C/, and
the gains to the polluter from the innovation would be only the cost savings at the
existing level of control, OAB. Since the private gains in this case, OAB, are less than the
social benefits, QAE, there will be instances — those in which CMB < RD < O/\£ — where
the profit-maximizing polluter will fail to adopt innovations that are socially desirable.
In the second context, depicted in Figure 2.3, where the innovation changes mar-
ginal conditions (when the social value of emissions reductions is no longer P, but Pj)
but the control authority fails to adjust, we obtain the following results. Economic
instruments encourage too much innovation and emissions control and direct regulation
provides too few incentives for innovation.
<;.c "re:.U-'> O -
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Figure 2.3. Marginal costs and benefits from emission reductions
where the innovation changes marginal conditions. Source: Down-
ing and White (1986, p.24).
The reason for this overencouragement of innovation is that the social value of subse-
quent emissions reductions above C/ are worth less to society than P, when the marginal
" The gains to the polluter are cost savings OJ4B, plus the extra revenues from the subsidies or
the sale of excess permits (A£DC), less the extra costs of control (BEDC).
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damage curve is downward sloping. This conclusion is reached under that assumption
that the innovation is specific to the innovation polluter and cannot be transferred to any
other polluter.
In the third context, where the innovation changes the marginal conditions and the
pollution control authority makes the socially appropriate adjustments ("ratcheting") the
results are somewhat different from those in the second situation. Optimal agency
response implies that the effluent fee or the emission reduction subsidy are lowered
from P, to Pj or that the number of marketable permits is reduced to G/. In the case of
ratcheting, the effluent fee again causes an excessive amount of innovation. This excess-
ive incentive arises because the decreases in inframarginal effluent fee payments are
transfers from a social perspective but provide an incentive for the innovator. The excess
incentive is muted somewhat if there are other polluters, who reduce their emissions in
response to the lower fee.
In contrast, ratcheting results in too little innovation under the regimes of emission
reduction subsidies and marketable permits. This is due to the reduction in revenues
from subsidies and from selling permits. Direct regulation also provides too little incen-
tives, just as in the two other situations. Again, this deficiency arises because of the
inadequate reflection of the social gains from emissions reduction in the incentive struc-
ture of the polluter subject to direct regulation. Reactive regulation of this kind provides
even less incentive for innovation than do the nonreacrive regulations.
The effects on innovation of the four methods of pollution control, in the three
contexts, are summarized in Table 2.1. The consequences for emissions control are
summarized in Table 2.2.
effluent fees subsidies marketable direct regulation
permits
No change in marginal
conditions
Change in marginal
conditions; no ratcheting
Change in marginal
conditions; ratcheting excessive
optimal optimal
excessive excessive
deficient
optimal deficient
indeterminate deficient
deficient deficient
Table 2.1. Incentives for innovation under various pollution control arrangements. Source:
Downing and White (1986, p.28)
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No change in marginal
conditions
Change in marginal
conditions; no ratcheting
Change in marginal
conditions; ratcheting
effluent fees
optimal
too high
optimal
subsidies
optimal
too low
optimal
marketable direct
permits
optimal
indeterminate
optimal
regulation
too high
too high
optimal
Table 2.2. Emissions levels under various pollution control arrangements.
Source: Downing and White (1986, p.28)
Mt7/f'man and Prince's model
The model of Milliman and Prince (1989) extends Downing and White's model and that
of Zerbe (1970) in several ways. First, they assess firm incentives to promote the entire
process of technological change: innovation and technological diffusion. Thus, their
model analyses incentives for pollution control innovations in a multi-firm setting in
which non-innovating firms may adopt a discovery, which in turn may require regula-
tory control adjustment in order to maintain optimal efficiency conditions for abatement.
Second, the model considers five regulatory regimes: direct control, emission subsidies,
emission taxes (fees), free marketable permits and auctioned marketable permits (Down-
ing and White only considered the first four regimes). Third, their analysis assesses
incentives to promote optimal agency response via political lobbying or information
withholding, for both innovating and non-innovating firms. And finally, the authors
examine technological change incentives for both non-patented and patented innova-
tions, and for innovations which occur outside the polluting industry.
The model assumes a large number (N) of identical firms in a competitive industry,
each discharging a homogenous emission into a body of water, air or land. In addition,
it is assumed that the regulator possesses perfect information on current abatement
technology, but lags in perceiving a discovery and political pressures prevent the regula-
tor from imposing optimal agency response prior to the completion of diffusion.
The model of Milliman and Prince is depicted in Figure 2.4. Total industry
emission per time period, £, is the regulatory control variable. It has a maximum (unreg-
ulated) value of E™, and is initially set at the socially optimal rate of E\ MD and MC are
the industry marginal damages and abatements costs associated with incremental
changes in E. Innovation (step 1) initially shifts the industry marginal cost curve for
abatement from MC to MC, generating social gains equalling area £""v4JB at the original
level of control; diffusion (step 2) shifts this curve still further to MC", creating addi-
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tional gains of area £™BC; and optimal agency response (step 3) reduces the emission
level from £' to £**, with additional gains equalling area G4D.
$/E
Higher emissions
Emission/Time
Lower emissions
Figure 2.4. Social gains from technological change in pollution
control. Source: Milliman and Prince (1989, p.248).
Milliman and Prince go to great pains in assessing and ranking firm incentives to pro-
mote technological change in pollution control for polluting innovators, non-innovators,
and outside suppliers under two appropriability regimes: with and without patent
protection, before and after optimal agency control — for all five regulatory regimes. We
will briefly discuss their findings, by looking at the results and the rationale behind
them.
The first case that Milliman and Prince consider is that of a non-patented innova-
tion (for which the innovator cannot receive royalties), which is developed by a polluting
firm. When there is no diffusion of the innovation and no agency response, the results
are equal to those of Downing and White. Direct control leads to smaller cost savings
than incentive-based regimes (which all cause equal cost reductions).
The ranking of firm incentives for the innovator however changes when the non-
patented innovation is adopted by other firms. Then the auctioned permits yield higher
cost savings due to the lower permit price (the innovating firm has to buy permits),
whereas the free permits system results in a (relative) loss to the firm because diffusion
reduces revenues from selling permits by driving the permit price down. Under the
other regimes, diffusion of the non-patented innovation causes no change in the cost
savings for the innovator. All non-innovators that adopt the innovation benefit from cost
savings, with auctioned permits providing the highest cost savings. „ „ , „„ ,,,,.^
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The effects of optimal agence response are also analyzed in the model. Optimal
agency response imposes industry losses under all regimes, except for emission taxes.
This is because optimal agency response reduces the emission tax rate, while under the
other regimes optimal agency response means tighter emission standards, lower sub-
sidies, and fewer permits. Hence, the emission tax regime is the only policy which
encourages firm promotion of control adjustment. When the potential innovator looks
across the entire process of technological change (including optimal agency response),
only emission taxes and auctioned permits clearly generate abatement cost reduction for
non-patented innovations (under the other regulatory regimes this is uncertain).
The model furthermore analyzes the situation of patented innovation, in which the
innovator receives a set percentage of all cost reductions accruing to non-innovators
from patent use, including any beneficial changes in transfer gains or losses. For the
innovating polluter the rankings are similar to those obtained in the absence of a patent,
with auctioned permits and emission taxes providing incentives that are equal to or
better than those associated with the other regimes. However, in the regimes other than
emissions subsidies, the non-innovators may oppose control adjustment whereas the
innovator favours such a step.
The (patented) innovation may also be supplied by an outside supplier instead of
a firm in the polluting industry. When the innovator is an outside supplier firm, diffu-
sion rankings are similar to previous results. In this case, however, control adjustment is
favoured by the outside firm innovator under direct control and free permits, may be
opposed with auctioned permits, and is definitely opposed under emission taxes. In
contrast to the results for an industry innovator, overall innovator gains from the entire
process of technological change are unambiguously positive for under all regimes, as the
outside firm earns patent royalties without paying any direct costs or transfer payments.
A summary of relative rankings and the attitudes of innovators and non-innovators
towards optimal agency response is given in Table 2.3. It shows that relative rankings
under emission taxes and auctioned permits are equal to, or higher than, rankings under
direct controls, free permits, and emission subsidies in all cases, except for control
adjustment with a non-industry innovator. Moreover, only emission taxes and auctioned
permits clearly reward positive gains to an industry innovator from the entire process of
technological change (see Table 2.2). Thus, the analysis suggests that emission taxes and
auctioned permits are better facilitators of technological change.
As regards to the question: "Which regime is more attractive from the vantage
point of dynamic efficiency, emission taxes or auctioned permits?", the authors note that
emission taxes have the important advantage that they induce firm promotion of control
adjustment, so the social gains from this step may be more rapidly realized, and firm-
regulator conflicts could be reduced. On the other hand, control adjustment may not be
favoured by other parties. Since adjustment means lowering the tax, this action tends to
increase emissions and may be strongly opposed by environmental special interest
groups and the regulatory agency. Control adjustment may also reduce emission tax
revenues, thus fostering further regulator resistance.
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direct
controls
regulatory regime
emission
subsidies
free
permits
auct.
permits
emission
taxes
1. Innovation
Diffusion
2. Innovator, non-patent
3. Non-innov, non-patent
4. Innovator, patent
5. Non-innov, patent
6. Outside firm, patent
Optimal agency response
7. Industry, non-patent
8. Con. adj. stance
9. Innovator, patent
10. Con. adj. stance
11. Non-innov, patent
12. Con. adj. stance
13. Outside firm, patent
14. Con. adj. stance
2
2 sin'
4
4
4
2-5
oppose
1-4
uncertain
2-5
oppose
1
favour
2
2
2
2-5
oppose
5
oppose
2-5
oppose
4
oppose
5
4
4
2-5
oppose
1-4
uncertain
2-5
oppose
1
favour
1
1
1
2-5
oppose
1-4
uncertain
2-5
oppose
3
uncertain
2
2
1
favour
1-4
uncertain
1
favour
4
oppose
Table 2.3. Summary of relative rankings of the incentives to promote technological change in
pollution control and the attitude towards optimal agency response. Source: Milliman and Prince
(1989, p.257).
In contrast, under auctioned permits, significant innovator gains will occur more rapidly
(from diffusion) and are not dependent upon control adjustment. Proper emissions
tightening still allows for positive innovator gains from the entire process of technologi-
cal change. Optimal agency response (in the form of fewer permits) will also be favoured
by environmental special interest groups and possibly the public agency. This leads
Milliman and Prince to conclude that depending upon the particular policy setting being
examined, the incentive mix of auctioned permits may be superior to the incentives
generated by emission taxes.
2.2.1.2 77ie speci/iic /i'rm incentive mode/5
After having discussed the general firm incentive models, we now consider the innova-
tion models that assume explicit mathematical expressions for the costs of pollution
abatement.
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Wenders (1975) analyzes the impact of improvement in pollution abatement technology
on the costs of a polluting firm producing under three pollution control regimes: a tax
per unit of pollution emitted (where tax is used as another word for fee or charge), a
subsidy per unit of emission reduction and finally emission standards. As in Downing
and White (1986), innovation in pollution control is firm-specific, the firm tries to mini-
mize its costs (abatement costs plus tax payments minus any subsidies) and the pollution
control agency possesses full information about the marginal cost and damage functions.
The costs of abatement depend on the percentage of pollution abated, the amount
of pollution emitted before any abatement and the level of technology, which is repre-
sented by parameter a. The cost of abatement is assumed to rise at an increasing rate
with percentage abatement and innovation in pollution control is modelled as a set
percentage change in the parameter a. Thus, it is assumed that the pollution abatement
curve shifts downward as a result of "a lump of technological change in pollution
abatement".
Two kinds of situations are considered in the analysis of Wenders: the case in
which the pollution control board does not change either the emission standard or the
tax-subsidy rate as a result of the innovation, and the case of control adjustment. As in
the general model of compliance innovation discussed before, both taxes and subsidies
offer more inducement to innovate than the emission standard approach — the economic
rewards being equal under emission taxes and subsidies. Furthermore, if the pollution
control board reacts to the improvement in abatement, then the inducement to innovate
for the firm operating under the corrective tax becomes greater than the inducement for
firms operating under the subsidy or the emission standards, which is exactly the same
result found in Downing and White (1986) and Milliman and Prince (1989). The reason
for this is easy to comprehend: although the analysis assumes a specific cost abatement
curve, this cost curve satisfies the properties of the general cost curve, and, as in the
general models, innovation is modelled as a downward shift of the (whole) marginal
cost curve.
Unlike the former analyses, however, Wenders also considers the case where the
firms can change the form of the cost abatement function, besides its position. If firms
are able to control the direction of their R&D, and thus change the shape of the pollution
abatement curve, firms operating under either emission controls or a corrective subsidy
will prefer innovations which raise the established level of pollution abatement as little
as possible, whereas firm operating under a tax will prefer the kind of technological
change that raises the optimal level of abatement as much as possible.
McHwg/t's mode/
McHugh (1985) analyzes the implications of technological indivisibilities (or lumpiness)
for the dynamic efficiency of tax-based, economic instruments. While in the former
models assumed that innovation in pollution control would shift the marginal cost curve
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of pollution abatement downward, and that the cost-minimizing firms could control its
emissions up to the point where the emission charge equals the marginal control costs,
here pollution control technologies are discrete, and identified with a particular control
efficiency. McHugh divides technological innovations in pollution abatement into two
types: "technology stretching" innovation and "inframarginal cost-reducing" innovations.
"Technology stretching innovations are those which lead to a higher proportion of
potential emissions controlled at an acceptable cost. Inframarginal innovation are those
which control a lower proportion of emissions than the currently employed control, but
at a cost low enough to induce firms to switch to a control technique which controls a
lower amount of emissions.""
McHugh analyzes the possibility of cost-inefficiencies when technological change in
pollution control is of the in/rarrwrginaZ type. In his model there are two sectors: the
affected sector, in which the inframarginal technological innovation occurs, and an
unaffected sector. Given any existing tax rate or permit price, the firms in the first sector
may find it more attractive to use the new inframarginal technology and reduce the level
of emissions it controls, since the marginal cost of the presently employed technology
has increased above that tax rate. This may induce the pollution control authorities to
raise the level of the tax to meet the emissions reductions goal. As a result of this, total
industry's compliance costs (resource plus transfer costs) may increase, which means
that a tax-based environmental policy may lead to dynamic inefficiencies. >• ;;T ~r; ; :.
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We will now describe the R&D models of pollution control: Magat (1978) and Mendel-
sohn (1984). In these models, the optimal amount or rate of innovation in pollution
abatement technology can be calculated.
Magat's model (1978) analyzes the effects of two types of pollution control policies
(effluent taxes and effluent standards) on the path of technological change chosen by a
firm- which produces an effluent by-product. In this model, the firm may invest
resources to improve its abatement technology, its production technology, or both. The
purpose of the analysis is to extend the static analysis of effluent taxes and standards: to
include their effects on both the rate and the direction of technical advance.
The model considers the behaviour of a price-taking firm which employs a single
variable input to produce a single product. The production process results in an effluent
byproduct, whose abatement requires the use of the variable input. The firm also
engages in an R&D programme to improve its current technology of output production
and effluent abatement. Magat advances a Kennedy-based model of induced, "product-
McHugh, op at, p.59.
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augmenting" technical advance in which R&D effort is allocated between technological
advancement in output production and effluent abatement. In the model, improvements
in the output production and effluent abatement technologies are represented by
changes in the output production augmentation parameter A and in the effluent abate-
ment augmentation parameter B along an innovation possibilities frontier." For each
level of R&D spending this frontier describes the tradeoffs available between improving
output production technology and advancing effluent abatement technology: a high
decrease in >4 (which reflects a great improvement in output production) is only possible
if the increase in B (the improvement in effluent abatement technology) is low, and uice
persa. Magat's figure of the innovation possibilities frontier is in Figure 2.5."
A/A
O1 S
0=0
B/B
Direction of a
Decrease in £
•«
Figure 2.5. The innovation possibilities frontier. Source: Magat (1978).
Magat analyzes the time path of production, effluent discharge and the rate and bias of
R&D, both under a constant effluent tax and a constant effluent standard. We will not go
into the details of the model, but only give the main results. Both the constant tax and
standard will induce a "typical" firm to undertake an expanding R&D programme. The
" In fact, Magat's model is the Kamien and Schwartz model (1969) of induced factor augmenting
technical change, except that the input and output roles have been reversed (cf. M.I. Kamien and N.L.
Schwartz, 1969, Induced Factor Augmenting Technical Progress from a Micro Economic Viewpoint,
Economefrica 37(4): 668-684.
" Improvements in the output production and effluent abatement technologies are represented by
a decrease in /4 and an increase in B, respectively. This follows from the observations that: i) for the
same labour and effluent rate a lower level of /I allows a higher output rate, and ii) for the same
labour and output rates a higher level of B allows a lower effluent discharge rate (p.4). Parameter P
indicates the 'direction' or 'bias' of technical change. <„,...,., > ,-w,«^.«,n> ^«^«»-.j
I
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allocation of R&D between output augmentation and effluent abatement augmentation
depends on the elasticity of transformation a, which measures the ease of substituting
labour between producing output and abating effluent." "When labour substitutability
is difficult (or < 1) the constant standard induces a direction of technical advance which
converges to a pattern of augmenting both technologies, whereas the constant tax
induces a pattern of ever-increasing (relative) allocations to output technology augmenta-
tion and ever-decreasing (relative) allocation to effluent abatement technology augmenta-
tion. On the other hand when labour substitutability is easy (cr > 1) the constant tax
induces a pattern of ever-increasing (relative) allocations to effluent abatement technol-
ogy augmentation while the constant standard leads to a direction of technical advance
which diverges toward relatively more output technology augmentation or diverges
toward relatively more effluent abatement technology augmentation (depending upon
the initial value of the direction)".'*
The article served as the basis for another article (Magat, 1979) in which he com-
pares five types of environmental regulation: effluent charges, nontechnology-based
effluent standards, marketable permits, technology-based effluent standards, and sub-
sidies for abatement capital. This paper concludes that 'equivalent' effluent charge,
standards and marketable permits, i.e., policies which induce the same level of effluent
discharge over the entire period of analysis, provide exactly the same incentive for both
abatement technology and output technology innovation. The assumption that the level
of effluent discharge is the same is essential. It is criticized by Downing and White who
write that "insisting that the innovator is induced by a fee decrease to return to the
original pollution level, just for the purposes of comparison, has little behavioral or
normative justification.""' In addition, a reduction of the effluent charge by the regula-
tor to induce the same abatement as under the effluent standard, still leaves the innova-
tor with a transfer gain. These however are not the only problems with this model, as
we will see in the next section.
A new element, not discussed before by the other authors, is the distinction
between technology-based and nontechnology-based effluent standards. Nontechnology-
based effluent standards create a stronger incentive for abatement technology innovation
than technology-based effluent standards, unless the benefits from the use of new abate-
ment technologies can be appropriated by their owners and unless regulatory agencies
quickly revise their regulations based on the new abatement technologies.
" The elasticity of transformation is defined as the reciprocal of a proportional change in the ratio
of the marginal products of labour in producing the two products (output and effluent) with a
proportional change in the output-effluent ratio (p.6).
<«?! i« Magat, op rif, pp. 21-22.
•' Downing and White, op cif, pp. 22-23. . ... .....
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The model of Mendelsohn (1984) extends Martin Weitzman's analysis of regulation
under uncertainty." Weitzman's model analyzes the efficiency of quantity and price
rules for the situation where the regulator is uncertain about the costs and benefits of
regulation. The model shows that when the regulator is uncertain about the locus (but
not the slope) of the linear marginal cost curve, quantity regulations are likely to be
more efficient than price regulations if (and only if) the marginal cost curve is relatively
flat (as compared to the slope of the linear damage function). This contradicts the tradi-
tional economist's argument that price rules, such as emission taxes in environmental
policy, are more efficient than quantity rules.
Mendelsohn adds endogenous technical change to Weitzman's model of regulation
under uncertainty. Mendelsohn finds that quantity rules tend to encourage more efficient
levels of technical change. Under price rules, firms tend to overreact, producing either
too much or too little R&D depending upon the realization of the stochastic element of
the model. To understand this result, we have to look at the model in more detail.
In Mendelsohn's model, technical change is measured as a downward shift in the
marginal cost of producing abatement. As in Weitzman's model, the abatement cost
function is assumed to be quadratic in the neighbourhood of the optimal level of pollu-
tion abatement 4
C(«j,e) = «,(6) + ( C + a(e)X? - 4) * ^ U f " 4)' W
where 9 is actual pollution abatement, a,, and a are functions of a random component 9,
and C and C" are constants.
The functional form for the total abatement cost function implies that the mar i^nn/ cost
function of pollution abatement is linear (as in Weitzman's analysis). Similarly, the total
benefit function is assumed to be quadratic in the neighbourhood of ^ and, just as the
cost function, contains a stochastic element (r|):
It follows directly from this equation that the margina/ benefit function 3B(</,r|)/d<7 is
linear — just as it follows from the quadratic form of the cost function that the marginal
cost function is linear. It is assumed that this (linear) marginal benefit function, and also
the marginal cost function, are known to the regulator except for an additive error term
(with mean zero).
" Martin L. Weitzman, 1974, Prices vs. Quantities, Review 0/ Economic Studies, 16: 477-549.
Technical advances RD is measured as a downward shift in the marginal cost of
producing abatement. The cost of research and development is assumed to be quadratic
in RD:
After having specified the cost and benefit functions, we now consider the rules chosen
by the regulator and the response of the firm to these rules. Mendelsohn's model
assumes that the quantity and price rule chosen by the regulator equate the expected
marginal costs and benefits of pollution abatement. In response to these rules, and the
realization of the stochastic terms, the firm is assumed to minimize its costs. It can
minimize its abatement costs either by doing R&D and by choosing its abatement output
(the latter, of course, is only possible under the price rule). Differentiating the total cost
function with respect to RD, setting the derivative equal to zero, gives the optimal
amount of R&D: . , . ,•;.,..„ .................. „, . . . .^ .......
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Equation (4) demonstrates that the optimal amount of R&D depends on the realization
of the stochastic element in the R&D cost function and the firm's optimal level of abate-
ment. In the case of a quantity rule (emission standard), </ equals # so the optimal
amount of RD depends on fc(y) and / only." Under the price rule (an emission tax
which equals the expected marginal costs) the firm also chooses its abatement output
(besides the amount of R&D). This optimal quantity </ minimizes total costs (the sum of
abatement costs and R&D costs). Substitution of the optimal amount of R&D in the cost
function and minimization of the cost function with respect to 9, gives the optimal ^
under the price rule:*" ,
= .••- - ^ • - - • . ^ . • - V a(6)
c " - 1 / ( 2 / ) • , . . ^ / , ^ . ^ • • • • - ^ ;
The optimal <j under the price rule, $ depends on the realization of the stochastic term
in the abatement cost function (6) and in the R&D function (y), and further on the size of
/ and C". Thus, the firm is assumed to know the actwaZ costs of pollution abatement and
research and development, which is quite a strong assumption, especially for R&D. The
expected relative advantage A^  of the ex ante price rule over the quantity rule is defined
as:
" Note that the firm will only undertake R&D under the quantity rule if fcfy) is negative (a
negative Jtfy) implies that R&D is relatively cheap).
And «tt ? ^ ^- «(e)^W/(2Q as in Mendelsohn.
C"-(l/2)/
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It can be shown that the expected advantage of prices over quantities (A,-), given uncer-
tain costs and benefits function of pollution abatement and uncertain R&D cost curves, is
described by the following expression:^ ^ , ,
To understand this result, we have to go back to Weitzman's result (where there is no
technical change). Weitzman's coefficient of the comparative advantage of prices over
quantities is:
Without technical change, the expected net advantage of prices over quantities is positive
whenever the slope of the marginal cost function, C" (which is greater than zero),
exceeds the slope of the marginal benefit function, B" (which is less than zero). Thus,
price rules are optimal when the marginal cost curve is relatively steep, whereas quan-
tity rules are to be preferred when the marginal benefit curve is relatively steep. Weitz-
man's result also states that the only uncertainty that matters to the regulator who tries
to maximize the expected efficiency is the regulator's uncertainty about the true cost
function. The uncertainty about the benefits from pollution control (r|) does not matter
(under the extra assumption that the random terms of the costs and benefits function are
uncorrelated). This is one of the most important theorems of the economic theory of
regulation.^
After having described the (correct) model results, it is now possible to interpret Men-
delsohn's result concerning the (expected) advantage or disadvantage of price rules (as
compared with quantity rules) when there is endogenous technical change. Endogenous
technical change alters the coefficient of comparative advantage in favour of quantity
rules. Quantity rules tend to encourage more efficient levels of research and develop-
ment than price rules when the benefits of technical change depend upon uncertain
" T h i s r e s u l t d i f f e r s f r o m t h e r e s u l t g i v e n b y M e n d e l s o h n : ••' ' / > , ' ; , - U ' l y . ; '
Y « . * = ; , ^ r •• T i v - . .:•..: _ ( B " + C " - ( 1 / 2 ) / ) , ^ ^ ^ « i i v + ^ ,-, • „ : : ; . - i .
' ' " . • • < ' • ; ' • • - ? • • • • • • • • • • ; „ , 2 ( C - ( l / 2 ) / J * . . , , ' . V
" Adar and Griffen (1976) have derived the same result as Weitzman. Their analysis directly
addresses the choice of policy control instruments, whereas this is a special case of Weitzman's
analysis. Furthermore, the linear form for the marginal costs and benefits functions does not follow
from the quadratic form of the total costs and benefits functions, but is assumed directly. (Zvi Adar
and James M. Griffin, 1976, Uncertainty and the Choice of Pollution Control Instruments, /ouraa/ of
Economics and Management, 3: 178-188).
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abatement levels. Uncertain R&D costs, on the other hand, favour neither tool ex
but only increase the importance of choosing the better tool.
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Figure 2.6. The efficiency of price and quantity rules under uncertainty when there '
is endogenous technical change. Source: Mendelsohn (1984, p.206). .^
Mendelsohn also provides a more intuitive explanation of the model's results, which is
depicted in Figure 2.6. The firm is limited to just one of two equally probable short-run
marginal cost curves SRMC, and SRMCj. If there is no technical change, the short-run
marginal cost curve is also the long-run marginal cost curve. The regulator choosing
price and quantity rules, which equate marginal benefits with expected marginal costs,
selects either i? or # Given the quantity rule, the firm responds by producing 4
Without technical change, this output yields an ex post loss of Q, + Q2. With technical
change, the ex post welfare loss drops to Q,. Given the price rule, the firm responds by
producing ^JJ or ^ without technical change and ^ or qf with technical change.
Without technical change, the ex post welfare loss under the price rule is P, + P2. Com-
paring the two rules without technical change, prices are preferred if Q, + Q2 > P, + ?2-
Thus, the relationship depends on the relative slope of the marginal benefit and cost
curves. If the marginal cost curve is relatively steep, prices are preferred; if the marginal
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benefit curve is relatively steep, the quantity rule is to be preferred (the Weitzman
result).
Figure 2.6 shows that technical change produces cost reductions of Qj and Pj for
quantity and price rules, respectively. The size of Q^  and Pj depend on the relative
slopes of the marginal cost and benefit curves. Technical change, however, induces an
additional welfare loss with price rules, Pj. Thus, firms overreact to the price rule,
producing too much or too little abatement output, which in turn stimulates too much or
too little R&D. This leads Mendelsohn to the conclusion that, over the long run, the
quantity rule induces more efficient levels of technical change.^
2.2 A Critical Assessment of the Innovation Models
In the previous section, we gave an overview of different models of the impact of pollu-
tion control instruments on innovation in pollution control. The outcome of the firm
incentive models is that economic instruments (effluent fees or emissions taxes,
emissions reduction subsidies and tradeable pollution permits) offer more inducement to
innovate than direct regulation. Under economic regulation, the innovator is able to
exploit an extra gain by reducing its emissions. This is because the marginal benefits of
such extra emissions reductions (which are in the form of a reduction of tax payments,
subsidies for emission reduction or revenues from selling permits) exceed the marginal
costs of emission reduction. Under direct regulation there is no incentive for the polluter
to reduce emissions beyond the original level of emissions control, because the marginal
benefits to the firm of such a step are zero. These results are under the assumption that
the innovation in pollution control allows for emissions control at lower marginal costs
for each level of emissions control, which may be too strong an assumption. Moreover,
this result is derived under the assumption of perfect information. When there is uncer-
tainty about the costs and benefits from pollution abatement, these results may not hold.
This section provides a critical discussion of the models in section 1. Our criticism
should not be taking to mean that we oppose formal analysis, or that we think that the
earlier-described models are of little use. On the contrary, we view the existing models
as being helpful in understanding the important and complex technology-environmental
policy relationship, precisely for what they are meant to do: to explore the logical impli-
cations of certain assumptions about technology, market conditions and economic behav-
^-i<i-. <o.>.'•-' .;4'.'\f
* It should be noted that Mendelsohn's figure is not quite correct. In the figure, the long-run
marginal cost curve (i.e. the marginal cost curve after innovation) is the same for both regimes. The
marginal cost curve after innovation under the price rule is: _lj^.+C'+a(8)+(C" -_)((j-fj) whereas
under the quantity rule it is: _1L_ + C +a(8) +C" (<f -<J). Since/> 0, the marginal cost curve under the
price rule is less steep than under the quantity rule. . . . . ... »- , . ,-*•« *<•. «i ^j .« '». '«-- , i
^ Our criticisms of the models amount to six issues: 1) the neglect of innovation in
pollution control by outside suppliers, the neglect of innovator gains from diffusion, and
the neglect of other forms of environmentally beneficial technological change, 2) the
representation of pollution abatement technology in innovation models, 3) problems of
implementation and optimal design of pollution control instruments, 4) the reciprocal
nature of the regulator-innovator relationship, 5) the representation of the firm, and 6)
the assumed tradeoff between innovation in pollution control and innovation in produc-
tion technology.
• . » ^ - i ^ ' : ^ l . ' - - i i L j : ' . " . . - : , < ; • ; < * • „ « > ! : ! ; < • • . - > " } • . £ • • • < * - ' n : ^ . ' . ; - * - •••• . . - " . j ! i « • ? ! : . ? • - .•;--
2.2.1 77ie neg/ecf o/ innovation by oufsfrfe suppliers and* innovator
gains /rom di/jfosion
With the exception of the model of Milliman and Prince (1989), innovation by special
outside suppliers and diffusion of pollution control technologies is not considered in the
theoretical literature. This is a serious limitation because innovations in pollution control
are often (if not mostly) supplied by special outside suppliers, and innovator gains
usually result from the sale of the new technology rather than from lower abatement
costs for the innovator. In relation to this, the dynamic efficiency and social benefits of
the compliance innovation depends on the widespread employment of the innovation
and is based less on the cost gains of the individual innovator. Below, we will pay
attention to these aspects and explore their implications for the choice of pollution
control instruments.
As mentioned before, the model of Milliman and Prince is the only model that
analyzes the incentives for an outside supplier firm to develop and supply the innova-
tion. These incentives are compared to those of a polluting firm. Milliman and Prince
find that without control adjustment by the regulator, the relative ranking of innovator
incentives for an outside firm is similar to that for a polluting innovator that holds a
patented discovery. Auctioned permits and emission taxes and subsidies provide the
strongest incentives for the innovator, and direct regulation and free permits the lowest.
However, this situation changes «#er control adjustment. Under optimal agency
response, firm incentives for the outside supplier are highest under direct control and
free permits, whereas for the polluting innovator no conclusions can be drawn (except
that emissions subsidies provide the lowest incentives for innovation). Thus, if the
control agency does not know who is in the best position to develop an innovation — the
polluter or an outside supplier — no qualitative conclusions can be drawn with respect to
the best policy instrument to stimulate innovation in pollution control.
Another aspect of technical change that is typically neglected in the models is the
technological diffusion and innovator gains from selling the technology to other firms.
The only model that considers innovator gains from the technological diffusion of the
technology is Milliman and Prince. It does not consider however the rapidity of the
technological diffusion and the factors responsible for the time-intensive uptake of the
innovation. Although this is perfectly understandable, the technological diffusion of
innovations is an subject of its own, the policy instruments may influence the timing of
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purchases, and affect innovation gains and the dynamic efficiency. If the diffusion
process is more rapid and the innovation is widely applied, innovator gains will be high.
In this respect, emissions standards may provide stronger innovator gains than emission
taxes because they leave polluters less choice with respect to emissions reductions and
technologies for achieving this. However, if the standards are based on available technol-
ogies, which is usually the case, then they will provide very little innovator gains. A
discussion of the diffusion process of environmental technologies under the various
regulatory regimes is in chapter 5.
Finally, the innovation models only analyze innovations in pollution control tech-
nology aimed at reducing pollutant emissions of production. The development of envi-
ronment-friendlier materials and consumer products is not discussed, although both
types of innovations constitute important categories, which may be promoted or
obstructed by different factors. Demand for cleaner consumer products, for instance,
depends less on government regulation (despite the free-rider problem) and may be
obstructed by specific problems such as lack of information and unfavourable appropria-
bility conditions (see chapter 8). ^ ^E&^'J * / ^ ;»"'; ;'.r;i?';:,v'
2.2.2 Tne representation o/po//wfton contro/ fecnno/ogy
In the graphical models of Zerbe (1970), Downing and White (1986) and Milliman and
Prince (1989), and also in the model of Wenders (1975), innovation in pollution control is
modelled as a downward shift in the marginal cost curve of pollution abatement. In
these models, innovation in pollution abatement technology allows the polluting firm to
reduce its marginal abatement costs for eac/z level of emissions control. This is a very
strong assumption about the nature of technology which is seldom fulfilled in real life.
As pointed out by McHugh:
• ' the unique aspect of the equipment used to control emissions, giving rise to poten-
*7 tial cost decreases in the face of technological innovation, is that each control tech-
nology is typically identified with a particular "control efficiency", or percentage of
.;: emissions which that technology will control. Control efficiencies are embodied in
the design of the equipment and cannot be altered in any perceptible way by the
•; devotion of additional labour or material inputs to further control."
The way in which innovation in pollution control technology is modelled is not trivial: it
has implications for the innovation effects of environmental policies and the efficiency of
the various control regimes.
For instance, McHugh himself demonstrates that if technological innovation is of
the inframarginal cost-reducing type that allows for cost reductions only at a lower level
of control, that total private costs for industry may be higher if firms have different cost
McHugh, op cif, p.59.
abatement functions. This illustrates the limitations of the microeconomic concept of a
representative firm used in the models above.
Mendelsohn's conclusion about the dynamic efficiency of quantity and price rules
also critically depends on the way in which innovation in pollution control is modelled.
If technical change is of the inframarginal type instead of the "technology-stretching"
type, the conclusions about the optimality of price and quantity rules are exactly the
opposite. If LRMC in Figure 2.6 is the marginal abatement cost curve before technical
change and SRMC represents the cost curve a>if/j technical change, price rules instead of
quantity rules will tend to produce more efficient levels of pollution abatement. There-
fore, it is important to know how innovation in pollution control is likely to change the
abatement cost function. For instance, is innovation in pollution control of the technol-
ogy-stretching type or of the inframarginal cost-reducing type? Little empirical research
has been done on this issue. Casual observation, however, suggests that innovation is
typically of the technology-stretching type, with a higher control efficiency. But this may
be due to the use of direct regulation (in the form of emission standards) by pollution
control authorities — regulations that have become more strict over the years. If effluent
fees had been used instead of emission standards, more technologies of the inframargi-
nal cost-reducing type, which offer cost savings at lower levels of abatement, would
have been available and adopted by polluting firms.
Similarly, Wenders (1975) argues that if the innovating firm can change the/orm of
the cost of abatement function, then the firm may prefer different kinds of technological
change. Under a tax regime, a polluting firm will prefer the kind of technological change
that raises the optimal level of abatement as much as possible (which helps reducing its
effluent tax payments). This suggests that the regulatory regime may affect the choice of
particular pollution abatement technologies.
This issue is believed to be important, since in practice there are usually many
technological solutions for reducing pollutant emissions. Not only do these technological
solutions differ in a technical sense, but they also differ in terms of costs, control effi-
ciency and environmental impact. In this respect, an important distinction is that
between "end-of-pipe" technologies and "process-integrated" technologies. Process-inte-
grated changes prevent pollutants from arising, whereas end-of-pipe technologies pre-
vent the release of pollutants to air, water or land. In the past, in response to environ-
mental regulation, especially end-of-pipe technologies were developed and used." A
disadvantage of end-of-pipe technologies is that they usually lead to a transfer of envi-
ronmental problems. This is because the treatment and isolation of pollutants by these
technologies result in hazardous waste material, which creates an environmental prob-
lem of its own. .,, • . . . . . . . .
* According to Hartje and Lurie, the share of end-of-pipe technologies in pollution control
investment in Western Germany in the 1975-81 period was between 67 and 78%. In the United States,
in the 1973-82 period, it was between 76% and 81% (Volkmar J. Hartje and Robert L. Lurie, 1985,
Research and Development Incentives for Pollution Control Technologies, International Institute for
Environment and Society (HUG), Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin, p.14).
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Thus, it becomes important to investigate the factors that determine the choice of
end-of-pipe technologies instead of process-integrated technologies (including in-process
recycling); and, more specifically, if, and in what way, this choice is affected by environ-
mental policy. This issue is investigated in Nenrjes' model described in section 2 of the
next chapter and in Hartje and Lurie (1984). According to Hartje and Lurie, government
subsidies for pollution control (special depreciation allowances and pollution control
bonds) favoured end-of-pipe systems, because they require easily recognizable pollution
control technologies. One may add to this that the typical "norm" policy of the govern-
ment, based on available, relatively well-known end-of-pipe technologies, also favoured
the selection of end-of-pipe technologies. If economic instruments instead of direct
regulation had been used, the share of process-integrated technologies probably would
have been higher, since they leave the polluter more freedom in technology choices and
the timing of investments. . c^-jr-.^F,:.c«t?:iy.i -<t f*r;v - :.;,-•
To recapitulate, the results about the impact of various regulatory regimes on firm
incentives to innovate in pollution abatement technologies very much depend on the
modelling of innovation in pollution control. As we saw, if the technology is of the
inframarginal type instead of the technology-stretching type, the conclusions may com-
pletely change. Furthermore, the models overlook that firms have a choice with respect
to different types of pollution abatement technologies (process changes and end-of-pipe
technologies), and that this choice is affected by the regulatory regime.
2.2.3 Prob/ems 0/ impZementafioM a«rf desigM o/po/fufton confroZ instru-
ments
In the innovation models there are not problems of implementation and design of
pollution control instruments. The regulator knows the optimal level of emissions con-
trol, which may be achieved by any instrument. Of course, we do not live in such a
world: in practice, it is impossible for the regulator to calculate the optimal emmission
fee, subsidy or quotum due to imperfect knowledge of the costs and benefits of
emissions control. As a partial solution to this problem, the control agency may decide to
choose an instrument with "fail-safe" properties. Price instruments may be preferred if
the risk of high costs is relatively high and quantity rules may be preferred in situations
where there is a danger of sudden and dramatic environmental change (the Weitzman
result).
The implementation of policy instruments poses another wearisome problem.
Environmental regulations are usually the result of political bargaining between different
actors: politicians, government agency officials, citizens, environmental special interest
groups and industrial polluters, all with different goals, interests and powers.*' Thus,
" Reasons for this bargaining are the lack of information about the costs of pollution abatement,
insufficient ecological knowledge, the distributional consequences of environmental programmes,
competition with other public programmes, and disagreement about values (Giandomenico Majone,
what an economist may propose on theoretical grounds and what is politically feasible
may be entirely different. This leads to a different perspective for comparing policy
instruments.
The models in section 1 pay little attention to the policy making process of envi-
ronmental policies. In Downing and White (1986), for instance, optimal agency adjust-
ment ("ratcheting") is analyzed without a discussion of the political feasibility. The
control authority possesses perfect information about the costs and benefits of improving
environmental quality and about the relationship between emissions and environmental
quality. Although the authors acknowledge that in a real-world situation this is unlikely,
they do not explore the implications of imperfect information for environmental policy
making and the behaviour of potential innovators.
The only model that compares firm incentives to promote or obstruct policy adjust-
ment is that of Milliman and Prince (1989). The most important conclusions are: First,
that control adjustment only clearly generates abatement cost reductions for the innova-
tor of a nonpatented discovery under emission taxes and auctioned permits. Second, that
the emission taxes regime is the only policy which encourages industry promotion of
optimal agency response. Third, that if the innovation developed by the polluting firm is
patented, conclusions are similar to the ones above, except for emissions subsidies
(where control adjustment will be opposed by both the innovating and non-innovating
firms). Fourth, that when the innovation is supplied by an outside firm, control adjust-
ment is favoured by the outside firm innovator under direct controls and free permits,
may be opposed with auctioned permits, and is definitely opposed under emissions
taxes. And fifth, that the response by industry to control adjustment is opposite to that
of the outside firm innovator under all regimes except emissions subsidies (where both
are opposed) and possibly auctioned permits.
Thus, the incentives to promote or obstruct policy adjustment for the innovator and
the polluting industry differ widely and are usually opposed. There is only one case
where the innovator and industry both promote control adjustment: the situation where
the polluting firm is the innovator and emission taxes are used. It may be clear that such
a control adjustment will be strongly opposed by outside suppliers (since such a control
adjustment would result in lower taxes and revenues for them), and probably also by
environmental pressure groups and the agency itself. Thus, if control adjustment is
important to the decision to develop an innovation, it matters a great deal who is the
possible innovator.
The models also pay little attention to the design of policy instruments: the strin-
gency, flexibility, differentiation, phasing, enforcement, and sanctions. This is remarkable
because it is dear that these aspects influence the effectiveness and efficiency of the
1976, Choice Among Policy Instruments for Pollution Control, Po/icy /Ina/ysts, p.611). Majone adds to
this that, "although one may object to bargaining and political compromise, bargaining remains the
only known way of generating viable policies out of a welter of conflicting interests, ill-tested the-
ories, and differentially distributed resources."
Mo<fe/s 0/ innouafion in po/fufion confrof 4V
policies.^ These aspects also determine the willingness of potential suppliers of pollu-
tion control technologies to develop these technologies and the willingness of polluting
firms to adopt abatement technologies. Little systematic research has gone into this issue.
More research is needed on the optimal design of policy instruments to stimulate inno-
vation in and diffusion of cleaner technologies.^
More research should also be devoted to analysis of the political factors that
determine the design of policy instruments.^ As noted before, environmental policy is
likely to be influenced, or even captured, by special interest groups. Particularly polluter
industries are known to exercise an important influence on environmental policies. In
Giandomenico Majone's view, the performance of policy instruments depends even more
on the institutional framework they are used in than on their technical characteristics.
The actual outcomes of environmental policies are affected more by the institutional
arrangements emerging from the political process than by the technical characteris-
tics of the instruments employed; to use a statistical image, the "within group"
effects (the differential results obtained when the same tool operates under different
institutional circumstances) dominate the "between groups" effects (the results of
different tools used under approximately equal conditions). In other words, the
significant choice is not among abstractly considered policy instruments but among
institutionally determined ways of operating them.'"
This means that policy analysts should pay attention to the opportunities of industry and
other parties to influence the details of environmental policies when assessing the effects
of a certain policy tool and when comparing different institutional arrangements.
^ See Robert W. Hahn, 1989, Economic Prescriptions for Environmental Problems: How the
Patient Followed the Doctor's Order, /ourna/ 0/ Economic Perspectives, 3(2): 95-114).
** Jacqueline J. Cramer, 1990, De effecten van milieubeleidsinstrumenten op innovatie en diffusie
van schonere technologieen (the effects of environmental policy instruments on innovation in and
diffusion of cleaner technologies), concept report for integration project "Environment and Economy".
" In the words of Hahn: "We need to develop a deeper understanding of how politics is likely to
affect environmental goals, the definition of property rights, the design of institutions, and transaction
costs associated with different institutional designs" (Robert W. Hahn, 1993, Comparing environ-
mental Markets with Standards, Canadian /ourna/ of Economics, 26(2): 353).
°^ Majone, op at, p.593. The idea of the institutional framework being important to the outcomes
of government policies is developed into a process model of government policy by Hans Bressers.
The process model takes as its starting point the characteristics of the different actors involved: their
goals, knowledge and expertise, and relative power. Important actors are: legislators, government
agencies, trade assocan'ons, firms, special interest groups and consumers. This approach emphasizes
the open nature of the policy process and the mutual dependencies between different parties. Bres-
sers' process model of government policy is applied by Pieter-Jan Klok (1989) to unleaded gasoline
and clean cars. . . .. . . . . _ . . . . - , -
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2.2.4 77ie circw/ar re/aft'o«s/iip between eMuiromnenfa/ po/ici/ and
in poZ/Mtjon cowfro/
The decision to develop a new pollution control technology with a higher control effi-
ciency very much depends on the stringency of environmental policies. In turn, pollution
control policies depend on the technologies available for reducing environmentally
hazardous emissions and waste material. This means that there exists a circular relation
between environmental policy and innovation in pollution control. The reciprocal nature
of the relationship has received little attention so far."
Only two studies mentioned in section 1 pay attention to the fact that the control
policies themselves may change as a result of the development of new abatement tech-
nologies: Downing and White (1986) and Milliman and Prince (1989). In these models,
the effects of optimal control agency response ("ratcheting") are analyzed. For example,
the regulatory agency may set a more strict emission standard when a new abatement
technology with a higher control efficiency is available. Such a response may be critical
to a firm's decision to engage in R&D and develop an environmental innovation. Of
course, the firm may also try to influence environmental policy through lobbying, but
such attempts usually meet strong opposition from the polluting industry, which may
claim that the new technology is too expensive and ill-suited for their activities.
A model that analyzes the policy-making process in the context of technological
uncertainty about the costs of pollution abatement and the opportunities for innovation
is Nentjes (1988).^  In his model, Andries Nenrjes analyzes how the speed of innovation
in pollution reduction is determined by a) the risk aversion of the environmental bureau-
cracy, b) its time preference, c) the uncertainties surrounding unexplored clean technol-
ogies, d) the expected length of the R&D period, e) gaps in the range of unexplored
clean technologies, f) the expected costs of new technologies, and g) the maximum of
abatement costs the regulator is willing to accept. Incentives for polluting firms and
outside suppliers to develop an innovation in pollution control are compared. Nentjes
finds that polluting firms have an incentive to comply less than fully when the environ-
mental bureaucracy tries to impose a technology-forcing standard and they will try to
delay the introduction of cleaner and more expensive abatement technologies. A descrip-
tion of the model is in chapter 3.
Firm-regulator interdependencies may also be analyzed in dynamic game models,
as suggested by Milliman and Prince (1989). This has been attempted recently by people
like Carraro, Laffont, Tirole and others. A good example is the study by Jean-Jacques
" A discussion of this reciprocal relationship is in Alan Irwin and Philip Vergragt, 1989, Re-
thinking the Relationship between Environmental Regulation and Industrial Innovation: The Social
Negotiation of Technical Change, Tec/jno/o t^/ /4na/ysis and Strategic Mamigemenf 1(1): 57-70.
• * Andries Nentjes, 1988, An Economic Model of Innovation in Pollution Control Technology,
paper presented at the Annual Meeting of AAERE, New York, Dec. 28-30,1988. . ,,.».
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Laffont and Jean Tirole into the innovation incentives of a tradeable pollution permit."
Another example is Carlo Carraro and Domenico Sinicalco (1992) about the optimal
investment subsidy to induce environmental innovation in an open economy.*" Innova-
tion decisions of polluting firms in a oligopoly industry that are subjected to a pollution
tax are studied in Carlo Carraro and Giorgio Topa (1991).^  They find that the timing of
innovation is less than socially optimal and propose the use of an investment subsidy to
accelerate the innovation process. The policy implications of asymmetric information are
also analyzed. In the presence of asymmetric information, the subsidy must embody an
information premium so that firms reveal their innovative capability. The game theoretic
models provides an interesting and important addition to the theoretical models
described in section 1. A disadvantage of the models is their analytical complexity and
the fact that they assume some kind of 'superrationality' on the part of the different
actors. They do not allow for a simple systematic comparison of different policy regimes.
Finally, there is another kind of regulator-polluter relationship which has received
little attention; i.e., 'voluntary' agreements between industry and the regulatory agency
in which the polluting industry promises to reduce the environmental burden of their
activities. Such agreements, in the form of covenants, between the regulatory agency and
the polluting industry are a new trend in environmental policy making in the Nether-
lands. In such a covenant (in Dutch, convenant), firms and industries promise to reduce
their pollutant emissions within a certain period. Of course, the prospect of environ-
mental legislation in the form of standards or taxes, which may be implemented if the
industry fails to take satisfactory environmental measures, plays an important role here.
The use of covenants within environmental policy has several benefits: its flexibility
regarding the measures to be taken by the individual polluters, which makes it a more
efficient system, ii) no valuable time is lost with the law-making process, and iii) low
administrative costs. Covenants also have disadvantages. Apart from the fact that the
legal status of such arrangements is unclear, and opportunities for democratic control are
limited, a "prisoner's dilemma" situation may be created. Although it may be beneficial
to the industry as a whole to escape (inflexible) legislation, it will be attractive for
individual firms not to comply.
2 . 2 . 5 T n e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n 0 / f n e / i r m ^7 i " j ; , , » , ^ , . ^ ^ , « . ,
In the theoretical models of government-induced innovation in pollution control, the
innovating firm is a profit maximizer. Output is assumed to be constant and output
" Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole, 1994, A Note on Environmental Innovation, Fondazione
Eni Enrico Mattel discussion paper 42.94.
* Carlo Carraro and Domenico Siniscalco, 1992, Environmental Innovation Policy and Interna-
tional Competition, Enra'ronmenfa/ and Resource Economics, 2(2): 183-200.
* Carlo Carraro and Giorgio Topa, 1991, Taxation and the Environmental Innovation, Fondazione
Eni Enrico Mattei discussion paper 4.91 ..,! . ,, . , „ , , , „ .-.-.„ . .,.,.„ , ,.,. .. ,;„„,„.. ,»..*;<.«
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price is not affected by changes in abatement costs. Thus, profit maximization comes
down to cost minimization, unless, as in Milliman and Prince's model, there are extra
innovation gains from selling the innovation. Essentially, a firm is represented by a
(marginal) cost function, which may be shifted downward through innovation in pollu-
tion control.
At least three objections may be raised to such a representation of the firm. First,
the environmental image of the firm may affect its product sales and affect the firm's
ability to attract (high-skilled) workers. The environmental image of the firm and its
products are gaining importance, and are increasingly exploited in marketing. Second,
pollution control may be demanded by its employers or even by the firm's management
who have goals and aspirations of their own. The demand by workers is partly
explained by the fact that pollution control and workplace conditions are strongly
related. And firm executives may be sensitive about negative publicity, not just for
'normal' business reasons but also for personal reasons. And third, the models assume
that the firm knows the costs and benefits involved in pollution control and is able to
optimize between them. In reality, the costs and benefits of pollution control and R&D
are uncertain, diverse and difficult to assess in any precise way. sj;-^ .i ,, •- i ^ .w ,,,,:,
The notion of maximization has been criticized by many authors, especially when
it is applied to innovation activities. According to Nelson and Winter, the behaviour and
actions of firms may be understood better in terms of firm-specific capabilities and
typical decision rules (about how much R&D will be done, the organization of work,
etc.), than the optimization of an imaginary profit function.'*
The idea of inflexible decision rules and production routines may explain why
firms have up until now engaged so little in environmental management despite the cost
reductions that may be realized. For instance, in the Netherlands, a government-
financed, in-depth study of available pollution prevention measures in firms in the food,
electroplating, metal working and chemical industries and the (public) transport sector,
showed that almost always cost-neutral or cost-reducing pollution prevention options
were available. Implementation of these projects by the firms led to emission reductions
in the range of 5-100%, with an average reduction of 40%. Of the 45 pollution prevention
projects that were implemented, only three projects were cost-increasing, the others were
cost neutral (19 projects) or cost reducing (20 projects). Of these 20 cost-reducing pro-
jects, 16 projects had a payback period of less than one year, yielding very large cost
savings in some cases. Moreover, in many companies the preventive measures brought
indirect benefits also, such as improvements in product quality. Obstacles encountered in
the Project Industrial Successes with Pollution Prevention (PRISMA) were: conceptual
obstacles, organization obstacles, lack of knowledge, technical obstacles and economic
obstacles.^ • . . . . - . • - . . < ,- u ^ - , - , v , , ; r . - , . . , ; r ^ f •••• . v , - •-,.. . - . . - •
* N e l s o n a n d W i n t e r , 1 9 8 2 , o p e f t . -'•••'• ,-.-..•• , , - u ;• • , , . •-,.-.••.. ;•. • . . . , , , . .-
" Hans Dieleman and Sybren de Hoo, 1991, PRISMA: the Development of a Preventative, Multi
Media Strategy for Government and Industry, in Kurt Fisher and Johan Schot (eds.), 77K Greening o/
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It is unclear whether these obstacles — many of which are concerned with institu-
tional aspects — have certain implications for the choice of policy instrument. It may be
that economic instruments make pollution problems and losses of material more visible
and induce firms to engage in environmental management. There may also be room for
communicative instruments like environmental care systems, environmental audits or
requirements that force firms to communicate with the public (through information
disclosure laws). ... .., ,^  ,.,..., , , ., .
2.2.6 T7te supposed fradeo/jf between innovation in po/ZKfion confro/ and
norma/ business innovation ••*.,,•• •> := ,• : v^-iw! s .-.v-.< / •< v
Magat's model (1978) analyzes the effect of pollution control policies upon the path of
technological advance chosen by a polluting firm. The model assumes that there is a
tradeoff between innovation in pollution control and innovation in production technol-
ogy. Technical advance is allocated between technological advancement in output pro-
duction augmentation and effluent abatement augmentation along a innovation possibil-
ities frontier. This corresponds to economic presumptions that regulation stifles normal
business innovation and obstructs economic growth. Without going deeply into this
issue, we want to make a few critical remarks to the idea of such a tradeoff.
The idea that regulation leads to a diversion of innovation resources is only plau-
sible when it is the polluting firm that engages in R&D in pollution control and when
such R&D is financed out of the existing R&D budget (which may be constant or a set
percentage of turnover). It is hard to see the way in which R&D in the pollution control
industry affects the R&D decisions of polluting firms. Since most pollution control
technologies are developed by special firms in the pollution control industry, the
assumed tradeoff between R&D in pollution control and in production technology will
be weak.
The weak relationship between environmental policy and normal business innova-
tion is further affirmed by an OECD study that finds that, although there are examples
where a R&D-project in pollution control budget caused other innovation projects to be
cancelled or delayed, environmental pressures often modify or accelerate a programme
for improving production processes, because pollution abatement often joins the initial
objectives of energy and raw material conservation.^
Other studies, summarized in Rothwell (1992), confirm this. His conclusion is that
"the direct impact of regulation on the success or failure of individual innovation pro-
/ndusfn/: Research Needs and Po/iq/ /mp/icahons /or a Susfainab/e Future, Washington D.C.: Island Press,
pp. 245-275.
OECD, 1985, op cif, p.88.
51 • >;;.-..-u w,rtv: .!•,;: . :.w,,- CTwpter 2
jects was generally weak. Regulation was one of the many factors — and rarely the most
important-influencing innovatory outcome".*
To this we must add that even in those cases where regulation may have ham-
pered innovation, as in the pharmaceutical industry, these effects should only be com-
pared against a realistic alternative basis. As pointed out by Robert Leone, the industry
probably would have devoted resources to improving worker health and safety even if
there had been no Occupational Safety and Health Acts (OSHAct). This is because other
social and legal pressures existed, such as large tort or products liability damage
awards.*"
What about the possible tradeoff between environmental regulation and economic
growth? Does this hold true? In our view, also this tradeoff is doubtful. First, environ-
mental costs are only a small proportion of GNP (below 3 percent), even in countries
that instituted relatively strict environmental policies like Japan and the United States.
Second, and perhaps more important, even when national industries suffer from lower
sales due to higher environmental costs, this is compensated for at the macro level by
the production of pollution control technologies."' In addition, there may be environ-
mental constraints to current growth paths: pollution and soil erosion diminish agricul-
tural productivity, people's health and productivity are negatively affected by detrimen-
tal environmental conditions, and the economy may run out of cheap resources. It is
important to take this into account. As the study of Hung, Chang and Blackburn (1993)
shows, when there are serious environmental constraints, pollution control is no longer
a growth depressant."
• • > : * < t :
™ Roy Rothwell, 1992, Industrial Innovation and Government Environmental Regulation: Some
Lessons from the Past, Tec/imwaf/on, 12(7), p.454.
<° Nicholas A. Ashford, George R. Heaton Jr. and W. Curtiss Priest, 1979, Environmental, Health,
and Safety Regulation and Technological Innovation, in James M. Utterback and C. Hill (eds.),
JnnoiwfHm/or a Dynamic Economy, p. 172.
" According to a study of the Central Planning Bureau (CPB) in the Netherlands, the implementa-
tion of a 350 billion DF1 investment programme in environmental technology in the 1990-2010 period
would cause GNP (in constant prices) in 2010 to be 4.2% lower than the predicted increase of 99.4%.
If other countries adopt similar policies, the net effect on GNP is even positive (+0.5%) (Tweede
Kamer, 1989, Nad'onaa/ Mi'/jewte/eidsp/an. KiezCTi o/ tor/tezen (National Environmental Policy Pro-
gramme. To choose or to lose), publication 21137, nr.1-2, Den Haag, p.19). This illustrates that the net
effects of environmental policies on GNP are likely to be small.
" Victor T.Y. Hung, Pamela Chang and Keith Blackburn, 1993, Endogenous Growth, Environment
and R&D, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei discussion paper 23.93. ... , . , . . . ,.-...-
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2.3 Conclusions P 1^ r ( • ; : - !
At the end of the chapter, we summarize the main findings. In the chapter we described
the results of theoretic models that analyze and compare innovation in pollution control
under different policy regimes. The main findings of the models are: first, that incentive-
based instruments provide a greater spur to innovate in pollution control than direct
control does (if the innovator is a polluter and the level of emission reduction before
innovation is the same in all regimes); and second, that effluent fees (emission taxes)
lead the polluting firm to do too much R&D in pollution control and direct regulation
too little R&D when the marginal conditions of pollution abatement change as a result of
the innovation. These results are derived under a number of restrictive assumptions: the
innovation is firm-specific, the polluter is the innovator, and the innovation allows for
cost reductions for all levels of abatement. If the innovation is supplied by an outside
firm and the agency responds correctly to the change in marginal conditions, the results
are different: incentives for innovation are highest under direct regulation and lowest
under an emission tax.
The models can be subjected to several criticisms. First, innovator gains from
diffusion are neglected in all models, except Milliman and Prince (1989). The model of
Milliman and Prince is also the only model which considers political economy aspects of
policies by looking at the stance of the innovator and industry towards control adjust-
ment. The models do not analyze the policy-making process of environmental policies in
the context of technological uncertainty and sectoral pressures. This is an important
limitation because the stringency of the instrument which emerges out of the political
process may be more important than the instrument choice. Third, there is no realistic
account of the innovation process and technical change. The practical usefulness of the
models as a tool for public policy is believed to be limited.
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Pollutant emissions are examples of negative externalities in which the actions of one
party inflict harmful effects on others without consideration or compensation. This
results in a non-efficient allocation, as every economist knows. Policy makers that want
to arrest environmental degradation are confronted with the problem how to achieve
environmental improvements. A wide range of policy instruments for controlling pollu-
tant emissions are available: emission reduction standards, pollution taxes, subsidies and
t r a d e a b l e p o l l u t i o n p e r m i t s . ^ ' ' ••**•'• ^ ' - • ;~-^>'K/?>?;••>. . • - : / L V i ; ^ i ; : <*••;
Properties of pollution control instruments have been analyzed in theoretical
models by economists. As we noted in chapter two, most studies focused on the static
efficiency of different institutional arrangements. The effects of pollution control instru-
ments on technical change in pollution control received far less attention.
This chapter develops two models of government-induced innovation in pollution
control. The first model analyzes the effects of various pollution control instruments
(emission standards, taxes, tradeable permits, subsidies) on the amount of R&D in
pollution control and the level of emission reduction. The innovator is a profit-maximiz-
ing polluter who tries to minimize current costs, which consist of pollution abatement
costs, R&D costs and transfer payments (tax payments minus subsidies received). The
model is a neoclassical model in which information problems, time and the historical
context play no role.
The second model analyzes the circular relationship between government policy
and innovation in pollution control technology. It is a further development of Andries
Nentjes (1988). The model considers not only the impact of policy on technical change in
abatement technology but also the policy-making process, which depends on the innova-
tion possibilities. The model assumes that there exists a technology choice curve of new
technologies, of which the regulator has imperfect knowledge. In the model, the (risk-
averse) regulator balances the utility of a reduction in pollution against the disutility of
a lengthier compliance time and the increased uncertainty about the feasibility of a more
stringent standard. Nentjes' analysis is extended by the introduction of particular tech-
nology characteristics and industry heterogeneity in the model. The chapter also ana-
lyzes the innovation effects of two incentive-based policy instruments: a pollution tax
and a tradeable pollution permit.
' • * t
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3.1 A New Model of R&D in Pollution Control *?
The theoretical impact of environmental policies on innovation in pollution control has
been analyzed for the most part in graphical models that compare firm incentives for
innovation under various regulatory regimes — as in Zerbe (1970), Wenders (1975),
McHugh (1985), Downing and White (1986), and Milliman and Prince (1989). The general
conclusion from these models is that the benefits of technical change that reduces
emissions are higher under market instruments than under direct regulation. Technical
opportunities and the costs of developing new abatement technologies are exogenous.
This means that the graphical models are not able to foretell whether firms will engage
in R&D to produce a new abatement technology, and how much R&D they will under-
take. >.. •.. . . . _ - _ .
The R&D behaviour of a polluting firm has been modelled in two models only:
Magat (1978; 1979) and Mendelsohn (1984), the details of which have been described in
chapter 2. Magat's model is a dynamic model of factor-augmenting technical change, in
which there is a tradeoff between technical change in pollution control and technical
change in production technology. Mendelsohn is a static model which analyzes the
effects of an emission reduction standard and a pollution tax on innovation in pollution
control for the situation where the regulator is uncertain about the costs and benefits of
pollution control.
Our model differs from the above models in that it analyzes the R&D behaviour of
a polluting firm not only under an emission reduction standard, pollution tax and
tradeable permit but also under various subsidy schemes: an emission reduction subsidy,
an R&D subsidy and the combination of an R&D subsidy with a pollution tax. The basic
idea of the model is very simple: to reduce the costs of pollution control and any trans-
fer payments related to polluting emissions, the polluting firm may engage in R&D.
How much R&D the firm will undertake depends on the cost savings per unit of
emission reduction and the R&D costs.' The costs of pollution control and R&D are
described by the following expression:
*•*•• ' ' - ' - • C ( E R , R D ) = " * * ' * R D '' ( 1 )
(RD + 1)*
with ER emission reduction (0 < ER < 1), RD the amount of R&D (RD £ 0), and parame-
ters a > 1, 0 < b < 1, and a > 0. The abatement costs are described by the first term in
the right-hand side of equation (1). As we can see, the abatement costs depend on the
amount of R&D: by doing R&D the firm can diminish the costs of pollution abatement.
To simplify our analysis, the units of emissions have been redefined so that one unit of
' Throughout the analysis we assume that the gains from R&D in pollution control consist of
lower costs of pollution abatement and tax payments. R&D in pollution control does not influence
the sales of the polluting firm through a better environmental image nor does it provide the firm
with extra gains from selling the innovation.
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pollutants would be emitted in the absence of any controls. The amount of R&D is in
dollars.
The cost function, net of transfer payments, is chosen so that it satisfies certain
properties: 3C/9ER > 0, 3*C/9£R' > 0,3C/9RD < 0, and ^09RD* > 0 with £ = a ER V (RD +1)>
the abatement costs. This means that the costs of pollution abatement rise at an increas-
ing rate with abatement and that returns of R&D are increasing at a decreasing rate;
these are common economic assumptions about technology.
Under a regime of direct regulation, when there are no transfer payments, the firm
will minimize the above cost function under the contraints 0 < ER < 1 and RD > 0.
Under a tax regime, when the firm has to pay a tax p for each unit of pollution that is
emitted, the cost function to be minimized is:
C(£R,RD) = ° ^ " + RD + p ( l -ER) - . ^ ;=,»,• , (2)
p o l l u t i o n tax p (p > 0) ' •'-'• - ' " • ^ . ^ ' ^ ? ' ] ^ i
Equation (2) is the same as (1) with the exception of the term p(l - £R), the polluter's bil
for emitting pollutants.
With respect to the shape of the two cost functions, it can be shown that the above
cost functions are convex if (and only i f ) a - b - 2 > 0 (see appendix). This is an important
property because this allows us to judge whether or not the combination of (£R,RD) that
satisfies the necessary optimality conditions of the Lagrangian function is a (local)
minimum or a sadlepoint. As the reader may verify, the cost functions are continuous
differentiate functions of RD and ER (with RD and ER belonging to convex sets). «='
The Lagrange function for the cost function under a tax regime is: ' " ?-•. ' •
• ' L(£R,RD,X) = ° ^ + RD + p(l-ER) - X(l-ER) ^ ' - @>
(RD + 1)* ' -,•
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions, both necessary and sufficient for the problem at hand, are:
l £ = 0 ....(6)
dX.
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For RD > 0 and 0 < ER < 1 (which means that X = 0), we get the following results for
RDp, the optimal amount of R&D, and ER^ , , the optimal emission reduction (subscript p
stands for price rule):*
• I S *• H ' R ! a ; o C V r -',' • • ' • • - -
Minimization of equation (1) under the constraint ER > "EK(and the other constraints)
gives the optimal amount of R&D under direct regulation, RD^ (where <j stands for
quantity rule), and the optimal emission reduction ER,: ,,(. ,^ ,,-r W:- r^ - r ,.-j v ,.,.•:... .
^ - 1
ER, - T O • • ; . (10)
" ' ' ' with "El? the emissions reduction standard. ' ' • •»
Thus, under a regime of direct regulation the firm will not reduce its emissions above
the level of emission reduction that is required by law. .,, . . , , , , . , . ,
How do the above results under direct regulation compare with those under a tax
regime? Will the polluting firm undertake more R&D under a tax regime, and if so, how
much more R&D? What level of emission reduction will it choose under a tax regime
and under a command and control regime? To allow analytic comparisons we go back to
the situation where there is no innovation in pollution control, where the quantity rule
and price rule cause the same amount of emission reduction. In a world of perfect
information, with no technical change, the emission reduction under both regimes will
be the same if the pollution tax p equals the marginal cost of pollution abatement at the
emission reduction standard: that is, when p = MC(EK} which in our model is when
p = aa"E7T~.' Substitution of p = aaETT"' in the expressions for RD,, and ER^  gives
and 7TR":
' For the optimal combination (ER, RD) to be an interior solution"(i.e. RD > 0 and 0 < £R < 1) it is
necessary that ba £ 1.
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It can be shown that 7?U, > RD^ and E7? > ER = ER for RD > 0 and 0 < ER < 1
(see appendix). Thus, under a price rule (tax regime), the firm will undertake more R&D
and emission control than under direct regulation.
The optimal amount of R&D and pollution abatement under a tradeable permit regime
can also be determined. Suppose the firm gets (1 - £R) free permits. It it wants to pol-
lute more it must buy extra permits, if it emits less it can sell the unused permits.
Suppose the firm can buy and sell permits at a unit price of p'. The cost function C to be
minimized is now:
r» CD
C(£R,RD) = "** + RD + p'(EK-ER) (13)(RD + 1)'
Minimization of equation (13) with respect to ER and RD gives the same results as
under a tax regime, except that we now have p' instead of p. Thus, if p = p', that is, if the
permit can be bought or sold at a unit price p, the optimal amount of R&D and pollution
abatement is exactly the same as under a tax regime. (If p < p' (p > p'), the tradeable
permit regime leads to more (less) innovation in pollution control.)
Thus, under a tax or tradeable permit regime the firm will undertake more R&D
and more pollution abatement than under a command-and-control regime. This result
corresponds to findings of the graphical models. The reason why both the tax and
tradeable permit regime offer more inducement to innovate than direct regulation is
because under the incentive-based regimes, the innovator is able to exploit an extra gain
by further reducing its emissions. This is because the marginal benefits of extra
emissions reductions (in the form of a reduction of tax payments or revenues from
selling pollution permits) exceed the marginal costs of emission reduction (the sum of
abatement costs and R&D costs). Under direct regulation there is no incentive for the
polluter to reduce its emissions beyond the original level of emissions control since the
marginal benefits to the firm of such a step are zero.
We will now examine the effects of various kinds of subsidies on the polluting firm's
R&D behaviour and level of abatement. If the control agency pays an emission subsidy
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of s per unit of emission control to the firm, the amount of R&D, RD,, and the amount
of emission reduction, ER^, are:
RD-f^fir^-i (")
(15)
Thus, if the tax rate equals the emission subsidy (i.e., if p = s) then the same amount of
R&D and emission control will be undertaken, a result found also in the graphical firm
incentive models.
We will now analyze the innovation effects and amount of emission reduction
under subsidy arrangements: a lump sum subsidy and an R&D subsidy (combined with
an emission tax). As one would expect, a lump sum subsidy has no effect on the amount
of R&D that will be undertaken. (This is under the assumption that there are no financ-
ing problems for doing R&D and no alternative projects with a higher rate of return.) An
R&D subsidy, however, promotes innovatin in pollution control. When the firm receives
an R&D subsidy, s^, (with 0 < SRD < 1), the cost function changes in:
Minimization of (16), under the restriction that ER > ER~, gives the optimal amount of
R&D the firm will undertake if it receives an R&D subsidy under direct regulation:
' *"-Er)*-l-
, l - « , - J ^-'«>J '
Since ( l / ( l -s))"^ > l"** = 1, the firm will undertake more R&D if this is subsidized
than when it is not. This, of course, is also what one would expect. Combination of an
R&D subsidy with an emission tax gives a different result. The cost function the firm
will try to minimize becomes:
C(ER,RD) = + (l-Spn)KD + p(l-ER) (18)
(RD + 1)'
Minimization of the cost function with respect to RD and ER gives:
• 1 (19)
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Thus, as we can see, RD ^  > RD and £R ^ > £R for p,s > 0, that is, the firm will
undertake more R&D and emission control if R&D is subsidized.
The results are all straightforward and not surprising. The model is nothing more than a
small contribution to a well-established literature, the practical meaning of which is
limited. Many of the criticisms advanced in chapter 2 apply to this model. ; \, .,, ;r
3.2 A Model of Regulator Behaviour and Innovation in Pollu-
tion Control ' V ' ; a,.,., >
In chapter 2, we gave an overview of theoretical models of innovation in pollution
control. The common finding of most studies is that incentive-based environmental
policy approaches (like effluent charges or taxes, subsidies and tradeable pollution
permits) offer more inducement to innovate in pollution control than direct regulation.
This result is derived under a number of restrictive assumptions. One important as-
sumption is that the regulator possesses perfect information about the marginal costs
and benefits from pollution abatement. The technological implications of regulator
uncertainty about the costs and benefits of emissions reductions are examined in one
model only, Mendelsohn (1984), for the special case where the regulator is uncertain
about the locus — but not the slope — of the marginal cost curve of pollution abatement.
In actual practice, uncertainty about the costs and benefits of environmental
measures usually prevents the regulator from determing the optimal level of pollution
control, whereas practical problems of implementation, polluter's resistance and social
pressures make it difficult for the control agency even to oc/zieue a pollution abatement
goal. A model of innovation in pollution control which considers the problem of uncer-
tainty about abatement costs, especially for new technologies, and the control agency's
preferences and attitude towards risk is that of Andries Nentjes (1988). Nentjes' model
analyzes the emission standard set by an environmental agency and the effects on
innovation in pollution control for the situation where the regulator is uncertain about
the control efficiency, costs and time needed to develop new pollution control technolo-
gies. ,,..,. ;- .. , .,. - ,,- ..„„-.. ... . . . . .
In Nentjes' model, described in section 2.1, the regulator tries to maximize a prefer-
ence function U which is a function of r, the level of pollution reduction, f, compliance
time, and <(», a measure of uncertainty (which is a function of r). In choosing an emission
reduction standard, the environmental agency balances the utility of a reduction of
pollution against the disutility of a lengthier compliance time and the increased uncer-
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tainty about the feasibility of a more stringent standard. Thus, the regulator not only
selects a level of pollution abatement but also gives the polluting firm time to comply
with the emission reduction standard, which introduces a new element in the theoretical
literature.
Section 2.2 extends Nentjes' analysis. In our model, the regulator may choose a
different pollution control instrument: a pollution tax or a tradeable permit rather than
an emission reduction standard. Furthermore we analyze how regulation affects the
selection of different types of pollution control technologies: (curative) end-of-pipe
technology versus (preventive) process-integrated technology. And finally, we examine
the implications of sunk costs for the optimal level of emission reduction and compliance
time. The final section gives the conclusions.
3.2.1 Afenf/es' model „ _..„ ^
Nentjes' model is based on the economic theory of bureaucracy; it builds on the work of
Ames (1965) and Niskanen (1971), in which the government agency is motivated not by
the maximization of social welfare but by output maximization.^ In Nentjes' model, the
goal of the control agency is to maximize pollution reduction. The agency, however, will
not try to achieve emissions reductions at all costs: the abatement costs may not exceed
a certain level, Jfc^ ,. As in real life, the control agency is careful not to impose too large
costs on the polluting firm.
In the model, a higher control efficiency may be achieved through the use of new
pollution control techniques. The range of pollution control technologies runs from well-
known and proven technologies to highly uncertain technologies with high control
efficiencies. The different technological options open to a representative polluting firm
are depicted in Figure 3.1.
Envelope A: = fc(r) of the cost curves ^ is the technology choice curve. The shape of
the cost curves implies that the marginal costs of pollution abatement of the technologies
are increasing (3Jfc,-/dr > 0 and d*Jt;/3r* > 0). Figure 3.1 depicts the technology that is
necessary to realize a certain level of abatement efficiency. In the model, only part of the
envelope, interval J4B, consists of existing technologies. The other part of the envelope,
interval BE, represents expectations about new technologies with a higher control effi-
ciency at lower costs.*
' E. Ames, 1965, Soviet Economic Processes, Homewood; and W.A. Niskanen Jr., 1971, Bureaucracy
and Representative Government, Chicago.
* Note that the more advanced technologies are more expensive at low rates of pollution
reduction. This reason for this is that the fixed costs (R&D costs and installation) of new technologies
are higher than for less advanced technologies.
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Figure 3.1. The technology cost curves. Source: Nentjes (1988, p.5).
An important element in the model is that the regulator is uncertain about the
control efficiencies that may be achieved by the various technological options, and about
the costs and time involved in producing these technologies. It is assumed that this
uncertainty, represented by parameter <)), increases along the envelope, going from B to
£. The regulator knows however that by giving the polluting firm more time to comply
that the costs of producing the innovation may be reduced. In other words, there exists
a fime-R&D cost trade-off.
After having described the model in general terms, we will now define it more
formally. The regulator maximizes a preference function (21) under the constraints of the
cost function (22), the compliance time function (23), the uncertainty function (24) and
the cost ceiling (25).
(21)u = u(r,f,<|>)
with w, > 0, «„ < 0, u, < 0, u,, < 0, u^  < 0, M^ < 0
* = *(r,0
with fc, > 0, fc,, > 0, fc, < 0, it,, > 0, for t > f^ ,
f = f(r)
with f, > 0, *„ > 0
(22)
(23)
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(24)
w i t h <|), > 0, <|>,, > 0
fc < Jt (25)
max * '
Jt
max
The unknown parameters r, f, <|> have to be solved from the above model. In Nentjes'
paper, the focus in on r, the emission reduction standard, and on compliance time t.
Two regimes can be distinguished, depending on whether or not the cost ceiling is
binding. When the cost ceiling is nof binding, the formal problem is to maximize (21)
under the constraints (23) and (24). Optimization gives:
t, - 4 - ^ (26)
Equation (26) implies that the standard is set at the level where the compliance time
needed for one additional unit of pollution reduction (f,) is equal to the willingness of
the regulator to allow more compliance time for additional pollution reduction (-w,/u,)
minus the impact of extra pollution abatement on uncertainty (<j>,), 'translated' into time-
costs. The trade-off (-«^/«,) measures the degree of risk aversion of the regulator.
Optimization of the preference function, under a binding cost ceiling, gives the
same optimum condition (26). The interpretation of the optimum condition however is
somewhat different. The trade-off df /dr = -«,/u, is now determined by the cost constraint
(df/dr = Jtyifc,). A rise in control efficiency can be obtained at unchanged costs by accept-
ing a longer compliance period and some additional uncertainty about the innovation
result. Thus, even if the abatement costs of existing technologies are the maximum of
what is acceptable to the regulator, technical change in pollution control is still possible
if polluters are given time to comply with more strict regulation. Hence, the use of
compliance time by policy makers may stimulate technological advance in pollution
control.
In terms of Figure 3.1, the regulator may choose point B on the technology choice
curve, the best available abatement technology, or a point between B and £ which means
that the regulator imposes a standard which is tighter than the control efficiency of well-
tried abatement technology. The regulator will choose a point between B and D when
there is a range of relatively cheap and well-explored technologies of which the uncer-
tainty is believed to be relatively low. However, the disutility of increasing compliance
time and uncertainty about the feasibility and costs of more advanced technologies keeps
him from choosing a point between D and £. Thus, a risk-averse regulator with a high
time preference and a low cost ceiling will choose a point on the technology choice curve
not far from point B. In such a situation there is little incentive for the polluting firm to
develop innovations with a higher control efficiency. According to Nentjes, this has been
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the situation in Europe, where cost ceilings have often been chosen on the basis of well-
known and relatively cheap available abatement technologies.
3.2.2 Extensions o/ Afenf/es' mode/
This section extends Nentjes' model in two ways: First, by studying the innovation
effects of two other policy instruments, a pollution tax and a tradeable permit, and
second, by examining the implications of environmental regulation for the nature of
technical change (whether it is in abatement technology or process-integrated technology
and whether it is incremental or radical). Furthermore, we will adapt some of the mod-
el's assumptions.
In Nentjes' model, both compliance time t and uncertainty <j> are a function of the
level of emission reduction r. In our model, compliance time f is not a simple function of
r but a control variable. By choosing a high f, the regulator reduces uncertainty about
the feasibility of the standard and diminishes the costs of developing a technology with
a higher control efficiency (due to the time-R&D cost tradeoff). The reason behind
choosing a high f is that this allows the regulator to set a higher r — the extra utility of
which will be balanced against the disutility from a higher f. Our model also differs
from Nentjes's model in that we abandon the assumption of a representative polluting
firm but allow for industry heterogeneity with respect to the costs of pollution abate-
ment — which means that some firms may achieve emissions reductions at lower costs
than others.
To summarize, we assume that $ and A: are a function of both r and f. This means
that we do not substitute f = f(r) in the utility function but maximize u with respect to r
and f. In addition, our analysis assumes that the industry is heterogeneous with respect
to the costs of pollution control.
Redefining Nentjes' model gives: * , • • • , . . -
• •:."--• . . • * A.I » ^i y
'*- '•' *.•'*'• <|> = <))(r,£) i w ' M <)> < 0
T h e o p t i m a l i t y c o n d i t i o n s of t h e m o d e l a r e : .J : !-ia--<». ;^-i
, ' , - . . ' ; . • !
' ' * " ' * - - ' r . "• *
• • v ; r - •. - . .
(28)
i .v
.;;« • (29)
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.0 j ^ . = 0 =* u^  + l^ <)>, = 0 W-ki-J « A h (31)
= 0 => u, + t^ ()>, = 0 ^ ;•; (32)
These equations demonstrate that in the optimum, the marginal utility from extra
emission reduction r (or a shorter compliance time f) is compensated by the decrease in
utility due to the higher amount of uncertainty caused by the extra emission reduction
(or shorter compliance period). Combining equations (31) and (32) gives:
u = u " • « • < - • , ) ,«, .., ... - (33)
We will now extend the analysis by broadening the range of possible policies open to
the regulator. Rather than setting an emission reduction standard, the regulator may
institute a pollution tax (or effluent charge) p per unit of emission.
As in Nentjes' model, we assume that the regulator wants to maximize some utility
function, but is uncertain about the costs of abatement and about the level of abatement
that polluting firms will undertake in response to the tax. The model which describes
regulatory behaviour under a pollution tax is given below:
^ • - , - ! . « = «(f<p),40 - - •:••-< <:dv>=mM< (3*)
with r(p) the expected emission reduction of an average firm in response to pollution tax
p, and - .. - . . . - : . . . . .. . . , , . . , . „ , , . .;
with fc(p) the expected abatement costs for the polluting industry subject to tax p and p(l-
r) the tax payments the industry has to pay for emitting pollutants. (For simplicity, we
have redefined the number of emissions before abatement at 1).
••-••' < | ) = ( | > ( r ( p ) , i f c ( p ) ) - - • •'• • < : 3 ? = • : : » ' ( 3 6 )
••""" " " " ' " - ^ 1 T > , M , - ' * - ' X - ' ' - . . . 'V * V ^ ' ' * ^ " " " * "'• •"""'"'* '•"• (37)
• " ' • ' • ^ ? ^ - ' ' ' : . . m a x
Utility is a function of the expected emission reduction that will be produced by the
polluting industry and of uncertainty. Note that there are two forms of uncertainty:
uncertainty about the actual level of emission reduction and uncertainty about the
industry's abatement costs.' Both types of uncertainty are incorporated in the uncer-
The industry's abatement costs are the sum of the costs of pollution control of the individual
firms. Transfer payments are not included in this sum. .. . _. ,..„....
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tainty function, whereas in Nentjes' model they are included in one parameter. For
matters of comparison, the uncertainty function under direct regulation is changed in <j>
Optimization of the agency's utility function «(r(p),()>) gives:
?Kw ^ H v - — - ^ •*-.:.:• „ ^ ^ , )
The optimality condition under a command-and-control regime is:
The interpretation of equation (38) is very much the same as that of equation (39). For
the optimal level of the pollution tax, the expected extra utility from emission reduction
from a higher tax is equal to the decrease in utility due to the greater uncertainty caused
by the higher tax. This extra uncertainty consists of uncertainty about the industry's
pollution behaviour and uncertainty about the costs of abatement.
There are also some differences between the optimality conditions in equation (38)
and (39). The two most important differences are the differences in Jt and <|>. As regards
the difference in fc, it is well known that direct regulation is not a cost-effective system
for achieving emissions reductions when the costs of pollution abatement differ between
firms. An emission reduction standard that requires all polluters to achieve the same
amount of emission reduction is likely to impose large costs on some polluters and, as a
result, to violate the economic efficiency condition which requires that the marginal costs
of pollution abatement equal the marginal social benefits of abatement.' Under the tax
regime, however, a profit-maximizing polluter will only pursue emissions control to the
point at which the marginal cost of emission control per unit equals the tax. That is, the
firm cannot be forced to undertake emissions control of which the marginal costs are
higher than the pollution tax. Thus, under a price rule, the same emission reduction may
be achieved at lower abatement costs. This has a positive effect on the willingness of
policy makers to set a tax with a high r(p). However, the abatement costs are not the
only environmental cost under a tax regime. Under a tax regime, polluters must pay a
tax for emitting pollutants. This means that the total environmental costs for industry
may be f»g/ier under a tax regime than under a command-and-control regime with r(p) =
r, despite the efficiency gains under a tax regime. This has received little attention in the
economic literature. Firms and government authorities, however, are well aware of this:
it explains the fierce opposition from industry against pollution taxes and the reluctance
of policy makers to institute taxes unilaterally.
The implications of the above for the rate of technical change in pollution control
are relatively straightforward. If the total environmental costs for industry under a tax
' Differentiation of emission reduction standards diminishes the disadvantage of cost inefficiency
but leads to higher control costs for the control agency; it is also viewed as not fair if some firms are
subjected to more strict standards than others. ., . , , ., . ,„ , . . . , „ . , ,
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with r(p) = *" ^ e higher than the costs under the uniform emission reduction standard,
the regulator will institute a low pollution tax, that is, a pollution tax of which r(p) < r.
This means that under a tax regime, due to the low level of the tax, firms will undertake
/ess R&D in pollution control than under a command-and-control regime. This con-
clusion differs from the common result of innovation models that pay no attention to the
policy-making process. The tax regime only provides a greater spur to innovate when
the efficiency gain from lower abatement costs exceeds the tax payments. In most cir-
cumstances this is not the case.
What about the innovation effects of a system of fradeaWe permits? Are they the
same as those of the tax regime? The answer is no. A system of free tradeable pollution
permits provides a r^eflfer spur to innovation in pollution control than a tax regime. It
also provides a greater inducement to innovate than a command-and control regime.
This is because a tradeable permit system combines the advantage of a tax system with
that of a command-and-control regime: environmental improvements are achieved at the
lowest costs and there is no uncertainty about the total level of emission reduction. In
terms of our model, it means that fc(r*) < max[fc(r(p)),fc(r)] and <)>(/*) = «(>(r,f) < <|>(r(p)) for
r* = r(p) = r, with r* the level of emission reduction under a tradeable permit regime. As
a result, r* > max[r(p),r]. This means that a free tradeable permit system provides the
greatest spur to innovation in pollution control technology of the three systems. Note
that when the government auctions the (1-r*) permits, the innovation effect would be
higher, but this is not a realistic assumption: the regulator will not grant such a limited
number of permits because this would impose high environmental costs on industry.
The effects of compliance time on innovation in pollution control technology also
can be determined. As explained, compliance time reduces regulator uncertainty about
abatement costs ((j>, < 0), and helps to diminish the costs of emission (Control (since It, <
0). Both effects result in a higher value for r (the level of emission reduction at time f). In
other words, as in Nenrjes' model, compliance time has a positive influence on innova-
tion in pollution control.
' V . n '': •<';:;:••>!!;-.7/''.. • : ' ' • - . . ' . - . " ' . ^ • • : ; V . - " : J > ^ - ' : ,,'sii-.••••••.-<!« \ - i k j • •
The model may also be used to assess the effects of different control regimes on the
choice of pollution control technology, for instance, the choice between end-of-pipe or
process-integrated technologies. As pointed out in chapter 5, process-integrated technol-
ogies suffer from a sunk cost disadvantage because usage of these technologies often
requires the replacement of existing production facilities. If firms are forced to reduce
their emissions in a relatively short period, they will decide for end-of-pipe technologies
that can be added to the existing processes. This is exactly what happened in the 1970s
and 1980s when environmental policy was oriented at achieving quick emission reduc-
tions by way of direct regulation. These regulations gave polluters little freedom with
respect to timing and choice of environmental measures to reduce pollution. If incentive-
based instruments like pollution taxes and tradeable permits had been used, the share of
process-integrated technologies probably would have been higher.
Similarly, if firms are given (more) time to comply with more strict emission
reduction standards, the sunk cost factor will become less important. In terms of the
, " • : - • - • • . ' • . • " ' . " • • i , - • • • • • . • • : . . ' . - v
• . - . • • • • . • • • • • = • • • - . . . . • • . . • * . ; , • • • • • . • • • . . • , • . . • • . • ;
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model, the difference between fc(r,0) and fc(r,t) is higher for process-integrated technol-
ogies than it is for end-of-pipe technologies. Figure 3.2 illustrates this.
eop pi
k (r,0) < k (r,0)
pi eop
k (r,t) < k(r,t)
Figure 3.2. The abatement cost curves of an end-of-pipe (eop) and
process-integrated (pi) technology for different f.
Figure 3.2 demonstrates that if firms are forced to comply immediately with an emission
reduction standard r, they will adopt an end-of-pipe technology (since A "^(r,0) < fc^(r,0)).
If they are given time to comply with the standard, they will choose the process-inte-
grated technology (because Jf^r,*) > if"(r,0)- This means that compliance time is not only
an effective way to foster innovation in pollution control but also stimulates the adop-
tion of preuenfiw process-integrated technologies. It furthermore illustrates how the
design of policy instruments may be used to offset some of the disadvantages of particu-
lar instruments in effecting change in environmental technology.
The same arguments apply to the choice between incremental and radical innova-
tions. The short-term costs of developing a radical innovation with large environmental
benefits are usually high so that innovator firms will opt for incremental improvements
of existing technologies. Again, innovation waivers and the use of economic instruments
are a possible way out of this problem.
3.2.3 Swmman/ a«rf COHC/WSIOMS
In this section, we advanced a model of regulatory behaviour and innovation in pollu-
tion control. The model is believed to be interesting for considering the policy-making
process in the context of technological uncertainty, something that the models in chapter
2 failed to do. The model, developed by Andries Nentjes, demonstrates, that the prefer-
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ence of a risk-averse regulatory agency for short-term environmental benefits has a
negative impact on innovation in pollution control. One way to deal with this problem is
to give firms time to comply with emission reduction standards through innovations
waivers.
The model is then used to study regulatory behaviour and technical change under
two incentive-based control regimes: a pollution tax and a tradeable pollution permit. It
is shown that in most circumstances a tax regime provides less inducement to innovation
in pollution control technology than direct regulation. This is because the government
will set the tax at a low level in order not to impose too high environmental costs on
industry. We then show that a free tradeable permit system that combines elements of
both systems provides the greatest incentive to innovate in pollution control.
Finally, we examined the technological implications of different policy regimes on
the nature of technical change. We find that direct regulation favours end-of-pipe tech-
nologies and incremental technology improvements. The overall conclusion of the model
is that innovation waivers and tradeable quota are better instruments to promote innova-
tion in pollution control than direct regulation is. Of course, to assess the merits and
demerits of policy instruments one must also look at other aspects: the likelihood of
interest groups to capture policies, transaction costs, and the commitment of the gov-
ernment to carry forward the programme over an extended period.
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Appendix 3.A: Convexity of function
; " : l i ; - ! E ! • , : ! • ! ? • • - : ; ; •.:•..-.'. ; - . / \ . • . : . • • . ; . : • J ; ! 1
F u n c t i o n C ( £ R , R D ) i s c o n v e x i f a n d o n l y if: ' ;'•'' ' ;- - ; q * . - u * • .•• , •
) - • : • . . : • ! j j j . : ; • • • • / '
^^ >o
aERdRDj
V • r - • • : . • , " . , , • - • • ! < • : • : : . • :•; O L , ; I . . J
^ C ow(«l)ER _ , , . 3C ab(b+l)£R „Since = i i > 0 for a > 1 and = i i > 0
3£R^ (RD + 1)» 3 * *^
function C(£R,RD) satisfies the first condition. ,
With respect to the second condition:
(RD + 1)*
Thus, A(ER,RD) > 0 => a(a-l)b(b+l) > b V <=> («-l)(fc+l) > ba » fl-l-b > 0 D
Appendix 3.B: The Ranking of KD,, RD, and
The optimal amount of R&D under a price and quantity rule are:
- 1 and RD^  ( )
Since a - l > a - b - l > 0 ^ > 1 whereas < 1 we get,
a - b - 1 b+1
"RU > RD if baETT > 1 (the necessary condition for "RI7 > 0).
Similarly, IK , = ( b V
= ER" = ER^  for 107^ > 0 D
' M.H.C. Paardekoper and L.R.J. Westerman, 1978, Analyse I (Appendix), Theorem B.3, lecture
notes, propedeuse Econometrics, Tilburg.
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An Interpretative Survey of Technological
Diffusion Models ^
The effectiveness of policy measures to limit environmentally hazardous emissions
depends on the extent to which they induce polluters to reduce the flow of pollutant
emissions. Although such emissions reductions may be achieved in various ways, they
are usually realized through the application of pollution control technologies or the
usage of low-emission processes and products. This implies that possible improvements
in environmental qualities are a function of the rate of application or dij^ wston of environ-
ment-saving products and processes. The aim of this chapter is to give an overview of
technological diffusion models and to theorize about the appropriate diffusion model for
describing the growth in ownership of technological innovations.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 1 introduces the two main models of
technological diffusion: the epidemic and rational choice model. The epidemic model is
described in section 2. The rational choice model of technological diffusion is described
in section 3. Section 4 examines which model may be used best to analyze the diffusion
process of various sorts of technological innovations in different adopter environments.
We will argue that there is no single best model for analyzing the diffusion of techno-
logical innovations. The choice of the appropriate diffusion model should be based on
the characteristics of the adopter environment (whether potential adopters are consumers
or firms), the economic characteristics of the technology (purchase price, operating costs,
performance), and changes therein, and learning of potential users about the technology.
4.1 Introduction ^ : , J ,
What makes the diffusion of technological innovations an important issue for social
study is that economic welfare depends on the rate at which new technologies are
adopted and put into use. As Nathan Rosenberg writes: "new techniques exert their
economic impact as a function of the rate at which they displace older techniques and
the extent to which the new techniques are superior to the old ones".' Although the
above statement refers to productivity-increasing and utility-enhancing technological
innovations, something similar applies to environment-saving innovations: that the
benefits of low-emission technologies are a function of the rate of applica-
' Nathan Rosenberg, 1976, Factors Affecting the Diffusion of Technology, in Perspectives on
Tertmo/ogy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.189.
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tion of these technologies and the extent to which they are more environmentally benign
than comparable processes and products.
Being a topic of considerable social and economic significance, the diffusion of
technological innovations has been studied by sociologists, anthropologists, economists,
and marketing and management scientists. In his 1983 book "Diffusion of Innovations",
Everett Rogers reports of 3,085 diffusion publications, 2,297 of which were empirical
research reports.^ The bulk of these studies were performed in a relatively short period,
starting in the late fifties. The primary aim of such studies was, as Paul Stoneman writes,
to rationa/ize if/zy, i/a neu; fec/ino/ogy is supen'or, it is not tafcen up immediate/y by a// potential
users.*
In the study of the diffusion of technological innovations, various theoretical
models have been developed and employed to describe the diffusion of a wide range of
technological innovations. These models of innovation diffusion can be divided into two
broad categories: the epidemic diffusion models (divided into models that incorporate
economic factors and those that do not), and the rafiona/ c/ioice diffusion models in which
the aggregate diffusion pattern is the result of economic decision making by individual
adopters. In the first type of models, the system adjusts to a new equilibrium, whereas
in the second type of models economic actors are in equilibrium.
4.2 The Epidemic Diffusion Model
V i l l
The starting point of theoretical analysis of technological diffusion was the epidemic
model stemming from mathematical biology. The epidemic model was used by econom-
ists Zvi Griliches (1957) and Edwin Mansfield (1961) and is still the most widely used
model in marketing and management sciences.* The characteristic property of the epi-
demic model is that the diffusion process of a technological innovation is being gov-
erned by an endogenous process of learning and taste formation through personal
contact or observation. Just as an infectious disease may spread through contact of
individuals, so will a new technology. Perhaps the best-known epidemic model is the
/ogistic model. Both Griliches (1957) and Mansfield (1961) used the logistic model in their
intra-sector and inter-industry diffusion studies. The logistic model is described by the
differential equation:
' Everett M. Rogers, 1983, Dijjteion o/ Jnnozwf ions. New York: Free Press, p . XV. ' " " ' - • • • • '
' Paul Stoneman, 1983, T/ie Economic /Ina/ysis o/ Tectow/oigica/ C/wn^e, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, p.65. . . , , , , , ... .. . . ^ , ,,.. ^ ^ , , , , ^ ^ . ^ . . ,„ = , , ,<. . .^ . . . ^ , P ^ . , , , . . ^ « ,
* Zvi Griliches, 1957, Hybrid Corn: An Exploration in the Economics of Technical Change.
Econometrica, 25: 501-522; and Edwin Mansfield, 1961, Technical Change and The Rate of Imitation,
fl, 29: 741-766 (also published as chapter 7 of his 1968 book Jndusfria/ Researc/i ami Tedmo/-
/nruroa/ion.- /In Econometric Ana/ysis, New York: Norton). , , , , , . ,._, _.^ „ ,„..,,.,,.. ,
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with n, the number of individuals (consumers, firms) that have contracted the disease
(adopted the innovation) at time f, N the size of the population of people who may get
the disease (the potential adopters), and B the parameter reflecting the likelihood of
contracting the disease. Thus, the number of new infections (adoptions) at period f is
equal to the number of uninfected persons (remaining potential adopters), N - n,, multi-
plied by the probability of infection (adoption), which is the product of proportion of the
populations infected (already adopters) at time f, n,/N, and the parameter B, which is
dependent upon a number of factors such as the infectiveness of the disease and the
frequency of contact, both of which are assumed to be constant. Parameter B may rea-
sonably be called the speed 0/ dij^ wsion, though it is not the growth of diffusion.'
Equation (1) states that the number of (new) adopters is a function of the number
that have already adopted the innovation, n,, which reflects the idea that a basic charac-
teristic of the epidemic model is imitative behaviour or "bandwagon" effects. It should be
noted that whereas the probability of adoption increases over time, the number of new
adopters decreases after a certain point (which is when n,/W = 0.5) due to the decreasing
number of non-adopters. This leads to a bell-shaped frequency distribution for numbers
adopting over time. The cumulative number of adopters is described by a sigmoid (S-
shaped) logistic curve which asymptotically approaches the saturation level N.' The
logistic curve is depicted in Figure 4.1.
Most empirical investigations of the logistic model are straightforward, using linear
regression analysis on the transformation of equation (1):
(2)
Both Griliches in his 1957 study of hybrid corn and Mansfield in his 1961 study of the
diffusion of twelve innovations in American industry estimated the above equation (with
an error term added on the right-hand side). In a second stage, the estimates of the
speed of diffusion |} are used as the dependent variable in a cross-section analysis, to
* The above description stems from Colin G. Thirtle and Vernon W. Ruttan, 77ic Ro/e 0/ Demand
and Supp/y /'n the Generation and Dijfj'usion 0/ Tecftnica/ C/wnge, Chur: Harwood Academic Publishers,
pp.80-81 (who base themselves on Stephen Davies, 1979, TTie Di/Jiision 0/ Process /nmrofltions, Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.9-11).
' Solving equation (1) gives the number of adopters as a function of time:
N . . . . . . .
n = with a the constant of integration. ,<> . :-•;•*..••»-,* ,. -,•.,- . . .?J
l + e x p ( - a - p f ) - i 8 s a > - : v . - r . > ^ , i r ^ t . ^ b « r ? ' -
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analyze the impact of certain industry characteristics and product characteristics (like the
profitability of the innovation and investment costs) on the diffusion process/
Figure 4.1. The logistic curve. Source: Thirtle and Ruttan (1987, p.81).*
Despite its wide application and its success in describing empirically the diffusion
process of technological innovations, the logistic curve is based on a number of rather
stringent assumptions. These are spelled out by Davies: First, the infectiousness of the
disease must remain constant over time for all individuals. In other words, P must be
' For a critical discussion of the empirical studies by Mansfield (1961) and Griliches (1957), see
Davies op dt, pp.13-19 and Robert Dixon, 1980, Hybrid Corn Revisited, Econometrics, 48(6): 1451-1462,
respectively.
The distinction in adopter categories is from Rogers, op cit.
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constant. (If P falls (increases) over time the growth curve will be positively (negatively)
skewed.) Second, all individuals must have an equal chance of catching the disease. In
other words, p is the same for all groups within the population. Third, the population of
adopters is constant irrespective of the changes that may occur in the adoption environ-
ment (shifts of preferences, changes in people's wealth) or in the technology (improve-
ments, price changes). Fourth, the possibility of cures and reinfection (leading to mul-
tiple purchases) is ruled out.'
Other epidemic diffusion models that have been used (quite) extensively to
describe empirically the aggregate diffusion pattern of a technological innovation are the
Gompertz-model, a positively skewed model with an inflection point at n,/N = 0.37
(instead of 0.5 as in the logistic model), the lognormal model, and, especially in market-
ing, the Bass model. Of these models, the Bass model is most often used to predict
future product sales. Several companies, including Eastman Kodak, RCA, IBM, Sears,
and Hewlett-Packard, have employed the model and variations of it for forecasting pur-
poses.'" A description of the Bass model is given below." As other epidemic models,
the Bass model assumes that the central mechanism behind the diffusion patterns is the
transmission of information through communication. However, unlike the logistic model,
it makes a distinction between two means of communication: mass media and word of
mouth. Adopters are divided into two groups: people that are influenced only by mass-
media communication, called "innovators", and those that are influenced only by word-
of-mouth communication, termed as "imitators". The Bass model derives from a hazard
function (which gives the probability that an adoption will occur at time f given that it
has not occurred before) given in equation (4): ,. * '""
J[0 .
l-F(f)
(4)
The density function of time to adoption is given by /(() and the cumulative fraction of
adopters at time f is given by F(t). This basic premise states that the conditional prob-
ability of adoption at time f (the fraction of the population that will adopt at time f) is
increasing in the fraction of the population that has already adopted. As in the logistic
model, this reflects learning and imitation on the part of potential adopters (internal
influence). However, the conditional probability of adoption also depends on parameter
p which reflects an extenza/ influence, independent of the fraction of previous adopters.
' Davies, op at, pp.11-13.
'° Frank M. Bass, 1980, The Relationship Between Diffusion Rates, Experience Curves, and
Demand Elasticities for Consumer Durable Technological Innovations, /ouma/ 0/ Business, S51.
" The following description of the Bass model (1969) stems from Vijay Mahajan, Eitan Muller and
Frank M. Bass, 1992, New Product Diffusion Models in Marketing: A Review and Directions for
Research, in NebojSa NakifenoviC and Arnulf Griibler (eds.), 1992, Dijjj'wsion 0/ Tec/zno/ogies and Soda/
Be/zawour, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, pp.125-178 (the article was originally published in the Jounw/ of
M k g , 1990, pp.1-26).
For the purpose of comparison, we rewrite the Bass model in a form with which we are
already familiar:
J!i=p(N-n,)+«Aw-n,) (5)
If we compare equation (5) with (1) we see that the two equations are identical except
for the term p(N - n,) on the right-hand side. In fact, the Bass model combines the nega-
tive exponential model used by Fourt and Woodlock (1960) and the earlier discussed
logistic model." In the Bass model, the first term, p(N - n,), represents adoptions due to
buyers who are not influenced in the timing of their adoption by the number of people
that have already bought the product. This term gradually decreases over time due to
the fact that the number of people that have not yet adopted at time f, N - «,, is decreas-
ing with time. The second term in equation (5), ^(n,/N)(N - «,), represents adoptions due
to buyers who are influenced by the number of previous buyers. This term increases up
to a certain point in time, after which it starts to decrease. Bass (1969) refers to p as the
"coefficient of innovation" and to 9 as the "coefficient of imitation", although, as noted by
Lekvall and Wahlbin (1973), it is probably better to speak of the coefficients of external
and internal influence, respectively."
Being a flexible diffusion model, the Bass model has been successfully applied in a
number of empirical studies of the diffusion of new consumer durables. The model is
interesting in that it allows for independent decision making on the basis of product
information supplied by the producer through promotional advertising. In the logistic
model, only word-of-mouth effects determine the aggregate diffusion pattern. The Bass
model may also be used to analyze the effects of promotional advertising on the diffu-
sion process, which has been attempted by some diffusion students.
There are, however, a number of problems with the Bass model. First, as noted by
Tanny and Derzko (1988), the mathematical formulaton of the Bass model does not
correspond to the original qualitative description of the diffusion process by Frank Bass
in his 1969 article, in which there are two dichotomous classes of individuals (innovators
and imitators) with inherently different response characteristics to new products. They
rightly point out that the Bass model does not really abandon the assumption of a
homogeneous population. What the model does is to distinguish between internal and
external influence. As Tanny and Derzko write:
The Bass-model implicitly assumes that individuals in the population are homogene-
ous with respect to their behaviour regarding the adoption decision. That is, all
individuals in the population implicitly must be assumed to have intrinsic innova-
" L.A. Fourt and J.W. Woodlock, 1960, Early Prediction of Market Success for New Grocery
Products, /ourrw/ o/Mar*rtmg, 25: 31-38.
" P. Lekvall and C. Wahlbin, 1973, A Study of Some Assumptions Underlying Innovation Diffu-
sion Functions, Su#<iis/i /ounw/ o/ Economics, 75: 362-377.
/In mferpretefroe survey 0/ diffusion models 79
five and imitative tendencies in some fixed, common proportion. Whether an indi-
vidual ultimately adopts the product as a result of this tendency to innovate or
through contact with an adopter is a process affecting all individuals in the same
way.'*
This induced Tanny and Derzko to reformulate the Bass model in line with the beha-
vioural assumptions of its original description by Bass (1969) where innovators and
imitators constitute two distinct but interacting subpopulations. Estimation of the two-
compartment model, however, resulted in unsatisfactory model estimation results, which
casts some doubt on the appropriateness of the innovator-imitator dichotomy. Secondly,
several of the objections to the logistic model also apply to the Bass model (a fixed
adopter population, the only diffusion mechanism is the transmission of information,
constant diffusion parameters, the absence of differences in the propensity to adopt
within each subpopulation, etc.). ^ ,
The logistic model, the Gompertz model and the Bass model (or the generalized logistic
as some people have called it) have been extended in several ways to mirror any specific
form of the diffusion pattern. In marketing and management science, several /Zext'We
diffusion models have been suggested and empirically applied." In Hernes (1976), the
constant diffusion parameter p of the logistic model is replaced by a time-varying (i-
coefficient (P = Ab' in which f stands for time)." For values of b < 1, the diffusion path
is positively skewed and for values of b > 1 it is negatively skewed. The model of
Easingwood, Mahajan and Muller (1983) adapts the Bass model in that the coefficient of
internal influence (the word-of-mouth effect) varies with the number of adopters (a
factor (n,/W is added to 9)."
Not surprisingly, these flexible diffusion models yielded better fits than the original
models they extended. However, as being epidemic models dealing with the diffusion in
the aggregate they can be subjected to a number of criticisms. These are summarized in
a survey article by Paul Stoneman: i) the potential adopters are considered homogene-
ous, ii) information sources are all internal (i.e., information does not come from outside
the set of adopters), iii) the decision-theoretic framework does not really capture the
essence of decision making under uncertainty, iv) the technology is assumed not to
" S.M. Tanny and N.A. Derzko, 1988, Innovators and Imitators in Innovation Diffusion Models,
/ourna/ 0/ Forecasting, 7: 225-234.
" For a survey of flexible epidemic diffusion models, see Vijay Mahajan and Robert A. Peterson,
Mode/s /or /nnotwtion Dijfl'usion, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, and the chapter by Mahajan ef a/ in
the earlier-referred book Di^ iuston 0/ Tec/ino/ogies and Soc/a/ C/wnge.
" Gudmund Hernes, 1976, Diffusion and Growth - The Non-Homogeneous Case, Samdntawort
/ourna/ 0/ Economics, 78: 427-436.
" Christopher J. Easingwood, Vijay Mahajan and Eitan Muller, 1983, A Nonuniform Influence
Innovation Diffusion Model of New Product Acceptance, Management Science, 2(3): 273-293.
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change over time, and v) the treatment of risk, uncertainty and information acquisition
has been considered very inadequate."
A further drawback of the first generation of epidemic models is that they are
silent about how the diffusion process is affected by changes in economic factors (pur-
chase price, factor prices, profitability, incomes), this while the decision to adopt a
technological innovation is largely an economic decision." There have been attempts
however to incorporate economic variables explicitly into an epidemic model — instead
of in an indirect way as in the studies by Griliches and Mansfield referred to previously.
We will now describe some of these epidemic models in which the diffusion process is
affected by changes in economic variates. Gregory Chow (1967) was perhaps the first
who modified the epidemic model to incorporate other economic factors in a tech-
nological diffusion model in his study of the usage of general-purpose digital computers
in the United States in the 1954-67 period.™ In his analysis, the diffusion process is the
outcome of both epidemic learning and improvements in the quality-price ratio of the
innovation that raise the equilibrium level. His model is a stock-adjustment model in
which the growth of computer usage at time f is proportional to the difference between
the actual stock and the equilibrium stock.
In Stephen Glaister (1974), the diffusion speed P is made a function of price p."
Glaister analyzes the optimal price strategy and optimal advertising policy (when hold-
ing price constant) of a monopolist supplier. As one would expect in an epidemic model
in which the diffusion process is driven by endogenous factors, it is optimal for the
monopolistic supplier to set a low price initially (forward pricing) and engage in rela-
tively heavy advertising in the early stages to encourage early growth of users.
In Dan Horsky and Leonard Simon (1983) the effect of advertising expenditures on
the diffusion process is also analyzed." In the model, the probability of adopting by a
potential adopter is a function of both word-of-mouth effects and advertising expendi-
tures. Their model is a revision of the original Bass model, with 9, the coefficient of
external influence being a function of advertising expenditures.
" Paul Stoneman, 1985, Technological Diffusion: The Viewpoint of Economic Theory, mimeo,
Warwick University.
" This leads Dan Horsky to say that while the epidemic models provide a theory why consumers
do not simultaneously adopt a new consumer durable, "they lack a theory as to why consumers buy
those durables in the first place" (Dan Horsky, 1990, A Diffusion Model Incorporating Product
Benefits, Price, Income and Information, MarJfcefing Science, 9(4), p.343.
" In fact. Chow applied two epidemic diffusion models: the Gompertz and the logistic (the
logistic used by Chow is somewhat different from the logistic described earlier in that the right-hand
side is multiplied by N,).
" Stephen Glaister, 1974, Advertising Policy and Returns to Scale in Markets where Information
is Passed Between Individuals, Economica, 41: 139-156.
" D. Horsky and L.S. Simon, 1983, Advertising and the Diffusion of New Products, Atorfcefmg
Science, 2:1-17. . . . . . . . , .,„.
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Bass himself extended his own 1969 model in a 1980 article.^ The new Bass
model is very interesting in that the diffusion process of a consumer durable is the result
of price changes (through learning curve effects during the diffusion process) and shifts
of the demand curves (due to contagion and learning) that are endogenous to the diffu-
sion proces. The diffusion process is thus the result of interacting supply and demand
factors. The model predicts that a period of falling price and increasing demand will be
followed by a period of falling price and decreasing demand, a result that according to
Bass is consistent with the empirical evidence for new consumer durables." The new
Bass model is summarized graphically in Figure 4.2."
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Figure 4.2. The Bass diffusion model with experience-curve effects and endoge-
nous consumer learning. Taken from: Thomas Russell (1980, p.370).
" Bass, 1980, op dt . ' . . , . . . .= .;. ; .-."....
" /b id , S55.
" Thomas Russell, 1980, Comments on 'The Relationship between Diffusion Rates, Experience
Curves, and Demand Elasticities for Consumer Durable Technological Innovations", /ourna/ 0/ Busin-
ess, 53:569-573. , • ,- , , , , , : •- . - ^ - . ; - ,1 . i-
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Figure 4.2. demonstrates how shifts in the demand curve (depicted in the upper-right
quadrant) and reductions in the price of the innovation (depicted in the upper-left
quadrant) over time (£ = 1,2,3,4) trace out a sigmoid diffusion pattern. The demand curve
is assumed to shift to the right for f = 2 and 3 (due to information transfer and band-
wagon effects), and to shift backwards at : = 4 when demand for the innovation is
saturated. ii!«fc-?:-:: i••*;-.ness aai- v.-.#.
In Shlomo Kalish (1985), the population of potential adopters is made a function of
the purchase price of the technological innovation.^' Kalish thus abandons the implicit
assumption of most epidemic models of a homogeneous adopter population. In his
model, the population is heterogenous with respect to their valuation of the product
(reservation prices), due to income and taste differences. Only those of the population
for which the (risk-adjusted) reservation price exceeds the actual price will adopt the
new product. Part of his model is also an (epidemic) awareness information diffusion
mechanism which is a function of advertising. Thus, in Kalish's model, two economic
variables are incorporated: advertising expenditures, which affect the spread of aware-
ness about the product's existence and about the general characteristics of the product;
and the purchase price, which controls the rate of growth of the potential adopter
population. ^ , ,, „ , . „ . . . ,
Another interesting epidemic model is that of Karshenas and Stoneman (1992).^ In
their model (which nests the logistic model and the first Bass model), the probability of
acquistion P is a function of economic variables instead of a fixed parameter. Further-
more, the influence of previous adopters in terms of learning and/or social emulation
gradually wears off, something which they consider to be a more realistic assumption as
each individual has contact with only a limited number of individuals in society and as
news about the existence and qualities of the new product becomes common knowledge
through exogenous sources of information. As in the Bass model, an external factor is
incorporated into the learning or emulation process. Unlike the standard epidemic
model, the model by Karshenas and Stoneman does not assume a priori the dominance
of an endogenous growth factor throughout the diffusion process. The relative strengths
of the exogenous and endogenous forces may be determined empirically. • ,
Whereas the above models in which economic factors are incorporated constitute a
clear improvement over the original epidemic models, they still suffer from a rather
weak decision-theoretic framework. As noted by Davies, " by dealing only with the
behaviour of firms [or consumers] in the aggregate, it pushes aside many of the more
* Shlomo Kalish, 1985, A New Product Adoption Model with Price, Advertising, and Uncertainty,
Management Science, 31(12): 1569-1585.
" Massoud Karshenas and Paul Stoneman, 1992, A Flexible Model of Technological Diffusion
Incorporating Economic Factors with an Application to the Spread of Colour Television Ownership in
the UK, /ourna/ o/ Forecasting, 11: 577-601. . . . . . . .
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interesting theoretical questions and substitutes a rather mechanistic hypothesis of
behaviour".*® This has led some diffusion scholars to develop innovation diffusion
models in which the diffusion pattern is the result of economic decision making by
prospective adopters. It is to these models that we turn to now.
4.3 Rational Choice Models of Technological Diffusion
Although the epidemic models were able to describe empirically the aggregate diffusion
patterns of technological innovations quite well, several people expressed doubts about
its general relevance. As noted before, the rationale of the epidemic model is in learning
through the endogenous spread of information. Although demonstration effects and
learning from the experience of others certainly are factors in the diffusion of a new
technology, their relevance as the key diffusion mechanisms was seriously questioned,
especially by economists. Moreover, by addressing the diffusion process in the aggreg-
ate, the epidemic model is silent about one of the more interesting questions: Why do
some firms or consumers adopt certain innovations more quickly than others?**
The reason why the epidemic diffusion models are not able to foretell who will be
an early adopter and who will not is the absence of a causal explanation of behaviour.
This has led some diffusion scholars (mostly economists but more recently also market-
ing and management scientists) to develop diffusion models in which the decision to
adopt or not to adopt the innovation by potential users is explicitly modelled. The
development of the diffusion models from individual adopter decisions reflects a trend
towards giving macro models a micro-economic foundation and."' Moreover, there is
generally more consideration of supply factors (changes in purchase price, post-innova-
tion improvements in the technology) in making firms and consumers adopt a particular
innovation. In those models, the reason why potential adopters do not immediately
™ Davies, op cir, p.35. ,., ;•./,. . , : : , . . , , . ,
® / M d , p . l 5 . • . . - . - . • - . • • . . . .v,-.- . . - i . - • • •. , , : . - « x , - , • , .
* It is interesting to note that Zvi Griliches, one of the pioneers of the epidemic model, writes in
a later comment that "if all variables describing individuals and affecting them were observable, one
might do without the notion of diffusion and discuss everything within an equilibrium framework.
Since much of the interesting data are unobservable, time is brought in to proxy for at least three sets
of distinct forces: (1) the decline over time in the real cost of the new technology due to decreasing
costs as the result of learning by doing and to cumulative improvements in the technology itself; (2)
the dying-off of old durable equipment, making room slowly for the new, and, (3) the spread of
information about the actual operating characteristics of the technology and the growth in the
available evidence as to its workability and profitability" (Zvi Griliches, 1980, Hybrid Corn Revisited:
A Reply, Econometrics, 48(6): 1463-1464).
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adopt the new product or technique is because it is not rational for them to do so. These
models may be called ration^/ choice diffusion models.*'
v j ; In the rational choice models, the diffusion process of a technological innovation —
either a process innovation or a consumer product — is the outcome of the calculated
choices by prospective adopters who adopt the new product or process as soon as some
stimulus variate exceeds a critical level (threshold). The rational choice models may be
divided into two classes: perfect information models and models with (exogenous)
learning. Threshold models like the probit and logit model and vintage models belong to
the first category.
The probit model is perhaps the best-known model of the class of threshold
models in which a discrete choice (such as adoption of a new product) takes place the
moment at which an exogenous stimulus variable crosses a threshold. The rationale of
the probit model (or logit model) is well-described by Paul David:
Whenever or wherever some stimulus variate takes on a value exceeding a critical
level, the subject of the stimulations responds by instantly determining to adopt the
innovation in question. The reason such decisions are not arrived at simultaneously
^ by the entire population of potential adopters lies in the fact that at any given point
" ' of time either the 'stimulus variate' or the 'critical level' required to elicit an adop-
> tion is described by a distribution of values, and not a unique value appropriate to
all members of the populations. Hence, at any point in time following the advent of
an innovation, the critical response level has been surpassed only in the cases of
some among the whole population of potential adopters. Through some exogenous
or endogenous process, however, the relative position of stimulus variate and critical
response level are altered as time passes, bringing a growing proportion of the
population across the 'threshold' into the group of actual users of the innovation/"
David suggested the probit model to the diffusion of the McCorwick mechanical reaper
in the American Midwest in the 19th century. The critical variate is farm size: for small
firms below a critical threshold it is not profitable to adopt the product since the savings
in wages due to a reduction in labour use do not exceed the cost of the reaper. However,
as wage rates rise relative to the price of the reaper it becomes profitable for smaller
firms to use the product. As a result, the critical level of farm size shifts to the left, thus
tracing out a diffusion curve (see Figure 4.3). j
1 . . . - . - , ; , - • > . - : ;
" They are sometimes referred to as "discrete choice" models (as in Karshenas and Stoneman, op
at., p.578). We prefer the term "rational choice" models because it rational decision making by
prospective adopters which distinguishes these models from epidemic models that lack an explicit
causal explanation of market behaviour.
* Paul A. David, 1969, A Contribution to the Theory of Diffusion, Stanford Center for Research in
Economic Growth, Stanford Centre for Research in Economic Growth, Memorandum 71.
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Figure 4.3. Relative frequency distribution of farm size. Taken from Thirtle and
Ruttan (1987, p.lll).
Stephen Davies has developed a similar model to explain the diffusion of industrial
process innovations. The critical variate is firm size, which, as in David's model, is
assumed to be lognormally distributed. In Davies' model (1979), post-innovation im-
provements change the critical level of firm size which (together with changes in firm
size) yield a sigmoid diffusion curve. Whereas in David's model, increases in the relative
wage rates predominantly control the diffusion process, in Davies' model it is post-
innovation improvements of the innovation and learning that trace out a sigmoid diffu-
sion curve. His model furthermore differs from David's model in that firms make deci-
sions in a behavioural way by comparing the expected pay-off period to some critical
pay-off period which varies with firm size. The model has been applied empirically to
twenty-two process innovations in U.K. manufacturing industries in the post-war period.
In his analysis, the innovations are divided into two groups. Group A consists of rela-
tively cheap and simple innovations, while in group B innovations are expensive and
complex with much opportunity for post-invention improvements. For group A innova-
tions, Davies derives analytically a positively skewed cumulative lognormal and for
group B innovations the symmetric cumulative logistic.
It is important to note that in the probit models learning and social interaction play
a limited role. They are considered "equilibrium models" by Thirtle and Ruttan because
in these models "the system has adjusted to the particular values of the variables at each
point in time, rather than being out of equilibrium and approaching a distant final
ceiling level of diffusion".^
,.fCf
" Thirtle and Ruttan, op rif, p.109.
Threshold models have been applied empirically to consumer durables by Bain
(1964) (television sets), Bonus (1973) (cameras, projectors, typewriters, vacuum cleaners,
automobiles, refrigerators, washing machines and television sets), Dagenais (auto-
mobiles) and Wilton and Pessemier (electric vehicles).*' We will only discuss Bonus'
model (1973) of the diffusion of a consumer durable. In Bonus' model the critical stimu-
lus is income: among all potential owners, only those whose income does not exceed
their critical income of adopting will be actual owners.^ The idea of income being an
important determinant of the adoption process of a new consumer durable is supported
by detailed data about the ownership of consumer durables accross income groups. For
each higher income group, the proportion of households owning the durable was higher.
In Bonus' model, the diffusion process is the result of (exponential) shifts in the distribu-
tion of real household incomes and shifts in the distribution of critical incomes (due to
shifts in preferences). For both distributions, the lognormal is used as an approximation.
To be sure, Bonus does not deny the possibility of information transfer as a diffusion
mechanism but takes issue with the idea of information transfer as the on/y diffusion
mechanism (or even the key mechanism).
Another rational choice or equilibrium model is the vintage model. In the vintage
model, the capital stock is made up of machines of different ages (vintages) with differ-
ent operating costs. Although the vintage model has not been fully developed as a
diffusion model, it may be used to explain the non-instantaneous adoption of a "best-
practice" machine which is available to potential users. In the vintage model, old
machines remain to be used as long as their revenues cover their operating costs or
when the variable costs of the old plants are below the total annual costs of using the
new plant. The diffusion process of the new technology is a function of factor price
changes and the rate of capacity expansion.
Although the threshold and vintage models rightly stress the importance of
changes in the heterogenous adopter environment (factor price changes, rising incomes)
and/or changes in the innovation (post-innovation improvements and price changes) to
the diffusion process, they can be subjected to a number of criticisms. Several of the
models' shortcomings are pointed out by Paul Stoneman: First, the diffusion process is
driven by exogenous changes in factor prices and no real attempt is made to endogenize
such price movements; second, learning is given a very minor role, if any, in these
models, because, basically, they assume complete information.'*
 > u- ;;••:<> :«,.i,v^  .•:>/;
A way of combining the idea of imperfect information and learning with rational
decision making by individual adopters is by using an Bayesian learning model. An
ii;-!3.<tf:. . •.«!.•,-
* For exact references, we refer to Thirtle and Ruttan, op eft. .,.. ,.-,..-
* Holger Bonus, 1973, Quasi-Engel Curves, Diffusion, and the Ownership of Major Consumer
Durables, /ourna/ o/Po/iiica/ Economy, 81, p.657.
" Stoneman, 1983, op c/t, p.104. : I . •-. ; _'
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example is Stoneman's learning model of intra-firm diffusion.^ " In this model, the firm
faces a choice between using an old technology and a new technology of which the
returns are both uncertain. In choosing the proportion of the firm's (fixed) output pro-
duced on the new technology (the diffusion path), the firm is assumed to maximize a
utility function which is a function of the returns of the technologies, the risk involved
and adjustment costs. A Bayesian mechanism of learning is specified in which the firm
updates its estimates of the distributions of the returns of the technologies. The interac-
tion of learning, the choice of technique procedure and adjustment costs generate a time-
path of the new technology that is the diffusion path. Examples of other Bayesian learn-
ing models of technological diffusion and adoption are Lindner et al. (1979), Jensen
(1982), McCardle (1985) and Oren and Schwartz (1988)."
Finally, we must note that there exists another type of technological diffusion
model: the game theoretic model of the diffusion process. Jennifer Reinganum has
shown that it is possible to explain differences in the time of adoption of a cost-reducing
technological innovation in terms of a game with or without perfect information. She
shows that even in the case of identical firms and complete certainty, there may be
'diffusion' of innovation over time, in the sense that firms do not adopt simulateneously
the innovation.** This result is derived on the assumption that the profitability of adop-
tion decreases with the number of adopter firms and the assumption that the adoption
costs decrease with time. Whatever one may think about such a model, a shortcoming is
the absence of learning and risk reduction. Moreover, they are not able to derive sigmoid
diffusion curves that are commonly observed. The practical meaning of game-theoretic
diffusion models is thus limited at their current state of development.
4.4 A Comparison of Technological Diffusion Models
The reason for giving a rather extensive overview of the various diffusion models is to
find out what model is most suitable for explaining the diffusion of an environment-
saving technological innovation and for analyzing the technological diffusion effects of
various policy instruments. This section will argue that there does not exist a comprehen-
sive theoretical diffusion model which captures all the factors that are likely to affect the
decision of prospective adopters at any particular moment to adopt or not to adopt a
" /bid, pp.77-88.
* R. Lindner, A. Fischer and P. Pardey, 1979, The Time to Adoption, Economics Letters, 2:187-190;
Richard Jensen, 1982, Adoption and Diffusion of an Innovation of Uncertain Profitability, /ounw/ o/
Economic Theory, 27: 182-193; Kevin F. McCardle, 1985, Information Acquisition and the Adoption of
New Technology, Management Science, 31(11): 1372-1389; and Shmuel S. Oren and Rick G. Schwartz,
1988, Diffusion of New Products in Risk-sensitive Markets, /ourna/ o/ Forecasting, 7: 273-287.
" Jennifer Reinganum, 1981, On the Diffusion of New Technology: A Game Theoretic Approach,
lie Studies, 58: 395-405. ...,,->„-„, „, „,. . .„.., „ . , ,,„ , ,„,,,„.
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technological innovation. Such a model would have to incorporate the following factors
(and the evolution thereoff): the technological and economic properties of the innovation
(performance characteristics, its purchase price, costs of installation, operating costs);
competitive and social pressures that induce or force potential buyers to purchase the
innovation; consumer preferences and valuation of performance characteristics; people's
perceptions of the innovation and attitudes towards the new technology; the availability
of the innovation; attempts by suppliers and others to persuade people to buy a new
technology; the search for information and reduction of risk, etc. It may be clear that it is
impossible to develop an analytically manageable model in which all the above factors
(or even a large subset of these factors) are incorporated in a non-superficial way.*"
With respect to the spread of a technological innovation across a population of
potential adopters, the key problem is what factors are responsible for the time-intensive
diffusion process and whether these factors are exogenous or endogenous to the diffu-
sion process. In the epidemic models it is endogenous changes that drive the diffusion
process: the probability of adoption of a new product is increasing in the fraction of the
population of potential adopters that has already adopted. In these models, learning and
imitation are commonly considered as the key diffusion mechanisms. In the previous
section, it was noted that the epidemic models, at least in their mathematical formula-
tion, provided too simple an explanation for the spread of a new technology across a
population of prospective adopters. Furthermore, the epidemic models lacked an explicit
decision-theoretic framework from which the individual decisions to adopt or not to
adopt can be understood.*'
*° At this point we should emphasize that the problem of the non-instantaneous adoption of a
technological innovation relates to quite fundamental issues of human decision making and choice:
whether individuals make decisions on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis, whether firms are
maximizers or satisficers (and what it is that they maximize or satisfice), to what extent decision
making is myopic and problem-oriented, whether or not people apply simple decision rules (rules of
thumb) in complex decision situations, the ways in which social influences affect individual choices,
and the role of perceptions, attitudes, personal judgements and interpretations (aspects that are being
shaped by personal histories of potential adopters) in adopter decisions. It is not the purpose of this
chapter to solve these issues, or to make an original contribution towards them, but we will touch
upon these issues in our discussion of the rate of application of environmentally beneficial techno-
logical innovations.
" This statement must be qualified: The logistic model used by Mansfield (1961; 1968) is based on
a (implicit) decision rule. And Davies (1979) derives the cumulative normal and lognormal growth
curve from a model of decision making. Furthermore, in a recent article, Rabikar Chatterjee and
Jehoshua Eliashberg have derived several 'epidemic' growth curves (like the logistic, the Gompertz
and Bass growth curve) from a micro-economic model of the adoption process at the individual level
(Rabikar Chatterjee and Jehoshua Eliashberg, 1990, the Innovation Diffusion Process in a Heterogene-
ous Population: A Micromodelling Approach, Ma«ag«nenf Science, 36(9): 1057-1079). A problem with
these micro-economic models is that it is not clear what the exact contribution is of each of the
variables in tracing out a diffusion growth curve. For instance, in Davies model (1979) it is unclear to
what extent the growth curve is the result of learning or of post-innovation improvements since both
factors are put into one parameter.
* ; • • • • . ' . • ' • •
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In the rational choice models, the diffusion process is the result of exogenous
changes in the (heterogenous) adopter environment and changes in the technology rather
than the product of endogenous learning and taste formation. Although these models are
right in emphasizing the role of changes in the adopter environment (changes in wage
rates, the obsolescence of capital goods, increases in people's wealth etc.) and of possible
improvements in the quality/price ratio of the technology, such changes are not inde-
pendent of the diffusion process of the innovation. As noted by Stanley Metcalfe, "while
some post-innovation improvements may be traced back to exogenous changes in knowl-
edge, many arise from the experiences, incentives and bottlenecks which arise endoge-
nously during the diffusion process".'" Furthermore, the diffusion process of a new
technology is likely to affect the competitive conditions under which firms operate (for
instance by increasing competitive pressure on non-adopters).
The central difference between the rational choice and epidemic models (or equilib-
rium and disequilibrium models), however, concerns the way in which agents acquire
information relevant to their adoption decisions in a world of costly information and
limited cognitive capacity." As Stan Metcalfe writes:
The key problem is not that adopters have full a priori information, although this is
problematic enough. Rather the problem is the assumption of information sets which
are given and interpreted independently from the process of diffusion. It is this ^
which rules out any elements of fashion or bandwagon effects as an explanation of ^
adoption. The appraisal by firms of an innovation is complete the moment the
innovation is announced. Delay in adoption can only be the result of objective "
circumstances, not a failure to comprehend the significance of events." *
The above suggests that both endogenous and exogenous factors are involved in the
spread of a new technology across a population of potential adopters, the relative impor-
tance of which will differ between innovations and adopter environments. Below, we
will theorize about the relative importance of various diffusion mechanisms for different
types of innovations and adopter environments. We will analyze how the diffusion
process is likely to be affected by: (1) the characteristics of the adopters (in terms of
goals, decision rules, their need for information, the financial resources available for the
purchase of the new product, etc.); (2) the characteristics of the wider social and eco-
nomic context (the fierceness of competition, social influences, whether there are compet-
ing technologies); and (3) the characteristics of the technological artefact (its price, techni-
cal characteristics, complexity, and the evolution of the quality/price ratio). On the basis
of these factors, we will develop a number of hypotheses about the rate of application of
environment-saving innovations and the evolution of the population of potential
J. Stanley Metcalfe, 1988, The Diffusion of Innovations, in Dosi et a/, op cif, p.562.
/bid, p.567.
/bid, p.566. . ,. *,:**.,
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adopters. Moreover, we will say something about what model may be used best to
analyze the diffusion pattern of different types of technological innovations.
Let us start with the first element, the characteristics of the potential adopter and
the adopter environment. It makes a big difference whether the potential adopter is a
for-profit-firm, a not-for-profit organization or a consumer.'" We will limit our discus-
sion to two types of adopters: for-profit-firms (hereafter shortened as firms) and con-
sumers. A first difference between firms and consumers is to be found in the goals that
they have. The behaviour of firms is heavily conditioned by the single objective of
making profits (or the collorary goal of producing efficiently). Although the people that
make up a firm may have goals and aspirations of their own, the need to make profits is
of overriding importance since profits (the absence of losses) are a precondition for the
firm's existence. The goals of consumers, on the other hand, are manifold; they range
from purely physiological needs (food, clothing, shelter), to needs of comfort, enter-
tainment, self-development, fulfilment of duties, and appreciation by others. The deci-
sions and choices by consumers are to be understood from the relative importance of
these goals and the sacrifices involved in achieving them.
: ;->;•- Secondly, various kinds of knowledge are organized in firms: engineering prin-
ciples of producer equipment, knowledge about the properties of materials used in the
production, how to operate these machines, etc. This knowledge base of firms is con-
stantly augmented and updated through applied research, contacts with suppliers,
observations of competitors, the hiring of specialists, and special courses for employees.
This implies that information problems about new technologies (their technical features)
and the skills required for their operation are likely to be less of a problem for (know-
ledge-intensive) firms than they are for consumers. Furthermore, firms are more likely to
engage actively in the search for information than consumers who may rely much more
on casual observation.
,,>,* Thirdly, competitive pressures force firms to produce efficiently. Whereas con-
sumers may long resist or delay the purchase of a new product without putting one's
life at stake, firms may be driven out of business if they are not keen enough to adopt a
new technology in time. As a result, decision making in firms is likely to be more goal-
oriented and rational (based on cost-benefit analysis) whereas consumer decisions may
be more traditional and subject to social influences.
As explained, the diffusion process depends not only on the characteristics of the
adopter population but also on the characteristics of the technological innovation. If the
innovation is expensive and complex, diffusion is bound to be slow, at least in the early
stage. When a new technology is complex, potential adopters need time to evaluate the
new technology and to acquire the necessary skills for using it. Such evaluation may be
* Examples of not-for-profit organizations are hospitals, schools, universities, ministries, clubs etc.
Their goal is usually to serve a larger group (often the public). They differ from for-profit firms in
that profits are not essential for their operation. (This does not imply that cost efficiency is not
important, it usually is). Like consumers they have multiple goals. .««•-•<•: ,S~I-;;
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in the form of internal experiment, the collection of information by the firm itself,
consultancy of outside specialists, or through the observation of the experience of others.
All mechanisms of learning are commonly used, quite often simultaneously. The high
costs of a complex innovation may also be a factor in the diffusion process, in delaying
the adoption of a technological innovation. Risk-averse adopters are reluctant to buy a
more expensive innovation even if the expected benefits from the usage of the innova-
tion are correspondingly higher. Furthermore, financial means necessary for the purchase
of a technological artefact may not be available within the firm, and time may be needed
to raise such funds. The high costs of a technological innovation may pose a problem for
small firms in particular. They may lack internal funds for the purchase of the innova-
tion and they may suffer from scale disadvantages (due to the indivisibility or lumpiness
of the innovation).
The diffusion speed also depends on whether the innovation is compatible with
existing production processes and practices or requires the replacement of capital outlays
and new skills. In the latter case, the rate of diffusion process depends on the rate at
which older capital goods become obsolete and on the expansion of the market. Similar-
ly, the diffusion of a new consumer good depends on the extent to which it is compat-
ible with existing values, past experience and needs of potential adopters.**
The adoption of a durable, being a new production technique or a consumer
product, furthermore depends on the time preference, risk aversion and discount rates
(or maximum payback periods) of the potential adopters. Consumers are known to be
extremely myopic in their decision making, they may apply implicit discount rates as
high as 100%. Firms are less myopic, they commonly apply rentability requirements
above 10% or maximum payback periods of two to five years (depending on the
expected economic service life of the innovation).
And finally, the adoption of a new technology depends on the profitability of the
innovation: many studies find that the profitability of an innovation is an important
determinant of the rate of the diffusion.*^ The higher the profitability of a new produc-
tion technique (other things being equal), the faster the diffusion process.
Up until now, we have discussed how various characteristics of the adopter population
and certain attributes of the new technology affect the rate of application of technological
innovations. Differences in the rate of adoption may be explained by differences in
profitability, the expensiveness and complexity of the innovation, the compatibility with
past practices and beliefs, etc. They do not explain why a firm or consumer adopts a
* Rogers, op cif, p.15.
* See, for instance, Griliches (1957), Mansfield (1968) and L. Nabseth and G.F. Ray (eds.), 1973,
The Dij^ wsion 0/ New /ndusfria/ Processes. y4n /nfenwfiora/ Study, Cambridge: Cambridge University
new technology at a particular moment. What we have been discussing is adoption Meory,
being an example of variance theory.** ^ ^ 3 , 5 1 * ^ j*5j- : r r i ;v- ,vf . rX-"sa . -O.-LJI : •>•
To understand the actual purchase of an innovation by a potential adopter at a
particular moment in time, we must look at the c/wnges in the adopter environment and
changes in the economic characteristics of the innovation. The actual adoption of an
innovation at a particular moment may be the result of a better understanding of the
technology, of changes in people's preferences, of changes in factor prices, the obsol-
escence of capital outlays, expansion of the market in which the technology is applied,
increases in consumer wealth, changes in household characteristics (parenthood, settlem-
ent, etc.), post-innovation performance improvements and/or price reductions of the
new technology (or changes in complementary technologies), and changes in the legal
and institutional framework (like for instance environmental regulation).
To comprehend the diffusion process, we must ask ourselves the following quest-
ions: How important are incremental changes in the adoption environment and technol-
ogy in inducing firms and consumers to adopt the innovation at a particular moment in
time? Do small improvements in the performance characteristics of a technological
innovation or gradual increases in people's wealth induce someone to purchase the new
product at time f rather than at time M or t+I? As regards to learning: Does a marginal-
ly better understanding of a new product suddenly lead someone to purchase the prod-
uct? Furthermore, if we believe learning is the key mechanism behind the aggregate
diffusion pattern, how does it come about: is it through (stochastic) social interactions
and advertisements or stem from the search for information by asking salesmen or
consulting experts? If it is through word-of-mouth effects and advertisement, there is an
important chance element involved. Other questions central to any understanding of
adoption decisions are: How rational are people in making decisions about the purchase
of an innovation or in their decision to search for information? To what extent is the
decision to buy a new product whimsical and the result of an impulse? As a last point,
what role do expectations play in making decisions (and how are they formed)?
The answers to these questions have important implications for the choice of
diffusion models which may be used best to explain the diffusion pattern of a particular
technological innovation across a population of potential adopters. We will argue that
this choice of diffusion model needs to be based on what is believed to be the key
diffusion mechanism: endogenous learning and consumer taste formation or exogenous
changes in the innovation and adopter environment. Below we will theorize about the
suitability of various diffusion models for analyzing the diffusion of different types of
technological innovations across various populations of potential adopters.
The term "variance theory" is coined by Lawrence Mohr in his 1983 book, Ezp/ointng Organi-
Beftaznor, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers. In variance theory, the independent variables
are both a necessary and sufficient condition for the outcome. An example of variance theory is the
linear regression model in which the dependent variable (the outcome) is explained by the explana-
tory variables (including the error term). In process theory, on the other hand, the explanatory
variables are necessary for the outcome but not sufficient: a probabilistic process is involved which
determines the outcome. The epidemic diffusion model is an example of a "process" theory.
An interpreiafzue survey o/d(#usiOM mode/s
We first consider the diffusion of a relatively simple and inexpensive innovation.
For this type of innovation we consider learning as the key diffusion mechanism,
although for consumer products endogenous taste formation (bandwagon effects) may
also be a factor. For this type of innovation, the potential market does not depend
importantly on changes in the adopter environment (such as increases in consumer
wealth) or on changes in the innovation. An example of such an innovation is the
ballpoint pen. Once it had been developed into a reliable product (which took some
time), it diffused quite rapidly although its diffusion was delayed by social resistance
and legal barriers — for instance, schools rejected it for quite some time for (disputable)
educational reasons, official documents needed to be signed with a pencil.'" Since the
diffusion of a simple and inexpensive innovation often depends on information transfer
and bandwagon effects, the epidemic model may be used to describe the diffusion
process. The choice of the epidemic model should be based on the 'infectiveness' of the
innovation (P,) and on possible changes in the population of potential adopters (N,)."
If, however, the innovation is complex and expensive, the basic epidemic model
may be inappropriate. Although learning may still be an important factor, other factors
are likely to be important as well: price changes in factor inputs, improvements in the
quality/price ratio of the innovation, the obsolescence of capital outlays, and increases in
consumer wealth. For consumers, increases in income or wealth may be a precondition
for an expensive innovation (usually a consumer durable) to be purchased, as may be
price reductions and product modifications (for instance user-friendliness). In our view,
there are two candidates for analyzing the diffusion of an expensive and relatively
complex consumer durable: the threshold model in which adoption takes place the
moment at which a variate crosses a critical threshold or the epidemic model in which
the rate of adoption and/or the market potential is a function of economic factors.
The threshold model with income as the critical threshold may be used to explain
the diffusion process of a consumer durable (something attempted by Bonus, 1973). It
may be necessary, however, to incorporate price reductions and post-innovation im-
provements in the threshold model. Post-innovation improvements are a well-known
and commonly observed phenomenon. When an innovation first arrives in the market, it
is often ill-developed in terms of user needs. A better understanding of these user needs
and of the technological possibilities for improvement allow the innovator to improve its
product. On the other hand, the expectation of further improvements in the quality-price
*' H. Baudet, 1986, Een oertrouK)de awe/d 100 /'our /Timroafie m Neder/and (A familiar world. 100
years of innovation in the Netherlands), Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, p.10.
* If dp, /dt < 0 one may use a positively skewed diffusion model and if one has reason to believe
that p remains constant, one may use the logistic model. The specification of N, also has important
implications for the model results. It seems incorrect to include people who at time f are unaware of
the existence of the new product in N,. The specification of N, is known to constitute a serious
problem, depending on a wide array of variables (people's preferences, real disposable income, price
of the product, etc.).
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ratio may induce some adopters to delay their purchase.*' In addition to post-innova-
tion improvements, price reductions may affect the rate and extent of adoption of a
technological innovation. During the diffusion period, the price of new product tends to
fall as the innovator supplier benefits from cost efficiencies in the production of the
product and as competition between supplying firms becomes more intense. Prices may
also be manipulated by the innovator supplier in strategic ways: it may decide to offer
the new product at a low price initially to stimulate early market growth (a "market
penetration" policy) or instead sell the product at a high price to skim user gains or
consumer surplus (a "market skimming" policy).
A shortcoming of the threshold model remains the absence of a mechanism of
information transfer and persuasion which may be necessary for adopters to purchase
the new product. Especially if the new product is a radical innovation, people may be
reluctant or simply unwilling to purchase the new product (radical innovations like
television sets, automobiles are often regarded as unnecessary luxury goods, or even
dangerous and unhealthy). Time and persuasion may be needed for a radically new
product to become widely accepted. One way of introducing learning and taste forma-
tion in the model is to make the threshold a function of the proportion of adopters
(being a proxy for endogenous learning and bandwagon effects). Instead of income, the
willingness to pay of individual adopters could be made the critical threshold (as in
Kalish's model (1985) of reservation prices). Strangely enough, this has been attempted
by a few scholars only, despite the fact that the notion of "willingness to pay" is central
to the demand theory. " ~ • ' ;'•- * •< ^ *^ ;>H
If one has reasons to believe that the endogenous elements dominate the effects of
exogenous changes (such as increases in consumer wealth, improvements in the quality-
/ price ratio) one may decide not to employ a threshold model but to use an epidemic
model which incorporates economic factors. These economic factors may be incorporated
in the model in two ways: by changing the rate of adoption ((3,) or by altering the popu-
lation of potential adopters (N,). Thus, the rate of adoption (or the probability of acquisit-
ion) may be made a function of the purchase price, of improvements in the quality/pri-
ce, of income, and possibly of some institutional variables (like credit rules). Similarly,
the market potential of a new product is likely to be affected by changes in prices, post-
innovation improvements, consumer wealth and by changes in people's preferences
through which non-adopters become potential adopters (the opposite is also possible). It
is difficult to determine a priori on the basis of theoretical arguments whether the above
factors should be included in the rate of adoption or in the potential population, or in
both. This is something that needs to be determined empirically.^ „ „
" Nathan Rosenberg, 1982, On Technological Expectations, Economic /ourna/, 86: 523-35 (published
also as chapter 5 of his book 7ns/'df f/tf Btod Box: TecJmo/ogy and Economics, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, pp.104-119.
''-' * Wagner A. Kamakura and Siva K. Balasubramanian have investigated whether the impact of
price changes on the diffusion process is achieved through an effect on adoption probability (the rate
of adoption) or by changing the market potential. Using nested testing procedures, the relative
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If the potential adopters of a certain expensive and complex innovation are firms
(or more generally organizations) rather than consumers, the epidemic model may be
less appropriate. Endogenous taste formation is unlikely to be a factor in the diffusion
process (the single most important goal of a firm is to make profits) and learning may be
an important factor in the early stage of the diffusion process only." If the new innova-
tion requires the replacement of capital outlays, the vintage model may be appropriate.
The diffusion process is then a function of the rate of economic obsolescence of older
capital vintages and the expansion of the market in which it will be applied. Instead of
a vintage model, one may use the probit and logit model to analyze the diffusion of a
complex and expensive innovation. The cost/benefit ratio or maximum payback period
(as in Davies' analysis) may be used as the critical threshold.*'
Our conclusions about what model(s) may be used best for analyzing the diffusion
of differing technological innovations across two adopter environments (consumers and
firms) are summarized in Table 4.1. .,-
superiority of twelve competing model specifications (all based on the original Bass model) is
analyzed for six consumer durables (toasters, mixers, blenders, airconditioners, refrigerators, and
vacuum cleaners). They found that prices affect the diffusion process only for relatively high-priced
goods and that this is achieved through impact on the probability of adoption (Wagner A. Kamakura
and Siva K. Balasubramanian, 1988, Long-term View of the Diffusion of Durables: A Study of the
Role of Price and Adoption Influence Processes via Tests of Nested Models, /rtfemat/ona/ /ouma/ 0/
Researc/j in Marltefmg, 5: 1-13). The same problem has been analyzed by Dipak C. Jain and Ram C.
Rao by estimating three models in which prices affect either market potential or the rate of adoption.
They found that prices affected the diffusion process in the four applications of the models but since
the models did not belong to a nested familiy they were not able to tell whether prices affect the
market potential or the rate of adoption (or both). They tend to believe that it is market potential
which is mostly affected by price changes although this is not really brought out by the model results
(Dipak C. Jain and Ram C. Rao, 1990, Effect of Price on the Demand for Durables: Modelling, Esti-
mation, and Findings, /ourna/ 0/ Business and Economic Sfatisfics, 8(2): 163-170).
" Management attitudes, however, may be a factor. j .
* It should be noted that the vintage model also belongs to the threshold models. ;
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The Diffusion of Environmentally Beneficial
Technological Innovations , „* I
This chapter examines the diffusion of technological innovations that conserve environ-
mental qualities. The aims of this chapter are: First, to theorize about the diffusion
process of environmentally beneficial technological innovations, in the light of what we
have said in the previous chapter. Second, to discuss existing diffusion studies of en-
vironment-saving technological innovations. And third, to analyze the influence of
various policy approaches on the rate of adoption of environment-conserving tech-
nologies in the context of a simple threshold model.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 1 examines the difference between
environmentally beneficial technological innovations and other technological innovations,
and the likely technological diffusion of environment-saving innovations under different
policy regimes. This is followed by a discussion in section 2 of two studies of the diffu-
sion of environment-saving technological innovations: Hyder Lakhani's analysis of the
technological diffusion of environment-saving techniques in the petroleum-refining
industry, and Adam Jaffe and Robert Stavins' diffusion model of an energy-conserving
technology. The final section advances a threshold model of the diffusion of an environ-
mentally beneficial durable. The model is used to analyze the impact of different policy
instruments on the technological diffusion of environmentally preferable technologies.
Empirical results from this model are presented in chapters 6 and 7.
5.1 The Adoption of Environmentally Beneficial Innovations
To what extent is the diffusion of environment-conserving technological innovations any
different from that of other types of innovations? To answer this question, we must ask
ourselves the following question: What is the difference between environmentally benefi-
cial technological innovations and 'normal' innovations? As noted in chapter 1, the
distinction between environmental technologies and technologies that produce cost
savings or yield superior services to the individual user is not a sharp one. 'Normal'
business innovations may have environmentally beneficial side-effects, and environmen-
tal technologies may yield non-environmental gains to the individual user (such as
savings on materials use, higher product qualities, etc.). To answer the above question,
we must make a distinction between technologies whose environmental gains are not
considered in purchase decisions and technologies whose environmental aspects are part
of the decision-making process. Only the latter type of technologies may command a
..
new type of diffusion model — one that considers the costs and benefits associated with
the environmental effects in adopter decisions.
To understand and explain the diffusion of environmentally beneficial technologies,
we furthermore need to distinguish between different types of adopters — whether they
are organizations (like firms) or consumers — and take into account the economic charac-
teristics of the technology — whether it is a durable, requires the replacement of existing
capital outlays, etc. An important category of environmentally beneficial technological
innovations are technologies for reducing indusirw/ emissions. These are commonly
divided into two categories: process-integrated technologies and end-of-pipe technol-
ogies, the characteristics of which are described in chapter 1. Again, we ask ourselves:
Does this distinction have specific implications for the appropriate diffusion model for
analyzing the diffusion of environmental technologies?
A general feature of process-integrated technologies is that their use often requires
the replacement of existing production facilities, the training of personnel, the reor-
ganization of work. This means that sunk costs (i.e., the value of past investments) and
uncertainty are likely to have an important impact on the adoption decision-making
process. If sunk costs are important — i.e., when the technologies are capital-intensive
and have long life-times — the vintage model may be the appropriate model for explain-
ing changes in the aggregate diffusion pattern. If, furthermore, the decision to purchase
the environmentally desirable technology is surrounded with great uncertainty about the
economic consequences of adoption, an (endogenous) learning mechanism should be
incorporated into the diffusion model.
We now come to diffusion of end-of-pipe technologies (such as fluegas desulphur-
isation techniques, biofilters, waste-water treatment technologies) and the appropriate
model for analyzing the adoption of such technologies. To the extent that end-of-pipe
technologies can be easily added to the production process (which is not true for all end-
of-pipe technologies), and the total costs of using them are well known, the appropriate
model may be a threshold model with the Net Present Value or Maximum Payback
period as the critical threshold.
Besides the characteristics of the adopter population, the characteristics of the in-
novations and of the adopter environment are also likely to influence the adoption
growth rate of environment-conserving technologies. As indicated in the previous chap-
ter, post-innovation improvements in the performance-price ratio of the new technology,
input price changes, and changes in adoption costs, may exercise a significant influence
on purchase decisions of potential adopters.
For consumers, the distinction between cheap and expensive technologies is likely
to be important. The diffusion of low-cost, environment-friendlier consumer products
(such as water-based paints) is commonly driven by environmental awareness and
(endogenous) information transfer, whereas the diffusion of more expensive 'green'
consumer durables is more likely to be governed by changes in the costs and benefits of
using the environment-conserving durable (such as blown insulation), although infor-
mation transfer and taste formation may also be of influence. Hence, for inexpensive
environmentally benign consumer products, we may use a simple epidemic model (like
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the logistic or Gompertz) and for environment-conserving durables we may apply an
epidemic model in which the rate of adoption and/or the population of potential adop-
ters is a function of economic variables (prices, incomes), or use a threshold model with
a learning mechanism.
We now come to discuss the technological diffusion of environment-conserving tech-
nologies under different control regimes: an incentive-based regime and a command-
and-control regime. Under incentive-based approaches (like a carbon tax, effluent char-
ges, pollution fees, subsidies) the potential adopter is free to adopt (or not to adopt) an
environment-friendlier technology. The incentive-based policies are aimed at changing
the economic calculus in favour of adopting a more environmentally benign product —
by increasing the costs of using environmentally hazardous inputs, raising the costs of
emitting pollutants or by reducing the costs of adopting an environmentally beneficial
technology. Under command-and-control policies, polluters are forced through legal
requirements to reduce their pollutant emissions, the fulfilment of which may necessitate
the application of certain pollution control technologies. Sometimes environmental
technologies are prescribed by way of technology standards. In most cases, however, the
regulator sets performance standards that specify the maximum level of pollutant emis-
sions or the amount of emission reductions to be achieved. •
The distinction between the two identified policy regimes has implications for the
aggregate diffusion pattern and the appropriate model for analyzing the growth in
ownership of environmentally beneficial technologies. Under incentive-based approaches
(a pollution or energy tax, tradeable pollution permit, an emission reduction subsidy or
an investment subsidy), firms and households are free in their purchasing decisions. This
implies that the mechanisms that govern the spread of an environmentally desirable
technology across an adopter population are basically the same as those of other types of
technological innovations. This suggests that we may use any of the diffusion models
described in the previous sections for analyzing the growth process in ownership of an
environment-saving technology — bearing in mind what we have said before about the
appropriate diffusion model(s) for analyzing the uptake of different types of innovations
across various adopter populations. The theoretical impact of different economic incen-
tives (taxes, subsidies) and information supply on the technological diffusion of environ-
mental technologies will be analyzed in the last section.
What about the diffusion of environmental technologies under direct regulation? Is
it possible to theorize about this? This is far more difficult. The diffusion process will
depend on the details of environmental regulation, the control agency's willingness to
accept delays in the realization of emissions reductions, and to violations of the rule.
This means that the diffusion of environmental technologies under direct regulation
(performance standards, technology standards, product bans) basically commands a
different model — one which incorporates the details of legal requirements, the law
enforcement processes and penalties for legal violations, and the law-obeying nature of
people and organizations that are subject to environmental laws. It may be dear that
such a model would be more complex and difficult to apply empirically, and we shall
not attempt therefore to develop such a model in this thesis.
5.2 Two Diffusion Studies of Environment-Saving Technolog-
ical Innovations
Whereas the diffusion of technological innovations across a population has been studied
by many social scientists, there are only few studies on the diffusion of CTiuironmcwt-
saping technological innovations. As far as we know there exist only two models describ-
ing the growth in ownership of environmentally desirable technological innovations:
Hyder Lakhani's model of environment-saving petroleum refining techniques and Adam
Jaffe and Robert Stavins' model of the diffusion of an energy-conserving technology.
This section will examine both models.
5.2.1 Lflfc/iani's worfeZ o/tfze dt/jfasion o/£rti>m>nmettf-saz>i«£
in tfte U.S.
In an old study, Hyder Lakhani analyzed the changeover in U.S states from thermal to
catalytic cracking and from catalytic cracking to hydrocracking — each being a cost-
saving and environment-saving technique for refining petroleum.' The reason for study-
ing the diffusion of both catalytic cracking and hydrocracking was, first, to analyze
whether the diffusion of these technologies was socially optimal, and second, to inves-
tigate empirically whether environmental policy accelerated the growth rate of adoption.
To do so, Lakhani first applied a Gompertz function to describe the aggregate diffusion
growth curve. The Gompertz function is described by:
n, = Ma* . ^ (1)
with n, being the number of firms that adopted the innovation at time f, N the popu-
lation of potential adopters, and parameters o,p € (0,1).
The above equation can be rewritten (in logarthmic terms) as follows:
1
with Y=-JT ~1 (a^d not - ln((J)), the coefficient of the growth rate.
' Hyder Lakhani, 1975, Diffusion of Environment-Saving Technological Change. A Petroleum
Refining Case Study, Tec/moio>gic«/ Forecasting and Soda/ C/wnge, 7: 33-55.
0/ enuironmenfa/Iy berce/zcza/ 101
In Lakhani's study, N, the ultimate equilibrium level is not fixed but changes over time,
which implies that the diffusion ceiling ££ is upward sloping with time. Figure 5.1
depicts Lakhani's model.
Cumulative
adoption
in percent
Time
Figure 5.1. The Gompertz model with an upward-
sloping ceiling. Source: Lakhani (1975, p.39). >:':ii
After substituting N, for N in equation (2), and replacing ln(n,) by ln(n,.,) in the right-
hand side of this equation to take care of positive autocorrelation in the error term (a
rather crude way of doing so), equation (2) is estimated both for catalytic cracking and
hydrocracking in various U.S petroleum-refining states for the 1949-63 and 1967-71
periods, respectively. The regression results found by Lakhani were rather poor, with
coefficients of determination (R^  corrected for degrees of freedom) mostly below 0.3 and
often less than 0.1, and relatively low f ratios (below 2 in some states) for Y/ the coef-
ficient of the growth rate.
Lakhani found that the growth rate of diffusion of hydrocracking was lower than
that of catalytic cracking (also when compared with the early growth rates of catalytic
cracking in the 1949-53 period). On the basis of a comparison of pftysica/ quantities of
residuals, Lakhani concluded that the social benefits of the substitution of hydrocracking
for catalytic cracking were considerably greater than the social costs — implying that the
growth rate of adoption of hydrocracking was less than the socially optimal growth rate.
Lakhani furthermore investigated whether environmental policy accelerated the
speed of adoption of both petroleum-refining innovations. Regressing the diffusion
growth rates in the various states on per capita expenditures on water pollution control
(a proxy for the strictness of environmental policy in each state) during a five-year
diffusion period, gave the following estimation results.
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Process <
Catalytic
cracking
Hydro-
cracking ;
3
Regression
Constant
23.2674*
(5.389)
4.2712
(1.933)
Coefficients
Per Capita
expenditure
-0.0758
(1.245)
0.4913"
(Z212)
Durbin
Watson
statistic
2.554
2.603
0.031
0.394
' Significant at 0.05 level (t ratio greater than 2.110)
Significant at 0.05 level (t ratio greater than 2.015)
Table 5.1. Regression results explaining the growth rates of diffusion by per
capita expenditures on water pollution control. Source: Lakhani (1975, p.51).
Table 5.1 shows that the regression coefficient for the environment-economic parameter
is negative (but not significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level) for
catalytic cracking and significantly positive (at the 5% level) for hydrocracking. Accord-
ing to Lakhani, this suggests that increasing pressures from public authorities on
refineries has stimulated the rate of adoption of hydrocracking (but not that of catalytic
cracking), being an environment-conserving technology.
fj'C ^. ;.>j«r,. ;>?•
Are the hypotheses concerning the adoption growth rate of petroleum-refining techni-
ques validated by econometric analysis? For instance, has the relationship between
environmental policy and technological change been firmly established? The answer is
negative. There are several weak points in the analysis, many of which are acknowl-
edged by Lakhani. First, Lakhani applies an incorrect model to the diffusion of petro-
leum-cracking techniques. Because such techniques are extremely capital-intensive with
lifetimes of 30 years, Lakhani should have applied a vintage model with the age distri-
bution of the existing capital stock as an explanatory variable. The low coefficients of
determination also indicate that the Gompertz model is not a good model for analyzing
the diffusion of petroleum-cracking techniques. Second, the conclusion that the growth
rate of hydrocracking is less than socially optimal is not supported by economic analysis.
Although the operating costs of hydrocracking may be below those of catalytic cracking,
one has to compare the fota/ costs of hydrocracking with the variable costs of catalytic
cracking. As the fixed costs are known to be very high for capital-intensive petroleum-
cracking plants, the accelerated adoption of hydrocracking is likely to provide some
refineries with extra costs — which must be compared with the monetary value of the
environmental benefits. And third, the way in which Lakhani tries to establish the
relationship between environmental policy and the growth rates of adoption of petro-
• ' • I . • . . • • - . . • - • • . . • • - • > : " • . -
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leum-cracking techniques, is too crude a test it is based on small samples, it uses a poor
proxy for the strictness of water pollution control policies, and the coefficients of deter-
mination and (-values for regression coefficients found are all low.
5.2.2 /a/jfe «na* Staums' adoption mode/ 0/ an energy-consen;iM£ tec/mo/-
A more recent model of the diffusion of an environmentally desirable technological
innovations is Adam Jaffe and Robert Stavins' model of the adoption of an energy-
conserving technology.* Their model is a threshold model in which (heterogeneous)
homeowners consider the possibility to thermally insulate their homes (for instance by
injecting blown insulation into exterior walls). In the model, risk-neutral homeowners
attempt to minimize the present discounted value of the stream of expected costs as-
sociated with providing an adequate degree of warmth in their homes. These costs are:
1) the present discounted value (PV) of annual energy costs from the present to the time
of adoption (T) of the energy-saving device, 2) the PV of annual energy costs from the
time of adoption until the end of the relevant planning period, and 3) the costs of adop-
tion of the energy-saving technology. In the model, a (risk-neutral) homeowner ; selects
the optimal time of adoption, T > 0, by minimizing the following function:
^ i « (3)
where i indexes a local jurisdiction,; indexes individual homes, and f indexes time. The
model's variables are: ; . . . . . , , , - J .,„,.,, , , , , , . ^ ^ , . ,^  ,,; «.«.W^., ,..,,
h;y, = index of efficiency of individual home-heating plant and preferences re-
garding heating; < •• iV;;. • j. h;, " A-t- i. ?vrtfe
Jfc,-, = average annual energy cost for heating, in the absence of the energy-sa-
ving technology;
w = index of the average effect of the new technology on annual energy con-
sumption (with 0 < u> £ 1);
#(.) = function which relates average annual energy cost for region i at time f
and efficiency of household heating plant in a specific home with the
home's average energy cost (for heating);
* Adam B. Jaffe and Robert N. Stavins, 1990, Evaluating the Relative Effectiveness of Economic
Incentives and Direct Regulation for Environmental Protection: Impacts on the Diffusion of Tech-
nology, paper prepared for the WRI/OECD-Symposium "Toward 2000: Environment, Technology and
the New Century", June 13-15,1990, Annapolis, Maryland.
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C.-j- = cost of adoption of new technology; JOJ *• .sAifpiruhs? 5*n
r = the real interest rate; ., .- , .-.- -
T = the time of adoption (installation).
Only the index of heating plant efficiency and preferences regarding heating, denoted by
fc^, is specific to the individual home; all the other variables are measured at the sectoral
level. Minimizing PV(T), under the constraint T > 0, gives:
The above condition for adoption states that the risk-neutral homeowner adopts an
energy-conserving technology (such as blown insulation) if and when the discounted
value of the future stream of avoided energy costs — i.e., the expected savings in energy
costs g(.) divided by the interest rate r — exceeds the present cost of adoption of the new
technology minus the product of the expected rate of change of adoption cost and the
reciprocal of the interest rate.* From the above expression it is easy to see that a higher
energy efficiency (H;) of the energy-saving technology, lower adoption costs (C) and a
lower interest rate (r) encourage the adoption of the energy-saving technology.
Under the assumption that g(/i,fc) can be expressed as a multiplicative function of
g,(JfcJ and /fy, the decision to adopt the energy-saving technology can also be cast in
terms of a critical threshold /i;,\ being the upperlimit for fc^ above which it is no longer
cost-effective for household / in region i at time f to invest in energy conservation:
-3T "•^•" v? i S ' ; : - (5)
The level of adoption .A,, — the proportion of the population in region f that will have
adopted the energy-saving device at time f — is:
with F(.) being the cumulative density function for /i^, the index of efficiency of in-
dividual home-heating plant and heating preferences — where F(.) is considered to be the
same for all regions and assumed constant during the diffusion period (which means
that the efficiency of home-heating plants is the same across regions and that heating
preferences do not change over time). , ..-,-..-. —• — • -
/bid, p. 12.
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According to Jaffe and Stavins, their model may furthermore be used to analyze the
relative effectiveness of economic incentives and regulation (like building codes) in
affecting adoption behaviour. Let R,, be a dummy variable which equals unity if a
relevant regulation exists, and zero otherwise; p, a parameter that indexes the probability
that someone for whom the investment is profitable and who is not subject to relevant
laws or regulations will adopt the technology; pj a parameter which indexes the proba-
bility that an unprofitable technology is adopted because of regulations; and p^  a param-
eter which indexes the additional probability of adoption due to laws and regulations for
households where the investment is in fact profitable. Defining R;, and parameters p,, p2
and P3 as above, they find that the fraction of homes within region i which 'should' have
adopted the energy-saving technology by time i equals:*
A, = p, + (P3RJ * ((p.-p^R, - p,)F(/r/) (7)
By doing a cross-section analysis over the diffusion period, the above parameters may be
determined statistically. Unfortunately, up until now Jaffe and Stavins have not applied
their model empirically — something which would enable us to assess the model's ability
to describe empirically the aggregate diffusion pattern and permit us to draw conclu-
sions concerning the impact of economic incentives and regulations (in the form of
technology standards) on the adoption of thermal insulation technologies by home-
owners. At this stage, we can only say something about the theoretical underpinnings of
the model.
The decision to use a threshold model for analyzing changes in the ownership of
an energy-saving durable (like injected blown insulation) seems justified by the con-
sideration that economic variables such as energy prices, adoption costs and interest
rates are likely to exercise a significant influence on homeowners' decisions regarding
the adoption of thermal insulation technologies, given the high costs of such invest-
ments. A weak point of the model is that a mechanism of information transfer and
"bandwagon effects' are not incorporated in the model. In section 2 of this chapter, we
have argued that the spread of information and endogenous taste formation are likely to
be important factors for the purchase of consumer products. Furthermore, Jaffe and
Stavins' model assumes that potential adopters only consider the monetary gains from
energy savings in their purchase decisions. As there are other important benefits con-
nected with thermal insulation — for example, fewer temperature differentials in rooms,
higher temperatures in unheated rooms, less condensation on windows — the model is
incomplete in this respect.
Of course, no econometric model is able to consider all the details of the decision-
making process regarding the adoption of a durable. Furthermore, certain assumptions
must be made about the distribution of the model's variate(s) and the parameters to be
estimated. Whether some of the assumptions made in the model — like a to^iomu!
function for /j^ with a constant mean u and variance a* across regions and over time, and
id, p. 15. . ' .
• • • • ' ; • • • . • • • • • ; ' ' ' . v ( , :
10* C/wpter5
constant parameters p,, pj and P3 — are sufficiently justified and not overly restrictive, is
partly an empirical issue.
5.3 A Simple Threshold Diffusion Model for Environment-
Conserving Technologies
This section advances a simple threshold model that may be used to analyze the growth
in ownership of various types of environmentally desirable durables: energy-conserving
technologies, pollution control technologies, re-use sytems, and low-emission processes
and products. Our model differs from traditional probit models in that learning and
(endogenous) shifts in preferences or attitudes may affect purchasing decisions of poten-
tial adopters. By doing so, it overcomes what we consider to be the main weakness of
threshold models: the absence of a mechanism of endogenous learning and taste for-
mation.' More importantly, the model allows us to analyze the impact of different
policy instruments (pollution taxes, energy taxes, investment subsidies and information
supply) on the diffusion growth curve of an environment-saving technological inno-
vation, both theoretically and empirically.
This section proceeds as follows. First, we develop and describe the structure of
the model. This is followed by an analysis of the impact of various incentive-based
policy approaches on the technological diffusion of an environment-conserving inno-
vation.
5.3.2 "Die ffm?s/ioM mode/
As noted in our survey of innovation diffusion models in chapter 4, there are basically
two approaches in the study of the growth in ownership of a technological innovation:
First, epidemic models in which the diffusion is addressed in the aggregate and the
spread of the innovation across a population is driven by endogenous factors (especially
learning); and second, threshold models in which the aggregate diffusion pattern is the
result of economic decision making by a heterogeneous population over a longer period.
A drawback of the epidemic models (such as the logistic model) is the lack of a decision-
theoretic foundation of individual adopter decisions.' Although epidemic models may
be used to describe empirically the aggregate diffusion pattern, it is unclear what causal
mechanism underlies the growth in ownership of the technological innovation.
* Although our diffusion model combines elements of the epidemic model and an equilibrium or
threshold model, the model is viewed as a threshold (or rational choice) model because of the micro-
economic behavioural basis.
' Oren and Schwartz, op c«f, p.274. .§;• <,
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This section will develop a simple diffusion model of an environment-saving
durable/ Our model is a threshold or rational choice diffusion model in which the
aggregate diffusion pattern is the result of purchasing decisions by individual decision-
making units. The model allows us to analyze the impact of alternative policy ap-
proaches (pollution and energy taxes, investment subsidies, information supply) on the
rate of adoption of environmentally desirable technological innovations. The model is
kept as simple as possible to facilitate empirical application, while incorporating a wide
enough set of variables that could explain the actual spread of an environment-saving
innovation across a population. Empirical results of the model are described in chapters
6 and 7.
After this short introduction, we will now describe the model. As in all threshold mod-
els, adoption of the innovation takes place when a stimulus variate exceeds a critical
value. In our model, a potential user — which may be a household or industrial firm —
will purchase an environmentally desirable innovation if and when the annual savings in
tax payments (or energy costs) plus other annual benefits from adoption minus the
variable costs of using the technology exceed the annual fixed capital costs. The decision
to adopt an environmentally desirable innovation can also be cast in terms of a com-
parison between a (risk-adjusted) reservation price and the purchase price (costs of
adoption) of the innovation: /4s soon as f/ie nsfc-ad/MSfed reseryafiow pn'ce 0/ a derision-
rn^in^ unit/or a« enui>o«menf-consen;in^ tecfmo/ogy exceeds f/ie cosrs 0/adoption (tne sum 0/
purc/wse price and msfa/Zafion costs), adoption 0/ t/ie fec/ino/ogy fates p/ace.
The reservation price is nothing else than the willingness to pay for the environmentally
desirable innovation. It is taken to be a function of the following factors:
1. the emission reduction achieved by the technology or the reduction in energy
use in the case of a energy-conserving technology;
2. the level of the pollution tax per unit of emission or energy price (of which
an energy tax may be a part);
3. other gains from adoption (such as savings on material inputs and waste
disposal costs, higher product sales from a better environmental image or, in
the case of consumers, health benefits, extra comfort for the individual user);
4. operating and maintenance costs;
5. interest costs;
' Although the model is concerned with the first purchases by a population of an environment-
saving durable (like a fluegas-desulphurisation device or an electric vehicle) it can be applied to non-
durables as well.
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6. the (economic) service life of the innovation;
7. uncertainty about the economic characteristics of the new technology.
Potential adopters of the environment-saving technology are assumed to be heterogen-
eous with respect to at least one of the above aspects. This implies that reservation prices
X, differ among decision-making units according to some distribution. The essence of the
model is depicted in Figure 5.2.
JTf
Af 1
Figure 5.2. The distribution of X, and the aggregate diffusion curve.
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The distribution of risk-adjusted reservation prices X is described by the probability
density function /(X). Of the total population of potential users, only those whose reser-
vation price exceeds the adoption costs C, (the critical threshold in our model) will be
adopters of the innovation. This implies that the proportion of the population that will
own the innovation at time £ is equal to the area of the upper tail at the right of the
vertical line going through the critical threshold C,. The aggregate diffusion pattern /4, is
controlled by shifts in the distribution of X, and changes in the costs of adoption, C,. If
the distribution of X, is bell-shaped, a shift of C, at a constant percentage rate through
time, or a constant shift of the distribution of X, trace out a sigmoid diffusion curve.
To illustrate how the model works, we will give an example. We consider the case
where a polluting firm is subjected to a pollution tax. If the tax on pollution increases
over time, the polluting firm will be prepared to pay more for a pollution control tech-
nology with a certain control efficiency (other things being equal). This implies that the
reservation price of the pollution control device rises, causing the distribution of reser-
vation prices to shift to the right, bringing a larger proportion of the population across
the critical threshold into the population of actual adopters.
We will now define the threshold diffusion model more formally. The model attempts to
explain the adoption decisions of an heterogeneous population over time. An obvious
determinant of the decision to adopt an environmentally desirable good is the cost of
adoption C, being the sum of the purchase price of the durable and any installation
costs.* To calculate the annual fixed capital costs FC, we must multiply the costs of
adoption C, with the imputed annual rental rate R, being a function of the annual
interest rate r and the service life / of the technology to be installed. As in Paul David
(1969), we use the following formula for the imputed annual rental rate:'
R = R(r,/) = _ ! _ (8)
1 - C '
This gives the following expression for fixed capital charge FC:
* These installation costs can be quite high. For biological industrial waste water treatment
technologies employed in the Netherlands, average installation costs were 53% of total investments
(without interest costs) (Jaap Schuurman, 1988, De pri/s can luster: een onderzoe/t near de aard en omcang
fan de regu/erende nerenweriting iwn de z*ronfr«nigings/iej0''ng opperpiaJtewjferCTi, PhD thesis, Arnhem:
Gouda Quint, p.280).
' Paul David, op rif, 1969, p. III/6. The imputed rental rate is based on the standard annuity
formula. Note that r = 0 => R(r,/) = — - — = —
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.<3 !i»t; vri ' FC = C*R = C >jiib?.-.*?h to ooiiiK' (9)
In the above equation it is assumed that the annual fixed capital costs are constant over
the expected (economic) life time of the technology — i.e., that FC,^  = FC,, V; = 1,..,/. A
central assumption of the model is that in making a decision about the purchase of the
environmentally desirable durable, a potential adopter compares the total annual costs of
using the technology (being the sum of FC, and the variable costs VC,) with the value of
the annual gains. The annual benefits consist of tax savings (or savings in energy costs)
S,, and other gains from adoption, the monetary value of which is K,.
The savings in tax payments S, are the product of (absolute) reductions in pol-
lutant emissions, ER,, achieved with the pollution control technology and the pollution
tax in year t, that is, Tax,: S, = £R,»Tflx,. In the case of energy-saving device, S, is the
product of the reduction in energy use and the price of energy (which may be a function
of an energy tax).
Examples of other gains from adoption are: the cost savings due to the re-use of
waste material (which leads to savings on material inputs and to lower waste disposal
costs) or an increase in product sales due to a better environmental image. For con-
sumers there may be utility-enhancing effects associated with an environment-friendlier
good such as the extra comfort that is connected with thermal home insulation (the
reduction in temperature differentials or a higher temperature in unheated rooms). The
positive valuation of beneficial environmental aspects of a good by consumers who care
about the natural environment is also reflected in (a higher value for) K,.'° Note that K,
need not be constant but changes over time as people develop different needs and their
perception of the innnovation changes, in part as a result of social influences.
Another factor that is likely to affect the decision to adopt an environment-con-
serving durable is uncertainty about the economic characteristics of the new technology.
Uncertainty about the economic characteristics of a technological innovation stems from
three sources: potential adopters are uncertain about the technical performance of the
new good (for example, about the pollution control efficiency and about the costs of
using the technology), and they are uncertain about future prices and taxes which
determine the profitability of the innovation. Uncertainty about the performance charac-
teristics and costs will reduce the willingness to pay for a new product by risk-averse
potential users.
To take account of uncertainty in the adoption decision, the annual gains are
discounted for uncertainty by dividing these gains by an uncertainty factor U, = li,(p) 2
1, where p is a parameter which reflects risk aversion and uncertainty and f indexes
'" K may be positive or negative. As we have seen, K is positive for double glazing. For an
environmentally desirable good that is of lower quality than comparable goods (which is the case, for
example, when a good is made of recycling material or in the case of an electric vehicle with a short
range and long recharging times) K will be negative. K may also be positive for some people and
negative for others, depending on their preferences, life-styles and habits.
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time, li = 1 if p = 0, i.e., when there is no uncertainty. Furthermore, we assume that
uncertainty about the economic characteristics of the innovation decreases over time as
people learn about the true characteristics of the new technology (i.e., dli, / dr < 0 and
tfti, / dn, < 0 with n, being the number of decision-making units having adopted the
technology at time f)." A reduction in U, causes the distribution of X, to shift to the
right, bringing a larger part of the population into the population of actual adopters.
What it does is shift the demand curve for the new technology to the right:
- ,,-,•*
Figure 5.3. The effect of learning about the economic
characteristics of an innovation on the demand curve
Of course, this is a very crude way of incorporating uncertainty and learning into the
decision-making process. A theoretically more appealing way of doing so is by defining
a Bayesian learning process, where a potential user updates its estimates of the expected
profitability of the innovation and perceived risk each year. We have not attempted this
because of the analytical complications this would lead us into — for instance, we must
assume a probability distribution for the profitability of the innovation as perceived by
the adopter population and specify a learning mechanism which changes the parameters
of the profitability distribution.
After having defined the model's variables, we will now define the adoption rule. As
explained, the model assumes that a potential user will adopt an environment-saving
" In chapters 6 and 7 we use the following one-parameter functions for I/: U,(p) = 1 + p/(f-f<>) arid
) = 1 + p/ln(<-<o). Note that U, -> 1 for f -» °°. An alternative specification is: U,(p) = 1 + pe"'. li,
may also be defined as a function of the number of adopters n,.,, for instance, U, = 1 + p(N-«,.,)/N,
with N the size of the total population.
innovation 1/ and W/ICTJ the risk-adjusted annual economic benefits associated with the
usage of the environmentally desirable technology exceed the annual total costs TC,
(being the sum of annual fixed costs FC, and variable costs VC,)." This means that a
potential adopter will adopt the innovation at time t if:
f i l ^ L > FC+VC = TC (10)
i ( 0
+  
' • ' •"-••••• with S, = £R,»T<uc, and FC, = C,»R, where R, = 1—
From inequality (10) it is easy to see how the different variables affect the decision to
adopt (or not to adopt) the environmentally beneficial technology. A high purchase price
and a high interest rate have a negative effect on the decision to adopt the product.
Similarly, high control efficiency (large energy-savings), high tax (energy price) and
relatively little uncertainty about the economic consequences of adopting the innovation
have a positive effect on the willingness of potential users to purchase the innovation.
Growth in ownership of the technology is controlled by c/wnges in the above variable —
i.e., by a reduction of uncertainty, improvements in the performance-price tradeoff(s),
changes in the pollution tax (energy price) and the costs of using the technology, and
shifts in people's preferences."
The decision to adopt an environmentally desirable technological innovation at a
given time f can also be framed in a different way. If we divide both sides of inequality
(10) by R,, the imputed annual rental rate for the [f,f+Z] period, and bring VC,/R, to the
left-hand side, we get:
^ ^ ^ c " • • * (IDx ^ > 
- ' U,R, R, R, '
The expression on the left-hand side gives the (risk-adjusted) reseraiHon pnce X, of the
environment-saving durable which is compared with the costs of adoption." The reser-
vation price gives the willingness to pay for a technological innovation — where the risk
factor discounts for any uncertainty about the value of the new good.
Note that uncertainty factor U, can also be interpreted in a different way. Simple
manipulation of inequality (11) shows that Li, is the quotient of S, + K, and TC,. In other
" An implicit assumption is that the net expected annual economic benefits from adoption are
non-decreasing with time.
" Throughout this study it is assumed that adoption of the technology leads to usage. The
possibility of 'disadoption' during the diffusion period due to technical breakdown or a change in
market conditions is not considered.
" X, can also be interpreted as the certainty equivalent of (S,+K,-VC,)/R^ ;< . ;. .< \
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words, ti, can be interpreted as a rentability requirement of an uncertain adopter for an
innovation of uncertain profitability or merit.
In our model, the risk-adjusted reservation prices X are assumed to differ among poten-
tial users, depending on the type and age of the existing production process, the size of
the firm, the industrial sector a firm belongs to, the skills being available for using the
new technology (factors that determine the costs associated with the usage of the tech-
nology), and, in the case of consumers, individual preferences, household characteristics
(income, family size, place of residence), stock of durable goods, etc. H
To keep the model simple we assume that I/,, R, and C, are the same for all
decision-making units. This implies that any disparity in reservation prices X at a given
point in time is caused by variations in: ?
i) tax-savings S (or savings in energy costs) associated with the usage of the
innovation, being related to differences in (absolute) emissions reductions,
ER, among polluters and differences in pollution taxes, Tax, across regions;
ii) extra gains X associated with the usage of the environment-saving durable;
iii) the variable costs of using the environment-saving technology VC."
In other words, it is assumed, at least in this chapter, that differences in cost-savings
associated with the usage of the environment-saving innovation and differences in the
valuation of the other attributes of the technology are more important than variations in
purchase prices and installation costs and differences in risk attitudes in affecting pur-
chasing decisions." Of course, this assumption may be incorrect for certain goods. The
model can, however, be extended in assuming distributions for C, R and U.
Having modelled the adoption process of an environmentally desirable technological
innovation, we now examine the aggregate diffusion pattern resulting from adopter
decisions. Is the model able to generate S-shaped diffusion patterns found in many
" The variable costs of using the technology consist of operating and maintenance costs (being a
function of labour costs, energy and material costs) and waste disposal costs.
" A class of innovations for which differences in purchase prices are likely to be small and
differences in user costs large is that of indivisible goods. If the innovation is indivisible, there are
economies of scale in using the technology, which puts small firms at a disadvantage. Even if the
innovation is not indivisible but varies in size and performance (as is often the case for pollution
control devices) there may still be some degree of "lumpiness", causing significant differences in unit
costs for differing users. Valuation of the performance characteristics of the durable is also likely to
differ among potential users. The service characteristics (speed, mileage) of an electric car will be
valued less negatively by someone who wants to use it for urban travels (shopping, etc.) than by
someone who plans to use a car for making long business journeys.
- • • • " • • - . . . . " I , - - -
1 1 4 .- . -•>;•>•,!-;••: V-, ••'-.-•,,
empirical diffusion studies, and, if so, under what conditions can particular sigmoid
curves be derived?
As noted earlier, the aggregate diffusion pattern stems from changes in the stim-
ulus variate and in the critical threshold. The stimulus variate (the risk-adjusted reser-
vation price) is described by a distribution which is the joint product of the distributions
of the tax-savings S (or savings in energy costs), the extra gains from adoption K and
variable costs VC."
Let us first consider the simple case where all three variates are nomw/Zy distrib-
uted at any given time f: . . , . , - . . . . .
X . ) ; K, ~ N ( u , X , ) ; VC,-N(M^,,,o^,) ; : • , / ; (12)
If we assume that S,, K, and VC, are independent variates, we can apply the convolution
property of normal distributions, which gives that the (risk-adjusted) reservation prices
X at time t are also distributed according to a normal distribution: . . ,.
. . . X - N ( u . , c * ) - • • • • " ' • • - • • • " ( 1 3 )
,
with mean u, = —_ 1 i and variance
The proportion of the population having adopted the innovation at time t, defined as A,,
is:
• •:•• •• ••-'• < A, = P(X,>C,) = J/(X,)dX,
with/(X,) being the probability density function of X,.
To calculate the probability that a randomly selected decision-making unit of the popula-
tion has adopted the innovation at time t we rewrite equation (14):
^ = P(X,>C,) = 1-P(X,<C,) = 1 - N(C, |u,,of) = <D((p,-C,)/o,) (15)
where N stands for the normal distribution and <I> for the standard normal distribution.
" Variations in tax-savings S associated with the usage of a pollution control technology (or a
low-polluting product or process) may stem from two sources: variations in absolute emissions
reductions £R achieved by the innovation and differences in pollution taxes Tax (due to a variation in
taxes across regions). Variations in absolute emissions reductions in turn may stem from variations in
the control efficiency and differences in the (absolute) level of pollution before abatement PA
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A, is the probabilistic counterpart of the level of diffusion at time f.™ The time path of
J4, gives the growth in the proportion of the population having adopted the innovation.
From this equation it follows that diffusion will follow a cumulative normal time path if
(/*, - C,)/o, grows at a constant absolute rate through time and a cumulative lognormal
time path if (^ , - Q)/o, is a lognormal function of time only. - >vK K^ .^V,, .f •.,.>,rrr,i
If we had chosen different probability distributions (like the Cauchy or logistic
distribution) for S, K and VC, the aggregate diffusion pattern would be described by the
probability distribution of the sum of these distributions (assuming the random variables
are independent). As the Cauchy distribution and the logistic distribution, being sym-
metric distributions, resemble the normal distribution (they only differ from the normal
distribution with respect to their tails) we will not consider these situations here.
Note that our model does not restrain the diffusion growth curve to be of the
cumulative normal or lognormal form. Even under the assumption of a (log)normal
distribution for the (risk-adjusted) reservation prices our model may generate a wide
range of diffusion patterns (including non-sigmoid curves), depending on the particular
time paths of the variables affecting the decision to adopt the innovation concerned.
5.4 The Diffusion Effects of Different Policy Instruments
This section examines the technological diffusion effects of different approaches to
controlling pollution in the context of the threshold model described in section 3.1. We
will determine the technological diffusion effects of: 1) a pollution tax (or an energy tax),
2) an investment subsidy, and 3) information supply, being the most common policy
approaches for controlling pollutant emissions besides direct regulation."
The ways in which environmental policies affect potential users' willingness to
purchase an environmentally desirable technology differ quite strongly. In the case of a
pollution tax, adoption of a pollution control device (or a low-polluting process or
product) brings cost savings for the polluter, the amount of which depends on the
control efficiency. An investment subsidy also changes the economic calculus in favour
of adoption of the environment-saving technology by lowering the cost of adoption.
Information supply, however, does not alter the monetary costs and benefits of adoption
of the innovation but aims to increase knowledge about the economic characteristics of
the innovation and attempts to improve environmental awareness and responsibility of
firms and consumers. -. . . ^
Davies, op rif., p.77.
v; ;i in i
" Note that in the context of the model, an emission reduction subsidy and a tradeable pollution
permit affect the decision to adopt a pollution control device in the same way as the pollution tax if
the emission reduction subsidy and the unit price at which the tradeable pollution permit are equal
to the pollution tax.
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We will now analyze the impact of the different policy approaches on the aggregate
diffusion pattern. In the model described in section 3.1, the pollution tax was already
incorporated. The impact of a change in the pollution tax on the expected rate of growth
of the diffusion process can be analyzed by differentiating i4,, the probability that a
randomly selected decision-making unit owns the innovation at time f, with respect to
Tax,.-"
r = W ^ - ^ ^ ™
Equation (16) shows that an increase in the pollution tax at time £ will lead to an increa-
se in the proportion of the population having adopted the innovation if /*, < C, or if £R
is deterministic, i.e., if c?^ = 0. If ER is stochastic and /<, < C, it is unclear whether an
increase in T<«:, leads to an increase in the proportion of adopters. This is because a
change in Tax, affects the shape of the distribution of X,. This change in the dispersion of
X, may compensate the positive effect of Tax, through / i ^ on A,. We have little reason
however to suspect that this really is an important factor. If we neglect this, equation
(16) changes into:
Equation (16)' shows that the higher the (average) level of emissions reduction that may
be achieved by technology, and the lower the imputed rental rate and uncertainty about
the economic consequences of adopting the technology, the greater will be the increase
in adoption due to a higher pollution tax. Of course, this is also what one would expect.
The effect of an investment subsidy can also be determined in the model. If the
subsidy is a lump sum S,, differentiation of /4, with respect to S, gives:
f £ S , ) > 0 (17)
Equation (17) states that the closer the difference between the cost of adoption and the
lump sum is to the mode of the distribution of reservation prices X, the greater the effect
of a change in the subsidy. This result is easy to comprehend: if C, - S, is dose to the
mode of X (assuming the distribution of X is bell-shaped), an increase in S, brings a
relatively large number of potential users into the population of actual adopters.
Instead of a lump sum subsidy, the investment subsidy may also be a set per-
centage, say s, of the sum of the purchase price and installation costs (which implies that
™ Here we assume that Tax, is the same across the population of potential adopters, that any
variations in S, are caused by variations in £R,. ,^ , ,*-.._, ,. . - „ , . . . , , ,.,. .,,,
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the costs of adoption are now C,(l - s)). The effects of an increase in s, on the probability
of adoption at time f is described by the following expression:
(18)
The higher C, and the higher the proportion of the population with a (risk-adjusted)
reservation price C,(l - s), the greater the effects of an investment subsidy where the
subsidy is a set percentage of the cost of adoption. Thus, if the real costs of adoption C,(l
- s) are close to the mode of X, an increase in the investment subsidy s will bring a large
proportion of the population into the population of actual adopters, especially for high
C.
Finally, we will analyze how information provided by public authorities affects
the diffusion growth curve. As explained earlier, the supply of information may affect
purchasing decisions in two ways: by reducing uncertainty about the economic charac-
teristics of the innovation and by changing people's attitudes towards the natural en-
vironment and environmentally preferable technologies. In terms of our model this
implies that both Li and K are a function of information supply, /S, that is U = U(p,JS)
and K = K(/S) (with dti MS < 0 and dK /d/S > 0). The effects of an increase in infor-
mation supply /S, on the probability of adoption at time t of a randomly selected firm or
household can be determined by differentiating /4, with respect to /S,. The impact of /S,
through a reduction of (i, and an increase in K, on /4, is described by the following
expressions:
dli. dU. (19)
d/S.
^•^=/(c,) - d/S.
(20)
What equations (19) and (20) show is that an increase in information supply has a clear
positive effect on /4, in the case of habit formation (for a non-stochastic K,). The impact of
information supply on .A, through a reduction of uncertainty about the economic charac-
teristics is less dear. It is positive if the term between the square brackets in equation
(19) is negative, which is, for instance, when S, the annual gains from adoption at time t,
are not stochastic. The magnitude of the effect of information supply on /4, depends on
several variables.
To analyze the effects of information supply on the adoption decisions at time f+7
(7 = 1,2,..) we must make further assumptions about the extent to which the effects last in
duration. This could be modelled by constructing a stock variable for information trans-
fer (being the (weighted) sum of information flows). As this would lead us into even
more complex computations we have decided not to do so.
The effects of a re/ahw change of a pollution tax or investment subsidy on the relative
change in the proportion of the population having adopted — what may be considered as
the elasticity of adoption with respect to changes in policy measures — can be calculated
by multiplying the left-hand side of equations (16)-(20) by Too:, /A,, S, /A,, s, M,, and
/S, / .A, respectively.
What conclusions can we draw about the technological impact of policy instruments?
For instance, are taxes a more effective policy instrument than investment subsidies or
information supply in stimulating the technological diffusion of environmentally bene-
ficial technologies? The answer to this question depends on the parameter values and
the stringency of the policy instruments. It also depends on whether or not the threshold
model is a good model for explaining adopter decisions over time. Therefore, we applied
the model to two types of environmental technologies: biological waste-water treatment
plants in the Dutch Food and Beverage industry and thermal home insulation in the
Netherlands. The results are described in chapters 6 and 7. We also estimated three
epidemic models to see which model is best, and to examine the robustness of the
results. Adoption decisions of firms and consumers are also studied in three case studies
of environmentally beneficial technologies in chapter 8. Chapter 9 gives an overview of
the results of empirical studies into the technological impact of environmental policies.
Conclusions about the usefulness of different policy instruments to foster technological
innovation and diffusion will be given in chapter 13.
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The Diffusion of Biological Waste-Water
Treatment Plants in the Dutch Food and
Beverage Industry ?,?
Throughout the past 25 years, many industrial water polluters in the Netherlands de-
cided to employ biological waste-water treatment technologies in response to public
waste-water policies. An important component of Dutch waste-water policies was the
usage of effluent charges in addition to environmental standards pertaining to the
composition of industrial discharges. As the Dutch waste-water control policy is one of
the world's oldest environmental control systems that use economic instruments, it is
interesting to analyze the effects of the effluent charge on the diffusion of biological
waste-water treatment plants. Besides providing statistical evidence as to the actual
impact of Dutch waste-water control policy on the rate of adoption of biological waste-
water treatment plants, such an analysis may further our understanding of the useful-
ness of incentive-based approaches as opposed to command-and-control approaches to
fostering the employment of environment-conserving technologies. This chapter presents
empirical results of the diffusion model described in chapter 5 and of three epidemic
models — the logistic, Gompertz and Bass models.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 1 describes Dutch waste-water control
policies. Section 2 describes how the earlier-described threshold model can be applied to
the diffusion of biological waste-water treatment plants in the Food and Beverage in-
dustry. Section 3 contains the empirical results of several variants of the threshold
model. Section 4 gives the results of the three epidemic models. The final section pre-
sents the conclusions.
6.1 Waste-Water Policy in the Netherlands
The Netherlands have one of the oldest and most advanced waste-water control system
in the world. Two interesting features of the Dutch waste-water management system
stand out, which together make it quite unique. First, its highly decentralized nature. In
the Netherlands, thirdly regional water quality management authorities (known as
"Zuiveringsschappen" or "Waterschappen") are responsible for the quality of surface
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waters.' Second, the usage of (high) effluent charges (or taxes) in addition to environ-
mental standards regarding the compostion of residual discharges. Unlike most other
countries, the effluent charge on oxygen-consuming pollutants in the Netherlands had a
significant impact on polluters' decisions. Research by Hans Bressers (1983, 1988) and
Jaap Schuurman (1988) has revealed that of all the factors that caused polluters to invest
in (biological) waste-water treatment technologies, the effluent charge was far and away
the most important factor.* Table 6.1 shows the importance of various factors in in-
ducing Dutch industrial water polluters to invest in biological waste-water cleaning
devices to reduce the discharge of organic pollutants in different time periods (based on
an opinion surey).
Before 1975 1975-80 After 1980
(N=17) (N=33) (N=30)
Environmental standards
Effluent charges
Effluent charges +
environmental standards
Other factors
47%
24%
i / , . , •>,,,:•.,. -,:.,-
29%
36%
55%
9%
30%
50%
13%
:>li!
Table 6.1. Direct cause for industrial polluters to invest in biological waste-water
cleaning technologies. Source: Schuurman (1988, p.86) (with N the sample size).
Table 6.1 demonstrates that since 1975, the year in which almost all water-quality boards
had instituted a system of effluent charges for oxygen-consuming pollutants, the effluent
' A federal agency, Rijkswaterstaat, is responsible for the water-quality management of "rijks-
wateren", that is, the big rivers (such as the Rhine and Maas) and coastal waters.
' J.Th.A. Bressers, 1983, Be/eids^ fectiCTteif CTI wfltertofl/ite/fsbeteid. ECTI besfuursfrundig oruferzodt (The
effectiveness of water quality policy. A political science study), PhD dissertation, University of
Twente, Enschede; see also Hans Th.A. Bressers, 1988, A Comparison of the Effectiveness of Incen-
tives and Directives: The Case of Dutch Water Quality Policy, Po/iq/ Studies ROTJCW, 7(3): 500-518; and
Hans Th.A. Bressers, 1988, Effluent Charges Can Work: The Case of the Dutch Water Quality Policy,
in Frank J. Dietz and Wim J.M. Heijman (eds.), Enpironmenta/ Po//cy in a MarJtet Economy, Wagenin-
gen, pp.5-39; Jaap Schuurman, 1988, De pn/s pan water. ECTI ondmoeJfc naar de aard CTZ omcan^ twi <fe
'•egwierende luerWng ran de iieronfreinigjngste)5?ng opperp/aJtfCT«ateren (The price of water), Arnhem:
Gouda Quint, and J. Schuurman en J. Tegelaar, 1983, De regulerende werking van de WVO. Een
kwantificering (The effects of WVO. A quantitative study), WeefcWad ixwr Fiscaa/ R£c/it, 15: 1561-1577
(nr.5614).
• i .
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charge was the single most important factor in causing industrial polluters to invest in
biological waste-water treatment plants. Especially in the Food and Beverages industry,
effluent charges were the key factor in inducing water polluters to invest in biological
waste-water technologies. According to Schuurman, effluent charges were of overriding
importance in the Food and Beverages industry in 75% of the investigated cases (N =
86).' However, Table 6.1 also demonstrates that environmental standards, formulated in
permits issued by regional water-quality agencies, were quite an important factor in
firms' decisions to invest in biological waste-water treatment. Especially industrial
polluters that released their waste water dz'recf/y on surface waters (mostly rivers) were
forced to invest in (biological) waste-water treatment plants, in order to comply with
environmental standards pertaining to the composition of their effluent.
Since our model assumes that polluters are free in their decision to adopt or not
to adopt an environmentally beneficial technology (and at what moment), we will
restrict the analysis to indirect polluters in the Food and Beverage industry that discharge
their waste water on a collective waste-water treatment plant. For indirect polluters,
effluent charges were by far the most important reason for investing in biological ef-
fluent treatment plants. In fact, in many cases, waste-water quality control agencies
resented the on-site treatment of waste waters by industrial polluters because this had a
direct negative impact on the agencies' revenues, sometimes creating problems of excess
capacity in collective waste-water treatment plants.*
Figure 6.1 depicts the diffusion curve of biological waste-water treatment plants in
the Food and Beverage industry — the sector in which most biological waste-water
treatment plants have been installed up to now. Figure 6.1 demonstrates that the dif-
fusion of biological effluent treatment plants in this sector is described by a sigmoid
curve.The main reason why industrial dischargers of organic pollutants did not invest
simultaneously in biological waste-water treatment plants was that it was not cost-
effective for all of them to do so. It was only when the effluent charges steadily
increased over the years — from an average of 5.42 guilders per inhabitant equivalent
(I.E.)* in 1973 to 74.26 guilders per I.E. in 1991 - that it became financially attractive for
polluters to clean their own waste water. The increase in average effluent charges per
unit of water pollution (I.E.) is depicted in Figure 6.2.
' Schuurman, op cif., Table 3.6, p.82.
* See the references of Bressers and Schuurman on the previous page.
* I.E. stands for "Inhabitant Equivalent" (in Dutch "inwoner equivalent"), the average oxygen
demand of pollutants in waste-water discharges of one person during twenty-four hours. One I.E. is
estimated at 136 gram of oxygen, being the sum of chemical oxygen demand (CZV) and the oxygen
demand due to conversion of nitrogen compounds according to the N-Kjeldahl method. (A. van der
Hoogt, P.J.J. Oosterling en J. Schuurman, 1990, Heffingen verontreiniging oppervlaktewateren, in
Hoq/tizaJten mi/ieutej^ingen, edited by E.P.J. Wasch, Fiscale studie serie nr.27).
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Figure 6.1. The diffusion of biological waste-water treatment tech-
nologies across indirect polluters in the Dutch Food and Beverage
Industry, 1970-91. Source: RIZA, CBS and own calculations.
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Figure 6.2. Average effluent charges for organically-polluted indus-
trial waste water in the Netherlands.
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Of the various options chosen by industrial polluters to clean organically polluted waste
waters, biological waste-water treatment plants were the most important option, in terms
of reductions in the discharge of organic pollutants in waterways and costs of capital
outlays.
We will now give a short description of biological waste-water treatment systems.
Biological waste-water treatment plants are designed to deal with the problem of oxy-
gen-consuming organic pollutants, although they are also capable of dealing with pol-
lutants like nitrates, sulphates and even metals.' Organic pollutants are degraded and
secured by micro-organisms (bacteria) operating in either an aerobic or anaerobic (oxy-
gen-free) aquatic environment. A biological waste-water treatment system usually con-
sists of one or two water basins, some tanks, special equipment (like a rootsblower and
sludge separator) and a control system. It is a typical end-of-pipe device aimed at the
prevention of the discharge of organic pollutants rather than the prevention of the
production of pollutants.
There are basically two types of the biological waste-water treatment technologies:
aerobic technologies like oxidation tanks, oxidation ditches, aeration tanks (each in a
continuous and discontinuous variant) and anaerobic technologies like Upflow Fluidized
Bed and Upflow Anaerobic Sludge Blanket. Up to now industrial firms have primarily
invested in aerobic technologies — only 16 of the 190 biological waste-water treatment
plants in operation in Dutch industries are anaerobic/ This suggests that the implicit
model assumption of a homogeneous technology — i.e., homogeneous at time t (not over
time) — is not correct. At least from a technical point of view there are considerable
differences between biological effluent treatment technologies, especially between aerobic
and anaerobic plants. Unfortunately, data on the diffusion of biological waste-water
technologies collected by the Central Bureau of Statistics in the Netherlands are only
available for the aggregate level, not for individual firms and technologies. However, as
the cost differences between aerobic treatment plants are relatively small according to
suppliers of waste-water treatment technologies and waste-water specialists of the RIZA
(the Dutch federal agency for water-quality management of "rijkswateren"), it seems
okay to perform the model analysis for all types of biological waste-water treatment
plants.*
' Maarten Evenblij, 1993, Waterzuivering. The Sky is the Limit, Mi/i£U/nagazin«, 4(4): 4-7.
' CM. Maas, P.J.J.G. Geudense, en L.E. Duvoort-van Engers, 1993, Afvalwater-zuiveringsslib van
Bedrijven en Instellingen, 1990, HjO, 26(3): 6-8.
* The incorporation of anaerobk waste-water treatment systems in the analysis is partly justified by
assuming a distribution for the unit costs of effluent treatment.
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6.2 Description of the Threshold Model
This section will describe the details of the diffusion analysis of biological waste-water
treatment technologies: the distributions of the factors underlying the diffusion process,
the parameters to be estimated, etc. For a detailed description of the model itself, we
refer to chapter 5.
An important characteristic of waste-water treatment plants is that the cost of
adoption and the reservation price depend on the size of the investment. A high dean-
ing capacity (in terms of "Inhabitant Equivalents", I.E) is associated with high capital
costs and a high willingness to pay for such a device. To deal with this problem, we
define the costs of adoption C, and the reservation prices X, per unit o/ poZZuf ion abated,
that is, per inhabitant equivalent.
In addition to the one-time costs of adoption, there are variable costs of using
biological waste-water treatment plants. The variable costs per unit of abatement are
denoted by VC,. These costs consist of operating and maintenance costs, energy and
material costs and waste disposal costs (biological waste-water treatment technologies
produce highly polluted sludge which must be taken care of).
In our model, a potential user compares the costs of employing the environment-
saving durable with the (risk-adjusted) monetary value of the gains connected with the
usage of the environment-conserving device. The gains from using a biological waste-
water treatment plant consist of the savings in effluent tax payments and the monetary
valuation of other gains from using biological, X,. Here, K, is zero because there are no
extra gains (like higher sales from a better environmental image) or losses attached to
the usage of the effluent treatment technologies.' Thus, the only gains from effluent
treatment are savings on effluent payments. The gains per «mf o/aba(emCTJ/ from using a
biological waste-water treatment in water-quality control region i at time f are equal to
TaXj,, the effluent tax rate. These gains, after being discounted for uncertainty, are com-
pared with total annual costs of using the technology, TC, being the sum of the annual
capital charge FC and variable costs VC, each defined per unit of pollution abated (I.E.).
Only those firms will have adopted the technology at time f for which:
••<• ' • • * ? • • • • - > > • . » T o r ' • - • - . v/ ,
V. . , - , ;. , . , . 1 - j -p > FC, + yC, = TC, ^ . ^ , . ,,. (1)
Dividing both sides of the above inequality by the imputed annual rental rate R, (being
a function of the interest rate r, and the service life Z of the technology), and bringing
VC/R, to the other side, gives us the risk-adjusted reservation price X, per unit of abate-
ment:
' In our analysis the waste disposal costs connected with waste-water treatment plants are part of
the variable costs.
126 Chapter 6
(2)
with R, = '
1 - * " ' • '
The risk-adjusted reservation price per unit of abatement, X,, is compared with the cost
of adoption C, = FC,/R,. If X, > C,, then a potential adopter 'should' adopt the environ-
ment-saving technology (here, a biological waste-water treatment plant).
To apply the model we must first determine which variables of equation (2) are likely to
be stochastic (differ among potential users) and what variables can reasonably be as-
sumed to be deterministic (which means that they are the same for all industrial pol-
luters)
The first source of variation is the effluent charge or tax rate Tox^  that polluters
have to pay for discharging oxygen-consuming pollutants in their waste water. As noted
above, water-quality management is highly decentralized in the Netherlands. At this
moment, there are thirty regional water-quality boards, each being responsible for the
quality of the surface waters in their own region. As the regional water-quality control
agencies are quite autonomous in deciding how to achieve a higher quality of surface
waters, and because the costs of effluent treatment differ across regions (due to geo-
graphical factors and the industry structure), the effluent tax rates set by the regional
water-quality authorities differed strongly between one another (see appendix A). For
example, in 1991, in the region of Vrije van Sluis in the province of Zeeland, industrial
water polluters had to pay 120 guilders for each unit of oxygen-consuming organic
pollutants, whereas in the AA region in Noord-Brabant water-quality authorities charged
only 42.24 guilders per I.E.
Figure 6.3 gives the frequency distribution of the effluent tax rates across water-
quality control regions in 1975 and 1991. The frequency distribution of Tax, in 1981 and
1987 is in appendix B. Casual observation of the frequency distributions of the effluent
charges per unit of I.E. across water-quality management regions indicates that, in the
1974-91 period, on the whole, the fequency of effluent charges is (slightly) positive or
right-hand skewed with the mean being a little higher than the median.
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Figure 6.3a. The frequency distribution of effluent charges for
organic pollution per unit of I.E. in the Netherlands in 1975.
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Figure 6.3b. The frequency distribution of effluent charges for
organic pollution per unit of I.E. in the Netherlands in 1991.
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A possible good candidate for the distribution of effluent charges is the lognormal
distribution, being a positive and right-hand skewed distribution. Using Aitchison and
Brown's notation: Tax, - A(/^,, ay / ) . ' " This assumpt ion has been tested more thorough-
ly by doing a Ko/mogorou-Smimou one-sample test. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is a
goodness-of-fit test which determines whether the scores in the sample can reasonably
be thought to have come from a popula t ion having the theoretical dis t r ibut ion." The
test involves specifying the cumulat ive frequency distribution which wou ld occur under
the theoretical distribution and comparing that wi th the observed cumulat ive frequency
distribution. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test focuses on the largest of the deviations
be tween the theoretical cumulat ive distribution and the observed cumulat ive frequency
distr ibution of a variate V (here Tax;,):
D^ = maximum |FQ(Y) - S^(Y) | • •:.
wi th Fp(.) being the value of the theoretical cumulat ive frequency distr ibution and S^(.)
the observed cumulat ive frequency distribution of a r a n d o m sample of N observations.
In our case:
I^Tax,.,) -S^ (Tox , , ) | -•• (3)
wi th Sfc,(T<uCj,) = Jt /N and fc the number of observations equal to or less t h a n Tax* and N
= 30 (the number of waste-water control regions). '••
The null hypothesis H,,: F(.) = F«,(.) is rejected if D^ is large. Critical values of maximum
deviat ion D^, are tabulated in Siegel (1956). We have tested the hypothesis of Fg being a
lognormal distr ibution and the hypothesis that the effluent charges are normal ly distrib-
uted. As it turns out, both hypotheses could not be rejected at a fairly large 20% sig-
nificance level, except for the year 1974, when several water-quali ty control agencies
failed to insti tute a system of effluent charges: D^ < 0.18, Vt e [1975,1991] if F,, is a
lognormal distr ibution and D^, 2 0.176, Vt e [1975,1991] for F<, being a normal distribu-
'" Note that ^ , is not the mean of the effluent charge Tfl* at time t but that of ln(Tax,). Tax, -
j - , , O7-/) means that the natura/ /ogarit/im of the effluent tax is distributed according to a normal
distribution with mean p,-, and standard deviation a,-,*, i.e., E(ln(Tax,)}=^j-, and V{ln(Tflx,)}=Oj,^ .
" Sidney Siegel, 1956, Nonparawfric Statistics /or t/ie Be/iawoura/ Sciences, Tokyo: McGraw-Hill
Kogakusha Ltd, p.47. The following description of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is based on this
source.
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tion. As we can see, all values for D ,^ in the 1975-91 period are below D-^^ = 0.19, the
critical value of D ,^ for a sample of size N = 30 at the 20% significance level."
Although the assumption of the effluent charges being lognormally distributed in
the 1975-91 period is not rejected, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test does not lead us to
reject the normal distribution in favour of the lognormal distribution. Both assumptions
are reasonably good, with the D ,^ values of the normal distribution being somewhat
smaller than the D ,^ values of the lognormal distribution in the 1974-86 period and
somewhat higher in the 1987-91 period. Throughout this section we use the analytically
more convenient assumption of a lognormal distribution for Tax,. When we apply the
model, however, we will also investigate the possibility of the model's variates being
normally distributed.
In addition to the effluent tax rate, another model variable varies widely among
the population of potential users in the Food and Beverage industry: the total annual
unit cost of using a biological waste-water treatment plant, TC,. The total annual unit
costs of a reduction in the discharge of oxygen-consuming organic solvents are known to
decrease wtfft tfze c/eani«^ capacity — implying that there are scale economies in biological
waste-water cleaning. Schuurman finds for 1983 the following cost abatement function
for biological waste-water cleaning technologies (with a control efficiency > 90%) emplo-
yed in the Food industry: TC, = 120,688/P/4, + 16.80 with TC the total annual unit cost
(measured in Dutch guilders) of water pollution abatement and P^ 4 the reduction in the
discharge of oxygen-consuming organic pollutants, measured in I.E."
The above expression clearly demonstrates that there are substantial scale econo-
mies in using biological waste-water treatment plants. For example, in the Food in-
dustry, in 1983, the cost of reducing the discharge of organic pollutants is 26.8 Dutch
guilders (Dfl) per unit of abatement for a firm which produces 12.067 units of I.E. where-
as it is Dfl 36.8 for a firm producing 6.033 units of I.E. It seems not permitted therefore
to assume that the unit cost of using biological waste-water treatment technologies are
constant across industrial water polluters. Since the distribution of firm size is generally
positively skewed, with positive values for firm size (whatever measure for firm size is
used, output, employees, pollution level) it seems reasonable to assume a lognormal
distribution for the distribution of firm size." But if firm size is distributed according to
a two-parameter lognormal distribution, then variations in the unit costs of using a
" This conclusion must be qualified. As noted by Siegel (1956, p.60), the distribution of D^ is not
exactly known for the case where the mean and variance of the population are estimated (as we have
done). The use of the critical values for D ,^ tabulated in Siegel will lead to a conservative test. The
values, however, of D^ are believed to be small enough (much below D^gg = 0.24) to have reason-
able confidence in not rejecting the hypothesis that Tax, is (log)normally distributed across water-
quality regions in the 1975-91 period.
" S c h u u r m a n , o p c i t . , p . 2 9 1 . • - • = - • • • < • - • . • . . = . , - . . . • . < , . . . .
" The assumption of firm sizes being lognormally distributed is confirmed by many empirical
studies studies (Davies, op cif.), which suggests that our assumption is indeed reasonable.
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newly built biological waste-water treatment facility at time f — being muerse/y related to
firm size — also follow a lognormal distribution: TC, - A(f*,.<-,, (T^c)."
The assumption of a lognormal distribution for pollution levels and TC, is also
examined statistically, using information provided by Schuurman on the distribution of
firms according to their pollution level. Schuurman has classified industrial polluters in
four categories on the basis of their pollution level in 1975 — a time at which only few
firms owned a biological waste-water treatment system. Figure 6.4 gives the frequency
distribution of firms' pollution levels (measured in 1,000 I.E.).
Figure 6.4. The distribution of firms according to the level of efflu-
ent discharges in 1975. Source: Schuurman (1988, Table 1.2 on p.34).
Figure 6.4 shows that the empirical distribution much resembles a lognormal distribut-
ion. The lognormality of the pollution levels is further analyzed by doing a x* one-
sample test for grouped data. The x^  test is another goodness-of-fit test which may be
used to test whether a significant difference exists between an observed number of cases
falling in each category and an expected number based on the null hypothesis." Using
Siegel's notation, x* is defined as:
<W^~ •„•*;< •;; f .-.--. •:•»
• ' - . } ' . > ' ! ' i l - * V ? i i ' V ' r i • • • » . . , ' • : • ' >
" This result is due to the mu/f jp/icflfrw reprorfurtrae property of the lognormal distribution: If X -
A0<, c^) then 1 /X - A(-^, cr*) or, more generally, if X - A(^, (?) and b and c > 0 are constants then
cX* - A(/n(c)+ty, f^ o^ ) (Theorem 2.1 of J. Aitchison and J.A.C. Brown, 1957, 77ie Lognornw/ Disfrifcurion,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.11).
" S i e g e l , o p d ( . , p . 4 3 . »:, . . : ... •.. • - . - . . • • - ' . < . v . . ?.--•-•..>•-.
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with O, the observed number of cases categorized in the ;th category (/ = l,..m) and £
the expected number of cases in the ;th category under H,,.
Under the null hypothesis, x* is distributed according to a x^.i-^-distribution — where s is
the number of independent parameters of F(,(.) which have to be estimated from the
grouped data.'* Again, we want to establish statistically whether the lognormal and
normal distribution are good approximations for the observed empirical distribution.
Calculating x* under both hypotheses, we find that x^  = 4.60 for the normal distribution
and that x* = 0.82 for the lognormal distribution (based on 503 observations divided into
four classes, that is, m = 4 and I O, = 503). These values for x* imply that the assumption
that the pollution levels are distributed according to a normal distribution is rejected at
the 5% significance level (Xi;o.o5* = 3.84) but not at the 1% significance level (Xwoi* = 5.41).
The hypothesis that the pollution levels are lognormally distributed, however, is not
rejected, not even at the 30% significance level (x , ^ = 107), which indicates that the
lognormal distribution is quite a good approximation for the distribution of pollution
levels, much better than the normal distribution. Thus, to the extent that variations in
TC,, the total unit costs of using a (newly built) biological waste-water treatment plant,
are caused by scale economies, such variations may be approximated by a lognormal
distribution.
In addition to cost differences due to scale economies, however, another factor accounts
for the variability in the total annual unit costs of biological waste-water treatment: the
confro/ t^ /Sciency of the cleaning device, £R. The control efficiency is known to differ
between aerobic and anaerobic technologies, across industries and, to a lesser extent,
within industries (being a function of the composition of waste streams). This implies
that variations in TC result from two sources. On the one hand we have cost variations
due to scale economies (variations that are approximately lognormally distributed) and
on the other hand there are variations in effluent treatment costs due to differences in
control efficiency between technologies and firms. If we assume that the control effi-
ciency is lognormally distributed, and that such variations are not correlated with cost
variations due to scale economies, then the variance of lnTC, o ^ is simply the sum of
the variance of both variates. (The practical meaning of this, however, is small as only
the sum of the variances can be identified empirically — not the variances themselves.)
This leads to the question: What if ER is not lognormally distributed? Is it still
correct to use the lognormal distribution for the total annual unit costs of using a (newly
"Jean Dickinson Gibbons, 1971, Nonparamefric Sfa/isfica/ /n/erence, New York: McGraw-Hill, pp-72-
73. In our case, s is 2 as we estimate the mean and variance from the sample. ,. T.-..,.«<»,•..«.•.
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built) biological waste-water treatment plant? We believe that even for such a situation,
the lognormal distribution may be used as an approximation of the distribution of TC
because the variations in costs due to scale economies (which may differ up to a factor
two) are believed to be much more important than variations in control efficiency (which
are commonly between 60% and 98%, with most efficiencies between 90% and 98%).
What does all this imply for the probability of adoption? As explained before, adoption
is believed to take place the moment at which the risk-adjusted annual gains from
adoption exceed the total annual cost of using the biological waste-water technology. If
we define the risk-adjusted annual gains by G, = Tax,/U,, G, is /ognorma//y distributed
with ^, = //^ - lnU, and a*, = o^, — that is, that G, - A(^,,o/) — under the assumption that
effluent tax rates To*, instituted by the water-quality regions follow a lognormal distribu-
tion.
The probability that a randomly selected industrial water polluter will have
adopted a biological waste-water treatment system at time f is the chance that G, > TC,:
, = P(G,>TC,) = 1-P(G,<TC,) = 1 - J A ( T C , |ti,,o? (4)
Substituting F(TC,) = A(TC, | /^a » <*TC ) ^ the above equation gives:.18
or, what comes down to the same thing, using the standard normal distribution function:
(6)A, = 1-N
a with u, = u^-ln(U,) ; a? =
•T,J
This is the equation to be estimated, with an independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) error term e, with zero mean and variance c^  added to the right-hand side. As ^ ,
//re,, and c^ may be determined outside the model, we have only two parameters to
estimate: p and o ^ using observations from the 1974-91 period (i.e., 18 observations)."
" Corollary 2.2b of Aitchison and Brown, op ri<., p.ll.
" Throughout the analysis we assume that the variance of TC is constant with time. •
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A possible extension of the model is to assume that uncertainty factor Li, differs across
the population of industrial polluters. Again, the assumption of a lognormal distribution
(being positively skewed and always positive) is analytically very convenient. Because
the quotient of two independent lognormally distributed random variables is also log-
normally distributed/' A, can be expressed as a function of A and <1>. In fact, /4, the
probability that a randomly selected industrial water polluter owns a biological waste-
water treatment system at time ( is described by equation (6) with /<, = ^ - ^ and a*,
= c^-, + a*u, if uncertainty factor ii is lognormally distributed with mean / ^ and varian-
ce c ^ and independent of Tax, and TC,. i*<< • ' * . • • ! * > • >
To estimate the above model with stochastic 17 we must assume a specific func-
tion for ^ and o ^ , for instance ^ = ^ + £(f-*o) and Cf^ ^ = 0 ^ (being one of the most
simple cases). Estimating the model for the case that I/, differs across adopters tells us
something about the importance of variations in risk attitudes and knowledge in affec-
ting purchase decisions. It should be noted that c\<-.i arid o ^ , can not be determined
statistically — only the sum is identified.
The next section will present the empirical results from the application of our
model (and various variants thereof) to the diffusion of biological waste-water treatment
technologies in the Dutch Food and Beverage industry in the 1974-91 period.
6.3 Empirical Results from the Threshold Model •
At the end of 1991, 93 indirect dischargers in Dutch industry owned a biological waste-
water treatment system. Of these 93 firms, 77 firms belonged to the Ftaod and Beverage
industry. The reason why in particular firms in the Food and Beverage industry (such as
breweries, tinned food manufacturers, slaughterhouses) decided to invest in biological
waste-water treatment plants was that they could clean their waste water at a relatively
low cost — in many cases below the average cost for cleaning residual discharges in
collective waste-water treatment plants, despite the scale advantages in collective waste-
water treatment. The reason behind this was that the effluent of firms in the Food and
Beverage industry was relatively homogeneous, being polluted with organic pollutants
mainly, which facilitated relatively high control efficiencies at low costs.
This section investigates empirically the impact of changes in the effluent tax rates
and other variables on the dz/jfasion of biological waste-water treatment systems. More
specifically, it seeks to analyze whether it is possible to explain the time-intensive adop-
tion of biological waste-water treatment systems by firms in the Food and Beverage
industry in terms of a threshold model in which the decision to adopt an environment-
conserving technology is understood as an economic decision under uncertainty.
Such an analysis could provide statistical evidence as to the following problems. First,
the usefulness of the model as a tool for analyzing changes in the adoption of (envi-
*° Theorem 2.1 and 2.2 of Aitchison and Brown, op rif., p. l l .
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ronment-conserving) technologies. Second, the actual impact of effluent charges on the
rate of application of biological waste-water treatment plants in Dutch industries. Third,
the importance of uncertainty and knowledge problems as a potential hindrance to the
uptake of cost-saving biological waste-water treatment plants. And finally, the pos-
sibilities of using incentive-based environmental policy instruments instead of command-
and-control approaches to fostering the adoption of environment-conserving tech-
nologies.
For reasons described earlier, our analysis is restricted to indirect disc/wrgers in the
Food and Beverage industry. We have estimated the model for the case that the effluent
taxes and total annual unit costs of using a (newly built) biological waste-water treat-
ment plants are /ogJiorma/Zy distributed and for the (less likely) situation that these
variates are nomw//y distributed, each for different specifications of (i,. We have also
estimated the model on the basis of a different investment selection rule: the Maximum
Payback period (which is considered to differ among firms).
Before giving the regression results, however, we will take a closer look at what is
believed to be the main driving force behind the technological diffusion of biological
waste-water treatment plants: the net annual gains from adoption, G, - TC,. As the
annual gains from effluent treatment increase over time, it becomes financially attractive
for more and more polluters to treat their own waste water. Figure 6.5 depicts the
development of the average net annual gains G, - TC, of using biological waste-water
treatment technologies in the Food and Beverage industry in the Netherlands.
1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991
year
Figure 6.5. The average net annual gains from using a newly built biological
waste-water treatment system in the Dutch Food and Beverage industry.
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Figure 6.5 shows that the average net annual gains G, - TC, of biological effluent treat-
ment in the Food and Beverage industry increased over time, except for 1974 (the first
oil crisis) and 1988. The main factor behind the steady increase of G, - TC, was the rising
effluent tax rate (see Figure 6.2). The increase in the effluent tax rate was particularly
high in 1975 and 1976, which is reflected in the sharp increase of G, - TC,. The slow
increase in G, - TC, in the 1978-80 period is caused by the relatively strong increase in
interest rates, energy prices and labour costs in those years, which resulted in a strong
increase in TC,. The strong decrease in 1988 is caused by the elimination of the WIR
(Wet Investerings Rekening), a government investment subsidy programme in the
Netherlands. The elimination of the WIR had a profound impact on the profitability of
biological waste-water treatment systems (under the WIR in 1987 it was possible for
investors in environmental technologies to receive an investment subsidy of 27.5%).
Figure 6.5 also illustrates that the fall in the price for electricity in 1986 led to a strong
increase in G, - TC,, as did the relatively low purchase price in 1991. (Comparison of
Figure 6.5 with Figure 6.2, which depicts the development of the effluent tax rate, re-
veals that the two figures are not identical, which provides some evidence as to the
importance of incorporating variables like the interest rate, energy costs and purchase
price in the model.) - i t ^ w r . , . - - ! V 1 M . - ; S - ; • • - K i • . . . . * . • • < • , • • * . ? • . ^ : v c : > « -
Besides the net annual gains of reducing the discharge of oxygen-consuming
organic pollutants, which differ across water-quality regions (because of the different
effluent tax rates), also information problems and uncertainty about the economic conse-
quences of effluent treatment are likely to affect investment decisions in effluent treat-
ment plants. The way in which this is incorporated in the model is by dividing the
annual gains from using a biological waste-water treatment plant by uncertainty factor
li, = U,(p), where p is a parameter of uncertainty and f indexes time (dli,/df < 0). As we
have no prior knowledge regarding the exact specification of li,, we have estimated the
model for various expressions for U, to see which specification would give the best fit,
and to analyze the robustness of the estimation results for different specifications of U,.
We will now give the regression results, first for the /ognomw/ model, which assumes
that both the effluent tax rate Tax, and the total annual unit costs TC, of using a (newly
built) biol Dgical waste-water treatment plants are lognormally distributed. Results for the
normal nodel and the payback model are in sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.3., respectively."
*' For those interested in technical details: We used 386 TSP (Times Series Processor) version 4.2A
(May 1992) to estimate the model. TSP is a software package for doing time series analysis, written
by Bronwyn Hall. As the model is nonlinear in the parameters, we used non-linear least squares to
estimate the unknown parameters. The Gauss method is used to approximate the Hessian of the
objective function in each iteration, followed by the Davidon-Fletcher-Powell method if the iteration
algorithm did not converge after 20 iterations.
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6.3.1 Resw/fs/rowi f/ie /ognorma/ mode/ ^'.;' l-nvs-:; . - ;>vr
We have estimated the lognormal model described in section 6.2 for four different
specifications of uncertainty factor U,: (1) U,=l+p/(£-Q, (2) U,=l+p//w(f-g, (3) U,=l+p(l-
A,.,) and (4) U, - A(/^,, a,/) with u^^ = u^+C('-*o) (*o = 1973). The regression results are in
column (1), (2), (3) and (4) of Table 6.2, respectively. The unknown parameters are, in the
first three variants: p, the parameter of uncertainty, and cr^c, the variance of the logar-
ithm of the total annual unit costs of using a (newly built) biological waste-water treat-
ment system. In the fourth variant we have three parameters to estimate: ^ , £, and c r ^
— the sum of cr^ and cr^ c-
Table 6.2 demonstrates that different specifications for LZ, lead to different parame-
ter values, especially for p, which is estimated at 25.87 in the first variant, at 3.78 in the
second, and at 2.03 in the third variant. All parameter values for p are significantly
different from zero at the 5% significance level (also at the 1% level).^ With respect to
the coefficients of determination, the adjusted-R* values are 0.97 for the first variant, 0.94
for the second and 0.95 for the third. The highest value of coefficient of determination is
for the fourth variant with stochastic (lognormal) U,. In all cases there is evidence of
positive autocorrelation — a common phenomenon in diffusion analyses.
As regards the values for uncertainty factor (i,, these are especially high in the
first and fourth variant. In the first variant, L7, is as much as 26.86 in the first year of the
diffusion period (in the fourth variant it is 14.89). This would mean that potential adop-
ters are extremely risk-averse: that in 1974 the gains from adoption are divided by a
factor as high as 26.87 (or 14.89). This is very high, in fact much too high. It is for that
reason that we attach more value to the regression results of the second and third
variant, especially the third variant where li, is 2.98 in 1974, the first year of the model
analysis, and decreases (at a decreasing rate) to 2.21 in 1991, which is still quite high -
implying that risk-averse potential adopters divide the gains from adoption by a factor
2.21."
^ It must be noted that the estimators are only asympfofica/Zy normally distributed. This means
that the quotient of the estimator and the standard error of the estimator is only asymptotically <-
distributed. This is due to the fact that the model is non-linear in the parameters and the error terms
are i.i.d. (if we had assumed a m)mu/ distribution for the error term, the above conclusion still holds
true). .
" One of the reasons why we get a high value for 17, is because we assumed that investments in
biological waste-water treatment plants are financed through loans. In practise, investments are at
least in part internally financed. For investment that are internally financed, firms are known to apply
high discount rates, much higher than the interest rate. This discount rate reflects opportunity costs
and corporate and income taxes. The assumption of the investment being wholly exfOTiaZ/y financed
results in a bias in favour of adoption and — in the statistical analysis — gives rise to a high value for
P-
Lognormal
model
P
e
ow
adj-R*
DW
(1)
: 25.87*
(2.16)
' 130*
.•. •; (o.2i)
-
; • • " • "
• 0.97
0.84
(2)
li,=l+p/ln(K>)
3.78*
(0.31)
051*
(0.12)
0.94
0.80
(3)
2.03*
(0.14)
050*
(0.10)
0.95
1.04
(4) ^
2.81*
(0.60)
-0.11*
(0.03)
2.46*
(105)
0.99
136
(5)
) (3) with TC+9
,) instead of TC
0.26
(0.55)
0.27*
(0.13)
30.26
(17.79)
0.97
175
(6)
(3) with one
year lag
2.07*
(0.16)
0.63*
(0.12)
0.95
0.90
significant at 5% level (standard errors in parentheses)
Table 6.2. Estimation results of the diffusion model with lognonnally distributed Tax, and TC,, 1974-91.
138 C/wpter 6
The value for the variance of the logarithm of the total annual unit costs of using a
(newly built) biological waste-water treatment plant is more or less of the amount we
expected Cf^ c to be.^
The predicted diffusion pattern of the lognormal model is shown in Figure 6.6. The
lognormal model underestimates the ownership of biological waste-water treatment
plants in the 1976-78 and the 1989-91 periods. It overestimates the ownership of biolog-
ical waste-water treatment plants in 1986 and 1987. What happened in 1986 was that the
price for electricity fell with 28.3%. The decrease in the model's prediction for .A, in 1988
is caused by the termination of the WIR subsidy programme. In 1987, the last year of the
WIR programme, each investor in the Netherlands was credited an investment subsidy
of 12.5%. For environmental investments like biological waste-water treatment plants it
was possible to obtain an extra subsidy of 15%. . . ... .. . j g.-^ -
1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990
real
Figure 6.6. The diffusion of biological waste-water treatment technologies in the Food
and Beverage Industry according to the lognormal model with U, = 1 + p(l - /4,.,).
On the whole, the lognormal model predicts the trend in the ownership of biological
waste-water treatment technologies in the Food and Beverage industry quite well in the
1974-85 period. It fails to explain the sharp increase in 1987, and underestimates the
ownership of biological waste-water treatment plants between 1988 and 1990. This
" The mean of the natural logarithm of the total annual unit costs of using a biological waste-
water treatment technology is 3.00 in 1974 and 3.69 in 1991.
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underestimation in the 1988-90 period is due to the fact that our model explains the
desired ownership of biological waste-water treatment plants in each year, based on the
costs and benefits of buying a newly built plant. After the elimination of the WIR in
1988, the desired ownership in 1988 (and the years after 1988) was lower than the de-
sired ownership in 1987. However, a firm that had bought a biological waste-water
treatment plant before 1988, given the prevailing price structure in the pre-1988 period,
is still an owner in 1988, even if he had not purchased a biological waste-water treat-
ment plant in 1988, when the costs of buying such a plant were much higher. This
explains why the model underestimates the ownership of biological waste-water treat-
ment plants in the 1988-90 period. To deal with this problem, we should have estimated
the following model:
' T X T >C,|X,.,SC,.,) (7)
Unfortunately, it proved impossible to derive an analytical expression for the conditional
probability of X, being higher than C,, given that X,., < C,.,, so that we could not estimate
t h i s m o d e l . . ^ , . „ , . , , ; . . , . , , , „ ^ , , ^ - , ' 1 7 , y > n n T r - w . > ^ < * r - < * . - " ' - • " < > * - -<<•• • > . . . •
What do the results tell us? For instance, does uncertainty about the economic conse-
quences of using an effluent treatment system cause firms to underinvest in biological
waste-water treatment plants — as the high value for p suggests? According to suppliers
of biological waste-water treatment technologies this is not the case. Potential users are
well aware of the possibility of cleaning their waste water in order to reduce effluent
payments, and reliable information as to the costs and benefits of using biological waste-
water treatment plants can be obtained from suppliers and consulting firms. So why do
we find such high values for U,? One explanation we have already given: throughout the
model analysis we assumed that the investment in biological waste-water treatment was
extema//y financed at the ongoing long-term interest rate. As explained, this assumption
results in upward-biased estimates for p and IZ,. Another explanation for the high value
of p found in the regressions is that we used too /ow estimates /or TQ, the total annual
unit costs of using a biological waste-water treatment system. This is highly probable for
the following reason. The cost figures used in the analysis are based on a survey under
adopter firms in 1983 — where we used price indices to calculate the total annual unit
costs in the other years. As the costs for Hem-adopters are likely to be higher than those
for adopters, we have probably underestimated the average costs of effluent treatment
for the Food and Beverage industry as a whole.
To further investigate this possibility, we have estimated the original model with
the total annual unit costs being an (unknown) factor 6 higher. Estimating parameter 9
together with p and a ^ , indeed provides some evidence that we used too low estimates
for the costs of biological waste-water treatment. According to column (5) of Table 6.2,
parameter 0 has a positive sign and is estimated at 30.26. Adding a factor 8 to TC, in the
analysis also causes p to be lower: 0.26 instead of 2.03. As the standard errors of both
estimates are quite high, we do not attach too much value to these estimates. (The
estimated value for 8 is also far too high.)
There are also other explanations for the high value for U,. One possible explana-
tion is that it takes time to build a biological waste-water treatment plant. To investigate
this possibility, we estimated the model with the explanatory variables one-year and
two-years delayed, to account for a time difference between the moment at which a firm
decides to buy an effluent treatment system and the moment at which the plant is built.
(It generally takes more than half a year to design and build a biological waste-water
treatment plant, and sometimes even as much as two years.) The regression results of
the model variant with one-year delayed variables are given in column (6) of Table 6.2.
As Table 6.2 shows, the results of the model with one-year delayed variables are similar
to those of the model with non-delayed variables: almost identical parameter values with
somewhat higher standard errors. (Introducing a two-year delay in the explanatory
variables gave similar results.)
This means that a one-year or two-year delay in the ownership of biological waste-
water treatment plants due to construction time is too simple an explanation as to why
firms were slow in investing in cost-efficient biological waste-water treatment plants.
There must be other factors besides uncertainty and building time that are responsible
for the slow uptake of waste-water treatment plants. What these factors are, we do not
know exactly. They could be financing problems, transaction costs, lack of management
time, or time that is needed for collecting information. That these factors play a role in
the timing of purchasing decision is probable, given that the investment costs of a
biological waste-water treatment plant are quite high. According to the 1983 survey of
Schuurman, the average investment costs amounted to 1.5 million Dutch guilders, with
a maximum of Dfl 15.9 million (almost 9 million dollars). One way of introducing
adjustment problems and costs in the analysis is by estimating a partia/ ad/usrmenf or
sfocJt <u//usrmfnt model. In the partial adjustment model, current values of the explana-
tory variables determine the desired value of the dependent variable (y*,) but only some
fixed fraction of the desired adjustment is accomplished in one period:
• • • • = • ' . • • » - • • / ' - - • • y , - y , _ ,
••• •.." - where 0 < A, < 1 is the coej^cient o/ad/usrment.^ ,
Combining both equations, gives the following equation for J4,:
" George G. Judge, William E. Griffiths, R. Carter Hill and Tsoung-Chao Lee, 1980, 77K TTKOH/ and
PratfK* o/ Econometrics, New York: John Wiley, p.626.
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the desired level of adoption at time f and i.i.d. e,.
We have estimated the partial adjustment model with lognormally distributed T<w, and
TC, for each of the expressions for U,. The results are in Table 6.3.
Partial adjustment
model
•'••'•' " V t - . s "
i < . ; ? .'•:.•
P i
' • i > ^ • i : • ; J
( 1 ) . - , , - : • ,
L/,=l+p/(<-f(,)
0.256*
(0.11)
18.1*
(5.67)
1.60*
(0.45)
(2)
U,=l+p,
0.180*
(0.08)
239*
(0.82)
0.61*
(0.22)
(3)
/ln(Mo) Lf,=l+p(l-y4,.,)
0.155*
(0.11)
1.14
(0.68)
-•:•: . 0 5 5 * . ,
' (0.23)
(4)
with ^uj=f u+C('-'o)
0.37
(0.23) - w . - ' :
• • < - . • • • • • , ' .
(0.95)
0.99
234
, 0.99
• • : , • • - 2 . 2 1
-0.07
(0.05)
1.48
(170)
0.99
2.04
adj-R^
DW
0.99
* significant at 5% level (standard errors in parentheses)
Table 6.3. Estimation results of the lognormal model with adjustment costs, 1974-91. -. *„>! ?;
. . . ' ' • • . ; ; . < • • • . • • . '
The estimation results of the partial adjustment model are quite good: high coefficients
of determination (adjusted R* values of 0.99) and all the parameter values have the
correct sign. Almost all parameter values are significantly different from zero at the 5%
level (except for p in the third specification and the estimates in the fourth version),
which is very good given that we have only 18 observations to estimate three parameters
(four parameters if LZ, is stochastic). The high f values for the coefficient of adjustment A.
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furthermore suggest that the partial adjustment model is indeed a good model, that it is
a better model than the lognormal model without adjustment costs. X is estimated
between 0.155 and 0.37, which is quite low. It means that only a small fraction of the
desired adoption level is accomplished.
The reported Durbin-Watson coefficients are also better than those in Table 6.2
(close to 2). However, the Durbin-Watson test is known to be a conservative test if the
error terms are autocorrelated — as they are according to Table 6.2. To detect (first-order)
serial correlation in autoregressive models we must use Durbin's /i test. The Durbin /i
statistic can be approximated from the estimated Durbin-Watson statistic d as follows:*'
with fe being asymptotically normally distributed with zero mean and unit variance.
The values for the Durbin ft statistic found in the estimations are, respectively: -0.81, -
0.77, -0.47 and 0.29. All ft values are between -1.96 and 1.96, so that we do not reject the
null hypothesis that there is no first-order autocorrelation at the 5% significance level.
This brings us to the question: which specification is best? Since each of the four specific-
ations yields a good fit, the reported coefficients of determination do not favour one
particular specification. If we look at the estimates for the parameters, however, we see
that the parameter values for p in the first and second specification are high — although
not as high as in Table 6.2. As we have reason to believe that uncertainty is not a sig-
nificant barrier to the uptake of biological waste-water treatment plants, we think that
the partial adjustment model with (J,=l+p(l-/4,.,) gives the best results (the model with
stochastic U, gave values for U, that were below 1 in the 1988-91 period). The parameter
values for X, p and cr><- in column (3) all have the correct sign and are of the right order,
and both X and o^^ are significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level.
(The parameter value for p is not significantly different from zero at the 5% level but is
at the 10% significance level.) Model results for /4, of the partial adjustment model with
L/,=l+p(l-/4,.,) are given in Figure 6.7.
Figure 6.7 shows that the partial adjustment model somewhat overestimates the
adoption level in the 1982-86 period, but that on the whole the model predictions are
very good. This suggests that adjustment problems play a significant role in the uptake
of biological waste-water treatment plants. The parameter value for the coefficient of
adjustment is low (it is 0.16 is the model with U, = 1 + p(l - A.,)), but, as noted earlier,
this value is biased downward due to the underestimation of the effluent treatment costs
and the assumption that the investment is externally financed at the ongoing interest
rate.
" Damodar N. Gujarati, 1988, Basic Econometrics, 2nd Edition, New York: McGraw-Hill, p.526.
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Figure 6.7. The diffusion of biological waste-water treatment technologies according
to the lognormal model with adjustment costs and (J, = 1 + p(l - 4^,.,).
The next section gives the results for the nomwl model, that is, the model with normally
distributed effluent charges Tax, and normally distributed total annual unit costs TC,.
Section 3.3 presents the results from a different version of the model, based on an
alternative investment selection rule, the Maximum Payback period.
6.3.2 .Resw/fs /rom tfie normaZ
The regression results of the normal model, with the effluent charges and total annual
unit costs of biological effluent treatment being rcorma/Zy distributed are given in Table
6.4. We have estimated the same variants as in section 3.2, with the exception of the
variant of a stochastic U, which we were unable to estimate because the quotient of a
normally distributed Tax, and (log)normally distributed U, is not distributed according to
a well-known distribution. Comparison of the results of Table 6.2 with those of Table 6.4
shows that the assumption of normally distributed variates yields less satisfactory
regression results: lower goodness-of-fit values, higher standard errors, and lower values
for the Durbin-Watson statistic (indicating positive first-order autocorrelation). The
variant with U,=l+p/ln(f-f,,) has the highest adjusted R* of the three investigated specific-
ations of li,. Again, the variant with U,=l+p(l-i4,.,) gives the lowest values for U,.
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P
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adj-R'
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U,=l+p/(f-*«,)
18.86*
(1.04)
327.15*
(42.45)
0.93
0.95
(2)
330*
(0.19)
218.48*
(38.64)
0.90
0.94
(3)
1.78*
(0.10)
209.86*
(36.53)
0.89
0.94
(4)
,) (2) with TC+9
instead of TC
-0.05
(020)
668.86*
(105.30)
4238*
(9.95)
0.97
142
(5)
(2) with one-
year lag
1.77*
(0.12)
247.17*
(4538)
0.87
0.71
* significant at 5% level (standard errors in parentheses)
Table 6.4. Estimation results of the diffusion model with normally distributed variables, 1975-91.
As regards the parameter values of the normal model: the estimates for p are somewhat
lower than those of the lognormal model but still quite high. Again, we have first-order
positive autocorrelation in the error term. Surprisingly, in the normal model the value
for 0 differs significantly from zero at the 5% significance level, despite the fact that it is
much too high — it is more likely to be in the range of Dfl 5-15 per I.E.
We also estimated the partial adjustment model. Results of the partial adjustment model
with normally distributed Taj:, and TC, are in Table 6.5. The coefficients of the partial
adjustment model are all high, but the parameter values often have the wrong sign: cr^ c
is negative in the first and second specification and the value for A. in column (3) is not
only negative but even significantly negative at the 5% significance level. We will not
pay further attention to the estimation results of the normal model, being a 'wrong'
model. Suffice to say that the better results from the lognormal model provide further
evidence that the distribution of the total annual unit costs TC, of using a (newly built)
biological waste-water treatment system is better approximated by a two-parameter
lognormal distribution than by a normal distribution.
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^034)^
-20.21
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(057) . - ^
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2,1
* significant at 5% level (standard errors in parentheses)
Table 6.5. Estimation results of the partial adjustment model with normally distrib-
uted Tax, and TC,, 1974-91.
We will now present the results from an entirely different model, based on a different
investment selection rule, the Maximum Paybacfc period. The maximum payback period
states the maximum number of years that are needed to recoup investment costs. What
many firms do is to compare the expected payback period with the maximum acceptable
payback period (which generally differs among potential adopters). If the expected
payback period is below the maximum acceptable payback period they will purchase the
durable, otherwise they will not. As most firms apply quite short payback periods, this
obviously has a negative effect on the rate of adoption of a capital good. Of course, a
short maximum payback period in part reflects risk aversion and information problems,
but it is not the same thing: the maximum payback rule is an institution, 'inherited' from
the past, commonly beyond evaluation and not subject to regular modification as more
information comes available about the economic consequences of purchasing a durable.
6.3.3 Results /rom ffte payback model
This section develops the payback mode/ and gives the regression results. As noted before,
a central assumption of the payback model is that a potential user will purchase a
capital good if and when the expected payback period is below the maximum acceptable
payback period. Thus, the maximum payback period still acceptable to a potential user
is the critical threshold in the payback model. Both the expected and maximum accep-
: f
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table payback period are likely to differ across the population of potential users — as a
function of different effluent tax rates, unit costs of effluent treatment, management risk
attitudes, etc. The expected payback period of a biological waste-water treatment tech-
nology built at time t, PB,, is defined as:
C
" • ,4 (9)
/C77a.-
with C, the purchase price plus installation costs, VC, the variable costs of biological
effluent treatment, /C, the interest costs, and To*, the effluent tax rate, where C, and VC,
are defined per inhabitant equivalent (I.E.) — the typical measuring rod for organically
polluted residual discharges in the Netherlands.
Assuming that C,, the adoption costs, and T<u:,-VC,-/C, are distributed according to a
lognormal distribution for each t, i.e., that C, - A(^ c,i/O"*c,i) and T<tr,-VC,-/C, - A(/^,-
/0*TW,I)' *rid that both variates are independent, applying Theorem 2.1 and 2.2 of Ait-
chison and Brown gives that the expected payback period is also lognormally distribut-
ed: PB, - A f a ^ o ^ ) . *
We now have to assume a particular distribution for PB', the critical payback
period. A convenient assumption is that the critical payback periods among indirect
dischargers are distributed according to a /o^ Momw/ distribution — with a maximum
acceptable payback period of one or two years for myopic firms, and higher critical
payback periods (up to eight years) for other firms. This seems a reasonable assumption,
given that payback requirements are correlated with firm size — with small firms typical-
ly applying short maximum acceptable payback periods.
If the critical payback periods among potential adopters are distributed according to
a two-parameter lognormal distribution, that is, if PB* - A(;ipg.,cr>g.), then the proportion
of firms that 'should' have adopted the technology under consideration at time f is:
/I, = P(PB,<PB') = jA(PB'|u^,cr^)dF(PB') (10)
Solving the integral in equation (10) gives:
^ Note that only for the case that Ta:r,-VC,-/C, is distributed according to a too-paramrter lognor-
mal distribution, the above result of a lognormal distribution for PB, holds. If both TflA:, and VC,-/C,
are lognormally distributed, TflAr,-VC,-/C, is not distributed according to a lognormal distribution and
nor is PB,. If Tar, follows a lognormal distribution, and VC,-/C, is the same for all firms, Tax,-VC,-/C,
follows a three-parameter lognormal distribution, which means that we cannot use the convolution
property to determine the distribution of PB,.
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(11)
*' "•'•'•" wi th Upg^  = P(-;~PTWJ and c r ^ = 0 ^ + 0 ^ , "
Equation (11) is the equation to be estimated, with an i.i.d. error term around zero
added to the right-hand side to account for possible measurement errors in ,4,, random
variables and misspecifications in the model. Since the mean of the expected payback
period and adoption costs and the variance of Ta;t,-VC,-/C, can be determined outside the
regression analysis, we must estimate three parameters: p^g., cr>g. and cr*<- (assuming that
o^ c, is constant over time).** Of these three parameters, only ^pg. and the sum of o%g.
and o^<- are statistically identified in the regression analysis, which leaves us with two
parameters to estimate.
Payback
model
&W
X
adj-R*
DW
(1)
1.11*
(0.10)
0.87*
(0.30)
0.83
0.42
(2)
(1) with one-
year lag
1.11*
(0.10)
1D9»
(032)
0.86
059
(3)
partial adjust-
ment model
1.67*
(029)
0.84*
(0.40)
0.115*
(0.03)
0.99
132
* significant at 5% level (standard errors in parentheses)
Table 6.6. Estimation results of the payback model with lognormally
distributed PB* and PB,, 1975-91.
** The variance of Ta;t,-VC, is estimated by subtracting VC, from the effluent tax rates across
water-quality regions and calculating the variance of the transformed data. Strictly speaking this is
not correct. We could have estimated the variance of Ta:t,-VC, in the regression analysis but then we
would not make use of the information available about the frequency distribution of Tax,. Moreover,
we would have one more parameter to estimate on the basis of only 18 observations.
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We estimated three variants of the payback model for the 1975-91 period: 1) the model
described above, 2) the above model with the explanatory variables one-year delayed (to
account for a one-year difference between the decision to purchase a biological waste-
water treatment plant and the moment at which the biological waste-water treatment
technology is ready for usage), and 3) the partial adjustment model. The estimation
results are in Table 6.6. , , , ,^.
The parameter values of the payback model all have the correct sign and are
significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level (the estimates for ^pg. and
O^ PB-C in column (1) and (2) are even significantly different from zero at the 1% signifance
level). The average critical payback period is estimated at 3.02 in the original payback
model and at 5.31 in the partial adjustment model. The last estimate is probably too
high, it is more likely to be around three years according to suppliers of biological
waste-water treatment plants. The estimates for cr^^ on the other hand are all low, in
fact much too low. Figure 6.8 gives the predictions for J4, of the original model and the
partial adjustment model.
1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991
• real payback-mode! withadjustm costs
Figure 6.8. The diffusion of biological waste-water treatment technologies in the
Dutch Food and Beverage industry according to the payback model with and without
adjustment costs.
While the predictions of the partial adjustment model for /\, are very good, these of the
original payback model are less good. The original payback model can statistically
explain quite well the observed diffusion process in the 1975-85 period. However, it
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overestimates the ownership of biological waste-water treatment plants in 1986 and 1987,
and underestimates the ownership in the 1988-91 period, when it was no longer possible
for indirect dischargers to receive an investment subsidy for waste-water treatment
plants.
6.3.4 M o d e / resu/fs / o r AA, ins tead 0 / A , ;
We now examine whether the threshold model is able to explain c/ianges in the owner-
ship of biological waste-water treatment plants. We estimated the following equation:*
, .-• i t '
(12)
with e, an i.i.d. error term with zero mean
The partial adjustment model for AA, is: j
with A,' - <I>
, AA, =
' PD ^^PD^
/ _ 2 2
(13)
and e, an i.i.d. error term around zero
An advantage of estimating the above models for AA, (instead of A,) is that we no longer
have non-stationarity in the variables and that the probability of (first-order) autocor-
relation in the error term is much lower. The estimation results are in Table 6.7.
Table 6.7 shows that the estimation results for AA, are all bad, except for the partial
adjustment model with lognormally distributed Tax, and TC, and the PA model with
lognormal PB*, and PB,. In most cases, we obtain coefficients of determination that are
close to zero (and sometimes even negative) and insignificant parameter estimates. It is
only when adjustment costs are introduced in the analysis that we get better results
(higher adjusted R* values and significant parameter values). This is not true, however,
for the normal model. There is evidence of positive first-order autocorrelation in col-
umns (3) and (5) but as we will not consider these specifications any further, this is not
disturbing. » ~ ... • ; ;
* This is not quite correct if <D, < <!>,.„ for some f. Instead of (12) we should estimate:
Aj = max[0,<J>, -max<I>J . Unfortunately, this equation cannot be estimated in TSP.
SSI-1
Xp
fur
adj-R'
DW
. 0)
:. lognormal model
with
u,=updA,)
• i
. 7.27
: (4-96)
2.19
• - ; (2.64)
: '•§ r
•• • 8 '"•
-•v
I -0.06
;-• > 152
(2)
PA model with
lognormal Tax,
and TC,
0.16
(0.12)
1.16
(0.67)
054*
(0.23)
" ' • • ' • ' - • * •
^ ' i • ' ' • *
" ' * ' ' , , ~
0 . 2 8 ;- ;••-..
2.18 -
(3)
normal model
with
u,=i+p(iA.,)
2.84*
(1.11)
-3.63
(41.74)
-0.02 ;
054
(4)
PA model with
normal Tax,
and TC,
-0.147* r;
(0.061) ^
2.04* :
(0.56)
11.23 I
(99.03) :
-
-0.05 :, *
1.85 '
(5)
payback model
' - • " i • ' • '
•V.
! • . ' • . - ' » '
-0.19 • ;^
(0.73) X
2.06 g
(1.76) £
0.04 . ' '
1.42 - . ij
(6)
PA model with
lognormal PB',
and PB,
0.12*
(0.06)
•f ' '
1.66*
(0.29)
0.85*
(0.41)
0.29 ;'
2.28 S
'51
f ^
\ « ' * • * *
' * " ' ' : '
S |
3;
T
J
••5
' t
1
5
.»;.
.(;
* significant at 5% level (standard errors in parentheses)
PA model stands for partial adjustment model - ."^  i~
cr^ is not the variance of TC but the variance of InTC in the lognormal model - :«, is.
Table 6.7. Estimation results for AA, of (log)normal and payback model with and without adjustment costs, 197541.
a
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Figure 6.9. Model results for changes in the ownership of biological waste-water
treatment plants according to the lognormal and payback model with adjustment
costs. . . , .
:.7c
Figure 6.9 gives the predictions for Av4, of the partial adjustment model with lognormally
distributed To*, and TC, and the adjustment model with lognormal PB', and PB,. It
demonstrates that none of the models is really able to describe empirically the observed
changes in ownership of biological waste-water treatment plants during the period of
investigation. They can only describe the broad pattern of A/4,: the increase in A/4, up to
1987, and the decrease in AA, after 1987.
The overall conclusion is that the threshold model cannot explain the year-to-year
changes in the ownership of biological waste-water treatment plants during the 1975-91
period; what it can do is explain the trend. This implies that there are other factors not
included in the model that affect firms' decisions to invest in biological waste-water
treatment at a particular time. What these factors are is unclear, they may be related to
information transfer, details of waste-water policies or firm-specific factors. It must be
noted that there are other explanations for the observed differences between the measur-
ed and predicted increases in A,: i) that we have too few observations, which makes that
the results are sensitive to particular values of the model variables; ii) the low numbers
for A/4, which makes the results sensitive to the purchase decisions of individual firms —
whether a firm invests in year f or in f-1 or f+1 may affect the model results (this might
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also explain the erratic pattern of AA,); and iii) measurement errors in the model's
variables, especially in AA, and the cost figures.
It will be interesting to see whether epidemic models are able to explain any better
the observed changes in ownership of biological waste-water treatment plants in the
Dutch Food and Beverage industry than our threshold model does.
6.4 Model Results from Three Epidemic Models
This section presents the model results from three epidemic diffusion models: the logistic
model, the Gompertz model and the (original) Bass model. These three models are most
commonly used in diffusion analyses. For a description of the models, we refer to
chapter 4. Our analysis differs from traditional diffusion analyses in that P (the param-
eter for the diffusion speed) and N (the size of the population of potential adopters) are
made a function of the effluent tax rate To*,. As noted, it will be interesting to see
whether the epidemic models are able to describe better changes in ownership of biolog-
ical waste-water treatment plants. It will also be interesting to see whether the inclusion
of economic variables (in the form of the effluent tax rate) yields better results than the
traditional models in which p and N are constants, and whether the influence of the
effluent tax rate on the diffusion process is mainly through p or through TV.
The first epidemic model we applied empirically is the /ogistzc model. As noted in
chapter 4, the logistic model is a symmetric model with an inflexion point at A, = 0.5.
The logistic model is described in the following equation:
. p ( N
. . ; • • ' " • d t N
with n, the number of adopters at time f and, N the total number of firms in the popula-
tion (here, indirect dischargers in the Dutch Food and Beverage industry).
Dividing this equation by N gives (in discrete time):
This is the equation to be estimated, with an i.i.d. error term with zero mean and varian-
ce a* added to the right-hand side. -;t,-..-.? -.• •_>,,i -,,ir•* -,.itti -.•.•...••'•!;:•;••• . ^ - . :
We also investigated three variants of the logistic model: i) the logistic with P being a
function of Tax,, ii) the logistic with N being a function of Tar,, and iii) the logistic where
both p and N are a function of Tor,. In the model analysis, we used the following expres-
sions for p, and N,: P, = P + Tax," and N,=N(1-1/Tax,i) - with Tax, the average effluent
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tax rate at time t and N, the size of the population of potential adopters at time f.*
(Note that Tax," > 0 and 0 < N, < N for To*, > 1 and that N , ^ N for Tax, -» ~ for y > 0).
The results of the logistic model are in Table 6 8 •••
1 1* ' i*2. *•' > W " - " i t * .*
Logistic
model
P
11
Y
adj-R*
DW
(1)
0.14*
(0.03)
0.07
1.54
(2)
4,,) (l)with
ft = P + Tax,"
-0.10
(1-67)
-035
(1.69)
0.03
1.90
(3)
with /l,'=l-l/Tax/
0.92*
(0.20)
0.13*
(0.01)
038
251
(4)
(3) with P,=p+Tax,"
-1.05
0.18
(0.25) &,
0.13*
(0.01)
034 >
248
* significant at 5% level (standard errors in parentheses)
Table 6.8. Estimation results of the logistic model, 1975-91.
Table 6.8 shows that the empirical results of the logistic model with constant P and N
are rather poor, with coefficients of determination close to zero. Making p, a function of
Tflx,^  barely improves the results. Letting the population of potential adopters N, be a
function of Tax,, in the way specified above, gives much better results: the adjusted /?' is
0.38 and both P and 7 are significantly different from zero at the 1% significance level.
(The diffusion speed is also higher if N, = N(l-1/Tax,*).) This provides further evidence
that the effluent tax rate is indeed a significant factor in the diffusion process of biolog-
ical waste-water treatment technologies. The results further suggest that the influence of
the effluent tax rate is through N,, the population of potential adopters, and not so much
through p,, the diffusion speed — the estimates for T| are not significant and in one case
it is even negative.
The reported Durbin-Watson coefficients are above 1.5 and below 2.5 which does
not lead us to reject the null hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation at the 5% sig-
*" The reason why p, and N, are made a function of Tax, rather than a function of G,-TC, is
because G,-TC, takes on negative values in some years, which means that we cannot use G,-TC, in the
above expressions. We also investigated the case where f$, and N, are a function of ATsx, rather than
Tax,. As the results are similar they are not reported.
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nificance level (the Eharbin-Watson coefficients in column (1) and (2) are all above d^ oos
and those in columns (3) and (4) above 4 - <4,o.<»)- However, if we use the modj/ied Dur-
bin-Watson test, there is evidence of negative first-order autocorrelation in the last two
specifications: dm, as = 1-71 for fc = 3)/" The evidence, however, is not very strong. Fur-
thermore, the modified DW test may be too strong a test.
The results of the logistic model with p, = p and N, = N(l-1/Tax/) are given in
Figure 6.10 (together with the results of the Gompertz model that are discussed later on).
0 06-
0 05- -
0 04--
003
0.02- •
1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991
real logistic • Gompertz
of: V
Figure 6.10. Model results for AA, of the logistic and Gompertz model with constant
P, and N, = N(l-l/TaV).
Figure 6.10 shows that the logistic model with N, = N(l-1/Tar,*) — just as the threshold
model — is not able to describe the fluctuations in AA,; what it can describe, however, is
the broad pattern in AA,, with low values in the early and later years of the diffusion
period, and relatively high values in between.
In addition to the logistic model, we estimated the Gompertz model, with p, and N, a
function of the effluent tax rate. The traditional Gompertz model is described in the
following equation:^
" In the modified Durbin-Watson test the DW statistics are evaluated against i^ instead of d^ .
* See Stoneman, 1983, op crt., p.70. .,„,,.. ,,..,,„, ,-.--,.-, ^......^ -,,,., «„»<>; •. •«. -
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= pn(O(ln(N)-ln(n(f))) (16)
where In stands for the natural logarithm.
This equation can be rewritten as: ' ^ t ^ > « " " ^ < ' - " w . i b
The results of the different variants of the Gompertz model are in Table 6.9. ,*.
Gompertz
model
P
adj-R'
DW
(1) ^ ' " •'
AA,=p>l,,(lnN-ln(n,.,))
i> 0.08*
(0.01)
. . , . - . . . . . ._,_..„.
' ^ - • <
0.14
1.93
(2)
(1) with
P, = P + Tax,"
-0.69*
(030) Q , i s ^
-0.07*
(0.10) *
0.13
2.05
(3)
M,=P/4,.,(lnN.-Mn,.,))
with N,=N(l-l/7ax,*)
0.18-
(0.05) rj(,.,!-JK4)-.>,
- - - — • • • -
0.17*
(0.04)
0.39 ' '""•' '""
2.28
(3) with
-158*
(034) kj
0.15*
(0.05)
0.13*
(0.01)
(MO :
2^3
* significant at 5% level (standard errors in parentheses)
Table 6.9. Estimation results of the Gompertz model, 1975-91.
The results of the Gompertz model with constant N, are somewhat better than those of
the logistic model but still not good: an adjusted R* of 0.14 is rather low. The model
variant with constant p, and N, = N(l-1/Tflx/) gives the best results, which corresponds
with the earlier conclusions about the impact of the effluent tax on the timing of the
purchase of biological waste-water treatment technologies. There is evidence of first-
order serial correlation in the fourth specification, when using the relatively strong
modified Durbin-Watson test. The predictions for AA, of the Gompertz model with
constant P, and N, = N(1-1/TOJC,*) are given in Figure 6.10. The Gompertz model predicts
a relatively fast diffusion in the early years and a relatively slow diffusion in later years,
as compared to the logistic model. This is due to the fact that the Gompertz model is
positively skewed whereas the logistic model is symmetric.
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The last model that we estimated is the (original) Boss model. The Bass model is des-
cribed in the following equation: A;ai;^*=v '• -
i(0) • - * <. (18)
with 8 the "coefficient of innovation" and P the "coefficient of imitation", although — as
we noted in chapter 4 — it is better to speak of the parameters of "external influence" and
"internal influence".
The Bass model can be rewritten as follows: -'"• ••"'••''' '• -
A/4, = (8 + pA ) ( l - i4 ) .„, .-, - (18)
The results of the Bass model are in Table 6.10. . . " ' , '
Bass
model
8
P
7
adj-R*
DW
(1)
0.015
(0.008)
0.077
(0.040)
0.03
1.83
(2)
A,.,) (1) with P, = '
0.012
(0.008)
-0.59*
(0-12)
0.05
1.89
(3)
with iV=l-'l/T«r,'"
-0.004
(0.028)
0.96*
(034)
0.13*
(0.01)
033
251
(4)
(3) with
P. = T«,»
-0.005
(0.026)
0.008
(0.086)
0.13'
(0.01)
033
251
* significant at 5% level ( s tandard er rors in parentheses) , . , ; • , • , . - , > , - -
T a b l e 6.10. E s t i m a t i o n r e s u l t s of t h e Bass m o d e l , 1975 -91 . '• u . ; ; ' . • • - - - i
As for the logistic and Gompertz model, the results of the Bass model with constant P,
and N, = N are bad, even though we have an extra parameter (8). It is only when the
population of potential adopters is a function of the effluent tax rate that we obtain
better results. The variant with N, = N(l-1/Tax/) and constant P, gives the best results.
This variant has the highest adjusted R* and both p and y are significantly different from
zero at the 5% level. Table 6.10 also shows that the extra parameter 8 does not improve
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the estimation results: in none of the estimations is 5 significantly different from zero at
the 5% significance level. The predictions for AA, are almost identical to those for the
logistic model, which is not really surprising. As we noted in chapter 4, the logistic
model is a special case of the Bass model where 8 is zero — and as we can see, 5 is very
small compared to (J in column (3).
6.5 Conclusions
What conclusions can be drawn from the results of the different diffusion models? The
first conclusion is that the effluent tax rate is a significant factor in the time-intensive
adoption of biological waste-water treatment plants. If the effluent tax rate had remained
at the low 1974 level, only a small proportion of the indirect dischargers in the Food and
Beverage industry would have purchased a biological waste-water treatment plant, as
Figure 6.11 demonstrates. However, with the increasing effluent tax rate it became
financially attractive for more and more firms to invest in biological waste-water treat-
ment, - J " ''"'•* ''• ' ' '- '" • - '""•••"' •/•-•'^ ' q ^ ''•- ; • • " '••••'.-..- ••-- ••-•• ,-..,-•
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Figure 6.11. The diffusion of biological waste-water treatment plants according to the
partial adjustment payback model with the effluent tax rate fixed at the 1974 level.
The results in section 6.4 furthermore suggest that the way in which the effluent tax rate
affected firms' purchasing decisions was through N, and not so much through p: the
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relationship between the effluent tax rate and the diffusion speed is statistically much
weaker than that between the effluent tax and the population of prospective adopters.
The model results thus confirm the hypothesis advanced in chapter 4 that economic
factors exercise an important impact on the diffusion of expensive technological innova-
tions like waste-water treatment plants. This result is brought out by both the epidemic
and threshold models. , . ,,.*,* ;.,... ..=..„.• >,.*'•--,.
Another conclusion that emerges from our analysis is that none of the models is
really able to explain the year-to-year changes in ownership of biological waste-water
treatment plants. This suggests that there are other factors, not included in the model,
that affect firms' investment decisions. What these factors are is not clear. They may
have to do with management time, learning, waste-water policies or temporary financial
constraints. Perhaps there is a probabilistic process involved in the time-intensive adop-
tion of biological waste-water treatment plants. The fluctuations in AA, lend some sup-
port to this idea. In any case, it proved to be impossible to explain with much precision
why firms invest in biological waste-water treatment in year (, rather than in f-1 or f+1
— at least, not by using a threshold model or any of the three epidemic models.
Now what is the best model for explaining the diffusion of biological waste-water
treatment technologies? This question is not easy to answer, it depends on the criteria
against which the models are judged. The results of the epidemic models with the
population of potential adopters being a function of the effluent tax rate are better than
those of the threshold model without adjustment costs, which lends support to their
superiority. On the other hand, this comparison is not fair to the threshold model. As we
noted in section 3.1, the threshold model explains the proportion of adopters that would
desire to own and use a newly built biological waste-water treatment plants each year,
given the prevailing price structure in that year — not the acfua/ ownership in each year
which is a function of past purchasing decisions. (Of course, this in itself is a disad-
vantage of the threshold model, just as the need for detailed data on the costs and
benefits of adoption for an adopter population over time is a clear disadvantage — and
one of the reasons why few people have attempted to estimate a threshold model.) The
results of the threshold model with adjustment costs are much better. They are just as
good as those of the epidemic models — and even better if we do not consider the year
1986. This lends support to the threshold model. A second important question is whether
or not in practice purchase decisions are made on the basis of an economic comparison
of the costs and benefits of adoption. If decision makers can be believed to be rational in
their purchasing decisions, then a threshold model is to be preferred. According to
adopter firms and waste-water treatment specialists this is the case, which supports the
usage of the threshold model. (Furthermore, as noted in chapter 5, in the epidemic
models the decision-making process is not made explicit, which is a clear weakness.) A
final consideration concerns the learning process, which is commonly believed to be an
important element in the diffusion process. Here it is hard to compare the two types of
models. The learning mechanism in the threshold model is a very crude mechanism, but
so is the learning mechanism in the epidemic models. On the whole, the above con-
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siderations lead us to prefer the threshold model for analyzing the diffusion of biological
waste-water treatment plants.
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REGION 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
groningen
friesland
drenthe
west-overijssel
regge en dinkel
fleverwaard
oostelijk gelderiand
veluwe
rivierenland
utrecht
amstel- en gooilantf
uitwaterende sluian
rijnland
woerden
delfland
schieland
holt, eilanden en waa
schouwen-duivenlan
tholen
walcheren
noord- en zuidbevela
vrije van sluis
de drie ambachten
hulster ambacht
west-brabant
akn en biesbosch
dorrmel
a a i •;.; •;
maaskant ,
Bmburg , .«
mean
maximum
minimum
standard deviation
0
6
0
6
11.75
0
10.5
10.5
10.5
0
0
9.65
9.4
0
0
0
;' 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
7
11
7
3.6
0
0
3.43
11.75
0.00
4.48
8
8
6
8
11.75
0
12.75
14
13.8
18.24
0
12.2
11
0
0
0
0
0
. 0
0
0
:. 0
0
-.*,• 0
••. 1 0
14
.•'.. 9
6.8
0
V 0
5.42
18.24
0.00
5.91
11
10
12
12.96
15.6
0
16.8
16.8
17.43
18.24
0
15.1
13.5
18.24
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
16
16.8
11
8.6
0
11
8.04
18.24
0.00
7.39
15
15
18
18.96
15.6
0
21
20.4
22.8
21.72
18
18.5
17.9
22.8
16
20
15.53
26
26
18
28
34
7.5
9
20
20
13
10.68
0
14.5
17.46
34.00
0.00
7.13
20.9
19.2
26.64
30.72
23.04
0
31.35
28.8
30.96
31
29.6
38.3
28
36.12
27.5
35
30.6
38
37
28
37.5
39
7.5
12.5
26
26
23.04
22.32
23.52
26.65
27.16
39.00
0.00
8.80
25
24
30
36
25.68
0
33.95
31.2
35.6
35
. 29.6
42.3
29.5
42
27.5
38
35.44
43
39
28
40.5
40
: 7.5
16
29
28.5
25.92
25.92
26.88
29.88
30.03
43.00
0.00
9.48
31
27.78
31.44
30.88
28.8
0
34.8
33.6
37.6
35
31.8
44.15
32
44
31.5
39.8
38.07
43
40
34.5
43
45
7.5
36
32
39.5
28.08
25.92
27.6
33.84
3Z94
45.00
0.00
9.48
37
30.84
32.4
41.76
31.68
0
36.4
33.6
40.8
35
33.6
47
36
45
33.12
44
41.56
48
41.38
39
48
48
31
46
31.5
33
30.48
31.44
30.24
37.44
36.51
48.00
0.00
9.00
45
32.5
34.2
43.68
36.24
0
39.2
36
44.64
36.5
33.65
54
44.5
45
31.44
48.4
49.75
53
46
46
55
51
42
50
34
35
31.92
33.12
30.96
41.16
40.13
55.00
0.00
10.43
50
34.14
34.8
51.84
39.84
0
42.15
40.8
50.88
42.5
43.4
61
49.6
45
34.8
52
64
55
50
50
64
67
42
55
38
37.5
34.08
33.12
33.84
44.52
44.69
67.00
0.00
12.65
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REGION 1982 1963 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
groningen ;•'
friesland ;•'•
drenlhe ••
west-overijssel
regge en dinkel
fleverwaard
oostelijk gelderiand
veluwe
rivierenland
utrecht
amstel- en gooiland
uitwalerende sluizen
njnland
woerden
delfland
schieland
holl. eilanden en waa
schouwen-dutvenlan
tholen
walcheren
noord- en zuidbevela
vrije van sluis
de drie ambachten
hulster ambacht
west-brabant
aim en biesbosch
domm©l
aa
maaskant :
limburg , ,-; [
mean
maidnunn
nvwTunn
stBnowu dsvwtafl
50
37.2
37.2
55.68
39.84
0
45.85
4296
57.2
40.8
48
66
53.8
45
38.4
54.8
68.4
56
54
56
71
78
: 44
- 69
42
; 40
36
33.12
38.88
48.24
48.25
78.00
0.00
1<55
55
37.2
37.2
55.68
39.84
0
40
40.08
61.6
528
52.2
70
54.8
53
41.16
59.8
68.4
57
55
58
75.5
86
46
72.5
42
41.5
36.96
33.12
44.64
51.36
50.61
86.00
0.00
15.81
60
39.48
37.2
55.68
39.84
0
40
38.4
61.6
55.8
58
70
57
58
42.84
64.8
68.4
57
54
58
79
86
48
72.5
42
44
36.96
33.12
51.12
53.64
5208
86.00
0.00
16.14
70
49.68
41.6
55.68
41.28
62.4
43
43.92
75.2
55.8
62.9
70
59.8
60
44.52
66.48
68.4
57
51
58
80
88
51
72.5
42
45
36.96
33.12
58.56
54.96
56.63
88.00
33.12
13.14
75
51
41.6
62.4
50.4
62
42
47.88
80.2
55.8
66.7
70
61.2
60
45.36
68.16
68.4
59
51
62
81.5
96
58
75
42
45
36.96
33.12
66.72
54.96
58.98
96.00
33.12
14.21
75
53.04
43.16
65.6
50.4
62
42
49.8
79.2
58.2
69.4
70
62
58
45.36
69.84
69.24
67
51
64
83
104
66
78
45
47
39.6
34.08
73.2
54.96
60.97
104.00
34.08
14.95
75
55.92
44.88
68.8
50.4
62
42
52.8
79.24
60.36
72.2
70
63.6
58
46.2
71.64
71.16
79
63
64
83
107
66
82
46
47
40.32
32.16
73.2
54.96
62.73
107.00
32.16
15.55
75
57.78
47.6
72
50.4
62
45
55.44
81.2
64.2
75.6
70
66
61
47.16
73.44
74.76
82
58
64
S6.5
110
70
92
48
49
4224
3216
73.2
56.64
64.74
110.00
3216
16.31
75
60.72
50.48
75
50.4
65
48
58.8
83.04
70.2
80.5
70
72
64
49.08
75.36
78.24
92
65
68
90.5
117
74
97
54
56.5
51.84
37.2
73.2
60
68.74
117.00
37.20
16.52
75
67.44
56.68
78.6
55.44
71.5
50
60
93.6
79.2
86.5
75
77.8
67
54
78.36
82.8
102
80
76
95.5
120
78
105
59
63
58.92
42.24
73.2
66
74.26
120.00
4224
16.97
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Appendix 6.B: Frequency distribution of effluent tax rates
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Appendix 6.C: Effluent treatment costs
The costs of biological waste-water treatment are calculated on the basis of Table 6.3 of Schuur-
man (1988, p.281), which gives the variable and fixed costs of biological effluent treatment in the
Dutch Food industry in 1983. The variable costs consist of labour costs, material and electricity
costs and waste disposal costs. The fixed costs consist of depreciation and interest costs and are
based on a depreciation period of 25 years and 10 years for construction work and equipment
and a fixed interest rate of 5%. In our study, we use a depreciation period of 18.5 years for the
construction part of biological waste-water treatment plants. According to Schuurman's own
study (p.356), the average depreciation period of the construction part is not 25 but 18.5 years.
Furthermore, we do not assume a fixed interest rate but use the ungoing (nominal) interest rates
for private loans, reported in the annual reports of De Nederlandse Bank (the Dutch National
Bank). The investment costs have been corrected for WIR investment subsidies.
The costs of biological waste-water treatment in the other years are calculated on the basis of
price indices for the different cost components, according to various sources of the Dutch Central
Bureau of Statistics (CBS). For equipment, we used the price index for filters and cleaning
technology (manufacturing products, domestic sales, producer prices) published in "Bijvoegsel
Maandstatistiek prijzen". For construction works, we used the price index for houses and other
buildings (net of value added tax), published in "Maandstatistiek Bouwnijverheid". For labour,
we used the CBS-price index for wages in industry, published in "Supplement sociaal-economi-
sche maandstatistiek". And for electricity, we used the price index for electricity in industry,
published in the "Statistiek van de electriciteitsvoorziening in Nederland". The only cost variable
for which no price figures were available is waste disposal. For waste disposal costs we used the
price index of labour costs. This may have resulted in an underestimation of the effluent treat-
ment costs in the late eighties and early nineties, when waste disposal costs increased sig-
nificantly. (However, this does not affect the model results in an important way as waste dispo-
sal costs are only a small part of the variable costs.) The price indexes for the different cost
components are given in the figure on the next page.
Appendix 6.D: The diffusion of biological waste-water treatment
plants ••'• • ••'•
The figures for the proportion of firms in the Food and Beverage industry that discharge their
waste water on a collective waste-water treatment plant are based on two sources: the RIZA
survey in 1986 and a survey by the CBS of 1992. In both surveys, firms were asked in what year
they had installed a biological waste-water treatment plant. We used the RIZA figures for the
1974-85 period and the (less detailed) CBS figures for the 1986-91 period. The reason for using
the RIZA figures for the early period were that the CBS figures were given at a more aggregate
level (sometimes for two years) and that the plants in the RIZA survey are first-purchases,
whereas the CBS figures include replacement investments (the number of which, however, is
believed to be small). Dividing the number of indirect dischargers in the Food and Beverage
industry with a biological wast-water treatment plant by the total number of indirect dischargers
in this industry (which is estimated at 183) gives /t,, the proportion of indirect dischargers in the
Food and Beverage industry with a biological waste-water treatment plant.
Price indices effluent treatment costs
source: CBS
130
. - • . " • *
c.
• • ' . ' • • !
O
O
II
CO
19
8
120-
110-
100-
90-
QA
OW"
70-
60-
50-
40^
/-\/"\ I O . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1972' 1974' 1976' 1978' 1980' 1982' 1984' 1986' 1988' 1990' 1992
year
equipment construction labour electricity n
s
The Diffusion of Thermal Home Insulation
in the Netherlands
Over the last few decades, many houses in the Netherlands have been thermally in-
sulated in response to energy-efficiency standards, higher energy prices and the demand
for extra comfort. Of these factors, building codes that aimed at reducing thermal losses
were the main factor in the improvement of the thermal integrity of houses built o/ter
1975. In the Netherlands, new standards for heat losses became effective in 1975, which
required cavity wall insulation and roof insulation in all newly built houses. Double
glazing in living rooms and kitchens became compulsory in 1978 for all new govern-
ment-subsidized houses — and in 1981 for all new houses. These building codes reflected
several public worries: to become less dependent on foreign energy suppliers, to reduce
energy costs and to conserve the natural environment.
Whereas building codes pertaining to heat losses either directly or indirectly
commanded the use of thermal insulation technologies in new homes, there were no
requirements for improving the energy efficiency of the existing housing stock. Nonethe-
less, many house-owners and occupants decided to have their homes thermally in-
sulated, not so much for environmental reasons or energy security reasons but to save
on the energy bill and for personal comfort — to benefit from extra comfort connected
with thermal insulation such as less temperature differentials, less window condensation,
and a warmer bedroom or attic. Higher energy efficiency of the existing housing stock
was also promoted by public authorities through special investment subsidy program-
mes and information dissemination programmes.
As a result, the share of houses built before 1976 with thermal insulation increased
steadily over time. The proportion of owner-occupied houses built before 1976 with double
glazing rose from 34.3 per cent in 1978 to 79.4 per cent in 1992. The penetration of the
other types of thermal insulation in 1992 was much lower: 41.8 per cent for cavity wall
insulation, and 51.8 and 17.2 per cent for roof and floor insulation.
The proportion of re/7 fed houses with thermal insulation also increased over time,
although the shares were lower than those of owner-occupied houses, especially in the
early period. In 1992, 70.7 per cent of all rented houses built before 1976 had double
glazing, 40 per cent had cavity wall insulation, 24.4 per cent had roof insulation and 7.1
per cent had floor insulation. The growth in the proportion of owner-occupied and
rented houses built before 1976 that have double glazing and cavity wall insulation (the
subject of our analysis) is depicted in Figure 7.1.
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Figure 7.1a. The diffusion of double glazing in owner-inhabited and rented
houses built before 1976. Source: NIPO, BAK and own calculations.
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Figure 7.1b. The diffusion of cavity wall insulation in owner-inhabited and
rented houses built before 1976. Source: NIPO, BAK and own calculations.
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Figure 7.1 shows a steady increase in the proportion of houses with double glazing and
cavity wall insulation built before 1976. The diffusion of double glazing and cavity wall
insulation follows more or less a sigmoid pattern with differing growth rates (both with
respect to technology and time period). This raises the question as to what factors are
responsible for the observed increases in the proportion of houses with thermal in-
sulation, and how important these factors were in inducing households to invest in
thermal home insulation. For instance, how important were the investment subsidies for
double glazing and cavity wall insulation? And how important were price changes in
natural gas (the main energy source for space heating in the Netherlands) in making
households install double glazing or to invest in cavity wall insulation? Other questions
that may be asked are: What accounts for the differences in the adoption of the various
types of thermal insulation? Why is the number of houses with double glazing much
higher than those for wall, roof and floor insulation, this while the financial payoffs from
double glazing are the lowest?
These questions, together with other questions about household motives to invest
in thermal insulation, can be analyzed in the threshold model developed in chapter 5. To
do so, we apply the model to /wo types of thermal insulation (double glazing and cavity
wall insulation) for houses built be/ore 1976 for two occupant categories — ouwer-occupattte
and renters. (The diffusion of roof and floor insulation is not investigated econometrically
because of insufficient data and inaccuracies in the measurement of the model variables.)
The reason for making a distinction between owner-occupants and renters is that they
constitute different occupant categories in terms of income, education level and ability to
appropriate the benefits from the investment in thermal home insulation. For example,
renters may lose the value of their investment in thermal insulation once they move to a
different house. In the Netherlands, however, this holds less true than for other coun-
tries, because a large part (approximately 75 per cent) of the stock of rented houses is
owned by non-profit housing councils ("woningbouwverenigingen") and local councils.
The one-time costs of thermal insulation are taken care of through the rent by these
housing associations so that renters do not suffer a disproportionate loss when they
move to a new house. The decision to thermally insulate a rented house is made by the
renter, not by the housing council. _ . „ „ ...
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the threshold model for thermal
insulation: the model variables and parameters. Section 2 contains the empirical results
of the threshold model. Section 3 presents the results from three epidemic models — the
logistic, Gompertz and Bass model. The final section gives the conclusions about the
impact of investment subsidies and price of natural gas on the diffusion of thermal home
insulation.
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7.1 The Threshold Model for Thermal Home Insulation
This section discusses econometric aspects involved in the application of the threshold
model to thermal home insulation: the model variables, the distributions of the variables
that underlie the diffusion process, the parameters to be estimated, and the estimating
procedure that will be used to estimate the model parameters.
As explained previously, a key assumption of the threshold model advanced in
chapter 5 is that in making a decision about the purchase of a thermal insulation tech-
nology, a household compares the costs of adoption (being the sum of purchase price
and installation costs) with the risk-adjusted reservation price (being heterogeneous
across the population of households). Only those households for which the risk-adjusted
reservation price exceeds the costs of adoption will be adopters.
After this short introduction, we will now define the variables that affect the
reservation prices (willingness to pay) for thermal insulation. The first two variables that
immediately come to mind are: First, the annual energy savings in m*, ER,, from thermal
insulation, and second, the price of natural gas, p^,. Together these two variables deter-
mine the savings on energy costs from thermal insulation. The willingness to pay for
thermal insulation technologies also depends on the interest rate (r,), the life time of the
investment (/), and on utility-enhancing effects of thermal home improvement, K,. It also
depends on uncertainty about the economic characteristics of thermal insulation — the
energy savings to be achieved and future energy prices. The disutility of uncertainty
about the desirability of an investment in thermal insulation is accounted for in the
model by dividing the reservation price by uncertainty factor U,(p) > 1 (with p the
parameter of uncertainty and 3L/,/3t < 0). The way in which the above variables affect
the willingness to pay for thermal insulation X, is described in equation (1).'
with R = ! the imputed annual rental rate (f indexes time)
£R,, p^,, and JC, (and X,) are defined per m* o/ f/zenrw/ insulation. This is because the costs
of thermal insulation C, vary with the surface area that is insulated (usually measured in
square meters).
In the model analysis, only £R and K are taken to be stochastic variables (which means
that they are considered to differ among households). The energy savings from thermal
insulation, £R, are known to vary among households, depending on the housing con-
' For simplicity we have dropped index /' for the two types of thermal insulation that are statis-
tically investigated: double glazing (/ = 1) and cavity wall insulation (/ = 2).
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struction, the location of the house, and, especially, household heating habits. According
to Leo Meyer, energy savings from thermal insulation follow a worma/ distribution with
mean 21.51 and standard deviation 5.8 m^  of natural gas per m* for double glazing and
10.11 and 1.3 for cavity wall insulation (when using thermal wool).* Thus, the energy
savings from double glazing per m* are twice the energy savings per m* from cavity
wall insulation. Figure 7.2 gives the cumulative frequency distribution for the energy
savings from thermal insulation.
1 - F
ER-u
ER
Figure 7.2. The distribution of energy savings from thermal home insulation. Source:
Meyer (1981, p.82).
Figure 7.2 shows that the energy savings from thermal insulation are distributed accor-
ding to a normal distribution. The distribution of Efy over time is constant with time
because the thermal efficiency of insulation materials did not change during the dif-
fusion period: / ^ = ^ , and o ^ = cr^, for; = 1,2.
* Leo A. Meyer, 1981, Energiebespanng in de Socia/e WoningboMw: Bespan'ng op Ruimteoerwarmmg m
Tfteorie en Prafai/fc (Energy savings in government-subsidized house building: savings in space heating
in theory and practice), PhD thesis, University of Groningen. In the model analysis, we use somewhat
different estimates for the average energy savings from double glazing and cavity wall insulation:
22.83 and 9.38. The estimates for the energy savings and the costs and benefits of thermal insulation
are based on several sources: H.M. Roos, 1977, Kosten-baten analyse van isolatie (Cost-benefit
analysis of thermal insulation), Gas, 97: 90-103; Nationale Woningraad, 1979, Woningisolatie: verstan-
dig aanpakken (Thermal insulation: making a wise decision), 1979, Woningnwd-Exfra, april 1979;
Stichting Bouwresearch, 1985, Wonen in de kou (living in the cold), Rotterdam; and Communicatie-
en Adviesbureau over Energie en milieu (CEA), 1993, Besparingspotentielen woningbouw (Energy-
savings profiles in house building), Rotterdam.
j
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Unfortunately, no detailed knowledge is available about the monetary valuation of the
beneficial (or harmful) side-effects of thermal insulation, X (being a function of house-
hold preferences, wealth and housing location). In our analysis, we simply assume that
X, is Morma/Zy distributed with mean ^^, and standard deviation o^,. This is a very
convenient assumption which facilitates econometric application of the model. (The sum
of a two independent normal distributions is also normally distributed.) In the model
analysis, we consider three situations: that of a constant X,, the situation where X, is a
function of the number of previous adopters: X, = Xg + K/\,.,, and finally the case where
X, is a linear function of household income Y,: X, = ocY,. In the last two cases, X, is
increasing over time. In all cases, we assume that the variance of X, is constant with
Thus, in the analysis, the price of natural gas P^,, the imputed annual rental rate
R,, and the uncertainty factor I/, are taken to be deterministic variables. That is, they are
believed to be the same for every household. In the case of U, this may be an unrealistic
assumption as some people are more risk-averse, in need of information, and indepen-
dent in their decision making. Also, the rental rates may differ across households or
households may apply different rentability requirements. Introducing distributions for
these variables, however, would complicate the analysis, both theoretically and em-
pirically. It is for that reason that they are considered to be the same for all households.
A description of a threshold model with different rentability requirements is described in
appendix A.
What does the above imply for the way in which the reservation prices are distrib-
uted across the population of potential adopters? It implies that if ER, - N(|*£ ,^ o ^ )
and X,, - N ( ^ , o\y), then the (risk-adjusted) reservation prices X, also follow a nomwi
distribution with mean fy, and variance o^:
_ MEH/P^ + "*,. y^  o* - P ^ < > * ° l (2)
As explained in chapter 5, the probability of adoption at time £, A,, is equal to the pro-
portion of the population for which the reservation price exceeds the cost of adoptioa
From equation (15) in chapter 5 we know that:
S l 0)
,..;,.,,, . r with <1> the standard normal cumulative density function.
This is the equation to be estimated with an error term added to the right-hand side to
account for differences between the probability that a randomly selected house is ther-
mally insulated (with insulation of type ;) at time (, and the measured proportion of
homes with thermal insulation of type / at time f, A,. What we get is:
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with A., the measured proportion of houses with thermal insulation of type ; at time f,
Cj, the costs of adoption, and e^ , an i.i.d. error term with zero mean and variance o^,; =
1,2 — where ; = 1 for double glazing and / = 2 for cavity wall insulation, (fy, and CT^, are
the mean and standard deviation of reservation prices X^ ,, defined in (2).)
Equation (4) can be estimated in TSP by nonlinear least squares. The parameters
that we want to estimate are: ^^ , Cf^ , and pj. The number of parameters to be estimated
is f/iree if j * ^ is constant with time (i.e. if j / ^ = ^ - for all t) or if Ky, = a,Y,, and /our if
J*jyi = /*it/o + ^ ; i i- ^  ^; is zero we have only one parameter (p^ ) to estimate (K, is likely to
be small for cavity wall insulation, for which there are little utility-enhancing side-
effects). Since we were able to collect and construct data for the 1977-92 period, we have
16 observations to estimate the above parameters, which is not much. (For K, = K,, + KA,.,
we have one observation less, which means that we have only 15 observations.)
After this long exposition of econometric detail, we will now touch upon the kind of
conclusions we might infer from the diffusion analysis. First, the model might provide
information about the importance of changes in the price of natural gas in inducing
households to invest in thermal insulation. Second, the model may enable us to assess
whether shifts in preferences and reductions in uncertainty are important factors in
household insulation decisions. And third, the effects of government subsidy schemes
may be determined empirically, which enables us to evaluate the effectiveness of these
schemes in influencing people's investment decisions. Of course, the accuracy of the
above conclusions depends on the ability of the model to explain the diffusion of ther-
mal home insulation across different household categories over the period of inves-
tigation.
7.2 Empirical Results from the Threshold Model ^
This section presents the empirical results of the threshold model for double glazing and
cavity wall insulation. We have estimated the threshold model for these two thermal
insulation technologies, both for owner-occupied and rented houses built before 1976.
Before we give the results, however, we will take a look at the development of the
average net annual gains from double glazing and cavity wall insulation for each occu-
pant category. Figure 7.3 gives the average net annual monetary gains (fy, - C,-,) of an
investment in double glazing and cavity wall insulation at time t, both for owner-
occupied and rented houses.
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Figure 7.3. The average net annual monetary gains of an investment in double
glazing (dgl) and cavity wall insulation (cw) for owner-occupied and rented houses.
Figure 7.3 shows that the average net annual monetary gains from an investment in
thermal insulation vary over time and differ between double glazing and cavity wall
insulation. It also demonstrates that the net annual monetary gains from cavity wall
insulation are significantly higher than those from double glazing, despite the fact that
the energy savings per m* of insulation area are only half of those of double glazing.
Figure 7.3 furthermore shows that the net average annual monetary gains from double
glazing are negative in the entire 1978-92 period for owner-occupied houses (and for
renters in all years, except for 1985 and 1986). This illustrates the importance of includ-
ing non-moneffln/ gains K, in the analysis of the diffusion of double glazing. About the
development of fy, - C,,, the steady increase in the net annual monetary gains from
thermal insulation up to 1985 is caused by the increase in the price for natural gas,
which rose from Dfl 0.27 per nV* in 1978 to Dfl 0.66 in 1985 (see appendix B). When the
price of natural gas dropped in the 1986-89 period (to Dfl 0.42 in 1989), the net annual
monetary gains of an investment in thermal insulation also dropped significantly.
Another factor that affects the net annual gains of thermal insulation is investment
subsidies. In 1976, the Dutch government instituted a large investment programme for
thermal home insulation, the "Nationaal Isolatie Programma" (NIP). Under the NIP
programme, households could receive an investment subsidy of more than 20 per cent
and often as much as 30 per cent of total investment costs. For owner-occupants, the
programme ended in 1983, after a phase-out in 1981 and 1982. For renters, however, it
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was possible to receive an investment subsidy of one-third of total investment costs up
to 1988. The elimination of the programme is reflected in the decrease in the annual
monetary gains from a thermal insulation investment in 1981 for owner-occupants and
the decrease in fy, - Cy, in 1988 for renters. We will now give the model results, first for
owner-occupied houses and then for rented houses.
7.3.2 Reswffs/rom tfie tfzresfto/d mode/ /or ouwer-occupied Ziowses
We have estimated the diffusion of double glazing and cavity wall insulation for owner-
occupied houses in the 1978-92 period. As for biological waste-water treatment plants,
we estimated several model variants. Here, only the results where K, is a linear function
of/4,., and of Y, and U, = 1 + p/(t-fo) are reported. These three expressions gave the best
results, and they are also preferred on theoretical grounds: the valuation of utility-
enhancing effects K, is likely to be a function of household income or the number of
previous adopters that are instrumental in influencing other people's decisions and U, is
likely to be high in the first years for risk-averse consumers.
In the regressions, we had to impose restrictions on the parameters. Estimation of
four parameters on the basis of 15 or 16 observations led to bad estimation results: very
high parameter values, standard errors that were not determined and negative coef-
ficients of determination. For double glazing, we estimated the model for different
parameter values for ^<, and a*. For ;^ .<, we used the following values: 5, 7.5,10, 12.5,15
and for o^ we used 5, 10, 15. This led to different parameter estimates and goodness-of-
fit values. The model results showed that the higher the value for o ,^ the higher the
coefficient of determination: for o^ = 15 and ^ 0 = 7.5, the adjusted R' is 0.74. However,
a value of 15 for a,, is much too high, it corresponds with a 95% interval for K, of ^ , ±
30. More reasonable estimates for ^ and o\ are: 12.5 and 5. Estimation results of the
regressions under these restrictions are given in column (1) of Table 7.1. K is estimated at
4.5 and p at 1.1, with both estimates significantly different from zero at the 5% sig-
nificance level and more or less of the magnitude that we expected.' The reported
coefficient of determination is 0.55. We also estimated the model for K, = aY, with Y,
average household income. Again, we had to impose certain restrictions on the model
parameters in order to obtain reasonable estimates. We estimated the model for o\ = 5,
7.5,10,12.5 and 15. The results for o\ = 7.5 for double glazing are given in column (2). a
is estimated at 0.42 (with a standard error of 0.04) and p at 1.29 (with a standard error of
0.45). The value of 0.42 for a means that the willingness to pay per year for a 14 m*-
sized, double-glazed window is Dfl 169 in 1977 and Dfl 257 in 1992. The adjusted R*
value is 0.67.
' A value of 4.48 for K together with f<vj, = 125 implies that house owners in 1978 are prepared to
pay Dfl 195 for the extra comfort of a 14 nr-sized double-glazed window (which is approximately the
size of a large window in a living room). The willingness to pay in 1992 wass 224 guilders. These
values correspond with monthly payments of 16 and 19 guilders. Note that these figures are averag-
es.
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For cavity wall insulation, we estimated the model for K, = 0. As explained before, there
are very few utility-enhancing gains from cavity wall insulation. The only gains are in
the form of energy savings. If we estimate the model for ^ = K = 0, we get extremely
high parameter values (of almost a billion) for o> and p. If we estimate the model for o^
= 2.5 (to allow for a little variation in K), we get a more reasonable estimate for p of 23.8
(which is still very high). The adjusted R* of this regression is 0.66. The results are in
column (3) of Table 7.1.
The model results for the diffusion of double glazing and cavity wall insulation
across owner-occupied houses are rather bad: coefficients of determination are low (for
a model that explains /4,) and there is strong evidence of positive first-order autocor-
relation. Although the parameter values are signifantly different from zero and of the
correct magnitude, one cannot attach much value to them as they are based on regres-
sions in which several parameters are fixed.
double glazing
(1)
with w,y> = 12.5
and o^ = 5
(2)
(1) with
and 0g =
K,=
= 7.5
aY,
cart/y
(3)
with ;,
and O;
wall insuiation
, = 2.5
4.48*
(2.04)
0.42*
(0.04)
1.09* 1.29* 23.76*
(0.28) (0.45) (2.28)
055 0.67 0.66
DW 1.06 0.93 0.61
* significant at 5% level (standard errors in parentheses)
Table 7.1. Estimation results of the threshold model for owner-occupied hou-
ses, 1978-92.
The model predictions for /4,, the proportion of owner-occupied houses with double
glazing and cavity wall insulation, are in Figure 7.4. Figure 7.4 shows that the threshold
model under the imposed restrictions cannot describe the observed diffusion patterns for
double glazing and cavity wall insulation. It overestimates the proportion of owner-
occupied houses with double glazing in the 1983-86 period, when the price of natural
gas was very high, and it underestimates the proportion of owner-occupied houses with
cavity wall insulation in the 1978-83 period. (The high predicted values for /4y, in 1991
zow 0/ f/iemw/ /zome znsu/af ion 175
and 1992 are caused by the increase in the price of natural gas and the fact that thermal
insulation was again subsidied.) The overall conclusion is that the threshold model is not
a good model for explaining the diffusion of thermal home insulation. It must we noted,
however, that one of the reasons for these bad results is that the model does not explain
the proportion of thermally insulated houses in each year but the proportion of house-
holds that would desire to have thermal insulation given the prevailing price structure
and subsidies in that year. The decrease in fy, - C^ , after 1986 due to the decrease in p ^ ,
after 1985 and the elimination of the subsidy programma for thermal insulation are
responsible for a sharp decrease in the predicted ^ , , whereas in reality an adopter in
year f will be an adopter in f+1.
1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992
double glazing
cavity wall
with Kt = KO+kAt-1
wit Kt = 0
with Kt = aYt
Figure 7.4. Model results for the proportion of owner-occupied houses with double
glazing and cavity wall insulation according to the threshold model.
What if we introduce adjustment costs into the model? Does this improve the results? To
investigate this possibility we estimated equation (8) in chapter 6 for double glazing and
cavity wall insulation. In the partial adjustment or stock adjustment model, only a fixed
proportion of the desired adjustment is accomplished in one period due to adjustment
problems (such as financing problems). We estimated the partial adjustment model
under the same parameter restrictions. The results of this model are given in Table 7.2.
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K
P
X
adj-R'
DW
rfouWe grazing
(1)
with ^ = 12.5
and a,c = 5
0.83
(103)
453
(4-29)
-0.065*
(0.020)
0.98
144
(2)
(1) with K, = aV,
a* = 5 and a = 0.6
1.06*
(036)
0.093*
(0.015)
0.99
2.18
anrify waiJ insulation
(3)
with ^KJ = 0,
and a* = 2.5
-729
(2928)
0.032*
(0.008)
0.98
1.64
* significant at 5% level (standard errors in parentheses)
Table 7.2. Estimation results of the partial adjustment model for owner-
occupied houses, 1978-92.
Table 7.2 demonstrates that the coefficients of determination are very high, above 0.98.
However, the parameter values found in the regressions differed widely, depending on
the value of the fixed parameters. The only robust parameter in the analysis was A, the
coefficient of adjustment. In all regressions, A. was close to zero (less than 0.10). A. was
even significantly negative in the model with K, = /C^  + KA,.,. The low and negative
values for A., the insignificant values for K and p lead us to the conclusion that the
threshold model is not a good model for explaining the diffusion of thermal insulation
technologies across owner-occupied houses.
We will now investigate whether the threshold model can explain the diffusion of
thermal insulation technologies across rented houses during the 1978-92 period.
7.3.2 jResuffs/rom ffie fhresJioM »io<fc?/or rewfed Ziowses
This section presents the results of the diffusion model for double glazing and cavity
wall insulation in the 1978-92 period in rented houses built before 1976. Again, we only
report the results of the model variant in which X, is a linear function of y4,., and Y, and
li, = 1 + p/(Mo). Other expressions for K, and U, that we investigated gave less good
results in terms of coefficients of determination and parameter values.
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Again, we had to impose several restrictions on the parameter values. We es-
timated the model for double glazing using the same values for ^ and a* as for owner-
occupants. Investigation of the results shows that the value for c?,. has little influence on
the estimation results. Each of the regressions gave quite a high coefficient of deter-
mination (above 0.73) but the estimates for K and p were far too high: K is estimated at
56.5 and p at 16.3 for ^ = 10 and CT^ = 5. Especially the value for K is much too high.
For that reason we re-estimated the model for K = 4.5 (the value we found for owner-
occupants). The estimation results are in column (1) of Table 7.3. p is now estimated at
4.58 with a standard error of 1.08. The adjusted R* for double glazing is very low, only
0.21 whereas it was 0.55 for owner-occupants. The results for the model with K, = aV,
and a,< = 10 are in column (2). p is estimated at 3.90 and a at 0.34. Different values for o^
gave different values for p and a, which means that we should not attach much value to
these parameter values.
For cavity wall insulation, we estimated the model for ^ = K = 0 and o^ = 2.5 (the
same values as those we used for owner-occupants). The results are in column (3) of
Table 7.3. As for owner-occupants we get a high value for p (37.03). Again, there is
strong positive first-order autocorrelation in all regressions. The model results for /4^ , for
rented houses are given in Figure 7.5.
annry uuil insulafion
(1) (2) (3)
with ^ o = 10 (1) with K, = aY, with f^ .o = 0
K = 4.5, Of = 5 and a* = 10 K = 0, a* = 2.5
4.58* 3.90 37.03*
(1.08) (2.65) (356)
0.34*
(0.13)
0.21 032 038
DW 0.55 0.54 0.72
* significant at 5% level (standard errors in parentheses)
Table 7.3. Estimation results of the threshold model for the proportion of rented
houses with thermal insulation, 1978-92.
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1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992
5 SO
double glazing
cavity wall
with Kt = KO+kAt-1
wit Kt = 0
with Kt = aYt
Figure 7.5. Results of the threshold model for the proportion of rented houses with
double glazing and cavity wall insulation.
Figure 7.5 demonstrates that the model predictions for ^ , are all bad. They are even
worse than those for owner-occupied houses in Figure 7.3. The threshold model is not
able to describe empirically the diffusion of double glazing and cavity wall insulation
across rented houses built before 1976. It overestimates the proportion of rented houses
with double glazing between 1983 and 1987 and underestimates the proportion of
houses with thermal insulation in the 1978-82 and 1988-90 periods.
Comparison of Table 7.1 with Table 7.3 shows that the estimates for p (the uncer-
tainty parameter) are higher for renters. This corresponds with the empirical finding of
economic studies that low-income groups apply higher implicit discount rates in energy-
related purchasing decisions.'' Furthermore, the coefficients of determination in Table 7.1
for owner-occupants are higher than those in Table 7.3 for renters. This suggests that the
threshold model is better suited to explain the purchasing decisions of owner-occupants
with respect to thermal insulation than those of renters. This is also something we did
expect: owner-occupants, being a better educated, high-income household category, are
considered to be more knowledgeable and rational in their investment decisions than
* Kenneth Train, 1985, Discount Rates in Consumers' Energy-Related Decisions: A Review of the
Literature, Energy, 10(12): 1243-1253.
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renters are. (This also explains the lower values for p and higher value for a for owner-
occupants*.)
We also estimated the partial adjustment model for renters. This gave results
similar to those for owner-occupants: high coefficients of determination (around 0.99)
with X almost zero or even negative. Again, A. was the only parameter that showed up as
significantly different from zero at the 5% level. The parameter values for the other
coefficients differed widely in the different regressions. This means that the threshold
model is not a good model, despite the good fit. The results are not presented here.
What conclusions can we draw from the model results? First, utility-enhancing effects of
double glazing are an important factor in the time-intensive installation of double glaz-
ing. This explains why a large number of households decided to invest in double glaz-
ing, despite the negative financial returns. Unfortunately, the monetary value of these
utility-enhancing effects of double glazing could not be determined with much precision.
Although the values found in the analysis (between Dfl 11 and 21 a month for a 14 m*-
sized double-glazed window) seem reasonable, the method used (a grid search for o^
and K) is too crude a test to have much confidence in them. With respect to cavity wall
insulation, the slow diffusion suggests that information problems are a significant barrier
to the uptake of this highly profitable type of thermal insulation.' An alternative explan-
ation is that people apply high discount rates in investment decisions.
Although these conclusions more or less follow from the model results, we should
be careful in drawing any conclusions on the basis of the bad estimation results (the low
coefficients of determination, the fact that we had to fix several parameter values).
Perhaps the main conclusion to be drawn from the model results is that the increase in
the proportion of homes with thermal insulation is not so much the result of changes in
the price of natural gas and changes in the adoption costs — there are other factors
involved. What these other factors are is unclear. They may have to do with information
transfer and taste formation (which is different from the way in which it is modelled),
budget restrictions, and changes in the population of households (like relocation to a
different house, changes in family size, etc.).
The next section investigates whether epidemic models can explain the increase in the
number of houses with thermal insulation. We have estimated three epidemic models,
both for .Ay, and A/4,,.
* The willingness to pay for personal comfort for double glazing is estimated at 137 in 1977 and
208 in 1992 for renters (based on a value of 0.34 for a).
' This conclusion corresponds with Meyer (1981). Meyer finds that in Gasselte, a small town in
the north of the Netherlands, there were significant information problems with respect to the effects
of thermal insulation and the cost efficiency of energy-efficiency improvement measures.
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7.3 Empirical Results from Three Epidemic Models ••
In the previous section we saw that the threshold model is not a good model for ex-
plaining the diffusion of thermal home insulation technologies in the Netherlands. This
raises the question whether epidemic models are able to describe better the observed
diffusion patterns for double glazing and cavity wall insulation. We estimated three
diffusion models — the logistic model, the Gompertz model and the Bass model, with
and without economic variables. As before, the analysis is limited to the existing housing
stock of houses built before 1976, for two occupant categories — owner-occupants and
r e n t e r s . • ' " " • ' " • '•' "" . " • ' • ' • - ' • • " ' • ' • " ' • • - • • - • - - • ' • • — • ' - • • - • . . .
7.3.1 77ie resM/fs /or ow;ner-occH/«erf frowses ' ; >
M : ' f f f v K; ;
First, we estimated each of the three models for y4^ ,, the proportion of houses with
thermal insulation of type / during the 1977-92 period. Expressions for J4,-, for the logistic,
Gompertz and Bass models are given below. The equation for logistic model that we
estimated is:*
The equation for the Gompertz model that we estimated is:*
And the equation for the Bass model:'
e , • : - . . • . • • • ( 7 )
with e^ , an i.i.d. error term with mean zero and variance a*,.
' We also estimated the logistic model with the error term added to -X - p(W(,). This led to almost
identical results.
• ^
* We leave it to the reader to verify that equation (6) is the model solution for:
with N the size of the population and n(0 the number of adopters at time t.
' Based on Mahajan and Peterson, op cif., p.21.
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Results of the logistic, Gompertz and Bass models for the proportion of owner-occupied
houses with double glazing and cavity wall insulation built before 1976 are given in
7 . 4 . " ' - U . . . „ • • . . • . - 1 1 , . . . . ; - . ' . - . • « . . - . ; . , - - i : . - : . < ? . • . , . ; • • . ] . . > < • ; i . ' , . . : ' • > , • • ; C ? . l l ^ - I V J j 3 ' , • : , ' T
% •
1)
X
p
•
6
adj-R'
DW
.'fit :/>«:.
(1)
logistic
-0.84*
(0.05)
0.15*
(0.01)
0.98
0.72
double g/azing '
(2)
Gompertz
0.11*
(0.003)
0.27*
(0.01)
0.99
1.25
(3)
Bass
0.14*
(0.03)
0.00*
(0.01)
0.98
0.63
• O •- : ; , -
(4)
logistic
-1.68*
(0.11)
0.10*
(0.01)
0.88
0.23
catrcfy aw// insulation
(5)
Gompertz
0.06*
(0.005)
0.14*
(0.01)
0.91
0.25
tftfj
(6)
Bass
-0.04*
(0.02)
0.04*
(0.01)
0.97
0.37
* significant at 5% level (standard errors in parentheses)
Table 7.4. Estimation results of the logistic, Gompertz and Bass models for owner-occupied
houses, 1977-92. '
Table 7.4 shows that the coefficients of determination are all high, especially for double
glazing, with adjusted R* values above 0.88. This means that each of the epidemic
models can describe quite well the development of /4,,, the proportion of owner-occupied
houses built before 1976 with double glazing and cavity wall insulation during the 1977-
92 period. With respect to the parameter values: the estimates for p and 8 are all positive
and significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level, except for the estimate
for (3 in the Bass model for cavity wall insulation. In all equations there is strong positive
first-order autocorrelation.
How should we interpret the results in Table 7.4? The fact that the coefficients of
determination are all high makes us suspicious. The good fit of the models may be due
to spurious regression, a common phenomenon in diffusion analysis, where any sigmoid
curve is able to 'explain' the diffusion process. The danger of spurious regression is
especially high, since a number of other variables not included in the epidemic models —
such as the price of natural gas — are likely to be an important factor in the timing of
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thermal insulation investments. To investigate this possibility, we let p, and N, be a
function of the price of natural gas (and in the case of cavity wall insulation also a
function of the net gains from adoption). We estimated each of the models with p, = p +
P^ o5,i arid N, = N(l-l/p^,,) where N, is the population of potential adopters at time t
(Note that N, -> N if p^ , -> °° for y > 0). T| is the elasticity of P, with respect to the price
of natural gas and y the elasticity of N, with respect to the price of natural gas. The
results with p, = p + p"^_, and N, = N(l-l/p^,) are compared with those with constant
p, and N, = N. For reasons of comparison, and to take care of the problem of autocor-
relation in the error term, the different model variants are estimated for AA,,, the change
in A;,.
The equations for the different models for AA., = .A,, - A;,., are given below. The equation
for the logistic model is: v.j,. -7ft; *.•;
"
The equation for the Gompertz model:
- - - - - - AA, =P,A,(ln(N,,)-ln(^.,)) . . .. (9)
with «y,., the number of adopters at time t-1.
And the equation for the Bass model: ,
- i » . ; * > f e a a t i * , : , A/L - ( S + p,A,)(_fl-A.,) - •- "•.,•=•,•> it^ v (10)
These are the equations that are estimated, with an i.i.d. error term e^ , around mean zero
and variance o^ , added to the right-hand side of each equation. The results of the differ-
ent variants of the logistic, Gompertz and Bass models are reported in Table 7.5. Table
7.5 shows that the model results for AA, are less good than for /4,,, the proportion of
houses with thermal insulation. It also shows that the results of the Bass model are less
good than those of the logistic and Gompertz models. With respect to the different
variants of the models, the variant with p, = p + p^ , , and N, = N gives the worst results
in terms of goodness-of-fit. The results of specification (1) and (3) with constant P, are
best: these specifications have the highest adjusted R* value and, except for the Bass
model, all the parameter values are significantly different from zero at the 5% signifi-
cance level. It is difficult to say which of the two specifications is best: specification (3)
with N, = N(l-l/p^,) has the highest R*, but the adjusted R' (the R' corrected for the
number of parameters) is below that of the variant with N, = N.
-it.*
pY
8
adj-R'
DW
(1)
0.15*
(0.02)
0.27
1.93
togisttc
(2)
-0.73*
(0.36)
-0.03
(0.10)
0.23
1.95
model ,,
(3) |
0.25*
(0.06)
; .3
( 0 ^ '
0.25
2.23
(4) ,..<
-0.63
(0.50)
-0.03
(0.15)
0.47*
(0.10)
0.20
2.25
(1)
o.ir
(0.01)
• , -
- i
030
2.14
Gompertz mode/
(2)
-0.94'
(0.19)
0.01
(0.05)
0.27
2.15
(3)
0.14*
(0.03)
057*
(0.22)
0.25
2.21
(4)
-0.98*
(0.22)
0.03
(0.05)
054*
(0.19)
0.21
2.24
(1)
0.06
(0.05)
4
0.05
(0.04)
0.21
2.13
Boss mode/
(2)'
-3.14
(1035)
0.08*
(0.02)
0.18
1.96
(3)
0.19
(0.21)
• ' •
(0.17)
0.02
(0.07)
0.20
2.24
(4)' ?S
1*
-0.30
(0.40)
0.02
(0.14)
-0.26
(0.38)
0.13
2.11
* significant at 5% level (standard errors in
(1) with constant P, and N, = N
(2) with p, = P + p"j.,, N, = N
(3) with constant P, and N, = N ( l - l / p ^ )
(4) with P, = P + p " ^ , N, = N ( l - l / p ^ )
(2)' and (4)' is with ft = p " ^
Table 7.5. Estimation results of the logistic,
occupied houses, 1978-92.
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The parameter values found in the regressions, fJ, and y are positive in all regressions.
Furthermore, P and y are significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level in
the logistic and Gompertz models with constant P,. The significant positive value for y
means that the price of natural gas has a positive impact on the population of potential
adopters. Surprisingly, the values for T|, the elasticity of p, with respect to p^, , are not
significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level. T| is even negative in the
logistic and Bass models. Figure 7.6 gives the model predictions of the Gompertz model
with constant P, for A/l^  for owner-occupied houses.
0.09
0.08-
0.07-
0.06-
0.05-
0.04-
0.03-
0.02-
0.01-
0
1978 ' 1980 ' 1982 ' 1984 ' 1986 ' 1988 ' 1990 1992
real with Nt=N with Nt=f(pgas)
Figure 7.6. Model results of the Gompertz model with constant fl, for the installation of
double glazing in owner-occupied houses.
Figure 7.6 shows that none of the variants of the Gompertz model can describe em-
pirically the strong fluctuations in A/4,. It is difficult to say whether or not the price of
natural gas has an impact on the installation of double glazing. The parameter value for
y is significantly different from zero but the predictions of the Gompertz model with N,
being a function of the price of natural gas are hardly better than with N, = N. The
relationship between the price of natural gas and the diffusion of double glazing across
owner-occupied homes is certainly not a strong one, not as strong as the relationship
between the effluent tax rate and the diffusion of biological waste-water treatment
plants.
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We now present the model results for cavity wall insulation. We estimated the same
models and model variants for cavity wall insulation.'" The results for owner-occupied
houses built before 1976 are in Table 7.6.
The results for cavity wall insulation for owner-occupied houses are much better
than those for double glazing. Especially the results of the Gompertz model with N, =
N(l-l/p^,,) are good. Again, it is difficult to say whether or not the price of natural gas
influences the timing of thermal insulation investments. The good fit of the Gompertz
model with N, = N(l-l/p^,) and the significant positive value for y suggest that this is
the case, but the high coefficient of determination for the logistic model with constant (3,
and N, = N suggest that it is not. In any case, the evidence that the price of natural gas
influences the timing of thermal insulation investments, by expanding the population of
prospective adopters, is stronger than for double glazing. This is what we expected: for
cavity wall insulation the main benefits are in the form of savings on energy costs,
which are strongly correlated with the price of natural gas.
0.06
0.05-
0.04-
0.03-
0.02-
0.01-
-0.01 J-T1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992
-«— real —•- logistic Gompertz-e- Bass
Figure 7.7. Model results of the logistic, Gompertz and Bass model with constant p, and
N, = JV(l-l/p^,J for cavity wall insulation in owner-occupied houses.
'° We also estimated each of the models with p, and N, a function of fy, - C^ , instead of p,,,,. (We
could not estimate this variant for double glazing because of the negative values for the net annual
monetary gains from adoption.) The results are similar to those in Table 7.5: significant positive
values for p and y in specifications (1) and (3), but somewhat lower coefficients of determination for
the logistic and Gompertz models.
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1.97
(1)
-0.08*
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* significant at 5% level (standard errors in parentheses)
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(2) with p, = p + p V N, = N
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Table 7.6. Estimation results of the logistic, Gomperte and BBSS models for fih
insulation in owner-occupied houses, 1978-92.
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Figure 7.7 gives the model predictions of the logistic, Gompertz and Bass models with p,
= P + p ^ , and N, = N(l- l /p^,) for AAj, for owner-occupied houses built before 1976.
Figure 7.7 demonstrates that the model predictions of the epidemic models are quite
good, except for 1980, when there was a strong increase in A/4^ ,, the proportion of
owner-occupied houses with cavity wall insulation, and 1983 and 1984, when the in-
crease was very low. What happened in 1983 was that it was no longer possible for
house owners to receive a subsidy for thermal insulation. This may explain the small
number of houses (built before 1976) that were thermally insulated in 1983 and 1984. It
may also explain the peak in A/4,, for double glazing in 1982, the last year in which
house owners were able to receive an investment subsidy for double glazing (see Figure
7.6). We observed the same phenomenon for biological waste-water treatment plants: a
high value for A/4, in the last year of the subsidy programme — 1987. We will come back
to the effectiveness of thermal insulation subsidies in the final section.
7.3.2 The resu/fs /or rented houses ^
This section contains the results for rented houses built before 1976. We estimated the
same model variants as for owner-occupied houses. As before, each of the epidemic
models was able to describe empirically the development of y ,^, the proportion of rented
houses built before 1976 with double glazing and cavity wall insulation in the 1978-92
period (with one exception, the logistic model with constant P, and N, = N for double
glazing). As these results are not telling us much, we will only present the model results
for AA,,.
Model results of the different variants of the logistic model, the Gompertz model and
the Bass model for double glazing are given in Table 7.7. The results are quite good. P
and y are significantly different from zero in all regressions. As for owner-occupants, the
variants with N, = N(l- l /p^,) give the best results, although the results of the Gomp-
ertz model with N, = N are also good. r| is significantly positive in the logistic and
Gompertz models but negative in the Bass model. How should we interpret this? The
evidence is somewhat confusing and points in different directions. The only thing that is
consistent are the good results of the models with constant P, and N, = N(l- l /p^,) . If
we compare the results of this variant with those for owner-occupied houses, we see that
the coefficients of determination for rented houses are higher. The parameter values in
Table 7.7 are also higher than those in Table 7.5. This does not mean that double glazing
in rented houses diffused more rapidly than in owner-occupied houses — on the con-
trary. In 1978, 34.3 per cent of all owner-occupied houses built before 1976 had double
glazing, against 9.5 per cent of rented houses. What the high values for p in the 1978-92
period reflect is that in those years the diffusion of double glazing was faster for rented
houses. Before 1978, the diffusion of double glazing was faster for owner-occupied
houses.
The predictions of the different epidemic models with constant P, and N, = N(l-
1/p^,) for A/4j, for rented houses are given in Figure 7.8.
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Figure 7.8. Model results of the logistic, Gompertz and Bass models with constant p, and
N, = N(l-l/p^,) for the installation of double glazing in rented houses.
Figure 7.8 demonstrates that each model can describe empirically quite well the increase
in the number of rented houses that are thermally insulated: the gradual increase in AA,,
up to 1987, and the gradual decrease after 1987. They cannot explain the sharp decrease
in 1984, 1989 and 1991.
We now turn to the diffusion of cavity wall insulation across the population of renters.
The results of the epidemic models for AAj, for rented houses, presented in Table 7.8, are
more consistent than those for owner-occupied houses: the model variants with N, =
N(l-l/p^,) give good results (high coefficients of determination) whereas the variants
with N, = N do not. t| is not significantly different from zero in all models, y is signifi-
cantly positive at the 5% level in all regressions. The model results for A/l^ , for rented
houses are in Figure 7.9.
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Table 7.8. Estimation results of the logistic, Gompertz and Bass models for the installation of cavity wall
insulation in rented houses, 1978-92.
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Figure 7.9. Model results of the logistic, Gompertz and Bass models with constant B, and
N, = N(l-l/p^,,) for the installation of cavity wall insulation in rented houses.
ifU • ' • J ' - .
Figure 7.9 demonstrates that the model predictions for A/l^ , for rented houses are quite
good, especially those of the Gompertz model. Each model can describe the increase in
Mj, in the first years, the decrease in A/l^ , after 1982 and the zero-growth of /^, since
1988 for rented houses built before 1976. The results of the logistic model with constant
P, and N, = N(l-l/p^,) are better for 1978 and 1979, whereas the results of the Gomp-
ertz and Bass models are better for the 1983-86 period.
What can we conclude from all this? For instance, what do the results tell us about
the importance of information transfer and changes in the costs and benefits of thermal
installation in the time-intensive adoption of double glazing and cavity wall insulation?
And how effective were the subsidy programmes for energy-efficiency home improve-
ments and the information dissemination programmes in influencing household decis-
ions with respect to thermal home insulation? These questions will be addressed in the
final section.
1 9 2 - . - - . . - " ' •-"
7.4 Conclusions
A great deal of houses in the Netherlands were thermally insulated in one way or
another over the past few decades. In this chapter, we tried to explain the increase in the
employment of double glazing and cavity wall insulation in owner-occupied and rented
houses built before 1976. We estimated the threshold model advanced in chapter 5 and
three epidemic models for owner-occupied and rented houses.
As it turned out, it was impossible to explain the increase in the proportion of
owner-occupied and rented houses with thermal insulation during the 1978-92 period
using a rational choice model in which the decision to invest in energy-efficiency home
improvements is understood as an economic cost-benefit decision under uncertainty.
The estimation results of the epidemic models (the logistic, Gompertz and Bass
models) were much better: high coefficients of determination in the regressions for ^
the proportion of (owner-occupied or rented) homes with thermal insulation of type;.
To analyse the impact of the price of natural gas p^ , on the diffusion process we es-
timated each model with p, = p + p"^, and N, = N(l-l/p^,) — with p, a measure for the
diffusion speed and N, the population of prospective adopters at time £. There is eviden-
ce that the price of natural gas influenced household purchasing decisions with respect
to thermal insulation, but the evidence is not conclusive. Although the parameter values
for Y were positive and significantly different form zero, the coefficients of determination
in the regressions with N, = N(l-l/p^,) were not always higher than those with N, = N.
Moreover, in one case (the Bass model for double glazing in rented houses) we obtained
significantly negative values for n, the elasticity of p, with respect to the p^, . In any
case, the relationship between the price of natural gas and the timing of household
energy-efficiency investments seems to be a weak one. Thus, the hypothesis advanced in
chapter 4 that economic variables are likely to exercise an important influence on the
diffusion process of consumer durables is not confirmed (nor rejected) by the analysis.
Furthermore, none of the models was able to explain with any precision year-to-year
changes in the proportion of houses with double glazing and cavity wall insulation
during the period of investigation (1978-92). This means that a number of other factors
not included in the analysis affect the exact timing of thermal insulation decisions.
If we compare the diffusion pattern of double glazing and cavity wall insulation for
owner-occupied houses with those of rented houses, we find that renters were relatively
slow in investing in thermal insulation but that the proportion of rented houses with
thermal insulation in 1992 is not much below that of owner-occupied houses (see Figure
7.1). This is in contradiction with the common argument that the non-ownership of
dwellings by occupants is an important institutional barrier to the uptake of cost-effec-
tive thermal insulation measures. Our results show that this does not hold true for the
Netherlands. The proportion of rented houses with thermal insulation in 1992 is not
much below that of owner-occupied houses, and in the case of cavity wall insulation it is
just as high. This is probably due to the unique situation in the Netherlands in which
about 40 per cent of the total housing stock is owned by non-profit housing corporations
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("woningbouwverenigingen") and local councils." These housing corporations (or
cooperations) and local councils have been very active in persuading people to invest in
thermal insulation: for example, letters and brochures were sent to renters in which the
benefits of thermal home improvements were explained, special meetings were or-
ganised in which people obtained information about thermal insulation, and personal
visits were paid to those people that still refused to have their home thermally in-
sulated." The one-time costs of thermal insulation were not a problem for public rent-
ers either, because this was taken care of through the rent. And finally, the collective
ownership of houses by a housing corporation or local council made it possible to
benefit from economies of scale, so that the costs of thermal insulation measures were
relatively low. This is an example of an institutional factor which facilitates change.
We now come to discuss the effectiveness of investment subsidies for thermal insulation.
In 1978, the Dutch government instituted a large investment subsidy programme for
energy-efficiency improvements of the existing housing stock, the National Insulation
Programme (NIP)." Under this programme, households could receive an investment
subsidy for thermal home improvements such as double glazing, cavity wall insulation,
roof insulation and, later, floor insulation. The subsidies amounted to 30 per cent of total
investment costs, with differing per centages during the programme and between in-
sulation measures. The programme was eliminated on January 1, 1988, primarily for
budgetary reasons. For owner-occupants, the programme had already ended in 1983. The
total costs of the NIP programme and its predecessor, the BGSWI, amounted to Dfl 2
billion (1.75 for the NIP and 0.25 for the BGWSI). Of this Dfl 2 billion, 1.8 billion was
spent on investment subsidies (approximately 1 billion U.S dollars at the 1994 exchange
rate). It is interesting to analyse the effectiveness of these investment subsidies in in-
ducing households to invest in thermal insulation; to analyse whether statistically a
positive relationship can be found between the subsidy programmes and the diffusion of
thermal insulation. Strangely enough, this has not been attempted up until now, despite
the large amount of money involved in the programme. The Dutch government did
commission an evaluation of the programme in 1988 but in this evaluation study the
number 0/ grants was taken as a measure for the success of the programme." No at-
" In the Netherlands, the share of rented houses in 1992 was 50 per cent. About three-quarter of
rented houses were owned by "woningbouwverenigingen" and local councils, so that the share of
"publicly" rented houses is about 40 percent of all houses.
'* Algemene Energie Advies Raad, 1990, Het woord aan de praktijk, jaaradvies 1990, Den Haag,
p.8.
" A predecessor of the NIP was the BGSWI, the "Beschikking Geldelijke Steun Warmte Isolatie",
which started in 1974.
" Stuurgroep Nationaal Isolatie Programma, 1988, Evaluatie 10 jaar nationaal isolatie programma
(Evaluation of ten year National Insulation Programme), Rotterdam.
i
tempt was made to assess the effectiveness of the programme in influencing household
decisions with respect to thermal insulation. /)•>-:;-> v./?;i? Jcnijfo IS'JQI ia;;
The way in which we analyzed the effectiveness of the subsidy programme is by
estimating equations (8) - (10) with a dummy variable and an i.i.d. error term around
zero added to the right-hand side. The dummy variable is the investment subsidy for
thermal insulation s^ , — where s^ , is 0.33 if the investment subsidy is 33 per cent and zero
for those years in which no subsidy was available for thermal home improvements.
Included in the analysis are also the subsidies for thermal improvements of the existing
housing stock under the SES programme (Subsidieregeling Energiebesparing en Stro-
mingsenergie) of 1991 and the SEBG programme (Subsidieregeling energiebesparing
bestaande gebouwen) of 1992. The logistic model changes in:
V - ^ > AA = B, A ( ' - A . , ) + 9^. + &. (11)
and the Gompertz model in: ><K* •*••'•''
AA, = B,,A,(ln(N,,)-ln(H,,.,)) * 9s , - e., (12)
<rc; '^t • ",;j- .:; with 9y a measure for the effectiveness of the subsidy.,% ..J^T
The results of the logistic and Gompertz model with constant B,, and N,, =
for double glazing are reported in Table 7.9. It shows that 9,, the coefficient of the
effectiveness of the investment subsidy for double glazing, is positive for owner-oc-
cupants, but that the values are significantly different from zero at the 5% significance
level. For renters, the value for 6, is negative (but not signficantly negative) for the
Gompertz model. The lower coefficients of determination (adjusted R* values) for the
regressions with s^ , provide further evidence that the subsidies were not an important
factor in people's investment decisions. Other specifications gave similar results. On the
whole, the evidence is quite strong that the subsidies for double glazing were not a
significant factor, that they only had a small effect — if at all — on households' thermal
insulation decisions.
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Table 7.9. The effectiveness of investment subsidies for double glazing.
We also analyzed the effectiveness of the subsidies for cavity wall insulation. The results
of the statistical analysis for cavity wall insulation are in Table 7.10. Again, we find that
the investment subsidies for thermal insulation had a (small) positive impact on the
investment decisions of owner-occupants (all estimates for 9, are positive), but that this
impact is not significant at the 5% significance level. Of all the models that we estimated
there was only one case in which 8j was significantly positive, the logistic regression
with Nj, = Nj but this result is likely to be the result of spurious regression: the coef-
ficient of determinations in the logistic model with constant N, were so low (below 0.07)
that almost any variable would show up as a significant factor. The parameter values for
62 for rented houses are even negative, with high standard errors. Comparison of Table
7.10 with Table 7.9 further shows that the parameter values for 0j in Table 7.10 for
owner-occupied houses are higher (with smaller standard errors) than those for 6, in
Table 7.9, which suggests that the effectiveness of investment subsidies was higher for
cavity wall insulation than it was for double glazing.
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Table 7.10. The effectiveness of investment subsidies for cavity wall insulation.
How reliable are the above results? Due to the fact that most of the estimates are not
significantly different from zero, we cannot attach much value to these estimates. When
we compare the results, however, with the findings of a recent study about the effec-
tiveness of the SES subsidy programme of 1991, they appear to be quite reasonable. In
the evaluation study by the NEI of the SES programme, applicants of the programme
were asked about the primary reason for investing in thermal insulation.'* The results
are in Table 7.11.
According to Table 7.11, the subsidy programme for thermal insulation was the
primary cause for investing in thermal insulation for only 11 per cent of the applicants.
Lower energy costs and personal comfort were far and away the most important causes
for investing in energy-efficiency home improvements. That personal comfort is an
important factor is something that emerged from our statistical analysis in section 2. The
figure of 11 per cent corresponds more or less with our own results: a weak positive
influence of the investment subsidies on households' thermal insulation decisions.
" L. Beumer, E.C. van der Giessen, R. Olieman and G.R. Otten, 1993, Evaluatie van de isolatiere-
geling (SES 1991) en de ketelregeling (SNEV), NEI, Rotterdam.
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lower energy costs 39%
personal comfort 32%
environmental responsibility 6%
subsidies 11%
safeguard against future increases in energy prices 4%
renovation 3%
Table 7.11. Primary motivation for investing in thermal home insulation of odiwii
applicants of the SES subsidy programme. Source: Beumer ef a/. (1993, p.42). . ,
The low effectiveness of the subsidies does not correspond with the results of the statisti-
cal analysis in the same NEI study which reports an effectiveness of the subsidy for
double glazing of 11 per cent, an effectiveness of the subsidy for cavity wall insulation of
50 per cent, and for roof and floor insulation an effectiveness of even 80 per cent."
To compare our own results with those of the NEI-study we calculated the relative
contribution of the investment subsidy to the increase in proportion of houses with
thermal insulation. We multiplied the average subsidy Sy with the average value for fy
and divided this by the average increase in the proportion of (owner-occupied or rented)
houses during the years of the subsidy programmes. What we found was, for owner-
occupied houses, a relative contribution of the subsidy for double glazing to the increase
" The reason why the researchers find such a high effectiveness becomes clear if we look at the
way in which the effectiveness of the SES subsidy programme is determined. The researchers es-
timated the proportion of houses with double glazing, cavity wall insulation, roof insulation and
floor insulation in 1991 on the basis of historical data about the proportion of houses with thermal
insulation. To calculate the proportion of houses with thermal insulation in 1991 without the SES
subsidy programme, they used the following specification: A^ , = b,/ ' where f = 1981..1991 and 60 and
(>i parameters. The predicted value for Ay in 1991 was then compared with the real value for Ay in
1991, and the difference between the two was taken as a measure of the effectiveness of the subsidy
scheme. But instead of using the real value for A, in 1991, they used the average of A^  in 1991 and
1992 for owner-occupied houses, and for rented houses even the value for A, in 1992. The reason for
doing so was to take into account a delay in the actual installation. Furthermore, when the difference
between the predicted value for Ay in 1991 and the 'real' value for A, in 1991 was negative, they
assumed that the difference between the estimated and 'real' A, was zero. It is not surprising that the
subsidies came out up as highly effective. The results are upwardly biased in three possible ways: (i)
by using the above specification for Ay, (which is a concave function for fc, < 1) instead of a sigmoid
curve, (ii) by using the 1992 value for the proportion of rented houses with thermal insulation in 1991
(and the average of 1991 and 1992 for owner-occupants), and (iii) by neglecting the negative differen-
ces between the predicted value for Ay in 1991 and the 'real' value of Ay in 1991.
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in /4, of 8.4 per cent and a relative contribution of the subsidy for cavity wall insulation
to AJ4J of 24.9 per cent. These estimates correspond quite well with the estimate of 11 per
cent reported in Table 7.11. For renters we did not find a positive contribution of the
subsidy programmes to A/4, and A^. The estimates of the relative contribution of the
subsidies should be viewed with caution, however, as they are based on insignificant
parameter values.
All this leads to the conclusion that the subsidy programmes for thermal insulation
only had a limited impact on households' thermal insulation decisions. What the pro-
grammes did, for the most part, was to provide receivers with a 'windfall gain'.
What about the effectiveness of the information about the benefits of thermal in-
sulation supplied by government authorities? Can we draw any conclusions with respect
to this? Unfortunately not. It is not possible to assess statistically the influence of infor-
mation dissemination by public authorities. This is because information is supplied by
public authorities in various forms through various media (television, brochures, etc.),
the effectiveness of which is likely to differ. We also do not have figures about public
expenditures on information dissemination — which could be used as proxy for /S,
information supply. In addition, it is not clear how exactly (mathematically speaking)
information supply reduces uncertainty and influences people's attitudes and preferen-
ces. We do feel however that the information provided by housing councils was an
important factor in the thermal insulation of rented houses. Without the efforts of these
councils, the proportion of rented houses with thermal insulation probably would have
been much lower. V?.-5 X':'"?f-^ ' - ^ "• "'•^ ••••- :^™
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Appendix 7.A: A threshold diffusion model with differing ren-
tability requirements
In the model of section 1, a household invests in thermal insulation measures when the reser-
vation price of the thermal insulation technology (double glazing or cavity wall insulation)
exceeds the costs of adoption. In the model, all households are identical with respect to the
rentability requirements of the investment (the expected profitability, however, differs between
households). This appendix advances a model in which the rentability requirements for thermal
insulation investments differ among households. In the model, only those households for which
the expected rentability, /*,, exceeds the demanded or required rentability, r*, will be adopters. *
The expected rentability of an investment in thermal insulation can be solved from the following
equation: , - . i . | ...,:...•>-.,.•; ...,..,...-.;,.--.,,,,..,,•- ;
JL ERp , + K . "*
with r*, the expected rentability of a thermal insulation investment at time < and / the economic
life time of the technology (we have dropped index ; = 1,2 for simplicity).
If we assume that the expected price of natural gas is constant over the entire life time of the
technology and K,^  = £„ the above equation can be rewritten as follows:
• « ? •
s,
Of course, this is really an awkward expression. However, for large enough (1 + r*,)' (which is
when / is large and /*, is high), the above equation changes in something more comfortable:
From this equation we can derive a distribution for r*,, the expected rate of return of a thermal
insulation investment (which includes a mark up for any utility-enhancing effects). For instance,
if £R and K, are normally distibuted and independent, then /*, is distributed according to a
norma/ distribution:
c,
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If we furthermore assume that the demanded rate of return is distributed according to a normal
distribution with mean p,- and variance cr^,, then the proportion of the population that will
be adopters of the thermal insulation technology at time < is:
u « - u ,
r/) =
The higher r*, and the lower f*, the higher will be .A,, the proportion of houses with thermal
insulation. Note that we have two parameters we did not have in the original model: p « and
Reduction of uncertainty can be brought into the model by making / , the required rate of return,
a function of p (for instance, r**, = r* + p, with dp, / df < 0) and different expectations with respect
to the price of natural gas could be introduced in the model by assuming a distribution for p^m
(k = 1,2...). A disadvantage of the r* model is that we must estimate two more parameters.
Appendix 7.B: Description of the data \ ;
price o / natural gas ' " - • ,«on,;!i.- ^ - v i . , = :.,«-< •• %VJIO
The price of natural gas is the price for households per itr* according to EnergieNed. This price
includes value added taxes and environmental taxes. The development of p ^ , is given in the
figure below.
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Unfortunately, we did not have detailed information about the costs of thermal insulation
technologies during the 1978-92 period. Information on the costs of double glazing and cavity
wall insulation was available only for the years 1976, 1979, 1984 and 1992. The costs of double
glazing and cavity wall insulation for the other years are calculated through linear intrapolation
of the costs in 1976, 1979, 1984 and 1992. The below figure gives the costs in Dfl per m* of
insulation area for 1976, 1979, 1984 and 1992, based on NEI (1977), NWR (1979), SBR (1985) and
CEA (1993). ,JT
':';.<.'tins
•• . f t
1976 1979 1984 1992
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imputed annwfl/ renta/ rafe
The imputed annual rental rate, fy,, is calculated on the basis of the nominal interest rates for
private loans from the annual reports of De Nederlandse Bank and service lives of 15 years for
double glazing and 25 years for cavity wall insulation.
energy saain^s /rom tfierma/ insu/affon
The average energy savings in m' of natural gas per m* of insulation area are simply the geo-
metric mean of energy savings reported in the studies, referred to earlier. For double glazing,
this is 22.83 and for cavity wall insulation 9.38. Standard deviations of the energy savings (5.8
and 1.3 for double glazing and cavity wall insulation) are taken from Meyer (1981).
nouse/io/rf income
For household income we used the average disposable household income (in current prices)
reported in the Sociaal-Economische Maandstatistiek (CBS).
number o / tfiermaffy inswZated /IOMSCS
The proportion of owner-occupied and rented houses with double glazing and cavity wall
insulation built before 1976, /I,,, are based on the NIPO study "onderzoek warmte-isolatie van
woningen". This study started in 1981 and is based on a (varying) sample of households in the
Netherlands. A problem with the NIPO data was that there was a trend break in 1985. To deal
with this problem, we corrected the 1981-85 figures on the basis of information from another
survey of the proportion of houses with thermal insulation, the "basisonderzoek aardgas klein-
verbruik" (BAK). The way in which we have done this is by dividing the NIPO data in the 1981-
85 period by the average quotient of the NIPO and BAK data in this period.
The proportion of owner-occupied and rented houses with double glazing and cavity wall
insulation in the 1977-81 period had to be estimated. The estimates for 1977 are based on the
1977 BAK survey. The proportion of owner-occupied and rented houses with double glazing and
cavity wall insulation in the 1978-80 period were estimated on the basis of the annual number of
insulation grants and the difference between A^ , in 1981 and 1977. The way in which we have
done this is as follows. First, we calculated the difference between ^ in 1981 and 1977 for ;' =
1,2. Then we divided the total increase in A,, in the 1977-91 period over the intervening years
according to the number of insulation grants for owner-occupants and renters in each year. A
disadvantage of this method is that it does not account for possible changes in the application
behaviour of households for subsidies. Thus, an implicit assumption is that the proportion of
households that applied for a grant (say 75% of the households that invest in thermal insulation)
was constant during the 1978-80 period.
Three Case Studies of Cleaner Technologies
This chapter analyzes the development and adoption of environmentally beneficial
technologies from an empirical point of view in three case studies:'
• CFC substitutes
• Low-solvent paints and coatings
• Membrane filtration in the Metal-Plating industry
The case studies examine the technological impact of environmental policies. The chapter
is divided in three sections. Section 1 identifies and discusses determinants of supply
and demand of cleaner technologies. Section 2 uses the determinants as a framework to
discuss findings from the three case studies. The final section gives the conclusions.
8.1 The Decision to Develop and Adopt a Cleaner Technology
This section identifies and discusses the factors that influence the decision to develop
and adopt an innovation in cleaner technology. To this end, we make use of the econ-
omic literature on technological change and the available literature on cleaner technolo-
gies.
8.1.1 Deue/opmeMf o / C/eaner TiecJmo/ogy
In the economic literature, the decision to develop and supply a technological innovation
is seen as an economic decision, in which the costs of developing a technological innova-
tion are compared with the benefits from selling the innovation. The innovator benefits
are a function of the size of the market and the ability of the innovator to reap the
benefits from using the innovation. Below, we will analyze how the decision to develop
a (environmentally beneficial) technological innovation depends on technological oppor-
tunities, market demand and the appropriability conditions.
' This chapter is largely based on a research project with the Institute of Environmental Affairs
(TVM) for the Dutch ministries of the Environment and Economic Affairs. Earlier results have been
published in EnDironmenta/ and Resource Economics and the book Economic Incentives and Enuironmenta/
Po/icies, edited by J.B. Opschoor and R.K. Turner (Kluwer, 1994).
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Opportunities
The technological opportunities to develop a particular technology for a certain environ-
mental problem differ for each problem, industry and firm. They are closely related to
the existing pool of knowledge — that is the whole of fundamental scientific knowledge
and the knowledge that is embodied in machines, human beings and organizations. Such
knowledge is not immediately available or free of charge. Research effort and money are
needed to draw on these technological opportunities, and there is always the risk that a
project will fail, either technically or commercially.
The technological capabilities to develop an innovation also differ among firms.
These capabilities are related to the size and nature of the organization's knowledge
base, which is shaped by its past activities. In actual practice, innovations are developed
by certain firms, both within and outside the user sector. Process innovations are usually
developed by special suppliers. Only the more knowledge-intensive sectors, such as the
chemical and the advanced electrotechnical industries, have the capabilities to develop
cleaner production processes, either independently or with the help of special suppliers.
Product innovations are usually developed by the manufacturers of the products.
The willingness to innovate depends on the size of the anticipated market for an inno-
vation. As a rule, the development of a new, cleaner technology for a firm's own own
use is not profitable. The demand for cleaner production processes depends on the
opportunities and willingness of polluting companies to purchase cleaner techniques and
to incorporate these in their production process. The demand for cleaner production pro-
cesses is realised mainly through environmental regulation, since cleaner production
generally does not contribute to the sales of products but only increases costs.* The
demand for cleaner consumer products occurs more easily through the market without
government intervention and is a stimulus for firms to develop these products.
Although environmental policy has become stricter, many firms that supply cleaner
technologies face insecure sales, due to the unchallenging character of regulatory stan-
dards and uncertainty about environmental regulations. On the other hand it is clear that
strongly emerging environmental awareness in general, increasing societal pressure, and
anticipated stricter environmental policies enlarge the sales outlook for cleaner processes
and products. In addition, firms that have developed cleaner techniques can try to
influence policy makers to prescribe their technology to polluters or to tighten environ-
mental regulation.
* Environment-saving technologies do not always raise costs. The literature contains numerous
examples of cleaner techniques that lead to cost reductions (D. Huisingh, L. Martin, H. Hilger and N.
Seldman, 1986, Proven Profits from Pollution Prevention, Institute for Local Selfreliance, Washington
D.C.). Profitable environment-saving techniques include, especially, recycling systems, energy con-
servation, and all kinds of improvements relating to "good housekeeping". This has inspired some
governments to Pollution-Prevention-Pays Programs — for example, the PRISMA project in The
Netherlands.
Case studies 0/ deaner tecfeno/ogies 205
If a firm is to engage in R&D and to develop an innovation, it must be able to appropri-
ate some of the benefits from using the innovation. Imitations by competitors undermine
this. The danger of imitation is generally high because the knowledge which is
embodied in a new technology becomes available, at least in part, to others when this
technology is introduced into the market; knowledge which usually can be reproduced
or used at much lower development costs. The benefits from the innovation may also be
reaped by non-competitors like suppliers and distributers that may command a high
price for their products or services. Thus, the decision to develop an innovation depends
on the appropriability conditions, i.e. the means of capturing and protecting the compet-
itive advantages of new and improved products or processes.^
Richard Levin (1986) distinguishes the following appropriability conditions: i)
patents, as a means to protect from imitation and as a means to receive royalties, ii)
secrecy, iii) the technical lead on competitors, iv) learning curve effects, and v) the extent
to which a strong market position can be built up through reputation or the set-up of
distribution channels.'' Dosi (1988a) adds scale economies to these factors.' Appropria-
bility conditions differ according to the type of innovation. Research by Levin and others
showed that technical lead and learning effects, along with additional marketing efforts,
are the most important appropriability mechanisms for product innovations, whereas
learning curve effects, secrecy and technical lead are most important for process innova-
tions. Patents are additional appropriability conditions in most cases. They are important
in some industries, such as the chemical industry and mechanical equipment industries,
as well as for smaller companies.
To our knowledge, no specific research into the appropriability conditions of
environment-saving technological innovations has been carried out. When the appro-
priability conditions for certain types of cleaner technologies are inadequate, this may be
reason for government to lengthen patent life, to conduct or finance research itself, or to
stimulate cooperation between companies. ; < >> .• w.-s.i . :>., / , ; 'v"w
8.1.2 Adoption 0 / C/ea«er Tec/ino/ogy
We now turn to the determinants of the decision to adopt a technological innovation. As
indicated, government policy is an important factor; coercion in the form of environ-
mental standards is often necessary for cost-increasing pollution control technologies to
be adopted. However, government policy is not the only factor. There are usually many
' Richard C. Levin, 1986, A New Look at the Patent System, American Economic ROTOT AEA
papers and proceedings, 76: 199-202.
* /bid.
fjf*sfi
* Dosi, Giovanni, 1988a, The Nature of the Innovation Process, in Giovanni Dosi, Chris Freeman,
Richard Nelson, Gerald Silverberg and Luc Soete (eds.), Tec/mica/ C/iange and Economic 77ifory, Lond-
on: Pinter Publishers, 221-238.
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technical solutions to deal with an environmental problem and comply with regulations.
Which solution will be chosen by individual firms and consumers depends on the price
and performance characteristics of the different options, on user knowledge about
product characteristics, and on the risk and uncertainty as to the economic consequences
of the employment of a new technology. Thus, to understand whether or not (and at
what time) a potential adopter will purchase the innovation, we must look at the price
and quality of the innovation, the valuation of service characteristics by potential
adopters, information distortions and risk and uncertainty as possible barriers to the
uptake of a new technology. As explained in chapter 4, the diffusion process is governed
by changes in the above factors, together with changes in the adopter environment.
Below, the three identified factors on adopter purchasing decisions are examined in
more detail.
Price a«d Qua/zry
The price and quality (meaning the service characteristics) of the innovation determine to
a large extent its costs and benefits, and, accordingly, its attractiveness for a potential
user. These costs and benefits may involve different elements (e.g., the costs of purchas-
ing the technology, implementation costs, financial costs, operating costs, and benefits
such as improvement of the firm's public image and consumer satisfaction). The willing-
ness to adopt cleaner techniques depends on the extent to which they increase costs and
decrease profits. With respect to these costs and benefits, firms and consumers are
considered separately.
For firms, the cost consequences of adopting cleaner technologies differ considera-
bly. They depend not only on the purchasing price of the technology but also on the
size, nature and age of the production process. Smaller firms often experience relatively
high pollution control costs as a result of scale disadvantages. On the other hand, the
environmental aspects of production and products play an increasingly important part in
decision-making. A bad environmental reputation may have a negative effect on the
company's sales and may lead to personnel problems (such as problems of motivation or
difficulties in hiring people). However, such stimuli are still rather weak. ;<-K
For consumers, the purchase of a cleaner product may also be hindered by price
and quality characteristics. An environmentally hazardous product may be superior to
its cleaner alternative in a number of respects. There is also opportunity for "free-rider"
behaviour of individual consumers, who may decide to benefit from changes in pur-
chases and behaviour of others, rather than making these changes themselves. On the
other hand, consumer willingness to buy cleaner products is growing.
Know/edge and /n/onnatfon
For the adoption of new technologies, transfers of knowledge and information are
necessary. There are numerous problems relating to knowledge and information that
hinder the adoption of cleaner technology. Apart from being unaware of the ecological
damage resulting from their business activities, firms often do not know which cleaner
technologies are available, or where to go to for information about the technologies, or
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about the kinds of technical and financial support available. Small firms in particular
face these problems. In addition, firms often feel the need for independent advice from
external sources. > - * • - . • - . •;;• -•;•-•-Nfi* » ? f 2 *;• 4 ;i,v-
The transfer of knowledge and information may be realised in several ways
through direct contacts with suppliers, demonstration projects, professional journals,
informal contacts, data banks, congresses and trade fairs, or special intermediaries such
a s c o n s u l t i n g f i r m s , ,v ?•- . . : •> . . , . , - • 1 ' 4 • . • ^ • • ; • • *
Buyers of environment-friendly products also face problems relating to knowledge
and information. Consumers have little knowledge of the environmental effects of their
consumption and behaviour. Furthermore, it is almost impossible for consumers to
compare the environmental aspects of products, even if product information is given.
Risfc and l/ncertamfy •. • .' • ' - . , . • - . •
Many firms do not apply cleaner techniques because of the uncertainty and associated
technical and economic risks. The adoption of a certain technique may require change in
the production routines and the organization of work (new functions, jobs, rewards, etc.)
and may meet with both managerial and worker resistance. Moreover, personnel must
gain knowledge of and experience with new machines. Process-integrated techniques
that lead to radical changes in the production process, particularly involve much risk
and uncertainty.' Firms differ in their risk attitudes and in their perceptions of technical
and economic risks.
8.2 Empirical Results from three Case Studies
In this section we use the determinants identified in section 1 to discuss development
and adoption of three environmentally beneficial technologies. The technologies are CFC
substitutes, low-solvent paints and coatings, and membrane technology in the metal-
plating industry. The results are based on the research project "Instrumenten voor de
stimulering van milieutechnologie" (Instruments to stimulate clean technology) with the
Institute for Environmental Studies (IVM). Although the study focusses on the Nether-
lands, the results are believed to apply to other Western countries as well. The research
involved an extensive literature survey of the technologies as well as interviews with
suppliers and (potential) adopters of the innovation/ Although the followed approach
provided much qualitative information about the factors influencing the innovation and
adoption of these technologies, it was not possible to assess the importance of the indi-
: • * • • - . • • ! ; • . • - - • «••,. .
' H a r t j e a n d L u r i e , 1 9 8 4 , o p rif. - . ; • / • ; • • • > ; ' > , • • = . ' . - < : < . • • .>:•;<, \ n > s - v " " = • / -;-^ i - , -» - . - , - •.,-• - *••">" "4
' A more detailed description of the case studies is in Ren6 Kemp, Xander Olsthoorn, Frans
Oosterhuis and Harmen Verbruggen, 1991, Instrumenten voor de stimulering van milieutechnologie
(Policy Instruments to Stimulate Cleaner Technology), Mi/ieutec/motogie, 1991/5. VROM, Leidschen-
d a m . •,-•;';, v ; - 5 r , ; : ' . - f ; ^ ' ' ' • „ ; • . . • ; " • • v - - - j & f * ? i ' * > • * • ""-'" ' • ' ' < - - ' • ••' •<•• •'"' • " ' • » • ' ' ' " •'-•'.''•
vswsftb Chapter 8
vidual factors in a quantitative way. Despite this, the adopted perspective proved to be
useful. Some conclusions with respect to the technological impact of government policies
can be drawn from the case studies.
S.2.1 CFC substitutes
Chlorofluorocarbons, abbreviated to CFCs, have been applied in a broad range of prod-
ucts ever since their invention in the 1930s. Originally developed as coolants, they have
also been used on a large scale as aerosol propellants, foam blowers, sometimes also as
insulators, and as solvents in a range of cleaning applications in the metal and
electrotechnical industries. An overview of the most important uses of CFCs and halons
is in Table 8.1.
Type Chemical formula Application
CFC-11 CCljF „ , Aerosols, foams
CFC-12 CCljFj Refrigerators, air conditioning, foams
CFC-113 CCIF2CCI2F, Degreasing and chemical cleaning
Halon 1301 CFjBr >- S i Fire extinguishers (stationary) ii>
Halon 1211 CF^BrCl Fire extinguishers (mobile)
Table 8.1. The most important CFCs and halons and their use. Source: Voider and
Vis (1990).*
Important properties of CFCs are their low toxicity and high level of stability (they are,
for instance, non-flammable). However, as a result of this stability, CFCs can reach the
ozone layer once they have entered the atmosphere. There they destroy the ozone which
protects the earth from ultraviolet rays. CFCs also contribute to global warming.
The suspection that CFCs destroy the ozone layer at high altitudes was first formu-
lated by Rowland and Molina in their 1974-article in Nature. This article was the cause
for world-wide concern and led to the ban in the United States in 1978 of the use of
CFCs in aerosol sprays. The increasing scientific evidence of the ozone-depleting effects
< * Voider and Vis, 1990, Produktie, verbruik en emissies van CFKs in Nederland (Production, use
and emissions of CFCs in the Netherlands), Den Haag.
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of CFCs and halons also led to an international agreement to limit CFC-emissions in
1987 in Montreal. The Montreal Protocol compelled a reduction of the production and
use of CFCs of 20% in 1994 and 50% in 1998, measured against 1986 levels. This protocol
was amended in June 1990 in London. In the London Protocol, countries agreed to end
the production and use of all fully halogenated hydrocarbons, including three halons
and carbon tetracloride (an organic solvent), by the year 2000 (the use of methyl cloro-
form, another organic solvent, had to be stopped by 2005). The signatories further
promised to stop using HCFCs (newly created CFCs with a lower ozone-depleting
potential) before 2040, and preferably before 2020.
It is expected that about one-third of the current CFC market will disappear as a
result of the transition to non-CFC technologies, such as the wider use of ammonia as
coolant or greater use of carbon dioxide instead of halons in fire extinguishers.' For
other CFC applications a shift to "CFC-likes" will take place. These consist of hydrocloro-
fluorocarbons (HCFCs), so-called 'soft' CFCs having a low ozone-depletion potential,
and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), which do not contain chlorine or bromine and therefore
do not affect the ozone layer. The use of CFC-likes is expected to replace one-third of
current CFC-use. Another reduction of one-third will be achieved through a more careful
use of these substances, so that unnecessary loss is avoided.
A transition away from CFCs is currently taking place. In Europe, the amount of
CFCs in use in 1991 was half of that in the 1986. In 1991, CFC use for aerosols was 11%
of the 1986-level. Table 8.2 demonstrates that CFC use in the EC decreases in all but one
area, refrigeration where it increased with 4%.
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Aerosols
Refrigeration
Foams "'' '•'
Solvents and
Miscellaneous
100
100
100
100
100
102
112
104
80
103
120
11
35
108
111
100
15
100
97
90
11
104
87
76
».;.- ." ' i j j j,
Total 100 104 98 73 58 51
Table 8.2. CFCs in use in EC countries (1986=100). Source: Financial Times, 2-9- '""'
1992, based on EFCTC report to the EC commission.
UNEP, 1989, Tec/mica/ Progress on Protecting /fee Ozone Layer.
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8.2.1.1 Factors m/ZMewcmg rfie deue/opmenf o/ CFC SMbsrirwfes
Worldwide there are some twenty CFC manufacturers, six of which account for the bulk
of the CFC production. These are large chemical concerns, part of the 'science-based'
sector, which has ample technological opportunities to develop new substances and
products. These companies have mainly focussed their attention on the soft CFCs,
continuing in the CFC trajectory so that they can benefit from the knowledge and invest-
ments made in that trajectory.
The possibilities to limit (H)CFC emissions are both in the hands of manufac-
turers and users of (H)CFC-containing products. The prevention of unnecessary losses of
(H)CFCs is a matter of good housekeeping combined with the application of relatively
simple equipment, such as that used to recover CFCs from cast-off refrigerators. Alterna-
tive product design is another possibility. Alternatives to the CFC family may be devel-
oped by various firms, including those outside the chemical industry (e.g. the use of
rock wool or natural materials as an insulator instead of polyurethane foam and the
replacement of propellant-driven aerosols by pump-driven aerosols).
Market demand for CFC substitutes is guaranteed by the future ban on CFCs.
However, in the short term, market demand for CFC substitutes may be weak, especially
for some applications. Except for aerosol propellants 'autonomous' market demand is
not strong enough to establish a serious substitution of CFCs. In most applications, CFCs
are 'ideal' substances. Substitutes that perform as well as CFCs a lower price, are mostly
inflammable, toxic and/or strongly reactive. Following is a brief exploration of the
market demand for aerosols, refrigerators and cooling systems, foam, and cleansing and
d e g r e a s i n g a g e n t s . •.-.•........-_.,.... :. --•:,;. _ . - , ^ ^ : . • . , - . . ^ s i t ! . - ^ • • - ;.
The buyers of aerosols have played an important role in the transition towards
CFC-free aerosols. Consumers indentify CFC aerosols as products that are harmful to the
ozone-layer. They have come to be regarded as 'contaminated' products. In response to
this, large retailers decided to discontinue selling CFC aerosols. In this case, relatively
cheap alternatives in the form of pump-driven aerosols were available.
Little initiative to replace CFCs is expected from the market for professional
cooling systems. However, HCFC-22, a 'soff CFC, is increasingly used nowadays in
larger equipment because of technical-economic reasons. In the case of domestic refrige-
rators, many solutions are investigated. It is difficult to tell which solution will achieve
dominance. The most promising solutions are seen to be HFC-134a and a mix of propane
and butane (LPG). The big refrigerator manufacturers opt for HFC-134a, but this com-
pound is rejected by environmentalist groups for being a greenhouse gas. They favour
the use of (flammable) propane and butane as a refrigerator coolant. Interestingly, the
German branch of Greenpeace supported the development of a propane-cooled refrigera-
tor. They found an East-German firm willing to produce such a refrigerator. Marketing
and distribution of the "greencooler" was taken care of through Greenpeace magazine.
The success of the greencooler (already 80.000 people subscribed to the purchase of this
refrigerator) forced the refrigerator manufacturers to rethink their strategies; firms like
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Siemens, Bosch and Liebherr recently announced to produce a LPG-based refrigerator.'"
Up until now, the transition to CFC-free refrigerators takes place very slowly, mainly
because costs of these refrigerators are still well above the traditional ones.
Market demand for CFC substitutes in the foam industry, the biggest user of
CFCs, depends strongly on government policy. In this sector, CFCs are used for the
production of insulation material, which accounts for approximately two-thirds of CFC
use. Insulation of buildings and houses helps save energy and prevents pollution, so
there may be a trade-off between different environmental goals. However, alternatives to
foam are available; rock wool is an example. To reduce the release of CFCs in the pro-
duction of soft foams, several firms in the Netherlands have invested in CFC recycling
technologies. This is only a temporary solution (about 60% of the CFCs are still released
into the air). In the future, soft foam firms are not allowed to use CFCs.
The demand for CFC-substirutes as cleansing or degreasing agents is growing.
Good and relatively cheap alternatives (such as water and soap) are available, and the
demand for these may increase in such firms as knowledge of their cost advantages
increases. It turned out that industry had been using a cleaning agent that was non-
optimal from also an economic point of view. The adoption of CFC substitutes some-
times requires certain institutional changes, however. The use of CFC solvents that are
used to clean components of high-tech equipment is often prescribed by the customers.
A well-known example is found in the specifications of defence ministries.
With respect to the appropriability conditions, much knowledge about CFC-like
alternatives is concentrated in the larger CFC manufacturers. They have acquired a
technical lead which obstructs market entry by other firms. In addition, the production
of HCFCs and HFCs calls for large investments," and economies of scale play an im-
portant role in the production of these subsitutes, as Figure 8.1 demonstrates.
• # > • - -
«u
'° Karel Knip, 1993, Groene koelkast (Green Refrigerator), NRC HanddsMad, March 4,1993, p.22.
" Du Pont estimates the costs of retooling at more than 2,000 million guilders (Michel Jehae,
Bescherming ozonlaag kan tot trendbreuk leiden (Protection of ozone layer may lead to a new trend),
Mem* Beta, sept 1991, p.13.
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Figure 8.1. Scale economies in the production of H(C)FCs.
Source: Du Pont de Nemours.
Patents are of minor importance as means to appropriate returns from R&D; the sub-
stances as such cannot be patented, but sometimes the different components of the
production processes can.
8.2.1.2 Factors tnt/lMenctng t/ic adopfion o/ CFC
This section considers the factors that influence the decision to adopt CFC subsitutes.
With respect to these factors, the price and quality of CFC substitutes do not so much
influence the substitution of alternatives to CFCs, because substitution is inevitable. They
do influence the direction toward which firms look for substitutes and the rapidity of the
transition process. Due to their complex production process, it is estimated that HCFCs
and HFCs will become two to five times as expensive as CFCs (HCFC-22 used in the
cooling industry will probably cost two times as much to produce as CFC-12 and HFC-
134a five times as much as CFC-11). The costs of a substitute technology are not, howe-
ver, exclusively determined by the price of the substance concerned, but also by the
amount needed and the cost of equipment in which it is used. In the cooling sector, the
price/quality ratio is likely to favour H(C)FCs, whereas in the other areas of application,
serious competitors will also be found outside the CFC trajectory.
For large users of CFCs, problems of knowledge and information about available
alternatives are relatively few. These users are also involved in the CFC manufacturers'
development and testing of CFC-replacing technology. Furthermore, in the Netherlands,
sector-specific organizations play a significant part in the transfer of knowledge and
information about alternative technologies, through their involvement in the establish-
ment of demonstration projects, admission rules, and so forth. Lack of information
usually occurs in smaller firms, but they use CFCs mainly as a solvent for cleaning
purposes. For these applications, relatively cheap alternatives are available. Consumers
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also have inadequate knowledge. But even if consumers have a good understanding of
environmental aspects, their willingness to buy environmentally benign products, like
CFC-free refrigerators, may be small.
Although technical and economic uncertainty and risks are inherent in the shift
to CFC substitutes in the various application areas, these are 'normal' business risks that
result from the shift to a new technology. Users tend to reduce the technical risk by
making use of drop-ins — substitutes that can be used in existing installations with little
adaptations — as much as possible. This is favourable for H(C)FCs. The economic risks
for national industries which use CFCs are limited because all CFC users, including
those abroad, are faced with the need to switch to substitutes, so that competitive disad-
vantages in the international market will not occur.
At the end of this section, we look back at the technological impact of govern-
ment policy. As we noted, the dominant policy instrument relating to the CFC problems
is direct regulation in its most extensive form: a future, general ban on its production
and use.'* This general ban can be considered as a form of technology-forcing standard.
The above suggests that this will be a strong enough incentive for CFC-substituting
innovations and their diffusion. The regulation of CFC use is even unique in one respect:
the regulations have been tightened several times instead of being softened, to give
industry more time to comply with regulations.
The role of economic instruments and information and communication is com-
plementary in nature. They are used to accelerate and/or facilitate the transition to CFC
substitutes. In the United States, for example, rights are allocated for CFC production
and use. These rights are gradually reduced and are tradeable. The aim of the CFC
charge, which is also used in the US, is mainly to skim off 'windfall profits' which may
arise from the artificial scarcity of CFCs.
On the whole, government policy seems to have been a success in making a
relative quick and smooth transition away from CFCs. Only two years after the dis-
covery of significant levels of ozone depletion at the South pole by a group of Britisch
scientists in 1985, an international treaty to reduce CFC emissions was signed. This
treaty was tightened several times to accelerate the phase out of CFCs. A cause for
concern is whether developing countries will also switch to CFC substitutes and at what
time they will do so.
8.2.2 Low;-so/uenf paints and coatings
In the 1950s, traditional linseed oil paints were replaced with paints based on synthetic
binding agents. A basic component of most of these paints was organic solvents, usually
present in per centages of 30 to 65 per cent, but sometimes as high as 90 per cent. It was
not discovered until much later that the solvents, which are released during application,
" 'Use' is defined in the Montreal protocol as production minus export plus import. Substances
with a limited ability to affect the ozone layer (the so-called 'soft' CFCs or H(C)FCs) will be allowed
until far into the next century.
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had negative effects on people's health and vegetation — for instance through the forma-
tion of smog."
Low-solvent paints and coatings constitute a preventive environmental innova-
tion. They are less damaging to health and the environment during application and
production, as well as in the waste phase, although the prevention of damage during
application is the most important aspect. There are various kinds of low-solvent paints:
water-based (or water-borne) paints (5-10 per cent solvents), 'high solids' (20-30 per cent
solvents), powder coatings, and ultraviolet and electron-beam curing coatings. The first
three types are appropriate for wide-spread application in both the architectural and
industrial market, although to different degrees.
8.2.2.2 Factors in/ZMencing t/ie de^eZopmejif o//?atn£s and coatings
Research into low-solvent paints and coatings started in the 1960s, particularly in the
laboratories of the major paint manufacturers. Currently, practically all paint makers are
developing water-based paints, for both the industrial market and the architectural
market. Small firms in the paint industry are strongly dependent upon their suppliers
(components of the large chemical concerns) of raw materials, which provide directive
recipes for paints. The production of water-based paints is somewhat more complex than
that of the traditional paints. In some cases paint companies cooperate with each other
or have research carried out by third parties. Large companies usually perform research
in a more systematic manner by testing the paint on all kinds of materials and under all
kinds of climatic influences. It can be concluded that vast technological opportunities for
low-solvent paints are available to every firm in the paint industry. However, paint
makers are sometimes criticised for conservatism and the under-capitalization of
research efforts. Although many different formulations for new products are constantly
being developed, only a small number reach the production stage."
The history of paints is strongly associated with changes in market demand. For
example, the development of high-solvent paints was stimulated by the demand for
paints with a shorter drying time than that of linseed oil paints. Demand by the automo-
bile industry was an especially important influence in the development of these faster-
drying paints. The demand for low-solvent paints has mainly been a derived demand,
dependent on government policy. Emission requirements in the 1960s and 1970s in the
United States and West Germany (like Rule 66 and TA-Luft, respectively) and legislation
relating to working conditions in Scandinavian countries particularly increased the
demand for low-solvent paints. Industrial users of organic solvents were forced to
" According to some (Scandinavian) studies, volatile organic solvents are also responsible for
damage to the nerve system of painters, the organo-psycho syndrom; but this result is not comfirmed
by other studies.
" Anonymous, 1988, Paint Markets. The Growth of Water-Based Products, 7M' Pigments,
and Extenders, p.8.
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reduce VOC emissions, and, in many instances, the most cost effective means to comply
with environmental regulations was to adopt coatings with low solvent content."
Recently, the growing environmental awareness of consumers has stimulated the
development of water-based paints and high solids for the architectural market. Indus-
trial demand for low-solvent paints has been growing in the last few years, interesting
enough not so much because of environmental considerations, but for normal business
reasons of lower labour costs and less material losses. In the Netherlands, the sales of
powder coatings for industrial application are currently increasing by 15 per cent an-
nually. This corresponds with world trends. The growth in sales of water-based paints is
approximately 10 per cent. In 1990, in the Netherlands, the share of water-based paints
in industry was about 10 per cent, the share of powder coatings 15 per cent and that of
radiation-curing coatings less than 1 per cent (see Table 8.3).
solvent-based paints
water-based paints
powder coatings
high solids
radiation-curing coatings
U.S.
1973
84%
12%
1%
3%
<1%
1983
68%
21%
3%
6%
2%
Western Europe
1983
75%
10%
4%
10%
1 % • : . r , v
Netherlands
1990
70%
10%
15%
<5%
? ' < 1 %
Table 8.3. Industrial use of paints and coatings in the U.S., Western-Europe and The Netherl-
ands. Source: Henckens and de Kok (1988) and own estimates." ^
Table 8.3 shows that the Netherlands, and to a lesser extent Western Europe as a whole,
were slow in using low-solvent paints. This is related to the environmental policies with
respect to organic solvents in the different countries. In the U.S., emissions of volatile
organic solvents were regulated already in the 1960 and 1970s, and much of the transi-
tion towards paints that were lower in solvent content took place in that period. In 1991,
the share of water-based paints in the U.S. was about the same as that in 1983: 20 per
cent in original equipment manufacture segment (automobile finishes, appliance coati-
" Ben Bonifant, 1993, Competitive Implications of Environmental Regulation in the Paint and
Coatings Industry, paper prepared for the 2nd Greening of Industry conference in Boston, November
14-16,1993, p. l l .
" M.C.L.M. Henckens and A.P. de Kok, 1988, Alternatieve lakken of emissiebeperkende appara-
tuur (Alternative coatings or pollution control equipment), Procestec/mie* 43(2): 56-59.
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ngs, etc.) and 71 per cent in the architectual market (80 per cent in interior paints and 60
per cent in exterior paints).'^
The size of the anticipated market for low-solvent paint products is an important
factor in paint manufacturers' innovative activities. For example, the large size of the
automotive market in the U.S. provided satisfactory justification for suppliers to research
and improve water-borne coatings, whereas the small size of the Californian wood
furniture market, and the technical difficulties encountered, delayed manufacturers from
achieving compliant coatings.'"
The paint industry is unique with respect to appropriability conditions. Imitation
of paint products is relatively simple. The composition of paints can be discovered quite
easily discovered by chemical analysis, although their production requires additional
research work. Protection through patents is practically impossible, since paint produc-
tion comes down to 'mixing and stirring'. To obtain a patent something, new technical
principles have to be developed. Suppliers of raw materials do patent new procedures
more frequently than do paint manufacturers.
In the Netherlands, as in most other countries, the most important means to
appropriate the benefits from new paint products lies in the distribution. The large paint
manufacturers have their own distribution networks (service stations for professional
users and paint shops for consumers), where customers can receive advice about the
paint product to be used. Moreover, some paint manufacturers have 'field workers' who
visit their clients. Small firms especially rely upon such customer contacts. The situation
in the Netherlands is quite different from that in Germany, where advice is much less
important and paint is usually diffused via the wholesale trade.
The fact that paint companies sell their products through their own channels
means that the innovating firm mainly reaches its own clients. Thus, a paint company's
new product competes with its own existing products. This has a negative effect on the
willingness of firms to perform R&D activities with respect to low-solvent paints. This
may explain in part why until recently paint manufacturers in the Netherlands were
slow in developing low-solvent paints. Around the mid 1980s this changed. Between
1985 and 1990, the number of researchers employed in the Dutch paint industry
increased with 60 per cent."
8.2.2.2. Factors in/7Henciwg f/ie use o/ /ou>-sofoent paints and coatings
The history of low-solvent paint products is long. The first water-based paints (apart
from the latex wall paints) were developed in the 1960s. Initially, low-solvent paints
were used for highly specific purposes; water-based paints were used as primers in the
" IM Pigments, Fillers and Extenders, op eft, p.8.
" Bonifant, op eft, p.34.
" Andre de Boer, Groene golf in lakken (Green wave in coatings), /n^ CTueursfcrant, 12, June 13,
1991.
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automobile industry and powder coatings were used primarily for coating domestic
applicances like washing machines and refrigerators. With the further perfection of these
products, they became attractive also for other purposes. One such innovation was the
development by ICI in the early 1980s of the aqeous microgel system for use in water-
borne base coat systems.*' The change process in paints, however, was more one of
incremental improvement than of revolutionary change.
At this moment, good-quality low-solvent paint products are available for both
the architectural and original equipment manufacturers (OEM) market. The performance
characteristics of low-solvent paints differ from those of high-solvent paints in many
respects: gloss, durability, adhesion to substrates and so.*' Painters and private clients
still have a strong preference for high-solvent paints, despite the benefits of water-based
paints (including possible health benefits for themselves). In addition to familiarity with
high-solvent paints, and the necessary extra cleaning of older layers of paint, (partly
unfounded) prejudices against the quality of water-based paints are a factor. For
instance, some painters wrongly believe that water-based paints are unsuited for applica-
tion on wood, because 'water is bad for wood'. Another factor that worked against
water-based paints was the small assortment of low-solvent paints. Today some high-
gloss water-based paints are available. High solids that are recently introduced in the
Dutch architectural market also have good gloss and protection performance.
The price of water-based paints is about 10 per cent higher than that of high-
solvent paints because of more expensive resins, production methods and R&D costs.
According to paint manufacturers, no major price falls are expected as a result of econ-
omies of scale and learning effects. However, application and maintenance costs often
favour water-based paints. Powder coatings are about 25 per cent more expensive per
kilo but estimated to be 15 per cent more cheap per nrr\" Their use requires capital
investments in special bake ovens and sometimes the retooling of production lay out.
The same holds true for radiation-curing methods.
There is a serious lack of knowledge and information regarding the environ-
mental damage caused by high-solvent paints and the availability and quality of altern-
atives. These information problems are particularly important to painters and private
users. Another obstacle is that in the past water-based paints were presented as being
overly promising. This publicity has led to disappointments in some cases. Some
retailers are still reluctant to promote low-solvent paints. The environmental benefits
play a limited role in the promotion of low-solvent paints.
™ Bonifant, op c«f., p.25
" A detailed discussion of the technical aspects of low-solvent paints and coatings can be found
in the articles by Cees Dijkstra on this subject (Cees Dijkstra, De nieuwe generatie verf (The new
generation of paints), Eisma's oafcpers, 1991, nrs. 24-25 and 1992, nrs. 1-12.
** Noll quoted in P.C. Koppert, A.A. Olsthoorn and O.J. Kuik, 1988, Emissiereductie door schone
technology. Een verkenning van demogelijkheden van 10 'schone' technologieen (Emission reductions
from clean technology), IVM R-88/2, Amsterdam.
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Although there is some uncertainty about the quality of paints (in terms of gloss,
durability, etc.) and their use entails some risks for professional applicator (unsatisfac-
tory results may lead to financial claims), the uncertainty and risks are relatively small,
especially for the non-industrial user. For industrial use, it is often necessary to change
production routines and the division of work, since the new paints and coatings require
different machines and tools. •,,' ;4- : • ' ->T - . ,.i>ift-Ki*ir<
The transition to low-solvent paints is taking place slowly, except for powder
which is the fastest growing paint market in the world, with volume increases averaging
about 15 per cent a year for the last decade.** Environmental consideration only play a
minor role here. To speed up the transition away from solvent-based paints, government
policy is needed. Currently, there is less need for incentives to encourage innovations in
low-solvent paints than there is for incentives to promote the diffusion of the new
products, particularly among professional painters and private consumers, r.-v-io;;
Policies to promote low-solvent paints have been implemented in several count-
ries. At present, in the Netherlands, Germany and Switzerland covenants are used to
reduce the use of solvents in paints. These covenants are agreements between polluters
and the government to reduce volatile organic solvent (VOC) emissions. Furthermore, on
November 19, 1991, 23 countries signed a United Nations European Commission for
Europe (ECE) protocol for reduction of VOCs. The aim of the agreement was for each
country to achieve a 30 per cent reduction in emissions by 2000 (the definition of the
base year was left to the signatory countries)." The Netherlands has committed itself to
a reduction of 50 per cent in 2000 compared to 1981 emissions levels in the KWS-2000
programme, initiated in 1986. Some countries (e.g., the Netherlands, Switzerland and the
United States) are considering the possibility to impose fees on high-solvent paints. A fee
imposed on solvents may contribute to the diffusion and further development of low-
solvent alternatives, but such a fee will need to be considerable in order to be very
effective. Information and communication are particularly important to increase accept-
ance of the new paint types and remove negative prejudices. Government procurement
policy may also be helpful.
8.2.3 Membrane tecwno/ogy in fwe mefa/-p/afm£ industry -
In the metal-plating industry, large amounts of heavy metals are released in wastewater.
A policy adopted in the Netherlands in the 1970s (tightened in the 1980s) was aimed at
combatting the discharge of these emissions into surface water. As a result, many firms
in the metal-plating industry purchased an "ONO installation" (ONO in Dutch stands
for: Detoxication, Neutralisation, Dehydration), a technique for treating metal plating
effluents. Although the resulting wastewater is cleaner, the technique produces toxic
" Financial Times Survey "World Paints and Coatings", Powder bucks the trend, March 27,1991.
" Bonifant, op of., p.18.
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sludges, which in turn must be taken care of. The ONO installation is a typical end-of-
pipe solution which leads to a transfer of environmental problems.
In contrast, membrane technology can be considered a typical process-integrated
technique. The technique recycles rinse waters from metal plating operations and plating
material directly back to the plating bath through the use of relatively small units em-
bodying semi-permeable membrane filters through which the rinse water are passed.**
Effectively operated membrane techniques generate substantially less quantities of toxic
sludges than conventional effluent treatment techniques and ion exchange units." Thus
far, metal-plating industry has made little use of membrane filtration for the purification
of industrial water. Approximately 15 per cent of the the firms in the metal-plating
industry purchased a membrane technology. The majority of firms (59 per cent) invested
in conventional ONO effluent treatment systems.
. Type of pollution control technique
, r fj ONO effluent treatment
Ion exchange units'
Membrane technology
..:,.,,, O t h e r s > . ; , , . , , , , ... .... •
e v • • • ' ( - • • ' • • • •
59%
1S%
,,,. ..u%,...^...
' sometimes in combination with ONO installations
Table 8.4. Type of pollution control technology applied in the .>-
metal-plating industry. Source: ECOTEC (1986) and own cal- ., .
culations.
The reason why firms in the metal-plating industry decided for the most part against
membrane technology, will be explained below. As we will argue, the main reasons why
firms decided to invest in ONO effluent treatment systems rather than in membrane
technology are to be found in the characteristics of the metal-plating industry and the
Dutch wastewater policies.
" ECOTEC, 1986, The Promotion and Diffusion of Clean Technologies in the Metal Plating
industry in the Netherlands, report to the Netherlands Ministery of Housing, Physical Planning and
Environment, p.48.
* / b i d , p . 4 9 . - ^ - - - - • • • : - • , . - - • - .,. •-• •. ;•* ^ ; . - , - , . > . -
8.2.3.2 Factors f'n/Zwencing tfie deue/o/jmenr o/membrane rec/mo/ogy - .>,
Membrane-separating or purification techniques were developed in the 1950s, as a result
of technological opportunities in the plastics-producing and plastics-processing industry.
On a world scale, the market for membranes is controlled by firms in the United States
and Japan, where the governments put large amounts of money into research and
development in this area in the 1960s. The research being carried out in the area of
membrane technology is still not driven in any major way by potential market sales in
the metal-plating industry, nor is such research specifically aimed at this industry.
The knowledge needed for the production of membranes and membrane installa-
tions is generally in the hands of their manufacturers. Protection of this knowledge is
usually fixed in the form of patents, the most important appropriability condition in this
industry. Application of membrane technologies in the metal-plating industry calls for
tailor-made solutions, which constitutes a barrier to market entry.
8.2.3.2 Factors tw/Iwencmg fne adopftoM o/ membrane fec/ino/ogy
For firms in the metal-plating industry, membrane technology is not directly relevant to
their product but only to the process. Whether or not a firm applies membrane technol-
ogy does not provide it with extra opportunities to increase their sales by creating or
conquering new markets.
The limited experience of metal-plating firms with membrane techniques is
largely negative. There have been many technical problems with the installations, such
as pollution of the membranes. In addition, the technical support of suppliers has often
left much to be desired. Many failures were due to deficiencies in the planning and the
assessment stage and inappropriate installation of the techniques rather than any faults
in the equipment as such.*'
Because of these negative experiences, membrane technology has a bad reputa-
tion in this industry. In general, the costs of using membrane equipment plays a lesser
role, although the high purchase price is an obstacle to risk-averse and myopic firms in
the metal-plating industry. A well-functioning installation might lead to cost savings for
some firms, due to savings in chemicals, plating materials and effluent taxes. This
potential for saving may rise substantially as the cost of transport and disposal of pol-
luted sludge increases.
The knowledge potential users have about membrane technology is minimal and
is limited to a number of bad experiences, which has a negative effect on demand.
Furthermore, smaller firms especially lack the expertise to apply membrane technology.
This is partly related to insufficient transfer of knowledge by the suppliers of membrane
ECOTEC, op cif., p.32.
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technology; these suppliers find the metal-plating industry a 'difficulf and not very
profitable market and direct their efforts preferably towards other markets.** •
Perceptions about the risks involved in the adoption of membrane technologies
also obstruct their use in the metal-plating industry. Firms are afraid of breakdowns,
which involve financial risks and time losses. Also, operating the installations seems to
absorb more time than indicated by the suppliers. Small firms, of which there are many
in the metal-plating industry, particularly cannot afford the risk of spending much time
on matters that do not directly benefit production.
From the above one may get the idea that membrane technology is an ill-suited
technology for dealing with metal-plating effluent. Technical imperfections and the need
for technical knowlege and capabilities to operate membrane technique indeed worked
against the purchase of membrane filtration techniques. But the main reason why mem-
brane technologies failed to make an impact is to be found in Dutch wastewater policies.
In the Netherlands, wastewater policy was oriented at the prevention of the release of
metals in wastewater, not at the prevention of toxic sludge. This favoured end-of-pipe
solutions like the ONO installation. In fact, the environmental standards were based
upon the use of convential (ONO) end-of-pipe solutions.
Another important factor that worked against the uptake of membrane technol-
ogies was that membrane technology were not recommended by the industry's research
association and wastewater boards for the reason that membrane filtration was a rela-
tively new technology in the 1980s when stricter water pollution standards were
imposed upon metal-plating firms.^
In turn, the slow diffusion of membrane technologies had a negative effect on
research efforts to perfect membrane technology and the willingness of suppliers to
provide good after-sales technical support, to overcome 'teething' problems. Because the
market did not develop, so did not the product. Due to the wide-spread application of
ONO installations, the market for membrane technology is blocked for many years.
The future prospects of membrane technology, however, are less dim. In the
1990s, environmental policy in the Netherlands has taken a more integrated multi-media
approach, instead of focussing on one specific medium such as water. Although policies
towards toxic sludge generated by ONO installations have not been implemented so far,
and are not likely to be implemented in the next few years (toxic sludge from the metal-
plating industry is not a priority waste problem), the fact that the cost of disposal of
polluted sludge have risen sharply in the 1990s (up to 1,000 guilders per ton in 1994),
™ W. van Tongeren and J.W. du Mortier, 1989, Practische Toepassingsmogelijkheden van mem-
braanprocessen in de natte oppervlaktebewerkende industry (Possibilities for the use of membrane
techniques in the metal-plating industry), VROM, p.34. - - • • - - -....-.
** ECOTEC, op rif., p.14 and Mensink ef a/., op a/., p.74. Membrane techniques were not included
in the CUWVO-list of best practicable technologies to reduce discharges of heavy metals effluents
because too little information was available about the control efficiency and costs of using membrane
technology. (The CUWVO is a commission which advices wastewater boards on technical matters.)
and are expected to rise further, favours the adoption of process-integrated technologies
like membrane filtration.*'
This case demonstrates the danger of using standards-based policies and the
importance of taking a long term, multi-media view in dealing with environmental
problems. It furthermore shows that information transfer can be of great importance.
Information should not only reinforce environmental awareness and convey knowledge
of the costs and benefits of various techniques but also remove prejudices against par-
ticular environmental technologies. Demonstration projects may make a significant
contribution to this goal.
Conclusions
This chapter has explored the factors that affect the decision to supply and adopt cleaner
technologies. This final section attempts to derive some general conclusions about these
factors and to give some policy implications.
One conclusion that emerges from the case studies is that technological capabil-
ities to develop compliance innovations are often located outside the polluting industry.
This creates particular problems of establishing new inter-industry relationships and the
transfer of knowledge. At the same time, this dislocation may be beneficial to environ-
mental policy in the sense that suppliers of environmental technologies have a strong
interest in stricter environmental policies, whereas polluting industries clearly have not.
Furthermore, the technological opportunities and appropriability conditions do
not appear to be distinct obstacles to the realisation of cleaner innovations, at least not in
the supplier industries in the case studies. One might reply that this is hardly surprising,
since if technological opportunities were absent and appropriability conditions insuffi-
cient, there would have been no new technology to study in these industries. A more
general conclusion, however, is that for almost all environmental problems, several
technological opportunities for cleaner technologies are available and that firms in one
way or another can protect a technological innovation against imitation for a long
enough period or find other ways to reap some of the benefits from using the innova-
tion.
The multiple technological opportunities may confront policy makers with a
dilemma. Since the success of a certain technology depends strongly on government
policy, policy makers should be careful not to induce the selection of the 'wrong' tech-
nologies, and, as a result, lock-in adherence to a sub-optimal technological trajectory.
This point is less academic than it may seem. In the case of the metal-plating industry,
the market for membrane technologies has been blocked for years because of the wide-
spread adoption of end-of-pipe (ONO) techniques that resulted in the transfer of en-
* Ben te Raa, 1991, Sectorale milieuwetgeving nekt complete bedrijfstak. Galvano-industrie staat
voor tweede grote investeringsgolf (Environmental regulation wrecks metal-plating industry. A new
wave of investments in pollution control measures is coming), Mt/ieuMarft, april-issue, pp.10-13.
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vironmental problem. In the case of the substitution of CFCs, policy makers face a
similar dilemma: should HCFCs, which also affect the ozone layer but to a lesser extent,
be allowed for a certain period, or should other solutions that are currently less suitable
and more expensive be stimulated? The choice between technological solutions is very
difficult, since a new technology's costs and benefits are unknown to both policy makers
and suppliers of the technology.
To address this policy dilemma, economic instruments may be preferred to direct
regulation, since they interfere less with the choice of technology. On the other hand,
standards may be better to induce a shift from a current non-sustainable technological
trajectory, such as replacement of the internal combustion engine by a less polluting
engine.
If the appropriability conditions are insufficient, policy makers can do little to
improve, except perhaps to subsidize certain R&D projects, or to stimulate cooperation
between firms. As discussed, unfavourable appropriability do not appear to be a barrier
to the exploitation of technological opportunities, although they can delay the develop-
ment of new products, as in the case of low-solvent paints and coatings.
Market demand seems to be the crucial factor for the successful exploitation of
technological opportunities. In the case of cleaner technologies, market demand depends
strongly on government policy. In each of the three cases, the creation of a market for
environmental technologies was necessary for these technologies to be developed and
adopted. Although there are other stimuli, such as pressure from local communities, the
work force, investors, insurance companies, special environmental interest groups, and
the larger public, these stimuli are still not very strong. The perspective of a certain
policy can also provide an important stimulus. In the case studies, it was found that a
clear objective for the interim period gave a strong push for the development of CFC
substitutes and low-solvent paints and coatings.
The case studies also provided a lot of information about the factors that affect
the adoption of cleaner technologies. One important factor is the price and quality
(performance characteristics) of the new technology, compared to that of less environ-
ment-friendly technologies. In all three cases, the technological substitutes have quite
unique performance characteristics, some of which are valued positively, other negative-
ly in the market. Water-based paints are a good example: they do not smell, dry more
quickly, have a longer life time, and are more environment-friendly; they are also more
expensive, have a lower initial gloss, and their application requires good cleaning. They
are presently unsuited as traffic paints, automobile finishers and as high performance
maintenance paints. These technical aspects and user understanding of these aspects are
an important factor in the diffusion of environment-friendlier technologies. Policy should
take such aspects into consideration in designing environmental policies in order to
prevent cost inefficiencies, obstruction from industry and non-compliance.
It is also important that policy makers take into account the technological oppor-
tunities to develop substitutes for environmentally hazardous technologies, together with
firms' capabilities and willingness to use them. In order to avoid lock-in adherence to
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sub-optimal technologies, policy should stimulate the widest possible range of technical
solutions and remain flexible with respect to technological choices.
Finally, this analysis suggests that in the short term, the transition towards more
sustainable technologies can bring about high costs and serious adjustment problems for
adopters. New and cleaner technologies will always be less suited for some adopters
because of specific technical requirements or prohibitively high costs — for instance when
existing production techniques have to be replaced early in their usable life. When
technologies are improved in terms of price or technical characteristics, the overall costs
of adopting environment-friendlier technologies may be much lower. Especially in the
case of standards, the costs related to such a short-term transition can be high. This
means that a combination of patience and persistence in environmental policy may well
be the optimal strategy. ' ' • - " • - . . ' > . . ' : • • -••• -:~-•••-'•• : • ' • > " . . > • . • , • . ; ' ! w v . • • r i . : : « . - ••:• -
- • v - •• > -"
Empirical Results of other Technology Studies
This chapter presents the findings of other empirical studies into the technological
impact of environmental policies. We look at the experiences with direct regulation in
the United States, especially those with technology-forcing standards and innovation
waivers. This is followed by a discussion of the technology effects of incentive-based
approaches such as pollution taxes, tradeable pollution permits and R&D and investment
subsidies. At the end of the chapter, we examine the innovation effects of covenants
used in the Netherlands.
9.1 Technology Effects of Environmental Regulations in the U.S.
9.1.1 Direct regulation and innovation waivers
Most of the studies into the technology responses to environmental regulation took place
in the 1970s and early 1980s in the United States. The main findings of these studies are
summarized in Nicholas Ashford, Christine Ayers and Robert Stone (1985).' They find
that the technology responses of industry to the environmental, occupational health and
product safety regulations differed widely between industries and regulations. With
respect to the technology responses to regulations, a distinction is made between tech-
nological innovation and diffusion of existing technology, and between product and pro-
cess changes. Innovative responses are divided into incremental and radical responses (a
description of technology definitions is in chapter 1). The following conclusions emerge
from their survey:
• product-focused regulation primarily elicits a product response (substitution of
existing products or a new product);
• sometimes the new product (e.g. lead-free gasoline) is accompanied by signifi-
cant process innovation;
• process regulation can elicit either a process response or a product change — in
fact, product substitution may be the only practical response to a strict process
restriction;
' Nicholas A. Ashford, Christine Ayers and Robert F. Stone, 1985, Using Regulation to Change the
Market for Innovation, Harrord EnuironmCTifa/ Law Rfpiew, 9: 419-466.
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the stringency of the regulation is an important determinant of the degree of
innovation.
Table 9.1 summarizes the results.
Substance Application Regulatory Type of Stringency Industry Response
Agency Regulation Degree Type
PCBs All EPA Product Very f Radical Product
Stringent* j
' * ** [ Incremental Process
CFCs Aerosol I'.I'A Product Very f Radical Process
CPSC Stringent*
I Incremental Product
Mercury Paint ^ j / ^? * jT^ftf|/x_'3. Product Very Diffusion Product
Stringent
Lead Paint CPSC Product Very Diffusion Product
Stringent
Lead Fuel EPA Product Very Incremental Product
Additive Stringent
Mercury Chloralkali EPA Process Stringent
Uad All OSHA Process Very
Manufacture Stringent*
f Incremental Process
I Diffusion Process
r Radical Both
[ Diffusion Process
Vinyl All OSHA
Chloride Manufacture EPA
Cotton All OSHA
Dust Manufacture
Asbestos All OSHA
Manufacture
Process Very f Incremental Process
Stringent* j
I Diffusion Process
Process Very Diffusion Process
Stringent
Process Mildly Diffusion Process
Stringent
'Substantial doubt about the standard's technological feasibility at the lime the standard
was proposed. . -...,..~._..-,, • .-, , ^ ,.
EPA is Environmental Protection Agency, CPSC is Consumer Product Safety Act and OSHA is Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act.
Table 9.1. A summary of regulations and the technology responses by industry. Source: Ashford
rt a/. (1985, p.431). ^ , . . . ,, , : , ; , . . , . , „ .„
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Table 9.1 shows that the most common responses to regulation are incremental innova-
tion and diffusion of existing technology (in the form of end-of-pipe solutions and non-
innovative substitutions of existing substances). Radical solutions were developed only
in the case of Polychorinated Biphenyls (PCBs), Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and leaded
products (like batteries and gasoline), most of which were effectively banned by regulat-
ion. It is also found that in many cases the new technologies were developed by firms
outside the regulated industry, in the form of pollution control equipment or substitutes
for existing products. These conclusions correspond with the findings of the case studies
in chapter 8.
The authors also provide a discussion of U.S. experiences with innovation waivers as a
way to encourage technological innovation. Innovation waivers are incentive devices
built into environmental regulation. Generally, they extend the deadline by which
industry must install pollution control equipment to meet emissions limitation require-
ments. They exempt industry from penalties during trial periods and offer the prospect
of cost savings derived from superior technology.^  In theory, innovation waivers seem
very attractive for both potential innovators and the regulating agency. In practice, they
have not achieved their intended effect. Reasons for such a failure were: First, ambiguity
as to the requirements made in the different acts. For instance, the Clean Air Act re-
quired that the proposed technology had not been adequately demonstrated and proof
that the technology would operate effectively. It is hard to see how it will be ever
possible to provide proof that the technology operates effectively without proper demon-
stration. These, and other, requirements, caused much uncertainty about whether a
proposed technology would qualify for an innovaton waiver under the different acts.
Second, the short and inflexible deadlines that acted as a disincentive for innovation,
especially for radical innovation with long development times. And third, the way in
which the programme was administered. Under the Clean Air Act, the responsibility of
issuing innovation waivers was given to the Stationary Source Compliance Division
(SSCD) of the Environmental Protection Agency, a division with limited technical exper-
tise, whose primary task was enforcement. As it turned out, the SSCD narrowly inter-
preted the waiver provisions, provided little guidance and the agency took a long time
before it arrived to a decision. In retrospect, it is easy to comprehend why innovation
waivers were unsuccessful. This does not disqualify innovation waivers per se. There are
several remedies to the problems encountered, many of which are given by the authors
- such as administration of the programme by people trained to interact with industry,
the establishment of a technology review panel, delineation of eligibility criteria, and
longer time allowances. It does illustrate, however, the difficulties in designing regula-
tions that encourage technological change towards efficient conservation of environmen-
tal qualities.
' /bid, p.444.
228
9.2.2 New car/iwe/ economy iw/jrouemeMfs: 77ie resu/f o/regw/afr'ons or fJie
nafura/ res/?oMse fo marfcef /orces?
What about the usefulness of economic incentives like pollution taxes and tradeable
pollution permits to encourage environmentally beneficial technical change? As we
know, the increase in oil prices encouraged much research into non-fossil fuel-based
energy technologies and energy conservation technologies. Is there evidence that pollu-
tion taxes and tradeable pollution permits fostered innovation in environmentally prefer-
able technology? As far as we know, there is no reported case of an environmental
technology which was developed primarily in response to pollution taxes and tradeable
permits. One explanation for this is the limited use of pollution taxes and tradeable
permits. Another explanation is that the level of the instituted taxes was simply too low,
or the number of pollution permits too high, to foster technological innovation/ There is
certainly much truth in this, but in our view, it is not the entire truth. As Nelson and
Winter have pointed out, technological advances often proceed in certain directions
irrespective of relative prices, i.e., they are not fine-tuned to changing demand and cost
conditions.'' Technology practitioners have their own agenda of development, based on
what they see as the relevant problems and the possible solutions, based on search
heuristics and research experience. As we will see in chapter 10, these notions are often
shared across the community of technology practitioners. Engineers also have their own
criteria against which technological possibilities are assessed. Economic considerations
play a limited role in such appraisals, they are just one criterium and are generally given
less attention than technical performance criteria. Economic criteria have to be brought in
from the outside by marketing people and by management in decisions over research
projects and budgets. This is not to say that firms do not respond to changes in cost and
demand conditions, only that such responses take time, especially when technological
competencies are not available within the individual firm.
This raises the question whether direct regulation in the form of technology-forcing
standards is better suited to promote technological innovation than incentive-based
approaches such as pollution taxes or tradeable pollution permits. Interestingly, this
question has been studied statistically by David Greene for new car fuel economy in the
United States.' In 1975, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, under the Energy
Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA), established mandatory fuel economy standards for
automobiles and light trucks. The EPCA regulations required manufacturers to meet a
fuel economy target of 18 miles per gallon (mpg) in 1978, increasing to 27.5 mpg by
' This is the conclusion of the OECD study Economic JnsfrumCTifsybr Enpironmenfa/ Protection, 1989,
Paris: OECD, p.14.
' Richard R. Nelson and Sidney G. Winter, 1977, In Search of Useful Theory of Innovation,
Research Po/icy, 6, pp.56-57.
* David L. Greene, 1990, CAFE OR PRICE. An Analysis of Effects of Federal Fuel Economy
Regulations and Gasoline Price on New Car MPG, 1978-89, 77K Energy /ourna/11(3): 37-57.
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1985. If manufacturers failed to comply with the corporate average fuel economy (CAFE)
standard — being the sales-weighted mean mpg of a manufacturer's product — it had to
pay a fine of $5 per car sold per 0.1 mpg of shortfall. The intent of the automobile fuel
economy standards (AFES) was to stimulate technological improvements that would
increase efficiency without substantially altering the size distribution of vehicles sold.
Although new car fuel efficiency doubled from 14 mpg in 1974 to 28 mpg in 1988, there
was disagreement as to whether this increase in fuel efficiency was the result of fuel
economy regulations or the natural response of market forces to rising gasoline prices.'
Greene developed a statistical test to discriminate between price and regulatory
effects. The basic structure of the model is very simple. The decision problem of the
manufacturer is to select a level of fuel economy, E, which minimizes the combined
penalties of being out of step with the market in terms of fuel economy, £^, and the
level required by regulation, ER.
,( V ' . . - - : j , . ^ •:;•<;«* M i « Z - / ( E ^ E ) +6^(E,-E) . „ . . ' . „ - , ,•
wiffc 0 = 0 1/ £ £ £R
'"""•"• • ; • ' - - - ' • • - - - - - - • = 1 f f E < E ^ ' • ' • - . - • • > - •-• . • . - ^ f . ;
The penalty functions / and g are additive and quadratic functions of the differences
between the desired market (or regulatory) level and the efficiency actually achieved:
The reason for using a quadratic function for g is to allow for benefits for exceeding the
standards as well as costs for falling short. The desired market level of fuel efficiency,
E^, depends on manufacturer's and consumer's price expectations and is taken to be a
function of current and past gasoline prices. Substitution of the equations for / and g in
Z, and minimization of Z with respect to E gives the optimal amount of fuel efficiency
for manufacturer m: • ' " " * ' ' " ..:--;.••.:.-• -.•:-.<:•.
This is the equation to be estimated for different manufacturers. The conclusion from the
statistical test is that "the standards were at least twice as important as market trends in
prices, and may have been completely replaced fuel price increases as a basis for long-
' The latter view is expressed in R.W. Crandall, H.K. Gruenspecht, T.E. Keeler and L.B. Lave,
1986, Regu/atmg fte Aufomobi/e, Washington DC: The Brookings Institution. .. ... „. ..... ..
230 Owpfer 9
range planning about mpg"7 That is, the CAFE regulations were more effective in
influencing new car fuel efficiency than an imaginary gasoline tax bringing the gasoline
price of $1 in 1978 to a level of $1.7 in 1981 (the year in which the gasoline price was the
highest in the U.S.) and back to the original level of $1 in 1986.
Of course, the above conclusion depends on the model structure, especially the
specification of the penalty function — where the use of a quadratic function for g is not
convincingly justified. Also, the relative effectiveness of the CAFE regulations should not
be taken as evidence that the regulations were economically desirable, the low respon-
siveness to gasoline prices may hint at high transition costs. Nevertheless, it seems to be
a story where technology-forcing regulations, supplemented with fines, were effective in
stimulating environmentally beneficial technical change, much more effective than a high
gasoline tax.
9.2 The Technological Impact of Environmental Subsidies and
Covenants in the Netherlands
Investment subsidies are another incentive-based approach. Being a politically attractive
instrument, they have been an important part of past environmental policies. This
section examines the effectiveness of investment subsidies in encouraging firms to
employ more environmentally benign technologies.
9.2.1 Investment subsidies
In the Netherlands, several studies have been undertaken into the technological impact
of investment subsidies. A parliamentary study of the WIR investment studies, showed
that, according to environmental authorities, the investment subsidies for environmental
technologies (which amounted to 15 per cent of total investment costs) induced only 8
per cent of the firms to undertake investments they would not have done otherwise.*
(Surprisingly, the government concluded from this evaluation study that the subsidy
scheme was "reasonably effective".') The effectiveness of three other types of investment
subsidies is analyzed in Walter Vermeulen (1992).'° The results of this study, based on
a questionnaire, are in Table 9.2.
' /bid, p.55.
* Tweede Kamer, 1987, Evaluatie WIR-milieutoeslag (Evaluation of the WIR investment subsidies),
Tweede kamer, vergaderjaar 1986-1987,19858, nr.4, p.39.
' /bid, p.2.
'" Walter Vermeulen, 1992, De Dernui/er fcetoa/d. Onderzock mwr de werfcmg twn subsidies op pier
dee//errem£n wm feet mi/ieubririd (Paying the Polluter. A study into the effects of four subsidy schemes
for environmental technologies), Utrecht: Jan van Arkel.
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very effective
reasonably effective
hardly effective
not effective
PCBs"
0%
37%
13%
50%
silent
trucks
2%
22%
23%
52%
manure
storage
1%
20%
3%
76%
' Polychlorinated Biphenyls
Table 9.2. The effectiveness of investment subsidies for environmental technologies.
Source: Vermeulen (1992, p.210).
According to Vermeulen's study, investment subsidies for the replacement of PCB
equipment, new trucks that were more silent and the storage of animal dung were
effective in only a small number of cases. The subsidies were the primary reason for
investing in the environmentally beneficial technologies in two per cent of the cases for
silent trucks and one per cent for manure storage. For PCB-replacement equipment the
figure was even zero. The investment subsidies were reasonably effective for 37 per cent
of the firms that used PCBs (and only in 22 and 20 per cent of the cases in the other two
sectors). In all three cases, other factors were more important than the subsidies, such as
fuel economy, road performance, and comfort in the case of silent trucks, health and
safety considerations in the case of PCB replacement, and environmental regulations in
the case of the animal dung storage." Vermeulen also analyzed whether the informa-
tion provided by government authorities about the subsidies being available and the
adverse environmental effects of existing technologies and practices influenced the
decisions of firms to invest in environmentally preferable technologies. This was only so
for PCBs, which not only had adverse health and detrimental environmental effects but
also posed a fire and security risk for PCB-using firms.
Other evaluation studies of investment subsidies for environmentally beneficial
technologies (including energy conservation, solar boilers and co-generation of heat and
power) arrive at similar conclusions. With the exception of the investment subsidy for
CHP, and, possibly, the subsidy for wind turbines, the effectiveness of the investment
" It should be noted that none of the technologies were prescribed by environmental regulation.
Environmental regulations played a role in purchasing decisions only in the case of the storage of
animal dung.
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subsidies in the Netherlands was small." For the most part, they provided applicants
with a 'windfall profif.
This corresponds with our own finding in chapter 7, where we found no significant
relation between the investment subsidies for thermal home improvement and the
diffusion of thermal insulation technologies. On the whole, the conclusion that emerges
from the different studies is that investment subsidies were only limitedly effective in
promoting diffusion of environmentally beneficial technologies. To what extent they
encouraged technological innovation is unclear, but given that the subsidies hardly
influenced adopter decisions, the innovation effects are likely to be small.
The combination of investment subsidies with environmental taxes, however, may
be an effective policy for accelerating the diffusion of clean technology. In 1986, the
Dutch government instituted a subsidy for 'clean' automobiles and a tax for cars with
high emission levels. The way in which the system worked was that the subsidies for
clean cars were payed out of the extra tax revenues from the sales of highly polluting
cars. This policy proved to be very effective: the share of 'clean' cars in new car sales
increased from 15% in 1986 to 90% in 1990." The same kind of policy was used to
encourage the supply and distribution of unleaded gasoline to protect catalytic converter
emission control systems used in cars. Due to a differentiation in excise taxes, unleaded
gasoline (first only regular but later also super gasoline) became more cheap than leaded
gasoline. Oil companies quickly responded to these changes in the tax regime by offering
unleaded gasoline for sale."
9.2.2 R&D sMbstrftes • ? » ' • ' M • .-.. / ^
What about the effectiveness of subsidies for the development of environmentally prefer-
rable technologies? Did R&D subsidies stimulate firms to undertake research in environ-
mental technology, that is, research they would not have done otherwise? This is a
question which has not been studied in a systematic way, at least not in the Netherlands.
However, the evidence that is available suggests that R&D subsidies in the Netherlands
for environmental technology have been limitedly effective. According to the study by
Xander Olsthoorn, Frans Oosterhuis and Harmen Verbruggen, the "Stimuleringsregeling
Milieutechnologie" (STTR-MT) for the development of environmental technology did not
" Evaluatiecommissie Wet Algemene Bepalingen Milieuhygiene, 1992, Financiele instrumenten in
het beleidsproces (Financial instruments in the policy process), advies nr. 5, Den Haag: VROM.
" Evaluatiecommissie WABM, op eft, p.39. A more detailed description is in Pieter-Jan Klok, 1989,
Lood-vrije benzine en schone auto's, een toepassing van de instrumententheorie (Unleaded gasoline
and clean cars. An application of instrument theory), Centrum voor Bestuurskundig Onderzoek,
Twente).
" Ibid, p.42. The quick response of oil companies was due in part to the fact that the manufactur-
ing of unleaded gasoline did not command any technological innovation. The manufacturing of
(high-performance) unleaded gasoline was something the oil companies had already mastered in the
1970s, to comply with U.S. environmental regulations, see Ashford ef a/, op eft, p.435-436.
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elicit new research projects." This conclusion corresponds with the observation by
Mark de Jong and Klaas van der Ven that innovator firms develop environmentally
beneficial technologies not because a subsidy is available but because they believe a
market exists for the new technology." It may be that the subsidies accelerated the
development of environmental technologies, but this is unclear. There are indications,
however, that government R&D subsidies played a role in the development of biological
cleaning technologies.'^
The experience with the Danish Clean Technology Development Programme,
described in Susse George, Inge Reipke and Ulrik Jergensen (1992) is more positive."
Under the programme, industries, private and semi-governmental research institutions
could apply for financial aid for developing and implementing clean technology. The
programme was oriented at stimulating preventive process solutions and co-operation of
technology suppliers, research institutes, consultancy firms, and users. The Danish
Environmental Protection Agency played an active role in selecting environmentally
beneficial projects and in finding the 'right' partner with whom to cooperate. That is, the
agency acted as some kind of "match maker" to elicit environmentally innovative solu-
tions, something that previous subsidy programmes had failed to do. According to the
authors, the Danish programme was a success. In almost all cases, appropriate technical
solutions were found for the environment problems at hand. (Examples are described in
Georg ef a/., op rit). In more than half of the projects, substantial environmental improve-
ments were achieved at low costs. Some project even led to net economic gains for the
polluting firms. In the Netherlands, a similar type of network approach has been fol-
lowed in reducing emissions of volatile organic compounds (VOCs).
9.2.3 Technology effects of covenants ,,,, v ^ ,,, ,.,^ ,,. y*, ,-
Covenants are a relatively new instrument of environmental policy. Covenants are
negotiated agreements between industry and the government in which the industry
promises to reduce the environmental burden of their products and activities. In Pieter-
Jan Klok (1989), the effectiveness of eight product-related covenants in the Netherlands
" Xander Olsthoorn, Frans Oosterhuis and Harmen Verbruggen, 1992, Inhoudelijke evaluatie van
de stimuleringsregeling milieutechnologie (Evaluation of the subsidy programme Environmental
technology), IvM report R-92/01, Amsterdam: IVM, p.18.
" Mark de Jong and Klaas van de Ven, 1985, Milieu-innovaties in kleine ondernemingen (Envir-
onmental innovations in small enterprises), publicatiereeks Milieubeheer 21, VROM, pp.78-79.
" CHsthoorn ef a/, op rif, p.16. •--*—~*—••——— -•—*-—
" Susse George, Inge Rapke and Ulrik Jergensen, 1992, Clean Technology-Innovation and Envi-
ronmental Regulation, Environments/ and Resource Economics, 2(6): 533-550.
is analyzed." The covenants covered products like mercury-oxide batteries, alkaline
batteries, beverage packages, heavy trucks, PET bottles, and the use of cadmium in beer
cases, CFCs in aerosols, and phosphates in detergents. Most covenants were about the
substitution of an environmentally hazardous substance. According to Klok, the effec-
tiveness of covenants was typically small: when environmental improvements were
achieved, this was more due to autonomous technological change, external regulations
(such as EC guidelines), and the evolution of market demand than to covenants. Fur-
thermore, there is little evidence that the covenants fostered technological innovation. An
exception is the KWS-2000 programme in the Netherlands to reduce VOC emissions,
which stimulated research into low-solvent paints (see chapter 8).
9.3 Conclusions
What conclusions can be drawn from the empirical studies into the technology effects of
environmental policies? One important conclusion is that the technology responses to
«iviro/unenteJ reguiah'ons differ between industries and regulations. According to the
study of Ashford e< a/. (1985), the most common technology response to regulations is
incremental innovation and diffusion of existing technology (mostly in the form of end-
of-pipe solutions). In several cases, however, environmental regulations elicited innova-
tive responses from industry. Examples are: the ban of PCBs, CFCs and automobile fuel
economy standards. The effectiveness of investment subsidies and R&D subsidies in the
Netherlands was limited in almost all cases. There is also no evidence that the covenants
that have been used in the Netherlands encouraged technological innovation. As regards
to the innovation effects of taxes and tradeable permits, there is no reported case of a
technological innovation that has been developed in response to a pollution tax or
tradeable permit, but this may be due to the limited use of these instruments and the
low level of the tax or high number of pollution rights. A more detailed discussion of
the pros and cons of environmental policy instruments will be given in the final chapter.
" Pieter-Jan Klok, 1989, Convenanten als instrument van milieubeleid. De totstandkoming en
effectiviteit van acht produkt-gerichte milieu-convenanten en hierop gebaseerde verwachtingen
omtrent de effectiviteit van convenanten, Enschede: Unversiteit Twente.
PART III
1 - ' • - £ - . -
The Problem of Technological
Regime Shifts '.'
. ' j ^ • • i > . . •
if"".'.* r'-r(-"
• : / i ' - J "•"» -'?:;t> ""•>'! - ^ " i l l V ^ ' j i ; J 4 ^
*; t.
• i • - • .
10
Continuity and Change in Technological
Regimes
'* f r 7
This chapter examines the possibilities of achieving radical change in technology — that
is, a change in our basic technologies of production, transport and consumption rather
than modifications of existing products or the adoption of end-of-pipe technologies. We
provide an explanation as to why such change is likely to be a gradual and slow proc-
ess. Radical technologies often have long development times and require for their opera-
tion special skills, infrastructure and all kinds of institutional changes (organizational
changes, regulation, new ideas and values etc.). Furthermore, the short-term costs are
likely to be high as the new technologies have not yet benefitted from dynamic scale and
learning effects (which result in cost reductions per unit of output and evolutionary
improvements in the technology). The chapter also provides some answers as to how it
is possible for firms with restricted technological capabilities to bring about a shift into a
new technological regime — emphasizing the importance of early market niches, avail-
able knowledge that may be used, institutional support, and the role of expectations.
It should be emphasized that the focus of this chapter is an exploration of the
properties of technological regimes. Rather than examining the specific technical, eco-
nomic and social aspects of a transition to more environmentally benign technologies
(like photovoltaics or alternative fuel vehicles) we are exploring the broader question of
how technological regimes evolve and change.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 1 looks at the way in which tech-
nological change has been understood by historians and economists. It describes various
technology concepts (like technological paradigms and regimes) employed by different
writers to account for the ordering and structuring of technology. Section 2 provides a
criticism of these approaches. We will argue that the reason why some technologies (like
the combustion engine) are dominant depends not only on engineering beliefs and
imagination but also on the accumulated knowledge, realized cost efficiencies in certain
designs, the build-up of an infrastructure around a technology, and the embedment of
technologies in people's way of life. Section 3 summarizes the main conclusions.
10.1 Patterns in the Evolution of Technology
That technical change is not a haphazard process but proceeds in certain directions is by
now widely recognized. Examples of persistent patterns of technical change, given by
Donald MacKenzie, are the increasing mechanization of manual operations, the growing
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miniaturization of microelectronic components, the increasing speed of computer opera-
tions.' Other examples of patterns in technological change are: reductions in material
requirements in products, the trend towards the use of lighter materials (in automobiles
and aircraft), the use of electronic components in consumer products and equipment etc.
There also exist relatively stable patterns in the usage of products and processes. In the
western world, cars only gradually came to dominate other modes of transport (horse-
drawn carriages and later on trains) in the last 100 years. Oil and natural gas became
dominant energy sources over a period of half a century. It even took almost a whole
decade for a simple product such as the ballpoint pen to become widely used.
Economists, historians and more recently sociologists have studied these regulari-
ties in technological change and have come up with concepts to account for the ordering
and structuring of technology. A useful starting point is the work by Nathan Rosenberg,
who, as an economic historian, has contributed much to our understanding of the nature
and direction of technological change. Rosenberg asked himself the following question:
Have there been forces at work in recent history which have pushed exploratory activity
in specific directions? His answer was that "technology is much more a cumulative and
self-generating process than economists generally recognize".* To be sure, in making the
above statement, he did not want to imply that economic incentives are not important
(or to suggest some crude form of technological determinism). The ultimate incentives
for problem-solving activities are believed to be economic in nature. Rosenberg's basic
point is that economic incentives fo rerfMce cost a/ways exist in business operation, and precise/y
because frcey are so di^ wse and genera/ t/iey do not explain very muc/z in terms 0/ the particular
sequence and timing 0/ innovative activity.^
According to Rosenberg, the kind of problems to which engineers are likely to
devote their attention are related to the day-to-day problems posed by the existing
technology such as constraints imposed by the existing plant and certain technical
imbalances between the components of a final product. As he writes: "most mechanical
productive processes throw off signals of a sort which are both compelling and fairly
obvious and lead to an almost compulsive formulation of problems and exploratory
activities".'' Within his view, firms are "naturally led to search the technological horizon,
as it were, within the framework of their current activities and to attack the most restric-
; : • > ; , •
' Donald MacKenzie, 1992, Economic and Sociological Explanations of Technical Change, in Rod
Coombs, Paolo Saviotti and Vivien Walsh (eds.), Tec/ino/ogica/ C/wnge and Company Strategies, London:
Academic Press, p.30.
* Nathan Rosenberg, 1976, The Direction of Technological Change: Inducement Mechanisms and
Focussing Devices, In his book Perspectives on Tecftno/ogy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
p.110.
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tive constraint".' Rosenberg's point is that explorative activities are essentially problem-
solving activities and that engineers will look for solutions of problems that present
themselves.
In his 1976 book, Rosenberg gave several historical examples of technological
change which had been pushed in a particular direction by such "focusing devices", and
suggested it was such factors that gave order to the change process and to the structures
which emerged from it. Several examples are given by Rosenberg to illustrate this point
for instance, that the improved designs of automobile engines have led — through the
achievement of higher speeds — to the invention of improved braking systems. Another
example is the development of the Bessemer process of steel production out of the task
to make a gun, able to fire a heavy, elongated projectile. It is found in historical studies
that the Bessemer process, being a major innovation in steel making, was the product of
Bessemer's search for a superior metal that could withstand the severe strains imposed
by the weight of heavy projectiles.
Implicit in Rosenberg's approach is a system's view of technologies: a technology is
made up of interrelated components that define a product's technical characteristics and
its production. This system's idea of technology and its implication for the evolution of
technological change is also a key element in Devendra Sahal's work. As Sahal writes:
one of the most important clues to the origin of innovations is to be found in the
fact that the performance of every technology depends upon its size and structure.
Specifically, as a technology is continuously made to become larger or smaller, the
relationship between its size and structural requirements changes, which in turn,
severely limits the scope of its further evolution. Thus the origin of a wide variety of
innovations lies in learning to overcome the constraints that arise from the process
of scaling the technology under consideration.'
Thomas Hughes, who, as a historian, studied the evolution of large technological sys-
tems, arrives at a similar conclusion. According to him, problem-solving activities are
very much aimed at solving "reverse salients" that arise in the growth of technological
systems. Reverse salients are components in the system that have fallen behind or are
out of place with the others/
The idea of bottlenecks and technical imperatives guiding the evolution of technology is
developed more systematically into an evolutionary theory of innovation by Richard
Nelson and Sidney Winter. Nelson and Winter strongly oppose the idea that the genera-
* /bid, p .m.
* Devendra Sahal, 1985 Technological Guideposts and Innovation Avenues, Research Po/icy 14,
p.61.
' Thomas P. Hughes, 1989, The Evolution of Large Technological Systems, In T/ie Sorifli
Construction o/ Techno/ogica/ Systems: New Directions in t/ie Socio/ogy and History o/ Tec/ino/ogy, edited by
Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes and Trevor J. Pinch, Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press, pp.51-82.
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tion of innovation can be understood in terms of a cost-benefit calculation, in which the
expected pay-offs from innovation are simply compared with the estimated cost of
producing the innovation.* Their criticism amounts to the fact that R&D is an uncertain
business in which cheap reliable estimates of benefits and costs are not available and in
which interpersonal and interorganizational difference in judgement and perception
matter a lot.' Instead, the innovation process is seen as guided by interacting heuristic
search processes, on the basis of previous experience and notions of success.
Nelson and Winter's approach is deeply rooted in the work of Herbert Simon
about decision making in complex situations and is related to the behavioral theory of
the firm as developed by Cyert and March. It is argued that in complex decision situa-
tions, due to bounded rationality, relative simple decision rules and procedures are used
to guide actions.'"
Whereas the very idea of search heuristics in innovation activities already accounts
for some stability and inflexibility in the evolution of technology, Nelson and Winter go
one step further by saying that "there may exist certain powerful intra project heuristics
that apply when a technology is advanced in a certain direction, and payoffs from
advancing in that direction that exist under a wide range of demand conditions"."
These directions are referred to as "natural trajectories".
Such natural trajectories may be specific to a particular technology or they may be
common to a wide range of technologies. When the trajectory is specific to a technology
they speak of a fec/mo/ogica/ regime. Such a technological regime defines certain boun-
daries for technological progress and indicates directions in which progress is possible
and worth doing. The concept of a technological regime relates to technicians' beliefs
about what is feasible or at least worth attempting - which implies that cognitive aspects
are considered important. Nelson and Winter give the example of the DC3 aircraft in the
1930s which defined a particular technological regime: metal skin, low wing, piston-
powered planes. As they write: "Engineers had some strong notions regarding the
potential of this regime. For more than two decades innovation in aircraft design essen-
tially involved better exploitation of this potential; improving the engines, enlargening
the planes, making them more efficient".'* In a study by Georghiou ef a/, on post-in-
novation improvements and competition, the concept of a "technological regime" is
further developed and defined as:
* See also Freeman, 1982, op cif, chapter 7.
' Nelson and Winter, 1977, op crt, pp.51-51.
'° Richard R. Nelson and Sidney G. Winter, 1982, y4n £po/Hfionary TTieory o/ Economic C/amge,
Cambridge (Mass.): Bellknap Press, p.35.
" Nelson and Winter, 1977, op cif, pp.56-57.
" ftrd, p.57.
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a set of design parameters which embody the principles which will generate both
the physical configuration of the product and the process and materials from which
it is to be constructed. The basic design parameters are the heart of the technological
regime, and they constitute a framework of knowledge which is shared by the firms
in the industry."
The concept of a technological regime is illustrated by the example of a plastic-bodied,
electrically powered car, being part of a new technological regime as the material prop-
erties of plastics, the functioning of electric motors and the manufacturing of such a car
requires a different knowledge base, different types of engineering skills, linkages with
information networks and interactions with different supply industries." Such a tech-
nological regime does not imply a unique design. A technological regime usually con-
sists of a set of design configurations, which forms the basis for competition, research
activities and agenda of development of individual firms or business units.'*
In a similar way, Sahal speaks of "technological guideposts" charting the course of
innovation activities and "innovation avenues" that designate pathways of technological
evolution."
The idea of a common technological framework guiding research activities is also
central to the concept of a tec/mo/ogica/ paradigm developed by Giovanni Dosi, which has
been influential in the field of the economics of technical change. The concept of tech-
nological paradigm refers to Kuhn's concept of a scientific paradigm and Lakatos' theory
of scientific research programmes from the philosophy of science. It is chosen by Dosi
because the procedures and the nature of technologies are believed to be broadly similar
to those which characterize science. Just as scientific research is aimed at solving par-
ticular problems or puzzles (while neglecting others) on the basis of a certain body of
knowledge and the application of search heuristics, so are problem-solving activities by
engineers employed in organizations to develop or improve products that may be sold
in the market place. Whereas a scientific paradigm may be defined as an "outlook"
which defines the relevant problems, a "model" and a pattern of inquiry, a technological
paradigm is defined by Dosi as a "model" and "pattern" of solution of se/ected tech-
nological problems, based on se/ected principles derived from natural sciences and on
se/ecfed material technologies." Elsewhere Dosi writes:
" Luke Georghiou, J.Stanley Metcalfe, Michael Gibbons, Tim Ray, and Janet Evans, 1986, Post-
Per/bmwnce: Tec/zno/ogica/ Deoe/opmenf and Competition, London: MacMillan, p.32.
" /bid, p.34.
" 76M, p.35.
" Sahal, op rif, p.71.
'* Giovanni Dosi, 1982, Technological Paradigms and Technological trajectories: A Suggested
Interpretation of the Determinants and Directions of Technical Change, Research Po/icy, 6, p.152
(original italics).
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A technological paradigm defines contextually the needs that are meant to be ful-
filled, the scientific principles utilized for the task, and the material technology to be
used. (...) A technological paradigm is both an e*emp/flr — an artifact that is to be
developed and improved (such as a car, an integrated circuit, a lathe, each with its
particular techno-economic characteristics) — and a set o/fcewrisfics (e.g. Where do we
go from here? Where should we search? What sort of knowledge should we draw
on?)"
Examples of technological paradigms are the internal combustion engine, the oil-based
chemistry, and semi-conductors.
An important characteristic of a technological paradigm, and the concept of a
technological regime, is that there exists a core technological framework which is shared
by the entire community of technological and economic actors as the basis upon which
one looks for improvements in process efficiency and product performances. As Dosi
writes:
a technological paradigm has a powerful exc/uszon ejjfetf: the efforts and the tech-
nological imagination of engineers and of the organizations they are in are focused
in rather precise directions while they are, so the speak, "blind" with respect of other
technological possibilities"."
To describe the dynamics of technological change many students of technology use the
concept of a "technological trajectory". The use of the metaphor "trajectory" suggests that
a pathway may be defined on the basis of the characteristics of technical advances.
Examples of technological trajectories are: in aircraft technology, the loglinear improve-
ments in the tradeoffs between horsepower, gross takeoff weight, cruise speed, wing
loading, and cruise range; and, in microelectronics, the exponential trajectory of improve-
ment in the relationship between density of the electronic chips, speed of computation,
and cost per bit of information.^"
According to Dosi, his model may be used to account for both continuous changes
and discontinuities in technological innovation. Continuous changes are related to
progress along a technological trajectory defined by a technological paradigm, while
discontinuities are associated with the emergence of a new paradigm.*'
" Giovanni Dosi, 1988, Sources, Procedures and Micro-Economic Effects of Innovation, /ourna/ 0/
Economic Literature, 26(3), p.1127.
" Dosi, 1982, op cif, p.153. Long before Dosi, Veblen spoke of the importance of 'habits of thought'
in technology and economic change (Veblen, op cit).
" /bid, p.l 128-1129.
" Dosi, 1982, op eft, p.147.
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10.2 The Socio-Economic Dimension in the Stability of Techno-
logical Regimes
The above studies rightly corrected the simplistic view that most economists held about
technology, as being fine-tuned to demand and cost conditions, or, as Donald MacKenzie
puts it, "an entirely plastic entity shaped at will by the all-knowing hands of market
forces".^ However, they suffer from "deterministic overtones", as pointed out by tech-
nology sociologists like Donald MacKenzie. In the above models, engineering imagina-
tion causes technology to proceed a certain trajectory, more or less in the same way as a
stone or rocket follows a trajectory once it has been launched.
In our view, there is a clear socio-economic dimension involved in the stability of
search activities and the patterns of technological change. One of the key reasons why
technological progress often proceeds along certain trajectories (defined by a tech-
nological regime or paradigm) is that the prevailing technology and design has already
benefitted from all kinds of evolutionary improvements, in terms of costs and perfor-
mance characteristics, from a better understanding at the user side, and from the adap-
tation of socio-economic environment to a certain type of technology in terms of ac-
cumulated knowledge, capital outlays, infrastructure, available skills, production rou-
tines, social norms, regulations and life styles.
For example, the dominance of the internal combustion engine in motor vehicles is
strongly related to the improvements in the design of the engine (leading to important
improvements in speed, durability, fuel consumption), the cost savings in manufacturing
due to large-scale production and learning by doing, advances in material technology,
technical advances in machinery and equipment, organizational adaptations in order to
produce more efficiently, low fuel prices due to economies of scale and technical pro-
gress in petrol production, and the whole network build-up around the internal combus-
tion engine: the distribution of petrol, a road and service infrastructure, training of
m e c h a n i c s , e t c . .., .^w i , , ^ : • =•.. ..•••.•.-. , ' , .•••".•••
To give another example, the costs of producing a 64 megabyte chip would be
much too high for any chip-producing firm or indeed the industry as a whole had they
not been involved in producing a 4 megabyte chip and gained experience in solving
complex problems in design and production of micro-chips. Similarly, the revenues from
selling a 64 megabyte chip depend on the size of the market for computers and other
applications for chips. But this market is shaped by the stock of computers already in
use, available computer software, computer knowledge and skills in using computers,
the existing infrastructure in telecommunication and so on.
These two examples are merely used as illustrations of a more general story. Below
we will explain more systematically how the dominance of particular trajectories is
related to the "dynamic scale and learning effects" prevailing technologies have benefit-
ted from and the adaptation of the "selection environment" to the old technological
M a c K e n z i e , op c/'f, p .34.
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regime. The concepts of dynamic scale and learning effects and selection environment
also help explain why the diffusion process of radical products and processes (such as
alternative energy technologies) is likely to be slow and why the short-term costs of
large-scale technological transitions are likely to be large.
The term "dynamic scale and learning effects" denotes the evolutionary impro-
vements in the performance characteristics of a technology and the cost savings in the
manufacturing (allowing for price reductions). These dynamic scale and learning effects
are related to the establishment and growth of the manufacturing industry, technological
progress in related industries, and network externalities due to the growth of the system
(for example, the growth of the petrol distribution system, the telecommunication net-
work). An important part of these dynamic scale and learning effects are so-called
learning curve effects that allow for cost reductions in the manufacturing of a product.
20.2.1 Tecfino/ogy /eafwres m ffee sfabiKfy o/ fgcftwo/o^tca/ regimes
In the world of engineering, learning curves are a well-known phenomenon. With the
increase of production, per unit costs tend to fall. Such cost reductions per unit of output
are related to economies of scale in production (lower costs per unit of production
related to higher production scales), standardization of products, process improvements,
and learning-by-doing in manufacturing. Learning curve effects are particularly impor-
tant in processing industries (such as the chemical industry, the food industry) and in
industries involved in the mass production of consumer durables (cars, television sets,
etc.).
The learning curve, or the experience curve, may be described by the following
function: C, = C^N^'with C per unit costs (or labour input per unit of output) and N the
cumulative production Q over time.'" The parameter £> is called the learning index or
learning elasticity. In economic terms, b is the cost elasticity with respect to cumulative
production. Parameter b defines the "slope", S^ , of the learning curve, the level at which
costs fall each time the cumulated output doubles." The cost reduction with doubled
experience is described by the following expression: a = 1 - Sj_ = 1 - 2'* . Figure 10.1
depicts a typical learning curve. , ^ „,
ft,?!..
Taken from Robert U. Ayres, 1985, A Schumpeterian Mode! of Technological Substitution,
ica/ Forecasting and Socia/ C/wnge, 27: 375-83.
That is, S, = ^ " ^ " - 2"» ' '- ~ • * - - ; " ^ *' • "" " ~ ' ' * "
f
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Figure 10.1. The learning curve
Figure 10.1 demonstrates that with increasing production, per unit costs fall. (Sometimes
the unit costs are expressed as a decreasing function of time). To illustrate the impor-
tance of learning curves, Table 10.1 presents price reductions (in percentages) with
doubled experience for a number of consumer durables.
Product and Years
Electric refrigerators:
1922-40
Room air conditioners:
1946-61
1946-74
Dishwashers:
1947-68
1947-74
Black-and-white television:
1948-60
1948-74
Electric clothes dryers:
1950-61
1950-74
Color television:
1961-70
1961-74
Price
Reduction
50.2
48.0
73.0
42.9
55.7
52.1
82.0
27.6
54.4
33.5
49.9
Average
Annual
Price
Reduction
2.6
3.0
2.5
2.0
2.0
4.0
3.0
2.3
2.2
3.4
3.6
Price
Reduction
with Doubl-J
Experience
7.0
8.0
12.0
10.0
11.0
13.0
22.0
6.0
12.0
S.O
7.0
Table 10.1. Price reductions over time and related to experience for consumer
durables. Source: Frank Bass (1980, S61).*
* Frank M. Bass, 1980, The Relationship between Diffusion Rates, Experience Curves, and
Demand Elasticities for Consumer Durable Technological Innovations, /owrna/ o/ Business, 53,
1980, S51-S67.
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As a further illustration, Figure 10.2 gives estimates for parameter b, the learning elas-
ticity, and a, the cost reduction with doubled experience, found in a number of indus-
tries (the chemical industry, the computer industry, electric power generation industry
and the automobile industry).
.70
.60
Semi-conductor octive
elements (1961-1977) J/unit
- lnCI-a)
In2
.50
.10
.30
.20
.10
4t—HOS dynamic RAM production (1973-78)
/ JAi lobi t
4-
integrated Circuits (1961-72) $/unit»
!e-standing Gas Ranges (1917-67) I/unit
HrDigital Watches (1975-78) J per unit.Hand-held Calculators (1975-78) $ per unit
Memory Drives (1975-78) $ per kilobit
PVC Price (1914-1968) */lb.
Steel Production (1920-19S5) man-hrtAon
*t-fAircraft Assembly (1925-57) man-hrs/unit
•/• —(Petroleum Cracking (1912-58) »/bbl» -i
/ /Crushed Limestone (1929-71) J/ton« I
ijlOS-LSl production (1970-76) J/unit
Petroleum refining (1860-1962) man-hrs/»bl
Model "T" Ford (1910-1926) I per unit
7
Catalytic cracking (1916-1958) man-hrs/bbl.
Electric pov,er generation (1910-1955) $/kwh»
.10 .20 .30 .40 .50
Figure 10.2. Parameters of the experience curve for various industries. Source: Ayres
(1985, p.379).
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Table 10.1 and Figure 10.2 clearly show that learning curves exist and that they are an
important phenomenon. In the case of consumer durables, such as refrigerators, air
conditioners, dishwashers, television sets and electric clothes dryers, price reductions
between 5 and 22 per cent were connected with a doubling of cumulated production in
different post-war periods. In the semi-conductor industry, in the 1964-77 period, cost
reductions per unit of output of as much as 40 per cent were associated with a doubling
of cumulated output. In steel production, pvc production, aircraft assembly, petroleum
cracking and refining, cost reduction between 15 and 25 per cent were realized with each
doubling of cumulated production, whereas for the famous T-ford automobile this was
'only' 14 percent. These figures are even more impressive when compared with the
growth of real disposable income in the same period. Of course, the increases in real
disposable income and the price reductions in several product categories are correlated
with each other: price reductions and productivity gains led to increases in real income
which in turn stimulated demand and helped producing industries in achieving further
cost reductions.
In all these cases, important cost savings were realized that led to lower prices and
higher sales. At the user side, learning and organizational adaptations led to cost gains,
which makes that firm are reluctant to shift to a new technology. Price reductions and
cost gains in using the new technology, however, were not the only factors in stimulat-
ing product sales. Other factors include post-innovation improvements in design, perfor-
mance, functions, user-friendliness, and durability. The redesign of products opened up
new markets and helped firms to expand in early markets. Although there does not exist
an analytical parameter describing these kinds of post-innovation product improvements,
historical studies show that they were numerous and important for the expansion and
opening up of markets. Many historical studies show that, at the time of their introduc-
tion, new technologies were often ill-developed in terms of performance characteristics
and offered only few advantages over existing technologies. They needed to be im-
proved, in terms of both prices and technical characteristics, in order to be diffused more
widely. As Nathan Rosenberg notices:
most inventions are relatively crude and inefficient at the date when they are first
recognized as constituting a new innovation. They are, of necessity, badly adapted
to many of the ultimate uses to which they will eventually be put; therefore, they
may offer only very small advantages, or perhaps none at all, over previously
existing techniques. Diffusion under these circumstances will necessarily be slow
Network externalities may reinforce the entrenchment of technologies in the economic
system. With the growth of the network of users, a network technology becomes more
attractive to its users. An example is the fax machine. The more people or firms adopt
* Nathan Rosenberg, 1976, Factors Affecting the Diffusion of Technology, in his book Perspective
on Tec/mo/ogy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p.195.
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the fax machine, the more valuable it becomes to the individual users. Network exter-
nalities that result from the growth of the system are a special kind of increasing returns
with adoption, which are being analyzed in Brian Arthur.^ Five sources of increasing
returns with adoption are identified by Arthur: learning by using, network externalities,
scale economies in production, informational increasing returns and technological inter-
relatedness. With increasing returns of adoption, a technology becomes more attractive
the more it is adopted, which further stimulates its adoption. Thus, in a situation where
two network technologies are competing, a technology that gets ahead early may for that
reason end up dominating the market. As Brian Arthur writes: - T«,i;
If one technology gets ahead by good fortune, it gains an advantage. It can then
attract further adopters who might otherwise have gone along with one of its rivals,
with the result that the adoption market may 'tip' in its favour and may end up
dominated by it. Given other circumstances, of course, a different technology might *
have been favoured early on, and it might have come to dominate the market.**
When there exist increasing returns with adoption it is entirely possible that society
becomes locked into a suboptimal technology. Well-known examples of suboptimal
technologies which came to dominate the market are the VHS-video system and the
QWERTY typewriter keyboard.** There may also be an element of self-fulfilling proph-
ecy involved in persistent patterns of technological change, as noted by MacKenzie. like
other sociologists, MacKenzie objects to the idea of technological change having a "mo-
mentum" or an "internal logic of its own" for having "deterministic overtones". Accor-
ding to MacKenzie, "a technological trajectory is an "institution" which like any institu-
tion is sustained not through any internal logic but because of the interests that develop
in its continuance and the belief that it will continue"." -..»•-• •
10.2.2 ITie prob/em of compatibility
This brings us to the role of institutions and technical interrelationships in the selection
of technologies and the ways in which they shape technological trajectories. As a theoret-
ical organizer we use the term "selection environment", stemming from the evolutionary
*' W. Brian Arthur, 1988, Competing Technologies: An Overview, in Giovanni Dosi, Chris
Freeman, Richard R. Nelson, Gerald Silverberg and Luc Soete (editors), Tec/mica/ Orange and Economic
Theory, London: Pinter Publishers, pp.590-607.
* fttf, p.59i. : , , . . - - ~ i . :
" The story of the QWERTY typewriter keyboard which became the dominant standard for
keyboards despite the superiority of the later developed Dvorak keyboard is described in Paul A.
David, 1985, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, /4merican Economic Review AEA papers and
proceedings, 75: 332-337.
* M a c K e n z i e , op eft, p . 3 4 . .,-•;..^i ;.»r,-*>.:' v A :« *-i>••••»••. j • « •>; y
I!
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theory in biology, and introduced into the economic literature by Nelson and Winter. It
is chosen as a more general term than "market" (or market demand) to emphasize the
institutions involved and the mechanisms behind the selection of an innovation. The
selection environment is defined by the capital outlays, physical infrastructure, supplier-
user linkages, production routines, skills, technical standards, government rules, norms,
people's preferences and beliefs.
The term "selection environment" is used to illustrate the importance of the his-
torical socio-economic context in the selection of innovations. Whereas economists use
the concept of a demand curve, describing the relationship between quantities demanded
and purchase price, we prefer the term "selection environment", which brings out the
systematic nature of technology and economy, the transfer of knowledge and infor-
mation that are necessary for exchange to take place, social processes of habituation and
taste formation, and political factors in the selection of an innovation. The important
point here is that a technology needs to be incorporated into a larger technical and socio-
economic system which has evolved in the process of development.
Between firms, but also inside firms, all kinds of technical, economic and institutio-
nal interrelationships have developed that may hinder the adoption and use of a new
technology. Within an economic system, activities are coordinated and were optimized in
the past. Patterns of exchange and information transfer are established through supplier-
user relationships and intra-organizational linkages. What we have is economic actors
dealing with each other, using materials with specific physico-chemical properties, using
special-purpose machinery and equipment, employing workers with certain skills and
knowledge, and operating within a broader socio-economic context. A new process or
product must be embedded in the existing production processes of potential users and
must comply with a diversity of qualitative demands (in terms of performance norms,
durability, user-friendliness, etc.).
In such circumstances, the introduction of new technologies may require the
replacement of large parts of the production system, creating an unusually heavy ob-
solescence problem. A special kind of technical interrelationships are technical standards
that create well-known problems of compatibility and raise complex issues of strategic
behaviour and government intervention.^ Institutional rigidities usually aggravate the
problem of technical interrelationships. The use of new technologies may require new
labour skills, management styles, and other kinds of institutional changes (for instance
new legislation). Vested interests (firms, industries, workers associations, etc.) may also
hinder the adoption of new technologies and the growth of new technological sys-
tems." ^ ^ _ ^ , , , ^ ,, ^ . , , •, , ^
" For an overview of these issues, see Paul A. David and Susan Greenstein, 1990, The Economics
of Compatibility Standards: An Introduction to Recent Research, Economics o/ Jwuroo/ion and Nero
Tectoio/ogy, 1: 3-41.
* The importance of institutional factors in technological change is a central element of 77K
o/ Economic Progress by Clarence E. Ayres, first published in 1944 by University of Carolina Press.
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Consumer tastes, life styles and habits are also an important part of the selection
environment. But consumer tastes, preferences and the ways in which people live their
lives are not autonomous factors: they are shaped by the adoption and use of past
technologies. Technological progress in food distribution, together with the widespread
diffusion of the automobile, have changed shopping habits dramatically. Also the move-
ment towards living in suburbs and the countryside is related to the availability of the
automobile as a convenient means of individual transport. These two examples illustrate
that technology is an important factor in shaping people's lives, either directly through
the services provided by the technology or indirectly by increasing real disposable
income. Of course, we do not want to suggest that social changes are the result of
antecedent changes in technology only. Technological change and socio-economic trends
co-evolve and interact.
Besides social adaptations in response to technological change there may also be
mechanisms of habituation and endogenous taste formation at work." People have
gained experience with certain goods and have become habituated to them. An impor-
tant implication of this is that new technologies are evaluated in terms of the characteris-
tics and services of the old technologies. This may explain the trajectory of ever more
powerful cars in a world where speed limits are becoming more and more tight. The fact
that people are used to having a car with a certain mileage and speed may obstruct the
development of a car with totally different characteristics (for instance, an electric vehicle
with a relatively low speed and range and long recharging times). In the process of
consumer taste formation there are also complex social aspects involved such as status,
appeal, emulation, social acceptance, etc. These social aspects are still not well under-
stood, but they may have important implications for the ultimate choice of technologies.
New ideas about social behaviour and different values may be needed for new tech-
nologies to be adopted and used.
The government is also an important actor within the selection environment.
Through its science and technology policy, the government is involved in the generation
of knowledge and through its education policy in education and skill formation. Public
authorities are often heavily involved in the provision of infrastructures (roads, telecom-
munication, etc.) which are so important for the growth of new technological systems.
As a last point, the government's tax policy, industrial policy, procurement and regula-
tion all affect the economic process in important ways.
But just as firms and consumers are adapted to the old technological regimes, so
are governments. Environmental and safety standards are usually based on well-proved
compliance technologies, which hinders the adoption and development of more ad-
vanced technologies. Industrial policy is often aimed at the protection of old industries
that are challenged by new firms and technological advances. Time is needed for new
* The terms "habituation" and "endogenous taste formation" are used by Paul David in his 1975
book Tec/ini'ca/ Cfeoice, Innopafion ami Economic Growf/i. Essays on Ammcan and Brifis/i Experience in </ie
M'neteenf/j Century, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. A recurrent theme in Paul David's work
is the importance of historical factors in the rate and direction of technological change. . „...-. .._.
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skills and ideas to penetrate in the education system, and so on. The key problem for
new technologies to become incorporated into the socio-economic system is that of
compatibility. Within the process of economic development, technical interrelationships
and institutional rigidities have developed that may hinder technological shifts. New
technologies that can be easily embedded in the production system and people's ways of
life will diffuse more rapidly than technologies which require the replacement of capital
goods, a new infrastructure, different skills, new ideas about production and con-
sumption, and regulatory changes. Not only do the characteristics of the selection en-
vironment determine the relative use of technologies over time but these characteristics
also have implications for the kind of search activities that are likely to be undertaken by
for-profit organizations.
The above helps to explain why manufacturers often strive to develop so-called
"drop-in" innovations which can be easily embedded in existing production processes
and require few changes in the selection environment. For example, in the case of chlor-
ofluorocarbons (CFCs), research efforts are directed towards the development of CFC
substitutes (e.g. as cooling medium in refrigerators) that can be easily embedded in the
economic and social environment rather than towards the development o/ totaliy dif-
ferent production techniques and products (e.g. a refrigerator with a totally different
cooling system). Not only do the manufacturers of CFCs have an interest in developing
these innovations that belong to the old CFC trajectory but so do the users of CFCs. The
idea of a selection environment shaped by the application of past technologies also
explains the dominance of "end-of-pipe" techniques over "process-integrated" changes
because the former can simply be added to the existing production processes.
10.3 Conclusion
Contrary to popular public perceptions of revolutionary technical change and heroic
inventors, modern historical studies find that technological change is much more a
cumulative and gradual process, proceeding in quite specific directions. Underlying
these technical advances are engineering ideas and beliefs of technical opportunities for
improvements. These engineering beliefs and expectations of where to go to, what
problems to solve, and what sort of knowledge to use, are often shared among com-
munities of technologists. The reason why such beliefs are shared is believed to be
related to economic supply and demand factors (past capital formation, accumulated
knowledge and experience, cost efficiencies and product improvements achieved with
the old technologies, social habituation and adaptation, etc.) rather than to cognitive
limitations of imagination, although the two explanations are strongly related since they
reinforce each other.
Of course, the argument should not be carried too far. Although there are some
powerful mechanisms that reinforce the embedment of technologies in the economic and
social system, there were major technological regime shifts in the past. How such tran-
sitions come about, and particularly what economic factors are involved in large-scale
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technological shifts will be discussed in the next chapter.
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Understanding Technological Regime Shifts
This chapter examines shifts in technological regimes as opposed to changes witfiin a
technological regime. Key factors in inducing and sustaining shifts in technological
regimes are identified and discussed in section 1, using historical examples to illustrate
theoretical arguments. Section 2 looks into the phenomenon of competing designs in
periods of radical technological change, where different designs compete for market
dominance. This is followed in section 3 by a discussion of the transition process into a
new technological regime. Here we provide an explanation as to how it is possible for a
new technological regime to emerge and replace the old one — emphasising the impor-
tance of market niches, available knowledge that may be used, institutional support for
new technologies and the role of expectations. Section 4 deals with the relation between
technological regimes shifts and firm behaviour. It asks the following questions: How do
new technological systems come about in a world of specialization and decentralized
decision-making? How are ideas of radically new technologies that require a different
knowledge base and production capabilities translated into tradeable products? The final
section draws some conclusions.
11.1 Determinants of Radical Technological Change
When taking a long-term historical perspective, we see that at certain times technological
paradigms and systems become outdated and are replaced by new ones, despite the self-
sustaining elements involved in the development of technological paradigms and
regimes. At certain historical moments, radical innovations are produced challenging the
old paradigm and gradually replacing it (although the two may co-exist for a long time).
Despite the importance of such events, our knowledge of how radical innovations come
into being and how they come to replace the old regime is rather limited. There do exist,
however, certain clues about what induces technological breakthroughs and some ideas
of the factors that govern the diffusion of radical innovations and the evolution of large
technological systems.
It is frequently stated that radical innovations depend on new scientific insights
opening up new technological and economic opportunities.' For example, Maxwell's
' The importance of scientific discoveries to the development of several radical innovations
(synthetic dyes, plastics, drugs) in the chemical industry has been analyzed empirically in Vivien
Walsh, 1984, Invention and Innovation in the Chemical Industry: Demand-Pull or Discovery-Push?,
Po/icy 13: 211-34.
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theory of electromagnetism in the 1860s was instrumental to the development of radio
technology, although the understanding of the phenomenon of electromagnetism did not
lead directly to the radio as a new consumer product; several decades of applied
research and experimentation were needed to turn it into a tradeable product. Radical
innovations sometimes also critically depended on breakthroughs and advances in
engineering and material technology. Perhaps the best example is James Wart's steam
engine with its separate condensing chamber, which depended for its production and
success on Wilkingson's boring mill.
This raises the question as to what other factors are conducive to the development
of radical innovations. So far, we have discussed the importance of new scientific
insights to the development of radically original products. They provided essential
knowledge and guidance to engineers in achieving technological breakthroughs. Pressing
technological needs that could not be met with available technologies and required
fundamentally different solutions are another factor. These technological needs may stem
from bottlenecks or reverse salients that arise in the growth of technological systems, or
stem from pervasive shifts in consumer preferences. Many technological breakthroughs
are also achieved in war times, when demand for new and better military technology is
especially high as is the need to develop substitute products and materials when nations
are cut off from critical supplies. To these technological needs, we may add the demand
for more environmentally benign technologies to arrest environmental degradation.
It may also be that old trajectories have reached certain technical limits or that
further advances along the same trajectory run into increasing marginal costs.* In terms
of the modern philosophy of science, engineers may confront an "anomaly" which leads
them to search into a new direction of technological advance, based on a different
knowledge base and engineering principles. Such anomalies need not constitute acute
and pressing problems. Also the perception of theoretical limits for advancement may
induce firms and technologists to shift towards a different technological regime. Edward
Constant uses the term "presumptive anomaly" for such a situation.* A presumptive
anomaly emerged in the late 1920s when insights from aerodynamics indicated that the
conventional piston engine-propeller system would not function at the near-sonic speeds
foreseen for airplanes.* This led to the invention of the turbojet engine.
Often, radical innovations are produced by newly established firms or by indus-
tries diversifying into a new market. There are several possible explanations as to why
radical innovations are developed and supplied by outsiders. First, a radical innovation
may require a different knowledge base which may not be available in the manufactur-
ing industry. In relation to this, "community practice may define a cognitive universe
* Paolo Saviotti and J. Stanley Metcalfe, 1984, A Theoretical Approach to the Construction of
Technological Output Indicators, Research
 Po/icy, 13, p.149.
' Edward E. Constant, 1980, Tfee Origins o/ f/ie Tw&o/ef Rew/ufion, Baltimore: John Hopkins
University Press, p.75.
* Hughes, 1987, op cit, p.75, who based himself on Constant, op rit, pp.194-207 and 242.
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that inhibits recognition of a radical alternative to convention practice".' Second, vested
interests may obstruct the development of a different technological system or paradigm.
According to Thomas Hughes, this was the reason why so many technological break-
throughs in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were achieved by indepen-
dent inventors who had distanced themselves from large organizations: 0 ; : '
They [the independents] rightly sensed that the large organization vested in existing
technology rarely nurtured inventions that by their nature contributed nothing to
: the momentum of the organization and even challenged the status quo in the tech-
nological world of which the organization was a leading member. Radical inventions
often deskill workers, engineers, and managers, wipe out financial investments, and
generally stimulate anxiety in large organizations. Large organizations sometimes
reject the inventive proposals of the radicals as technically crude and economically
risky, but in so doing they are simply acknowledging the character of the new and
radical.'
? ' • _ , ; - • • • • • . • ' • • ? ; • k . ; • ' • . - • • • ' . • • • > > • ; • < • < I t i f f f . ' " . . ' • • . . • • * ! • J ^ . • , 1 •; • • : • • - , ? * • f "
This same argument applies to modern firms, although such resistance may be less fierce
now technological competition is becoming more and more important to the survival of
the firm. Radical inventions may still endanger current activities of firms and for that
reason be rejected or delayed. On the other hand, new technological developments may
be nurtured by industries or organizations having an interest in the development of the
new product. The development of clean coal-burning technologies is strongly supported
by the coal industry in an attempt to secure the usage of coal in a world where environ-
mental regulation is getting tighter. Electricity producers have supported the develop-
ment of the electric car, as have producers of plastics. Customer firms may also actively
support the development of new technologies, by providing information about product
requirements and their involvement in tests. Even consumers may be involved directly
in the support of new technologies. As an interesting example, the German branch of
Greenpeace has provided financial means for the development of a CFC-free refrigerator
by an East German firm. They also took care of the marketing of the product through
their magazine.
The propensity to take risk may also be an important factor in the development of
radical innovations. Risk-taking entrepreneurs are often identified with the development
of radically new products. They may be inventor-entrepreneurs such as Thomas Edison,
venture capitalists that financially support an innovation, or managers that lead their
firm into a new technology field. Schumpeter even based his theory of economic devel-
opment on these entrepreneurs, picturing them as heroic men of great will, vision and
persistence.
* Edward E. Constant, 1984, Communities and Hierarchies: Structure in the Practice of Science
and Technology, in Rachel Laudan (editor), 77K Nature 0/ Tedmo/ogica/ Know/edge: Are Modefa of
C/iange Re/ezwnr?, Dordrecht: D. Reidel, pp.27-46.
Hughes, op cif, p.59. *
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It should be emphasized that the importance of entrepreneurship and pioneering
firms lies not so much in the market share they are able to achieve, for that is likely to
be small (at least in the early years), but much more in inducing other firms to take risks
and change their strategies. For the development of an alternative trajectory it is impor-
tant that the traditional firms possessing great market power, specialized knowledge and
large financial means commit themselves to the development of this trajectory. It is only
through the commitment of other firms that a dynamic learning process may emerge,
resulting in a wide array of post-innovation product improvements, complementary
innovations and cost reductions, which gives the new regime enough "momentum" so as
to replace the old one.
As a last general point, also non-market mechanisms were often important in the
establishment of a new technological regime or paradigm. As noted by Chris Freeman,
universities and public laboratories often played an important role in the generation of
the original radical innovations, as did government procurement in their early applica-
tions. Each new paradigm requires a modification to infrastructure which can only occur
as a result of institutional and regulatory changes in each country. Particularly important
in the evolution of the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) paradigm
were public programmes for computer technology and public policies for the telecom-
munications infrastructure/ „ .. , ... ^ , , - , , , , .
11.2 Competing Designs / ; , , ;-v
In the previous section we have discussed the emergence of radical innovations which
came to replace old technological paradigms and technological systems — where we
noted the importance of fundamental breakthroughs in science and technology, particu-
lar technological needs, the economic context (and wider social and political context),
and the presence of entrepreneurs in such events. From the above one may get the
impression that the replacement of old technological regimes was a relatively straightfor-
ward process. It would be a mistake to think so. In many cases it was not a straightfor-
ward event to the people living in those ages, not even to those who were actively
involved in the development of the new regime. At times in which a radical invention
was developed which later came to dominate the market, there were usually different
technologies and different designs to satisfy a particular need. The fact that different
technologies were produced and supported by various organizations implies that the
later dominance of one particular technology and design was not at all obvious.*
' Chris Freeman, 1992, A Green Techno-Economic Paradigm for the World Economy', in his book
Tte Economics 0/ Hope, London: Pinter Publishers, p.202.
* To illustrate this: in 1893, a group of 74 prominent Americans were asked to write an essay
about what the world would look like in 1993. These predictions were recently published in the book
Today T/wn: America's Best Minis LooJfc 100 Years info to Future on to Occasion 0/ to 2593 Wor/d's
Co/umfeian Exposition, compiled by Dave Walter (American & World Geographic Publishing, 1993).
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Some examples of different technologies competing for a market of adopters are
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In the 1890s the motor carriage could be powered by steam, or by gasoline, or by
electric batteries. In more modern times nuclear power can be generated by light-
water, or gas-cooled, or heavy-water, or sodium-cooled reactors. Solar energy can be
generated by crystalline-silicon or amorphous-silicon technologies. An AIDS vaccine
may eventually become possible by cell-type modification methods, or by chemical
synthesis, or by anti-idiotype methods. Video-recording can be carried out by Sony
Betamax or by VHS technologies'
The reason why various technologies with different designs based on different engineer-
ing principles are developed at about the same time is related to the following factors.
First, the opening up of technological and economic opportunities by new scientific
knowledge (as in the case of nuclear power). Second, the emergence of particular tech-
nological needs (as in the case of an AIDS vaccine). Third, the discovery of a new market
(as for bicycles). Fourth, uncertainty as to the "best technical solution" for meeting certain
market needs (which is related to uncertainty about the future rate of technological
progress). Fifth, uncertainty about market demand and the evolution thereof. Sixth, the
fact that the technologies are produced by organizations with different technological
capabilities and interests.
Since all these factors usually operate at the same time, it is difficult to assess their
relative importance. Of these factors, however, uncertainty about technological opportun-
ities and user needs are known to constitute two fundamental problems. The long-run
success of a product strongly depends on the rate of technological advance that may be
realized in a certain product and design. The technical advances to be realized depend
on the potential for improving performance characteristics and achieving cost efficiencies
and on the ability of innovating firms to solve certain critical problems. It also depends
on the rate of technical progress in other industries and scientific advances at univer-
sities. All types of advances are difficult to predict.
Uncertainty about user needs and requirements (and the evolution thereof) is
another serious problem. Although engineers and marketers may have certain notions
about what "the market" wants, market demand for a new product does not articulate
itself in an unambiguous and quantitative way. As Morris Teubal writes:
Almost all forecasts turned out to be wrong, in fact most predictions were completely wrong. For
example, the common opinion in 1893 was that in 1993 the railroad would still be the fastest means
of transport. Air travel was considered to be an alternative way of transport, but only in balloons.
None of the forecasters anticipated the future dominance of the automobile, a product which at that
time had already found its way in the street (based on Edward Cornish, 1993 as Predicted in 1893: If
They Could See Us Now, 77ie Futurist, May-June, 1993).
' Arthur, op rit, p.590. -:
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Technological innovation, like the activity of production, may be regarded as
induced by human needs, but unlike it these needs are frequently not represented
by an unambiguous and well-defined market or demand curve. Innovations gen-
erally involve a new product component and in so far as this is so they precede the
generation of markets and demand curves. They should accordingly be regarded as
responses to more general, less-defined needs than those expressible in terms of
well-defined markets or demands (original italics).'"
It should be noted that the problem of user needs is not so much whether people or
firms would like to /iaz>e the innovation but about how much they are actually prepared
to pay for it (their "willingness-to-pay") — which depends on their conception of the
product and their valuation of the service characteristics. This problem of user needs and
market demand is particularly large for radical innovations (a computer, an automobile,
a radio or even a bicycle) that constitute a radical departure from past practices. For
radical innovations, the problem of user needs is not only a problem of preferences
which are not revealed in the market place but also a problem of needs and wants which
are not yet determined. What we may have, in the words of Teubal, is consumers who
learn about what they want or need."
It furthermore implies that innovating firms involved in the commercialization of a
radically new product must not only engage in developing and producing the artefact,
but must also engage in shaping the market: to organize the product's distribution, to
inform customers about its existence and performance characteristics, to persuade them
to purchase the new product, and to educate them in using it." They may also need to
go into scientific and public debates about the efficacy and desirability of the new
product or to persuade policy makers to change the legal framework (the definition of
property rights, the setting of more strict environmental standards, etc.).
11.3 The Shift into a New Technological Regime
Up until now we have not discussed how it is possible for a radical innovation to
establish itself as a dominant technology in the market place. In chapter 9, we noted that
there exist powerful mechanisms that reinforce the entrenchment of a technology in the
sodoeconomic system. How are radical innovations able to compete with well-developed
technologies that are adapted to user needs and integrated in the economic system? One
explanation is the presence of a specialised market for which no real alternative is
'° Morris Teubal, 1979, On User Needs and Need Determination: Aspects of the Theory of Tech-
nological Innovation' in M.J. Baker (editor), /ndMSfria/ /nmroation: TTKOTI/, Po/icy, Dij^ 'usttm, London:
MacMillan, p.266.
" /bid, p.275.
" Kenneth Green, 1992, Creating Demand for Biotechnology: Shaping Technologies and Markets',
in Coombs ef a/., op dt., pp.169-170. • r
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available. For example, the first steam engines, the Newcomen and Savary engine, could
compete with alternative power sources in only one niche market: deep-drainage min-
ing." These early market niches are important for the further development of the new
technology. Besides providing necessary financial means, the experiences of users are an
important source of information in helping firms further to improve the product.
Radical technologies may also benefit from accumulated experience in other sec-
tors, and from the presence of a network in which it can be easily introduced. It is
perhaps not well known that the automobile owed much of its success to the bicycle.
Experience accumulated in bicycle production was put into good use in the automobile
industry and an improved road infrastructure was already present. Existing components
and products could often be incorporated in, or combined with, new technologies.
Photographs of the first automobiles clearly show that the automobile originally was
nothing else than a carriage powered by an engine instead of being drawn by a horse
(the early expression of a "horseless-carriage" thus described the first automobiles rather
well). Only in a few respects did radically new products constitute a radical break with
the past, which suggests that the term "radical" is somewhat misleading. Radical innova-
tions often combined the new with the old (or even combined older technologies) and
often rightly so because this helped the product to survive the initial harsh market
selection and establish itself in the market place. A good example of an intermediate
technology were the first steamships. According to Joel Mokyr, "the first steamships
were really sailing ships with auxiliary engines, with steam only helping out against
unfavourable winds and tides".'''
As noted by Chris Freeman, in every change of a techno-economic paradigm which
has occurred so far, the new paradigm already emerged and developed within the
previous one. Steam power (the second techno-economic paradigm) was based on a
technology already well established. Electric power (the third techno-economic para-
digm) was developing over half a century before the generation and transmission of
electricity became widespread towards the end of the nineteenth century. Mass produc-
tion (the fourth techno-economic paradigm) was already established in such industries as
meat-packing and automobiles decades before it became the dominant system. The fifth
information and communication technology paradigm has been developing since the
Second World War to the point where it is achieving dominance today."
•'. : ? • • • < . - " ' - . ' • ;
" Tine Bruland and Olav Wicken, 1993, Large-Scale Technological Transitions in Economic
History: Steam Power and Electricity, Chapter 5 of Rene Kemp et a/, Technology and the Transition to
Environmental Stability. Continuity and Change in Technological Systems, final report for SEER
programme of the Commission of European Communities, p.112.
" Joel Mokyr, 1989, TwCTiry-Fiw Centuries o/ Tedmo/ogica/ Change: ^n Historica/ Surrey, London:
Harwood Academic Publishers, p.84.
• ' . - • : ; • • • : • . . : i ; • • . - : » ; • • • . . ; • t . * ' . i . . . ' • ' - " • . f " . ; i f « * "
" Freeman, 1992, op cif., p.207. . < • /sv
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11.4 Firm Behaviour and Technological Regime Shifts "*•***!
In the preceding sections we discussed technological regime shifts without an explicit
discussion of firm behaviour. This is a clear shortcoming since firms are central institu-
tions in the shaping of trajectories of technological advance: user needs are translated in
economic goods by firms and production of these goods is organized in firms. Unfortu-
nately, the relationship between firm behaviour and technological regime shifts is a
relatively under-researched area. It involves the integration of studies which have been
carried out separately from each other: evolutionary theories of technical change, corpor-
ate decision making and strategy, and organisation theory. It raises a number of ques-
tions which are highly relevant to a better understanding of this important relationship.
For instance: How do new technological regimes come about in a world of specialization
and decentralized and myopic decision making? How are innovating firms able to
appropriate the economic benefits from systemic innovations? What are the implications
of economic organization for the development of new technological systems?
To start with the first question: How is it possible for firms with a restricted knowledge
base and highly specific technological capabilities to engage in developing a radical
technology which requires different knowledges, skills, machines and performs different
functions? Perhaps there does not exist a good answer to this problem. Perhaps firms
underestimate the problems involved in the development and commercialization of a
radically original product. Maybe it is overoptimism in the commercial viability of
radically original technologies that induces firms to develop and introduce a radically
new product or process. In this connection, Ian Miles notices that, just as in the establish-
ment of a new scientific paradigm, there may be an element of "hype" in the emergence
of a new technological regime:
This hype involves overstatement of the speed of change and rapidity of realisation "'
of benefits, it creates heroes and exemplars, and it serves to cement together the • *
networks of agents whose semi-coordinated action is necessary to bring about •.•• in-
substantial shift m mtercormected technologies and practices." . ;,, _ ;, , • . .,;
Although this may be an important element in technological regimes shifts, there are
other explanations. One such explanation is that radical innovations are produced by
firms with a knowledge base which is highly relevant to the new product. For example,
firms in the dye and organic chemicals industry with special knowledge in synthetic
chemistry moved into pharmaceutics (a field traditionally based on analytical and
extractive chemistry), and oil companies moved into the new business of producing
" Ian Miles, 'Shifting Paradigms: How are Transition Paths Constructed?', internal discussion
paper EC-project Technological Paradigms and Transition Paths: The Case of Energy Technologies,
PREST, Manchester. This corresponds to the idea of self-fulfilling prophecies in technology develop-
ment expressed by MacKenzie, op cit.
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plastics.'* New firms may also be created by inventor-entrepreneurs, as done by people
like Edison, Perkin, Baekeland and more recently (with less success so far) by
bioscientists with the help of venture capital.
Firms may also decide to collaborate with other firms in order to develop a new
innovation. They may engage in joint R&D projects, or involve users in experiments with
the new product. When learning curve effects are believed to exist, they may decide to
sell the product at a loss initially, as some kind of investment, in order to benefit from
user experience and achieve cost efficiencies in manufacturing through accumulated
experience. Such a strategy, however, has the danger of running into vast financial losses
and will only be undertaken by large organizations with sufficient financial means.
Another possible strategy is to involve potential beneficiaries from the new product in its
development, although uncertainty about the likely economic gains may prevent poten-
tial beneficiaries from taking part in the development (both technically and financially).
Such firms may also be unwilling to share economic benefits with the innovator, which
brings us to the issue of appropriability.
The appropriability conditions are about the ability of the original innovator to
capture the benefits from the innovation and "hold off other firms from eating too much
and too rapidly into these returns"." As noted by David Teece, it may be more difficult
for suppliers of systemic innovations that often require complementary assets (special
materials, machinery, skills) to appropriate the benefits from innovation. Control over
complementary assets may be necessary to capture the benefits from innovation when
the appropriation regime is weak." Elsewhere, Teece discusses the vertical integration
of General Motors into electrical equipment supply and its implications for the develop-
ment of the diesel electric locomotive. In the case of General Motors it is found that this
integration reduced costs by "internalizing market exchange under circumstances (uncer-
tainty, technological interdependence) which generated significant contractual diffi-
culties".*" Furthermore, the pace of product development was stimulated by a more
harmonious information exchange. Teece concludes that "the experience with vertical
integration in the diesel electric locomotive building industry suggests that technological
innovation displaying interdependences among the parts is greatly facilitated by com-
mon ownership of the parts"."
This does not imply that vertical integration is always conducive to the devel-
opment of systemic innovations, a point taken on board by Teece, when he writes that
" Walsh, op eft, pp.227-232. . , ,
" Richard R. Nelson, 1987, Understanding Tedino/ogjcai C/wnge as an £z»/ttJionary Process, Amster-
dam: North-Holland, p.52. -.. •• > - ...,-, . . .
" David J. Teece, 1986, Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integration,
Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy, Research Po/icy, 15: 285-305.
" David J. Teece, Technological Change and the Nature of the Firm, in Dosi et a/., op rit, p.274.
" /bid, p.274.
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"older, vertically integrated firms may have a greater commitment to older technology
because of the large technology-specific investments they have made upstream and
downstream"." This leaves the issue whether vertical integration is favourable to the
development of radical innovations rather inconclusive (although Teece is of the opinion
that the favourable appropriability conditions under common ownership outweigh the
unwillingness of firms to "cannibalize the value of past investments"). Of course, the
whole issue of appropriation is much more complex. The appropriability conditions also
depend on the market power of the firm and the existence of entry barriers preventing
other firms from entering the industry and challenging incumbent firms.
Important as the issue of appropriability of economic benefits may be, to us, a
greater problem seems to be that there are few or no benefits to reap, at least not in the
early stage, as the new technology has to compete with well-developed, existing technol-
ogies, depends for its success on technical advances (in material technology, complemen-
tary technologies) outside the innovating firm, may need the construction of physical
infrastructure, and must find ways of persuading potential customers into buying the
new product. Probably more important for the take-off of the new regime is that an
early market niche may be found for some applications. Besides providing financial
means, it helps to build "a wide constituency behind the product" as Ian Miles calls it,
finding support from other actors in the selection environment (firms, government
agencies, beneficiaries).^ -,:-, ; .. ..-..:, ., .< . . ..;,,,. >, >•/.,.
For the innovating firm to capture such a market niche, it may need to engage in
what Arie Rip and Johan Schot call "strategic niche management": the identification and
shaping of the market in which the new technology may first be employed. Kenneth
Green speaks of creating a "market space" and describes how biotechnology firms
attempted to create a market space for monoclonal antibodies, a promising cancer
therapeutic. He describes how in the case of monoclonal antibodies, biotechnology firms
identified diagnostics as products that could be quick revenue-earners, as they could be
produced in small volumes (so there would be few scale-up problems from laboratory
experiments), extensive in-human testing would not be required (since they were
intended for in citro use), and they could be used for quick, cheap diagnosis for a range
of infectious diseases for which no equivalent competing technology existed.** The fact
that even for this application, it proved to be difficult for biotechnology firms to make
money illustrates how difficult it is to create a market for a radically new product.
To give another example, firms in the motor car industry are engaged in develop-
ing electric vehicles. The following market segments are identified as being suited for
^ /bid, p.274. This argument is not new. Thomas Hughes made the very same point and Teece
himself refers to James Utterback as one of the writers using this argument.
* Johan Schot refers to this as the creation and utilisation of the technological nexus (Johan Schot,
1992, The Policy Relevance of the Quasi-Evolutionary Model: The Case of Stimulating Clean Technol-
ogies, in Coombs et a/., op eft, pp.193-196).
" Green, op eft, pp.172-173. j
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electric road vehicles: private passenger cars for urban use, buses, commuter vans,
taxis.** Research and development activities are directed towards developing electric
vehicles for these purposes. These niches may be expanded when manufacturers are able
to solve some critical problems with electric vehicles, especially those pertaining to
batteries, and consumer willingness to purchase electric vehicles gradually increases over
time (which depends on the performance and costs of the electric car, government tax
policies, and social pressure in favour of using an environment-friendlier motor car).
Under those circumstances, electric vehicles may seize a substantial part of the future
a u t o m o b i l e m a r k e t . : " . V . : ' < K . ; • . - . > •;'• • - ! > • • » - - « : « . ? : , ' ; > : . . - • , v ;,-', • • • „ • ; ; . , : • ; . ; • • : • ; ^ t v - . . - • ? , , . •
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This chapter examined inducement mechanisms of radical change in technology and the
transition process into a new technological regime. The following inducement mechan-
isms are identified: First, new scientific insights opening up new technological opportun-
ities (such as the development of electromagnetism); second, pressing technological
needs such as technical bottlenecks in the development of technology, high costs of
further advances within a technical design, changes in demand (especially for military
technology), scarcity of materials, labour conflict; and third, entrepreneurial activities
and institutional support for radically original technologies. The chapter also provides an
explanation as to how it is possible for a radically new technology to replace well-devel-
oped existing technologies — emphasizing the importance of early market niches, avail-
able knowledge and techniques that may be used to produce and market the product,
expectations, and changes in the technology and the socio-economic context.
H .
" Boelie Elzen and Johan Schot, 1992, Fumbling with the Car: How to Influence a Highly
Entrenched Technology? Paper for the joint 4S/EAST Conference 12-15 August, Gothenberg, Sweden,
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The Transition from Hydrocarbons
The present energy system based on fossil fuels gives rise to a range of environmental
problems — from photochemical smog and acid rain to greenhouse warming. The impli-
cation of fossil fuels in many of the world's environmental problems suggests that en-
vironmental sustainability requires — at least in part — new technologies for energy
supply, conversion and end-use. At this moment, many public and private decision
makers are thinking about how to achieve a smooth transition away from fossil fuel-
based energy technologies, and many sensible proposals have been made — like more
government R&D for renewable energy and energy conservation, the introduction of
carbon taxes etc. However, what is missing in the policy debate is a framework for
understanding change in complex technology systems, especially how the dynamics of
technology interact with the socio-economic system from which it emerges. In chapters
10 and 11 we outlined such a framework. The aim of this chapter is to apply this frame-
work to the problem of inducing a transition away from hydrocarbon-based energy
technologies towards a more environmentally sustainable energy system.
It must be emphasized that this chapter is an exploration of the policy issues of
making a transition away from fossil fuels. It does not spell out the details of specific
GHG policies (such as the optimal level of a carbon tax and size of R&D budgets), but
provides a general discussion of how public policy may be used to begin and sustain a
transition towards a more sustainable energy system, one in which renewables and
energy-efficient supply and end-use technologies are used more intensively.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 1 examines the relationship between
greenhouse warming and energy technologies. This is followed by a discussion of the
systemic nature of energy technologies and a discussion as to why it is so difficult for
alternative energy technologies to make an impact (section 2). Section 3 provides a short
discussion of three technology scenarios, depending on whether the change is recog-
nizable as being iwf/iin the hydrocarbon energy regime or constitutes a departure from
the present energy system. Section 4 discusses possible energy technology policies,
besides traditional tax and standards policies. The final section talks about strategic niche
management as a way to manage the transition to a more sustainable energy future.
12.1 Greenhouse Warming and Energy Technologies
Environmental concerns rank high on the list of today's worries. Of the environmental
risks, greenhouse warming is viewed by many as the most complicated and potentially
most far-reaching problem. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (EPCC), global mean surface air temperature has increased by 0.3-0.6 °C over the
264 Chapter 22
last hundred years, with increases as high as 0.3 °C per decade expected for the next
decades, if present trends continue.' Together with the increases in temperature, global
sea level has increased by 10-20cm over the same period, mainly as a result of the
thermal expansion of oceans. Although scientific evidence is still inconclusive, there is
wide consensus among natural scientists that the rise in temperature and sea level are
due to increases in atmospheric concentrations of (long-lived) radiatively active trace
gases (carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxides, and CFCs) that enhance the natural
greenhouse effect. Although virtually every form of human activity contributes some
amount of greenhouse gas to the atmosphere, (fossil fuel-based) energy consumption is
a key factor. The major proportion of man-made COj emissions and a large part of man-
made NjO emissions are related to energy use.*
Contrary to popular views, greenhouse warming does not simply mean that things
get warmer. Greenhouse warming has many facets: besides changes in temperature and
sea levels, there will be changes in rainfall patterns, storminess, and, possibly, in the
direction of ocean currents. Greenhouse warming may in fact lead to lower temperatures
in certain regions — for instance, a change in the gulf stream may freeze Western Europe.
In other words, greenhouse warming is about climate change; the rise in global tempera-
ture is an index of climate change which measures the departure of future climates from
what they are now.
Many different policies could be adopted to deal with greenhouse warming. They
may be divided into three types:^
i. Options that eliminate or reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
ii. Options that offset emissions by removing greenhouse gases from the
atmosphere, blocking incident solar radiation, or by altering the reflection
•""•*•> or absorption properties of the earth's surface.
iii. Options that help human and ecological systems adjust or adapt to new
climate conditions and events. ,
The first and second type of interventions are "mitigation" options; the third option is
that of "adaptation". Option i) consists of preventive policies like reductions in energy
' J.T. Houghton, G.J. Jenkins and J.J. Ephraums (eds.), 1990, C/imate Change. 77ie JPCC Scten*r/ic
Assessment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. xii. The uncertainty range of global temper-
ature increases is 0.2-0.5 °C. It bears noting that economic models show lower emissions and tempera-
ture increases than the extrapolative approach used by the IPCC because they project relative rising
prices and slowing economic growth (William D. Nordhaus, 1993, Reflections on the Economics of
Climate Change, /ourna/ 0/ Economic Perspecfroe, 7(4), p.14.
* OECD/IEA, 1991, Green/iouse Gas Emissions. 77ie Energy Dimension, Paris: OECD.
* National Academy of Sciences, 1991, Po/icy /mp/icafions 0/ Greennouse Warming, Washington:
National Academy Press.
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use, stopping deforestation and switching to non-fossil fuels — birth control also is an
example of a preventive policy. Examples of the second type of mitigation policies
(option ii) are: the sending of particles into the stratosphere to change the albedo (reflec-
tivity) of the earth or to put trace quantities or iron in the ocean to increase the rate of
carbon precipitation to the ocean floor. Such interventions are also referred to as "climate
engineering" or "geoengineering" policies. Up until now geoengineering options have not
been given much attention in the policy debate, partly for the reason that they pose a
risk to society in themselves. The final strategy (option iii) is to adapt to climate change,
something mankind has been doing for long. Human society may adapt to climate
change in several ways: by using more air conditioning or different clothing (to give two
of the more simple responses), by building dikes, cultivating different crops, changing
one's food habits, and by migration. a>>?wrjri-,r-<
It is important to recognize the broad range of possible actions to deal with climate
change. They range from big technical fixes to simple changes in behaviour. This chapter
will consider the mitigation options; it will analyse how public policy may be used to
induce a swift and smooth transition away from hydrocarbon-based energy technologies.
12.2 The Need for an Evolutionary Model of Technological
Change • — • • - — - - '• '• - = • • • - - - • - - — • >
In the global warming debate, the role of economists has been primarily to assess and
compare the costs and economic benefits of possible measures (scenarios) for reducing
greenhouse gas emissions. For this purpose, economists have typically adopted a "top-
down" approach: aggregated econometric models are used to generate predictions about
changes in the energy mix and energy efficiency.* Underlying the models' results are
assumptions about GNP growth, population growth, behaviour, resource reserves and
costs of primary energy inputs. In the main, the effects of carbon taxes or tradeable
emission rights are analysed. In the models, price changes govern the process of energy
savings and shifts in energy mix. There also exist a number of engineering studies
predicting market penetration levels of emerging energy technologies. These are "bottom-
up" studies based on detailed knowledge of energy technologies and of the markets in
which they may be used.
These two types of approaches are the basic tools to assist policy makers in design-
ing policy measures for dealing with the greenhouse problem. Unfortunately both types
of approaches suffer from rather simplistic assumptions about the dynamics of energy
substitution and technological change. As David Kirsch writes, the top-down studies
either assume autonomous improvements in energy efficiency or posit the existence of
* The discussion of top-down and bottom-up studies of energy-economy-environment linkages is
based on David A. Kirsch, 1992, The Impact of Technology Upon the Interaction of Energy, Environ-
ment and the Economy, MA thesis, MERIT, Maastricht.
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back-stop technologies that become economical at an externally specified threshold price.
Furthermore, the social context remains essentially unchanged, whereas in reality impor-
tant new technologies transform the system from which they emerge. The bottom-up
studies, by contrast, draw from a predetermined set of technological options. That is,
technological heterogeneity is specified ex ante, rather than as part and parcel of the
selection process. The possibilities for radical innovation, on the one hand, and the
impact of various learning effects on the other, are often neglected in favour of fixed
coefficients for 'known' technologies. Moreover, even after the set of available energy
technologies has been specified, the predictions depend upon assumptions about whether
or not economic agents (public and private) will opt to select these options.'
A good example is the Renewable Energy book commissioned by the United
Nations Solar Energy Group on Environment and Development as input to the 1992 UN
Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro.' This book contains a
figure which shows the life cycle costs for motor cars powered by alternative energy
systems: batteries, fuel cells (fuelled by hydrogen, ethanol or methanol), and internal
combustion engines. According to this figure, the costs of owning and operating an
automobile powered by alternative renewable fuels are almost the same as — and in
some cases even slightly below — the life cycle costs per kilometre of an internal combus-
tion engine fired with gasoline (at the price projected for the U.S. in the year 2000). This
raises the question why alternative fuel vehicles have not made an impact so far, and
why they are not likely to do so in the near future. Why this is so can be understood
from what we have said in chapter 10. Motor vehicle engines are an essential part of a
highly complex technology — the automobile is probably the most advanced consumer
product, being able to drive over 100,000 km at speeds well over 100 km/h — which has
benefitted over the last century from a wide array of product improvements in terms of
reliability, durability, speed, range, fuel efficiency, etc. Furthermore, the automobile
depends for its manufacturing on a production system and organisational structure
which is complex and capital-intensive. This makes it extremely difficult for new firms
to successfully enter the automobile business. The automobile is also part of a larger
technological system involving gas stations, automobile repair shops, an extensive road
infrastructure, etc. As a last point, the automobile is deeply entrenched in the social
system and people's ways of life/
Despite the considerable detail of engineering studies of alternative energy tech-
nologies (of which the UN report is an example) they fail to provide a realistic descrip-
* /tod, pp.35-39.
• Thomas B. Johansson, Henry Kelly, Amulya K.N. Reddy, Robert H. Williams (editors), 1992,
ErtCTjjy- Sources/or Fue/s ond Efecfririty, London: Earthscan.
' In a COST project memo about the motor car and the environment, the motor car is described as
"a backbone of high mobility and suburbanization as well as a vehicle of self-expression and identity
(Knut H. Serensen, 1992, The Car and its Environments. Proposal for an International Study of the
Past, Present and Future of the Motorcar in Europe, Centre for Technology and Society, University of
Trondheim, Norway, p.3.
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tion of how the technology development and selection process interacts with the socio-
economic system from which it emerges.
What is needed is not yet another detailed study of the technical, economic and
social aspects of a shift towards alternative energy technologies but a framework for
understanding change in complex technology systems. In chapters 10 and 11 we outlined
such a framework, based on an evolutionary model of technological change. In this
chapter we apply this model to the problem of inducing a shift away from hydrocarbon-
based energy technologies. To analyse what is involved in such a shift we use the
concept of a "technological regime" which is defined as the overall complex of scientific
knowledges, engineering practices, production process technologies, product characteris-
tics, skills and procedures, institutions and infrastructures which make up the totality of
a technology. The basic idea behind a technological regime is that the ways in which
technological change will and can develop are both structured and constrained: con-
strained by the available methods and techniques, by the consensus of engineering ideas
about how to approach problems, by the organisational and institutional context, by
patterns of infrastructures and consumer demand.* It should be noted that our approach
differs from the more cognitive technology approach of Nelson and Winter (1977; 1982)
and Dosi (1982; 1988) by looking at the real technical, economic and organizational
potentialities and characteristics of technology and the way in which institutions (econo-
mic, social and political) shape and limit economic decisions and technological choice.
The concept of a technological regime is believed to be highly relevant to energy
technologies. Most of the examples of technological regimes or paradigms are energy
technologies: the steam engine, the DC3 aircraft and, in our time, the internal combus-
tion engine. The concept of a technological regime may also be used for the energy
system as a whole. For its operation, the present economic system depends on an energy
system which is almost totally based on fossil fuels — coal, oil and natural gas. World-
wide, these three energy sources supply about 90 percent of the energy which is being
purchased and put into use in the economic system.' Together with these energy sour-
ces, we have conversion and end-use technologies in which energy is converted into
useful energy forms and energy services. So we could speak of the 'hydrocarbon regime'
with coal as the main source to generate electricity, with gasoline produced from oil as
the main transport fuel, and with natural gas as the primary source for space heating.
What are the implications of the concept of a technological regime for the direction
in which technological change will take place? As explained, the basic idea behind a
technological regime is that technological advances proceed in certain directions some-
what irrespective of relative prices, i.e., that they are not fine-tuned to changes in de-
mand and cost conditions. Our criticism of much of the economics of energy is that it
* Keith Smith in the joint research project for the Commission of European Communities, referred
to previously.
' Paul E. Gray, Jefferson W. Tester, and David O. Wood, 1991, 'Energy Technology: Problems and
Solutions', in Jefferson W. Tester, David O. Wood and Nancy A. Ferrari (eds.), Energy and fte Environ-
ment m tte 21s/ CCTtfwry, Cambridge (MA): MIT Press, p.122.
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rests on somewhat simplistic views of the nature of technological change in energy
systems: in particular many economists assume too readily that firms and consumers
have technological alternatives. We would argue, on the contrary, that because of the
integrated and systemic nature of energy technologies, firms and consumers are to a
considerable extent 'locked in' to existing technologies, with relatively limited alter-
natives available. Lock in can occur for many reasons. For example, technological alter-
natives may be insufficiently developed in terms of performance characteristics, or in
terms of the interaction between performance, on the one hand, and costs and efficiency
on the other. Or the connections between a technology and its socio-economic or or-
ganisational context may be insufficiently developed. Our argument is that these aspects
of the technological change process are insufficiently appreciated and addressed in much
of the literature on hydrocarbon build-up.'"
The concept of a technological regime helps to understand why it is so difficult for
alternative energy technologies to make an impact. Learning curves, sunk costs, and
technological interdependencies are particularly important for energy technologies. There
are also problems of appropriation for highly systemic energy technologies, which makes
that for-profit organizations are reluctant to invest in these technologies. (For instance,
the profitability of a hydrogen-powered vehicle depends on the availability and costs of
a hydrogen distribution system, the performance and costs of fuel cells, etc.). Further-
more, the development of non-hydrocarbon energy technologies is not in the interest of
capital-intensive petro-chemical firms vested in the fossil fuels-based energy system.
They will only move into the business of alternative energy technologies when fossil
fuels are depleted or when the costs of extracting fossil fuels are becoming too high.
Fossil fuels are also favoured by an institutional framework which fails to include the
full environmental costs of their usage. A last factor that works against the development
of renewables is prevailing engineering belief that renewables are less reliable and overly
expensive energy technologies.
It is important to recognize that these factors do not operate independently from
each other but are highly correlated. Engineering scepticism towards renewables and the
unwillingness of firms to invest in alternative energy technologies is related to observed
imperfections in these technologies (the limited range and high weight of battery-pow-
ered vehicles, problems with the on-board storage of hydrogen, the high costs of bat-
teries and fuel cells, and a number of safety and environmental problems). The high
costs of emerging energy technologies also lead to public concern whether the high costs
of a transition away from fossil fuels will not outweigh the possible benefits, which has
a negative effect on public programmes for renewables. But without sufficient public and
private support, renewables are not able to live up to their promise: the high costs will
limit their application to certain niche markets, small-scale production prevents cost
reductions from scale economies, little money is available for further research, etc.
Of course, expectations about the technical potential for improvement, for achiev-
ing cost reductions, and the scope for branching and extension, may provide a rationale
" Smith, op rit.
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for private and public decision makers to support the development of non-fossil energy
technologies, as a long-term investment. But the long development of radical energy
technologies, uncertainty about the evolution of market demand, and the need to gen-
erate satisfactory profits in the short and medium term makes that private firms are
reluctant to invest a lot of money in technologies for the future. Moreover, renewables
are not the only option for dealing with greenhouse warming, there are many other
options.
This brings us to the important issue of technology choice and pathways to a
sustainable energy future. As we indicated, the number of technology options to amelio-
rate climatic change is almost infinite. This raises the question as to which technologies
should be used, for what purposes, and within what time frame. Should one opt for
incremental efficiency improvements of existing supply, conversion and end-use tech-
nologies, of which the costs are relatively low and which do not require major change in
the production system and people's way of life? Or should one opt for more fundamen-
tal changes in energy technologies which yield higher environmental benefits by radical-
ly reducing greenhouse gas emissions but which bring high costs, especially in the short-
term? The next section will consider this problem in the context of three possible energy
technology scenarios.
• • ' • • • • • • • • • • ' - • ' • ' • • • • ' " - • » . • •
12.3 Technological Pathways to a More Sustainable Energy
Future
In the previous section, we talked about the symbiotic relationship between energy
sources, technology and economic development. The concept of a technological regime
was used to explain the enormous inertia in the present energy systems, where energy
sources interlock with energy conversion and using technologies, and an infrastructure
of energy distribution. Energy technologies even extend into social and cultural systems,
which makes it even more difficult to shift towards different technologies. This section
examines the transition problem to a more environmentally sustainable energy future. It
explores three possible energy technology scenarios, depending on whether the change is
recognizable as being ontfitn the hydrocarbon-based energy system or constitutes a
departure from the present energy regime:"
Scenario I: Business-as-Uswaf
This scenario contains a limited move away from hydrocarbons, with limited
emphasis on energy efficiency. Technology responses within this scenario are
fuel substitution by energy sources which are lower in greenhouse gas emis-
sion (especially natural gas), advanced fossil-fired power plants with a higher
" The scenarios are based on Ian Miles in a joint research project for the CEC, referred to pre-
viously.
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. «i j energy efficiency (like combined cycle power plants with natural gas-firing or
pressurized coal gasification), the use of electronic devices to improve the
fuel efficiency of gasoline-fired vehicles, etc.
• ' # ? • J ? ' • - « > . • • ' - ; • ; • ' • • ; : ' . / : . ; • • • ^ . . ! . . ' ; -
Scenario II: -A Pfl/e Greening o/ Energy
This includes a more intensive use of renewable solutions but only in the
context of the existing grid structure, with limited modification of the grid to
accommodate this. Furthermore, there is much emphasis on energy demand
and management, but limited experimentation with radical alterations.
H ' S c e n a r i o HI: A C / e a n B r e a k ••••'a-iiiJw• c t . ' !-^- ii. ' • / • ! . . R - ; ; r^ .
This consists of two distinct possibilities. One is a shift to a new centralised
* large infrastructure solution: the hydrogen economy, for example, with large-
.;- scale distribution of fuel cells. The other option is a shift away from reliance
' on centralised grids to much more emphasis on local self-sufficiency, with
possibly diverse solutions to energy requirements through different mixes of
renewables specified at these local levels.
The "business-as-usual" scenario entails a minor modification of the hydrocarbon regime.
Electricity would be supplied through the grid, gasoline would remain the main trans-
portation fuel, no new energy infrastructure is needed. It would cause minimal disrup-
tion of the existing production and transport system, but the environmental gains would
be limited.
The second scenario, "a pale greening of energy", is something of an in-between
scenario. Renewables would be used more intensively to generate electricity, which is
fed into the grid (as in the case of wind farms). There would be more use of co-gener-
ation plants of heat and power, especially in industry and for office buildings; utilities
would redefine their strategic objectives by engaging in demand-side management; there
would be a further shift towards more energy-efficient building practices, and users
would respond to energy-conservation policies and environmental pressures. Some
countries like the Netherlands are already proceeding into this direction.
The "dean break" scenario is the most radical scenario in terms of a departure from
the past. The use of hydrocarbons would be greatly reduced, either by a switch to
renewables to mass-produce electricity or hydrogen as a transportation fuel, or by using
renewables at the local level for different energy requirements. The last of these radical
options might well be accompanied by lifestyle changes, which would reduce energy
demand drastically. Here, a change of technological regime is most evident: not only do
we have different energy sources, conversion technologies, and a different energy distri-
bution system, but also, in the case of local self-sufficiency, significant changes in life
style.
This brings us to the question: Which scenario is the most optimal from a social
welfare point of view? And what are the implications for public policy making? These
questions are explored in the next section.
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12.4 Defining Energy Technology Policies •**.*»£hat* *J£},<M*T
The environmental problems are pressing society to look for different technologies to
satisfy human needs and aspirations. Many of the technology responses to slow climate
change are within the "hydrocarbon" regime — like advanced electricity supply tech-
nologies, co-generation plants of heat and power, and NO, emission control systems.
These technologies are usually developed by regular energy technology suppliers and
suppliers of pollution control technologies and may be integrated into the present energy
system with little difficulty.
There are also technology options that are outside the hydrocarbon regime like
photovoltaics, fuel cells, nuclear power, wind energy, and biomass (which may be used
as a transport fuel and to generate electricity). These are produced by relatively small,
specialized suppliers (except in the case of nuclear power plants), with the help of public
programmes, universities and semi-public research institutes.
Society may also 'innovate' around the need for energy, by making products and
plants more energy-efficient, changing its heating and food habits, reduce the need for
transport through urban planning and interactive telecommunication (like teleworking,
videoconferencing, etc.).
Most of the above technology options will find their way into the market, with or
without government support, and partly for non-environmental reasons. Although all
these options warrant some kind of government support, both for environmental and
social reasons, this section will focus on the policy problem of making a transition
towards a more renewable-intensive energy system, along the lines of scenario II and HI.
It may well be that this is not the optimal strategy; that technology options within the
hydrocarbon regime (scenario I) like a fuel switch to natural gas and coal gasification
power plants and energy conservation through thermal insulation are more cost-effec-
tive. It is also possible that greenhouse warming does not pose such a big problem and
that there will be relatively easy ways to adapt to the climate change. We do not know
and, more importantly, there is no way of finding out the optimal strategy when the
consequences of climate change are poorly understood and the economic costs and social
benefits of various technology options are largely unknown. In our view, there is a
special need to work on the second, and, especially, the third scenario, to encourage
renewables and more energy-efficient technologies, for the following reasons.
First, renewables have the potential of significantly reducing greenhouse gas
emissions. Their encouragement should be viewed as an insurance against sudden and
dramatic climate changes. This relates to what Brian Arthur has said:
It may sometimes be desirable as a policy option to keep more than one technology
'alive', to avoid monopoly problems (if the technology is marketed), or to retain
"requisite variety" as a hedge against shifts in the economic environment or against
future 'Chernobyl' revelations that the technology is unsafe.'* i , ,-.; .vds»'r. /r-. >, <j•&/•=.
Arthur, 1988, op rif., p.603.
272 -«.;*.w.r:hvr •<<-.• :.. Chapter 12
The idea that society may get 'locked in' to undesirable technologies provides a further
argument for retaining variety. The danger of 'lock-in' to suboptimal technologies is
particularly high for energy technologies that are highly systemic, with long lead times
and special infrastructure requirements. As explained by Arthur, when two or more
network technologies (like two transport technologies) are competing, positive feedback
(increasing returns with adoption) make the market for them unstable." A technology
that has been favoured early on, may come to dominate the market."
It should be noted that these selection dynamics do not simply reflect physical
alteration of the artifact, although these too are an important element in the process of
technological evolution; they are generated, in part, by the interaction of multiple,
T)oundedly rational' decision makers interacting with each other." The idea of 'lock-in'
development (or path dependency) is at the heart of our evolutionary model of tech-
nological change; it explains how the selection environment favours 'drop-in' in-
novations and is biased against technologies that require new knowledge, skills and
practices. And it is this idea of "lock-in" that provides much of the rationale for govern-
ment support for radical energy technologies with potentially high environmental and
social benefits. :, • • ' , ; - . i»^. : ;.,,
A last argument for a more intensive encouragement of non-fossil energy tech-
nologies is that they not only slow global warming but also produce a number of other
advantages: they generate significant air pollution benefits (which helps reduce abate-
ment costs) and they make countries less dependent of foreign energy suppliers, which
reduces the risk of rapid price fluctuations and supply disruptions. According to the
earlier-mentioned UN report, renewables may furthermore help developing countries to
develop. For instance, biomass energy plantations (to make transportation fuels and to
generate electricity) may provide work to many people, especially in rural areas. This
goes against the common argument that there exists a tradeoff between socio-economic
development and environmental conservation.
As we noted before, capturing the potential for renewables critically depends on govern-
ment interventions. The main benefits of renewables are not valued in the market place.-
" One way of dealing with this problem is to let market prices reflect the negative
environmental costs, to let prices speak the "environmental truth". This is exactly what
" W. Brian Arthur, 1990, Positive Feedbacks in the Economy, Sdenti/ic American, p.84.
" Arthur, 1988, op cit., p.591.
•* Kirsch, op eft., p.39. .... -, .,-> . <v , si-
" Bill Nordhaus notices that the market is biased against technologies that slow climate change
because of a "double externality": private returns are lower than social returns because the results of
R&D are available to other firms and because the benefits of greenhouse gas reductions are worth
nothing in the present market (William D. Nordhaus, 1991, Economic Approaches to Greenhouse
Warming, in G/ofto/ Wonning: Economic Po/icy Approaches, edited by R. Dornbusch and J.M. Poterba,
Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press, p.60).
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economists suggest policy makers should do: to rationalize energy markets by inter-
nalizing the environmental costs of pollution. Such an approach is not wrong, but we
must be looking at what is missing. It fails to recognize the way in which society is
locked in to particular technologies; how the market favours technologies that are within
the hydrocarbon regime, and is biased against technologies that require a new infrastruc-
ture, skills, plant design, etc. Certainly, a carbon tax and tradeable carbon rights will
have a role to play in the array of necessary GHG policies, but it is not likely that such
measures will be sufficient to bring about radical change in energy technologies and
practices, unless they significantly raise the costs of using fossil fuels, which is highly
unlikely in the political reality of today. To encourage renewable energy technologies
that are not part of the hydrocarbon regime, a more integrated and coordinated policy is
probably needed, a policy that would engage in experimentation and make use of the
cumulative and self-reinforcing character of technological change. What does this imply
for public policy in more practical terms? •issjuj:'.: "A.jSiOj ?< e*fbi>. ; • •;
In defining policies to begin and sustain a transition away from fossil fuels, it is
useful to look back in history, to look at the technological transitions that occurred in the
past. In the chapter of technological regimes shifts we identified five mechanisms that
helped a radically original technology to establish itself as a dominant technology in the
modern market economy.
• Available knowledge and experience (in universities and organizations) that may
be used for the production and marketing of the radical technology.
• • • / r , .
• The presence of early niche markets. ' . . ".••••. . ,s ' -
• Scope for branching and extension, of overcoming initial limitations, and for
achieving cost reductions.
• The building of a constituency behind the product (suppliers, customers, regula-
tors) whose semi-coordinated actions are necessary to bring about substantial
shift in interconnected technologies and practices.
• The overcoming of social opposition and consumer resistance.
It is important to recognize that these five factors do not operate independently from
each other but are interrelated, with self-reinforcing feedback loops and multi-directional
linkages. For example, the existence of early market niches helps innovating firms to
improve the new product by learning from the experiences of users; it helps to build a
constituency behind the product by demonstrating its validity and commercial feasibility
to potential users and policy makers, which helps the further development and diffusion
of a technology, etc.
The above list is useful in discussing possible policy actions to encourage renewa-
bles and other environmentally beneficial technologies. It provides a framework for
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examining technology strategies and policy actions. For instance, when alternative
technologies are insufficiently developed, or when the appropriability conditions for
innovation are unfavourable, there may be room for technology programmes to stimu-
late research at universities and laboratories, and the transfer of knowledge between
different organisations. Public policies could also be used to build technology networks
to work jointly on technical problems, find ways of cost sharing, define technical stand-
ards, etc. The transition to environmental sustainability could be made into a new
mission for public policy, different from the old missions in defence, nuclear and aero-
space technology. Such a mission would articulate the need for change and provide
guidance as to where we should be going, it also commits policy makers more strongly
to the goal of sustainable development. Elements of such a new 'mission' for science and
technology are described in a recent report on innovation and technology diffusion
policy for the Commission of the European Communities."' The characteristics of old
and new models of mission-oriented projects are summarized in Table 12.1. The mission
is defined in terms of economically feasible technical solutions to particular environmen-
tal problems. Key elements of a mission-oriented environmental programme are: to
promote the development and employment of a wide range of potentially beneficial
technologies, to involve many actors in the technology development and selection pro-
cess, and to take an "incrementalist" approach to the innovation process — that is to
favour technologies with relatively short development times, small project sizes, low
capital investment levels, and minimum need for infrastructure; to avoid overinvestment
in a limited range of expensive technologies that are later found to be unworkable,
overly expensive, or environmentally more harmful than the technologies they were
designed to replace." Such an incrementalist approach would favour renewable energy
technologies and warns against spending a lot of money on large-scale mission-oriented
projects like nuclear fission and fusion.
" Luc Soete and Anthony Arundel (eds.), 1993, An Integrated Approach to European /nnowrtion and
Tec/mo/ogy Dijjjfasion Po/icy. A Maasfn'dit Memorandum, Brussels: Commission of the European Com-
munities.
" /fcuf, p.58. The advantage of flexible energy technologies in uncertain markets is described in
David Collingridge and Peter James, Inflexible Energy Policies in a Rapidly-Changing Market, Long
Range Pfannmg, 24(2): 101-107.
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Characteristics of Old and New "Mission-Oriented" Projects
OM: De/ence, Nuc/ear nm/
/Veros/jace
The mission is defined in terms of
the number of technical achieve-
ments with little regard to their
economic feasibility.
• The goals and the direction of
technological development are
defined in advance by a small
group of experts.
• Centralized control within a
government administration.
• Diffusion of the results outside
of the core of participants is of
minor importance or actively
discouraged.
• Limited to a small group of firms
that can participate owing to the
emphasis on a small number of
radical technologies.
• Self-contained projects with little
need for complementary policies
and scant attention paid to
coherence.
New: Tcc/ino/ogies
The mission is defined in terms of
economically feasible technical
solutions to particular environmental
problems.
• The direction of technical change
is influenced by a wide range of
actors including government, pri-
vate firms and consumer groups.
• Decentralized control with a large
number of involved agents.
• Diffusion of the results is a central
goal and is actively encouraged.
An emphasis on the incrementalist
development of both radical and
incremental innovations in order
to permit a large number of firms
to participate.
Complementary policies vital for
success and close attention paid to
coherence with other goals.
Table 12.1. The characteristics of a new mission-oriented policy for environmentally
desirable technologies. Source: Soete and Arundel (eds.), (1993, p.51).
If we look at government R&D energy expenditures in Figure 12.1, however, we see that
almost all government R&D money has been spend exactly on large-scale energy supply
technologies with little opportunities for learning, experimentation, and generating
positive feedback effects. In the IEA countries, over the 1979-90 period, 59% of govern-
ment R&D energy expenditures were spent on nuclear power, 15.2% on fossil energy
- . u •'.(•:• 22
and only 9.4% on renewables and 6.3.% on energy conservation. In absolute terms, in
1990, 5.4 billion dollar was spent on nuclear and fossil energy and 0.9 billion on renewa-
bles and energy conservation.
F o s s i l i s e d , • ' . - •
Government R&D energy expenditure
IEA countries, 1990 prices
r ~ l Nuclear fission
I I Fonli and related
. I I Nuclear fusion $fc>n
l«-'*4 Solar and blomsst
Conservation ,
197} 80 81 82 83 M 85 86 87 89 90
Figure 12.1. Government R&D energy expenditure in IEA countries. Source:
The Economist, Energy and Environment Survey, August 31,1991, p.34.
Figure 12.1 shows that sustainable energy technologies did not only receive little govern-
ment R&D money, the relative decrease in government R&D energy expenditures was
highest for renewables. This suggests that a shift in government energy R&D spending is
needed, towards renewable energy sources and energy efficient end-using technologies.
Energy specialists and authorities are coming to this point of view. They believe that
there is a need to re-allocate energy R&D budgets for environmental reasons. One of the
conclusions of an executive conference on energy technology policy for sustainable
development was that there is presently: -•>..- •;, •>. d^snwwfr A
a severe imbalance between R&D spending on major energy supply-side tech-
nologies and R&D spending on renewables and demand-side technologies, par-
ticularly the efficient end-use of energy (...) A shift to greater spending on demand-
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side R&D, compared to supply-side R&D, is appropriate today. Within supply-side
R&D, there needs to be greater spending on renewable energy R&D."
Energy specialists at this conference also expressed the need to take an integrated system
perspective and that better methodologies be developed to evaluate energy technology
options against technical, environmental, economic and security criteria for the long and
short term to identify the most promising strategies for sustainable development.^" This
we agree on. However, we would like to add the importance of bringing in different
perspectives and expertise, and not to rely solely on energy specialists from traditional
energy fields. Social scientists should also have an important input in energy technology
appraisals, to discuss consumption patterns, life styles and values.
Such energy technology appraisals should be an important input to government policies.
What does the evolutionary model of technical change and the history of technological
transitions furthermore suggest about policies that may be useful to induce a transition
away from hydrocarbons? One obvious policy is to make fossil fuels more expensive
through a carbon tax. Tradeable pollution quota can also make an important contribution
to the goal of a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. These policies have received
most of the attention in the climate change debate. Political support for a carbon tax and
quota, however, has been limited, especially outside the EU. It is doubtful whether or
not they will introduced. In order to be introduced in the world economy it seems
necessary that they are linked to other issues (like employment and air quality benefits
in cities). When they are introduced, however, the danger is high that they provide too
little incentive to induce radical change in technology. This raises the question: What
other policies may be used to induce a transition away from fossil fuels? In our view,
the following policies may prove to be useful or even necessary. ,- .
First, promising new ideas with long-term benefits could be supported by special
science and technology programmes. As explained earlier, the market underinvests in
(energy) technologies for the future, especially technologies of which the social benefits
are not or insufficiently valued in the market place. Uncertainty as to which technology
is best from the vantage point of economic efficiency and social welfare provides an
extra reason for the use of research programmes. Important criteria for such programmes
are: the environmental benefits as compared to other technologies, the economic costs
(now and in the future), and social acceptance.
Second, a niche market may be created for emerging energy technologies through
government procurement, regulation, tax policies, investment subsidy schemes, etc. Such
a niche may be a possible stepping stone to the further development of an environmen-
tally benign technology; it helps to resolve some of the uncertainty about the economic
" OECD/IEA, 1993, Proceedings Execufroe Con/erena on Energy Tec/ino/ogy Po/icy /or S«sto/naWe
Deoe/opmen/. Comparing Long-Term Approaches, Noordwijk, the Netherlands, 9th-llth December 1991,
IEA/OECD/NOVEM, p.183.
" ftid, p.4.
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feasibility of radical energy technology options. How a niche market may be created
through public policy will be described in the next section.
Third, public authorities may create a network of technology suppliers, research
organizations, customers to work on technical problems, define technology standards,
find ways of cost sharing, to deal with controversies, etc. This might facilitate a better
exchange of information and knowledge and help create a common vision for future
development. Problems of appropriability may (or may not) be overcome through the
creation of such networks. As a last point, the involvement of consumers and environ-
mental groups may help technology suppliers to identify and dealt with problems of
social acceptance.
Fourth, the formulation of clear policy goals and setting of energy and environ-
mental objectives, as a demand-side policy, to reduce market uncertainty for environ-
mentally beneficial technologies. In the case of CFCs, a clear policy goal gave a strong
push to the development and adoption of CFC substitutes. As regards to greenhouse gas
emissions, national goals for COj are set by several governments, but the commitment of
the government to achieve these goals is not very strong.
Fifth, identification of energy technology diffusion bottlenecks and the implemen-
tation of policies that address barriers that prevent the uptake of energy conservation
technologies and energy-efficient, end-use technologies. Possible policies are information
diffusion (product information, energy-efficiency labels), energy-efficiency standards for
products, and the removal of institutional barriers. Such policies may increase environ-
mental awareness which is necessary not only for the uptake of energy-saving tech-
nologies but also for attaining political support for environmental policies.
Sixth, energy policies should be coordinated with other policies, not only environ-
mental policy and science and technology policies but also agricultural and transport
policies, urban and land planning, building regulations, industrial policies, etc. The
systemic nature of energy technologies implies that what is needed is not just energy
legislation and fiscal policies, but also changes in agricultural policy (to promote the
cultivation of biomass crops and ecological farming), in transport (new infrastructures),
in construction (to stimulate more energy-efficient practices and technologies), land-use
(to reduce the need for transport) etc. Existing policies are usually designed with little
consideration of environmental aspects and provide too often a barrier to the realisation
of environmental objectives. For example, the main obstacle to the diffusion of wind
turbines is not the cost of generating electricity but the local and national planning
system and the low return prices for wind power.
Seventh, international policies for environmental conservation. It is important that
environmental policies are implemented by the widest possible range of countries. Go-
alone policies are not only counterproductive from an environmental point of view in
the case of global commons, but they also are very expensive for individual countries
who may experience a relocation of business towards countries with less strict environ-
mental policies. One of the biggest obstacles towards the formulation of environmental
policies at the national level is the need for international coordination of such policies.
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And eighth, to help third-world countries (and other less-developed countries) to
develop a more environmentally benign energy system. They have before them a need to
build an energy system in the next decades. These are also countries that are less 'locked
in' to a hydrocarbon energy system (in terms of existing infrastructure, energy supply-
industry relationships, life styles). However, the great priority of relieving human pov-
erty and increasing material wealth will almost certain make them opt for the c/ieapest
rather than the c/eanesf energy technologies (especially if they have large reserves of
fossil fuels — as in the case of China). Technical and financial assistance from in-
dustrialised countries is needed to make sure that these countries do not disrupt their
own natural environment or worsen global environmental problems. Here the in-
dustrialised countries also have a special responsibility as they are responsible for the
major part of the present problem.
These are examples of policies that may be used to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Of
course, most of what we propose is not new; it has been suggested by others or has been
part of present and past policies. Research in renewable energy has been supported
through special technology programmes and R&D subsidies for at least two decades, in
some countries, electric utilities are forced to generate a certain amount of renewable
energy or to purchase renewable energy at a reasonable price, and several countries have
renewable energy objectives. These initiatives have helped the development of a wide
range of renewable energy technologies up to the point where many of these tech-
nologies are becoming competitive with fossil-fuel technologies for several applications.
This is not to say that all renewable energy policies have been a success. Many of them
were too much focused on the technical development of new energy technologies. There
was too little consideration of the technology selection process, that is, of the technical,
economic and institutional barriers that worked against the uptake of alternative energy
technologies. As many innovation studies show, successful technological innovation is
not simply a matter of perfecting a product along a well-known technological pathway,
but requires foremost a good understanding of user needs. Future policies should force
suppliers to pay more attention to what the market wants, to avoid the waste of research
money and user disappointment. It furthermore points at the need for more integrated
policies, to generate positive feedback effects through learning and adaptation at the user
and supply side. What such an integrated policy might look like is described in the next
section.
12.5 S t r a t e g i c N i c h e M a n a g e m e n t , r , , . ^ ?H- • , - = , , .
To give a better idea of a coordinated and integrated energy technology policy for
environmental protection, this section will describe one of the earlier-proposed policies
in more detail: the creation of a marJfcet mc/ie for a radical technology to limit greenhouse
gas emissions. Such a market niche may be an important stepping stone for the further
evolution of a radically new energy technology: it helps suppliers to better understand
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user needs, to identify and solve some critical problems, to achieve cost reductions in
mass production, and, perhaps most important, to create a constituency behind the new
product, finding support from other actors (firms, research institutes, public agencies,
users).
The creation of a market niche for radically new technologies with a low environ-
mental impact should be considered a learning experiment, not only for both suppliers
and potential users of these technologies but also for policy makers that want to achieve
a smooth transition towards low-impact energy technologies. It also helps to remove
some of the uncertainty about the viability of radical solutions that may otherwise be
foreclosed or seriously delayed.
What does the creation of a market niche imply in more practical terms for public
policy? First, part of such a policy is a good understanding of the barriers that prevent
the environmentally benign technology from being introduced into the market place.
These barriers may be economic, when the new technology is unable to compete with
conventional technologies given the prevailing cost structure. They may be technical, in
the form of a lack of complementary technologies, infrastructure, appropriate skills or
problems of integration in the existing technical infrastructure. And they may be social
and institutional, having to do with existing laws, practices, perceptions, habits. To
successfully deal with these barriers, an integrated and coordinated policy is required.
Part of such a policy are the formulation of long-term goals, the creation of an actor
network, and the use of taxes, subsidies and standards.
A good example of such a policy is the so-called "Los Angeles initiative" to pro-
mote electric vehicles. Although the Californian policy is primarily aimed at reducing
photochemical smog, a notorious problem in the Los Angeles area, it vividly illustrates
how "strategic niche management" (as Arie Rip and Johan Schot call it) may be used to
induce radical changes in the hydrocarbon-based energy system. By requiring car manu-
facturers to mass-produce zero-emission vehicles, it surpasses a technological deadlock
in which car manufacturers were reluctant to introduce electric vehicles for fears that
consumers would not want to purchase alternative-fuel cars whereas demand for elec-
trically-powered vehicles could not develop since electric vehicles were not for sale.
According to California rules, zero-emissions cars must account for 2% to 10% of new-
car production in the 1998-2003 period, while strict standards pertaining to hydrocarbon
and nitrogen oxide emissions are being set for all new motor cars to be sold in the 1994-
2003 period.*'
Part of the programme is a competition under which the three winning manufac-
turers are to build a variety of small cars, passenger vans and light commercial trucks to
create the 10,000 zero-emission vehicle fleet by the year
 1995.** The whole initiative is
" Neal Templin, 1991, California Rules Push Car Makers To Clean Up Act, Wei/ Street
Europe, March 27. . _ ••.,, ff;t:
** This part is based on a Financial Times Survey "Vehicles and the Environment", Finanria/ Times,
July, 27, 1990.
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jointly sponsored and is being overseen by the city council, its Department of Water and
Power and the private sector utility, Southern California Edison. The Department and
Southern California Edison are providing development funds to the chosen companies.
In addition, they are devising with both state and federal authorities fiscal incentives to
make the use of such cars attractive. This programme could pave the way for alter-
native-fuel vehicles, not only in the Los Angeles metropolitarian area but also in other
parts of the world.
To give another, more speculative, example, hydrogen (H2) is often considered the
ideal transportation fuel from an environmental point of view: hydrogen has a high
energy efficiency and does not emit carbon dioxide (if non-carbon energy technologies
like renewables or nuclear power are used in the production of hydrogen). Hydrogen
may be used in internal combustion engines or in fuel cells to supply power. Again,
although technically feasible, the high costs of using hydrogen pose an enormous barrier.
According to Tim Jackson, using estimates from various authors, the economic costs of a
hydrogen-fuelled car using electrolysis and photovoltaics to produce hydrogen are
estimated as being in the range of $1 and $5 per kilometre whereas the economic costs of
a conventional car are between 5 and 10 U.S dollar cents per kilometre.** To be sure,
these figures are for 1990, and further cost reductions and efficiency improvements are
to be expected from future advances in fuel cells and photovoltaics. However, to achieve
or accelerate the transition to an integrated hydrogen economy, the creation of a market
niche could make an important contribution.
At this moment, aircrafts are possibly a good candidate for the introduction of
hydrogen in the transport sector. Within the aircraft industry, hydrogen is already
considered a potential commercial aviation fuel. Over the last three years, 15 German
and Russian firms, under the leadership of Deutsche Aerospace Airbus Gmbh (DASA),
have investigated the possibility of using hydrogen. They are now involved in the design
of a large passenger airplane fuelled by liquid hydrogen, the "cryoplane", of which they
hope a prototype is ready by the year 2005.** Whether a hydrogen-fuelled airplane will
be mass-produced and will find its way into the market within the next 15 or 25 years is
unclear. There are several barriers which hinder the introduction of the cryoplane in the
commercial market. First of all, the high costs of hydrogen as compared to kerosine (so
far the only fossil fuel which is not taxed), the build-up of an infrastructure to mass-
produce hydrogen, the distribution of hydrogen in various parts of the world, and a
number of safety and environmental problems (for example, although it does not emit
COj it emits water vapour which at high altitudes contributes to global warming). A
carefully designed and coordinated policy could help realize the potential of the hydro-
" Tim Jackson, 1992, Renewable Energy. Summary Paper for the Renewables Series, Energy Po/icy,
p.869.
^ Ren6 Raaymakers, 1992, De Zeppelin van de volgende eeuw (The Zeppelin of the Next Cen-
tury), Znfmnaiwir.
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gen option and exercise a decisive influence on the future course of events, leading up to
an energy future which is more environmentally sustainable. H>:. :. >;, -.•••>& y
12.6 Conclusions
,.vjj!>
This chapter is an exploration of the policy issues of making a transition away from
fossil fuels that are seriously implicated in many of today's environmental problems. The
answer of economists is simple: it is that policy makers should institute a carbon tax or
other penalty on greenhouse gas emission and rely on the natural operation of market
forces. This chapter takes issue with the idea that a carbon tax that is politically feasible
will be lead us away from fossil fuels. In our view, such a tax will be insufficient to
induce radical change in technology — it will mere stimulate incremental changes. What
is needed (in addition to tax policies) are well-defined energy technology policies aimed
at the development and wider diffusion of specific energy technologies, such as gasifica-
tion-based biomass power generation, fuel cells, photovoltaics, combined cycle power
systems, COj removal, etc.
Examples of energy technology policies are described in this chapter. One such
policy are special science and technology programmes for promising new technologies
with long-term benefits. Policy makers should also engage in experimentation with new
technologies to learn more about the economic costs, technical feasibility and social
acceptance of these options. One way of doing this is through the creation of niche
markets through government procurement, regulation, tax policies, subsidy schemes, etc.
Other policies are: the creation of networks of technology suppliers, research organiza-
tions and users, and the coordination of energy technology and environmental policies
with other policies (agricultural and transport policies, urban and land-use planning,
building regulations and industrial policies). ' • - • • • - • • • • ; • • - .«,i . - . . - . .
• » • • : • •
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Conclusions
This thesis examines the relationship between environmental policy and technical
change. The way in which environmental policies influence technological change is an
important criterion on which to judge such policies, and a key factor in achieving sus-
tainable development. Unfortunately, our understanding of this important issue is
limited. There have been attempts to study firm incentives for innovation in pollution
control under different policy regimes, but the practical meaning of these models is
limited. There are also evaluation studies of environmental policies, but the focus of such
studies is on the effectiveness of policy measures, not on technology and how the poli-
cies influenced technological innovation and diffusion. What is needed is a systematic
study of the technological impact of policy instruments. This thesis provides such a
study. The aims of the thesis are threefold: . ... ^ • ... . : .^ ,^
i) to analyze and compare the effects of various pollution control instruments
(emission standards, taxes, subsidies, tradeable quota) on innoorfion in
:.,;., pollution control technology; ^ .^  _.^ . , .... . . . . . ,.^ ^ t , , ^ . r^ - , . ,
ii) to analyze the effects of different policy instruments to limit environmen-
, , tally hazardous emissions on the dz^ wsion of environmentally beneficial
V . „ processes and products; , , . ..^ ^ . . ^ . _
iii) to examine the problem of technological regime shifts. ,, , ,
These problems are examined by applying different research methods: theoretical models
of innovation and diffusion, econometric time-series analyses, descriptive case studies,
and appreciative theory. This chapter will present the main results and will draw conclu-
sions about the usefulness of different environmental policy instruments for encouraging
new technology toward the efficient conservation of environmental quality.
13.1 The Impact of Policy Instruments on Innovation in Pol-
lution Control . . . . .*,-..-
In theoretical models, economists have analyzed and compared firm incentives for
innovation in pollution control under different policy regimes (pollution taxes, stand-
ards, subsidies and tradeable quota). The main conclusion of the models is that incen-
tive-based instruments provide a greater spur to innovation-in pollution control tech-
nology than direct control (in the form of a uniform emission-reduction standard). Under
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incentive-based policies, the innovator is able to exploit an extra gain by further reduc-
ing its emissions. This is because the marginal benefits of extra emissions reductions (a
reduction of tax payments, subsidies for emission reduction or revenues from selling
pollution rights) exceed the marginal cost of emission reduction. (Under direct regulation
the marginal benefits of extra emission reduction are zero.) This important result is
derived under a number of restrictive assumptions: the innovation is developed by the
polluting firm and not sold to other firms, there are no information problems and the
control agency is motivated by the single goal of achieving environmental improve-
ments. Only one model — that of Milliman and Prince (1989) — analyzes firm incentives
for innovation for the situation in which there is technological diffusion and an outside
supplier.
A clear weakness of the innovation models is that they do not consider the policy-
making process in the context of technological uncertainty and do not distinguish be-
tween different technologies for achieving environmental improvements. To analyze the
implications of the above assumptions, we advance in chapter 3 a simple political econo-
my model of regulator behaviour (based on Nentjes, 1988) to analyze the innovation
effects of different policy instruments. The model shows that in most circumstances a tax
regime provides less inducement to innovation in pollution control technology, and
freely distributed tradeable quota (permits) more inducement to innovation than direct
control. This conclusion constrasts with the widespread opinion among economists that
pollution taxes and auctioned quota provide a greater spur to innovation in pollution
control than other instruments. The reason why in the political economy model the
innovation effects of a pollution tax and auctioned quota are relatively small is that the
agency will set the tax at a rather low level or allow a high level of emissions, in order
not to impose high environmental costs on industry (under a pollution tax and auctioned
quota the polluter has to pay for non-abated emissions). This result corresponds with the
observation that economic incentives are set at too low a level to induce technological
innovation (or even to induce firms to take environmental measures at all). Another
result of our analysis is that under incentive-based instruments the share of process-
integrated technologies will be higher than under direct control. (Under direct control,
firms will choose end-of-pipe technologies that enable them to comply with environmen-
tal regulations without the need to replace existing production plants.)
The overall conclusion of our analysis is that freely distributed tradeable polluting
quota and innovation waivers (in which the agency gives the polluting firm time to
develop a technological innovation) are better instruments to promote innovation than
emission-reduction standards and pollution taxes. - 3y 13£t|tT*i a*! I
13.2 The Diffusion Effects of Environmental Policies -s^ , >•
The second subject of the thesis is the technological diffusion of environment-saving
technologies, and how this is affected by public policy. To date, this subject has received
little attention in the economic literature. In chapter 5, we developed a simple threshold
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diffusion model with learning which describes adopter decisions under an incentive-
based policy regime. In the model, adoption of a pollution control (or energy-conserving)
technology takes place the moment at which the risk-adjusted reservation price exceeds
the purchase price of the new technology. The reservation price is a function of the
control efficiency of the technology, a pollution tax (or energy price), the valuation of
other product characteristics, the interest rate, operating costs, and the (economic) service
life. The model is used to calculate the technological diffusion effects of a pollution tax,
investment subsidies and information supply. It is applied empirically to the diffusion of
biological waste-water treatment technologies in the Dutch Food and Beverages industry
(chapter 6) and to thermal home insulation (in the form of double glazing and cavity
wall insulation) in the Netherlands (chapter 7). The threshold diffusion model proves to
be a good model for explaining the uptake of biological waste-water treatment plants by
industrial dischargers in the F&B industry between 1975 and 1992. Although it cannot
explain with much precision in what year a firm will invest in waste-water purification,
it can explain the trend. The analysis furthermore reveals that the effluent charge was a
significant factor in the employment of biological waste-water treatment plants. If the
effluent tax rate had remained at the (low) 1974 level, only a small proportion of the
indirect dischargers in the F&B industry would have invested in biological waste-water
treatment. " ••:-'"-*:•«•*-'•«•-'• ^ ' •-••'«.y«s-!.v*K*v .;-••:• •>- . :^ ^ n . ^ - j x * ; - ' ' - , . j v ?-m*.i«-'.*-"
The threshold model is also applied to the diffusion of double glazing and cavity
wall insulation in owner-occupied and rented houses built before 1976. As it turned out,
it was impossible to explain the increase in the proportion of owner-occupied and rented
houses with thermal insulation during the 1978-92 period by using a rational choice
model in which the decision to invest in energy efficiency home improvements is under-
stood as an economic cost-benefit decision under uncertainty. The estimation results of
epidemic models (the logistic, Gompertz and Bass models) were much better. There is
evidence that the price of natural gas influenced households' decisions concering thermal
insulation, but the evidence is not conclusive. We also analyzed the effectiveness of
government investment subsidy programmes for thermal insulation. The model results
show that the subsidy programmes for thermal insulation of more than 2 billion guilders
had only a limited impact on households' insulation decisions. What they did, for the
most part, was to provide recipients of the subsidies with a 'windfall gain'. Another
conclusion from the analysis is that in the Netherlands the non-ownership of houses by
occupants was not an important barrier to the uptake of double glazing and cavity wall
insulation: the proportion of rented houses with thermal insulation in 1992 was almost
as high as that of owner-occupied houses. (Owner-occupants, however, were quicker in
having their home insulated.) The reason why a lot of rented houses in the Netherlands
are thermally insulated is probably due to the unique situation that 75 per cent of them
are owned by non-profit housing councils ("woningbouwverenigingen" and local coun-
cils). These housing councils were very active in persuading tenants to thermally insulate
their homes. This is an example of an institutional factor that facilitates change. The
effects of public information about thermal insulation on adoption decisions could not be
determined from our analysis.
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Adoption decisions of firms and households are also analyzed in three case studies:
CFC substitutes, low-solvent paints and coatings, and membrane technology in the
metal-plating industry. In each case, government policy played an important role. With-
out the future ban of CFCs, users would not have switched to substitutes — not even
when they were more cost efficient. (The search for CFC-free cleansing agents revealed
that firms in the computer industry had been using products that were overly expensive;
the firms discovered, much to their own surprise, that water-and-soap was a more cost-
efficient way of cleaning electronic parts than CFC-based cleansing agents). Government
policy was not the only factor, however. The decision to adopt an environmentally
preferable technology also depends on the price and performance characteristics of the
new technology as compared to those of existing technologies, perceptions of the new
technology and resistance towards change (which depends in part on uncertainty). It is
important that environmental policies take these factors into account, in order to avoid
cost inefficiencies, obstruction from industry and disappointments. The case studies
furthermore show that market demand is the crucial factor for the exploitation of tech-
nological opportunities for environmental protection. For almost any environmental
problem, technological opportunities to deal with the problem are available, and un-
favourable appropriability conditions (like the easiness of imitation) do not seem to keep
firms from exploiting these opportunities. The case studies furthermore show that
technological capabilities to develop compliance innovations are often located outside the
polluting industry and that policy makers should be careful not to select the 'wrong'
technology. In the Netherlands, government policy favoured the use of ONO waste-
water treatment technologies, a typical end-of-pipe technology with limited environmen-
tal gains. The case study of low-solvent paints and coatings demonstrates that com-
pliance technologies need not necessary add to the costs of the firms using them. Water-
based paints and powder coatings are increasingly used for normal business reasons of
lower costs and higher quality. This example shows that technological innovation indeed
can overcome a possible conflict between economic wealth and environmental quality.
13.3 Best Policy Instruments to Foster Innovation and Dif-
fusion
We now address the question, what is the best policy instrument to encourage tech-
nological innovation and diffusion. We will draw conclusions about which policy instru-
ments) may be used best to stimulate technological innovation and the diffusion of
environmentally beneficial technologies. The conclusions are based on our own findings
in chapters 6 -8 , the findings of other studies into the technological impact of environ-
mental policies (described in chapter 9), findings from the innovation models (chapters 2
and 3), and from the economic theory of environmental policy.
As regards the technological impact of environmental regulations, experiences are
mixed. Emission standards that are based on available end-of-pipe technologies provided
Co«c/usio«s 289
little incentive for the development of new, more effective technologies. This demon-
strates the danger of using standard-based policies and the importance of taking a long-
term view towards environmental protection. Technology-forcing standards that require
the development of new technologies are a better way of encouraging technological
innovation, as the regulatory experiences in the United States demonstrate. However,
they may impose high costs on industry — unless the regulator is willing to soften and
delay standards, but this would have a negative effect on the willingness of suppliers to
develop innovations. Technology-forcing standards should only be used when tech-
nological opportunities are available that can be developed at low enough costs. The
chance that these opportunities will be developed is greater when potential suppliers are
located outside the regulated industry. Outsiders are also more likely to develop radical
solutions to environmental problems.
Economic incentives like taxes and tradeable quota that rely on financial incentives
are an alternative to command-and-control policies. They are favoured by economists
and international organizations such as the OECD. The benefits of incentive-based
approaches to reducing pollutant emissions are many. First, effluent charges (emission
taxes) and tradeable quota are more efficient because every polluter is given the choice
between compliance and paying the polluter's bill. The polluting firm cannot be forced
to undertake emissions control of which the marginal costs are higher than the effluent
charge. This means that environmental benefits are achieved at the lowest abatement
costs.' Second, there is a financial incentive to diminish all pollution — not merely up to
the level of emissions standards. (The economic belief that incentive-based approaches
provide a greater inducement to innovate is based on this argument). Third, such a
system depends less on the availability of pollution control technology and, therefore, it
may be more easily introduced and adjusted. Fourth, the danger that polluting industries
fail to develop new technologies for strategic reasons is less great under an incentive-
based regime. And fifth, economic instruments tend to stimulate process-integrated
solutions (including recycling technology) rather than end-of-pipe technologies that have
been overwhelmingly applied in the past. A disadvantage of effluent charges is the
uncertainty about the polluters' responses. Another disadvantage is that the total en-
vironmental costs (abatement costs plus tax payments) may be high, which lowers their
political attractiveness, and may induce the regulator to set a low tax (as explained in
chapter 3). Since freely distributed tradeable pollution quota do not suffer from this they
may be better instruments to stimulate environmental innovation.
After having outlined the advantages of using economic instruments, we also want
to point out certain limitations to their use. First, in order to be effective, polluters must
be responsive to price signals, which is not always the case. For instance, in chapter 7 we
found that price considerations played a limited role in the diffusion of thermal home
insulation technologies in the Netherlands. This suggests that price incentives are prob-
' According to Hahn and Hester, the US. emission trading programme introduced in 1974
resulted in cost savings in emission control between 1 and 13 billion dollars. Almost all of these
savings were realized from internal trading (Hahn, op cif, pp.100-101).
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ably better suited to change the behaviour of firms than the purchasing decisions of
consumers. Second, the price incentive must be sufficiently high to induce firms to
develop and implement environmentally beneficial technologies. This was not the case in
most environmental policies in which economic instruments were used (an exception is
the effluent charge in the Netherlands). And third, if we are dealing with continental or
global environmental problems, taxes should be used unilaterally only if their introduc-
tion does not put national industries at a serious competitive disadvantage — that is, they
should be introduced in those sectors where the environmental costs are a small part of
total costs or in sectors sheltered from international competition.
Uncertainty about the demand for cleaner technologies, partly related to unpredic-
table government policy, may call for the use of R&D subsidies or loans. Subsidies for
investments in pollution control technology are less useful in our view. They clash with
the polluter-pays-principle and are expensive, and evaluation research in the Nether-
lands has proved them to be only minimally effective. There is a great risk that such
subsidies provide 'windfall gains' for the firms and consumers receiving them. They
should be used only when a switch to cleaner technology entails high costs and prod-
uces competitive disadvantages due to less strict regulation in other countries.
Communication instruments can be useful policy tools for addressing information
problems related to products and processes. Environmental care systems (required in the
Netherlands), demonstration projects and information campaigns can be useful to ensure
that firms make better use of the possibilities available for emission reduction, because
firms are often not familiar with available cost-reducing environmental measures. Infor-
mation disclosure requirements, such as those in the U.S., that force firms to com-
municate environment-related information, product information and 'green' labels are
also believed to be useful. They increase pressures on firms to improve the environmen-
tal record and make the market for green products more transparent. They are useful as
additional instruments, not as substitutes for environmental regulations or taxes.
This study suggests that no single instrument is optimal. All instruments have a role to
play in environmental policy. In general, the stimulation of cleaner technologies calls for
a mixture of instruments, depending on the specific factors and circumstances. In the
case of heterogeneous users, economic instruments are generally preferred to standards.
They are more economically efficient than standards, giving equivalent environmental
improvements at lower costs, which allows policy makers to achieve greater emissions
reductions. As we noted, there are certain limitations to their effective use. For example,
there is a danger that incentive-based instruments such as taxes and subsidies provide a
too weak and indirect stimulus. They may be more suited to stimulate technological
diffusion than innovation. Our analysis of the diffusion of biological waste-water treat-
ment technologies in chapter 6 illustrates that economic incentives like effluent charges
can be effective policy measures in stimulating firms to invest in environmental technol-
ogies.
In order to stimulate technological innovation, a more focused approach may be
needed. One way of doing this is by specifying strict environmental standards that
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require the development of new technologies. However, this should be done only in
situations where the environmental risks are large and acute and when there is consen-
sus about the most viable technological solution or trajectory. If there is no such consen-
sus there is a danger that technology-forcing standards lock industry into overly expen-
sive and environmentally suboptimal technical solutions (for example, the ONO tech-
nology in the metal-plating industry). When using direct regulation, policy makers
should give careful attention to the actual design of standards: their strictness, differen-
tiation, timing, administration and flexibility. The experiences in the U.S. with innovation
waivers and tradeable permits illustrate that the ways in which the instruments are
designed and implemented are important determinants of the technological responses of
industry. Another way of encouraging technological innovation is to build a network of
technology suppliers, users, and research institutes, as in the Danish Clean Technology
Development Programme. This programme not only provided firms with economic
incentives for developing and implementing clean technologies, but, more importantly,
provided them with informative incentives and necessary contacts for finding efficient
technological solutions to specific environmental problems.* Of course, such a policy is
not easy, it requires special competence on the part of policy makers. They must have
technological understanding of the production processes, the associated environmental
problems and possible solutions if they are to act as a matchmaker and identify the
relevant participants for the development projects.
It may be dear that there are no ready answers to the problems of environmental degra-
dation, each situation requires a tailored response. However, the main conclusion of this
study is that certain instruments — like technology-forcing standards, tradeable pollution
quota, and the creation of technology networks — offer a number of advantages over
traditional policies.
13.4 The Problem of Technological Regime Shifts
This thesis also examines the possibilities of redirecting complex technology systems.
One may wonder what this has to do with environmental policy. Our answer is that the
problem of environmental sustainability not only requires the development and adoption
of cleaner processes and products, but also changes in complex technology systems, like
the transport system and the electrical power system based on fossil fuels. This raises the
important question of how public policy may be used best to induce a technological
transition away from non-sustainable technology systems. In order to answer this ques-
tion, part II discusses evolution and change in complex technology systems. Since neo-
classical economics has little to say about this issue, we adopt a different approach: the
evolutionary or Neo-Schumpeterian approach to technology, which emphasizes the
' Georg rt a/., op CJY, 545-546.
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cumulative nature of technical change, and the role of institutions in the creation and
selection of technologies. We look at various concepts (like a technological regime and
paradigm) that are used to account for the ordering and structuring of technology. In
these approaches, engineering ideas of the relevant problems and ways of solving them
are considered responsible for the dominance of certain designs and technologies. We
provide a different explanation. We argue that the reason why some technologies and
designs are dominant depends not only on engineering beliefs and imagination but also
on the accumulated knowledge, cost efficiencies achieved in certain designs, the infra-
structure around a technology, and the embedment of technologies in the economic
system and people's way of life.
In chapter 11, we provide a discussion of technological regime shifts as opposed to
change within a technological regime. We explain how it is possible for a new tech-
nological regime to emerge and replace the old one — emphasizing the importance of
market niches, available knowledge that may be used, institutional support for new
technologies, and the role of expectations. We also look at the relationship between firm
behaviour and technological regime shifts. - j
Chapter 12 explores the policy issues of making a transition away from fossil fuels
that are implicated in many of today's environmental problems. It addresses the follow-
ing question: How can public policy be used to induce such a transition, and what are
its technological, economic implications? The answer of economists is simple: policy
makers should institute a carbon tax or other penalty on greenhouse gas emissions. This
study takes issue with this idea. We believed that a carbon tax that is politically feasible
will not be strong enough to lead us away from fossil fuels. The lock-in of society to
fossil fuel-based energy technologies suggests (at least to us) that what is needed are not
so much generic policies (like a carbon tax) that change the marginal costs of using fossil
fuels; rather, what are needed are well-defined energy technology policies aimed at the
development and wider diffusion of specific energy technologies, such as gasification-
based biomass power generation, fuel cells, photovoltaics, combined cycle power sys-
tems, COj removal, etc.
What does this imply for public policy? One of the things it implies are special
science and technology programmes for promising energy technologies with long-term
benefits. Policy makers should also engage in experimentation with new technologies to
learn more about their economic costs, technical feasibility and social acceptance. One
way of doing this is through the creation of niche markets through government procure-
ment, regulation, tax policies, subsidy schemes, etc. Other policies are the creation of
networks of technology suppliers, research organizations and users, and the coordination
of energy technology and environmental policies with other policies: agricultural poli-
cies, transport policies, land-use planning, and industrial policies. This does not mean
that carbon taxes or tradeable quota have no role to play in greenhouse policies; they do,
but only as elements of a more comprehensive energy technology policy aimed at
making a transition towards a more sustainable energy system. This is the conclusion of
part HI of the thesis, although perhaps we should say that this is more of a belief than a
conclusion. More research on this topic is needed.
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Nederlandse Samenvatting
Dit proefschrift analyseert de invloed van milieubeleid op de ontwikkeling en toepassing
van schone technologie. Met schone technologie wordt bedoeld technieken, grondstoffen
en produkten die minder belastend zijn voor het milieu. Voorbeelden van schone techno-
logie zijn: biofilters, rookgasontzwaveling en zonnecellen. Voor deze technieken geldt dat
overheidsbemoeienis vaak nodig is opdat ze worden toegepast door bedrijven en huis-
houdens. De overheid voert daartoe een milieubeleid gericht op duurzame ontwikkeling.
De invloed van verschillende milieu-instrumenten (emissienormen, heffingen, subsidies
e.d.) op de ontwikkeling en toepassing van schone technologie wordt geanalyseerd in
innovatie- en diffusiemodellen en in een aantal empirische studies. Daamaast schenkt
het proefschrift aandacht aan grootschalige technologieverandering en de wijze waarop
dit gestimuleerd kunnen worden.
Hoofdstuk 2 geeft een overzicht van de belangrijkste economische literatuur op
het gebied over milieubeleid en milieutechnologie. Naast een kritische bespreking van de
theoretische literatuur worden in hoofdstuk 3 en 5 een aantal nieuwe modellen gepre-
senteerd: een politieke economie-model van overheidsgedrag en innovatie in schone
technologie, en een diffusiemodel van schone technologie, gebaseerd op economisch
keuzegedrag. In het innovatiemodel is het milieubeleid niet exogeen maar afhankelijk
van de technische mogelijkheden en kosten van nieuwe technologie. De analyse laat zien
dat verhandelbare emissierechten en 'innovation waivers' betere instrumenten zijn om
milieutechnologie te stimuleren dan emissie-normen en vervuilingsbelastingen.
De relatie tussen milieubeleid en milieutechnologie is ook onderzocht in een
aantal empirische studies. Hoofdstuk 6 analyseert de invloed van de Nederlandse water-
verontreinigingsheffing op de diffusie (verandering in de mate van toepassing) van
biologische afvalwaterzuiveringsinrichtingen (awzi's) in de voedings- en genotmiddelen-
industrie. Uit het onderzoek komt naar voren dat de WVO-heffing een belangrijke factor
was bij het diffusieproces: zonder de heffing zouden maar weinig bedrijven zijn overge-
gaan tot biologische zuivering van nun afvalwater. Ook de diffusie van woningisolatie
(in de vorm van dubbel glas en spouwmuurisolatie) in huizen gebouwd v66r 1976 is
onderzocht (in hoofdstuk 7). Anders dan de diffusie van biologische awzi's kan de
toename in het aantal woningen met dubbel glas en met spouwmuurisolatie niet goed
verklaard worden d.m.v. een economisch keuzemodel. De diffusie van woningisolatie
lijkt veel meer te worden gestuurd door informatie-overdracht en sociale invloeden
("buurteffecten") dan door veranderingen in de gasprijs en de kosten van na-isolatie.
Verder blijkt dat de subsidieprogramma's voor na-isolatie een geringe invloed hadden
op de isolatiebeslissingen van burgers. Dit suggereert dat de subsidies voor na-isolatie
ter grootte van 2 miljard gulden in belangrijke mate een 'windfall gain' vormden voor de
ontvangers.
Hoofdstuk 8 bevat de resultaten van drie case-studies van schone technologie:
CFK-vervangers, oplosmiddel-arme verven en lakken, en membraantechnologie voor de
galvanische industrie. Uit de case-studies komt naar voren dat de technologische moge-
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lijkheden voor milieutechnologie zich vaak buiten de vervuilende sector bevinden en dat
marktvraag een cruciale variabele is voor de ontwikkeling van deze mogelijkheden. De
analyse leert ons bovendien dat overheidsbeleid niet de enige factor is die van invloed is
op de beslissing van bedrijven om over te gaan op schone technologie. De beslissing om
te investeren in een bepaalde milieutechnologie hangt af van de technische karakteristie-
ken van de techniek, de kosten voor de gebruiker, het beeld dat potentiele gebruikers
hebben van de technologie en de weerstand tegen verandering.
Ook besteedt het proefschrift aandacht aan grootschalige technologie-verandering.
Grote technologische systemen (zoals het transportsysteem van voertuigen met een
verbrandingsmotor) worden gekenmerkt door een grote mate van complexiteit en pad-
afhankelijkheid. Ingegaan wordt op de factoren die verantwoordelijk zijn voor de stabili-
teit van technologische regimes (hoofdstuk 10) en de determinanten van radicale veran-
dering in technologie (hoofdsruk 11). Hoofdsruk 12 onderzoekt de beleidsimplicaties van
een duurzamer energie-systeem. Er worden drie mogelijke energie technologie-scenario's
besproken en er wordt aangegeven hoe een overgang naar een duurzamer energie-
systeem gestimuleerd kan worden. Hierbij wordt een belangrijke rol toebedacht aan
speciale technologie stimuleringsprogramma's en het creeren, via beleid, van niches voor
nieuwe energietechnieken met lange-termijn-voordelen.
De conci'usie van dif proerschrift is dat geen enkef mifieu-insrrument optimaal is
voor de stimulering van schone technologie. Het kiezen van milieu-instrument dient
gebaseerd te worden op de technologische mogelijkheden, de economische karakteristie-
ken van gebruikers en de urgentie van milieuproblemen. De uitkomst van het proef-
schrift is evenwel dat technologieforcerende normen, verhandelbare vervuilingsrechten,
en het opzetten van technologienetwerken doorgaans goede instrumenten zijn voor de
stimulering van innovatie in schone technologie, en dat economische instrumenten
(vervuilingsbelastingen en verhandelbare emissierechten) onder bepaalde voorwaarden
goede instrumenten zijn voor de stimulering van de technologische diffusie. Van investe-
ringssubsidies en zelfregulering zonder sancties wordt weinig verwacht.
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